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ABSTRACT 
Cumberland and Westmorland differed significantly from the rest of 
Mediaeval England. They were subjected to the English crown later 
than the rest of England and as a result the lordships of the region 
retained extensive powers comparable to those exercised on the March 
of Wales. Thus local lords played a larger role in government than 
elsewhere and they also enjoyed political dominance. Seigneurial 
officials bore the main burden of law enforcement. Cumbria evolved 
its own customs for law enforcement but crime remained a serious 
problem. 
In the early reign of Edward I the region enjoyed peace but since 
lordship there was of limited financial value, it was also largely 
neglected by its lords. In Cumberland, especially, absentee lord-
ship was common. In Westmorland the Clifford family, which had 
gained land there, attempted to establish local dominance. This 
resulted in disputes both with the borough of Appleby and the lords 
of Kendale. Robert de Clifford was able to complete his family's 
acquisition of land in the reign of Edward II but these gains were 
temporarily negated by the rebellion and forfeiture of his son Roger 
IV in 1322. 
The outbreak of war caused enormous material damage and rendered 
absentee lordship impossible. Edward II's failure to defend the 
border and minorities in leading local families left the region 
specially vulnerable. Scots raids resulted in the total disruption 
of local government and leadership was exercised by a series of 
military commanders the most notable of whom was Andrew de Harclay. 
These commanders enjoyed enormous opportunities for self-advancement, 
but they defended the Border badly. After Harclay's fall his place 
was taken by Anthony de Lucy and Ranulph de Dacre and with the 
resurgence of English power under Edward III they emerged with the 
Cliffords as the dominant local powers. The pattern for the region, 
thus, remained that set in the reign of Edward II. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Cumbria 1 was the region of mediaeval England where Celtic 
institutions enjoyed their longest currency and where they had their 
most important effect on the nature of local government and society 
in the middle ages. The vital local institutions were the lordships 
of the March for it was through these that the area was governed, 
administered, policed and managed. It is impossible to understand 
the importance and the strength of the lordships without consideration 
of the history of the region from an early date. Though this forms 
only a preliminary to the study of the lords and lordships of the West 
March during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it is an 
indispensable prelude. It is only by understanding the nearness of 
the Celtic period in Cumbria that one can appreciate the strength, 
persistence and importance of such Celtic survivals as carnage 
payments, the role of the serjeants of the peace in local policing and 
most important the profound influence the Celtic past had on the 
2 
nature and powers of the lordships of the region 
Secondly a survey of the history of Cumbria illustrates another fact 
of prime importance. The English crown was~in~~to exert full control 
over the area before the twelfth century and as a result the lords of 
Cumbria were able to develop the extensive powers which were one of the 
hall-marks of marcher lordship. 
1 Cumbria is used here to mean exclusively the English counties of 
Cumberland and Westmorland, the occasionally co~incident Kingdom 
of Strathclyde will be called only by that term. 
2 G W S Barrow 'The Pattern of Lordship and Feudal Settlement in 
Cumbria'. Journal of Mediaeval History, v8, 1965 
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Numerous scholars have attempted such a survey, but, despite this there 
are few secure foundations on which to base such an account. The 
starting point, however, must be the native British, the Cymry, from 
whom the region has taken its name. During the eighth and early 
ninth centuries, Northumbrian expansion into Southern Dumfries and 
Galloway created a cordon which excluded the kings of Strathclyde from 
their former influence in Cumbria. The establishment of this cordon 
facilitated further Northumbrian expansion into Cumbria and this 
expansion probably continued even after the death of the Northumbrian 
3 King Ecgfrith at Dunnichen in 685 since monumental evidence in 
the region suggests that Carlisle and the low lying land around in the 
region remained strongly influenced by Northumbrian culture for almost 
two hundred years after Dunnichen4 . 
The period of Scandinavian dominance in Britain inaugurated by the sack 
of Lindisfarne in 792 saw fu.rther important developments in the 
history of Cumbria. Initially Cumbria was little affected by the Norse 
invasions, though one important result was a further weakening of the 
kingdom of Strathclyde as Kenneth MacAlpin having subdued the Picts was 
able to establish a recognisably Scottish Kingdom based principally in 
5 Lothian 
3 D Kirby - Strathclyde and Cumbria 'Trans of C&W II', v62 (1962) 
82 
4 A Armstrong, A Mawer, F M Stenton and B Dickens - The Place Names 
of Cumberland. (English Place Name Society 1950-52, v22) xxii 
5 W C Dickinson - Scotland from the Earliest Times to 1603 (Oxford 
1977) 1 27 
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More direct Norse influence in Cumbria occurred in the ninth century. 
In the fourth decade of it, the Northumbrian king Raedwulf was killed 
in battle by the Vikings 6 and extensive Norse settlement in 
Northumbria effectively crippled the Northumbrian monarchy during the 
remaining part of the century. These attacks on eastern Northumbria 
probably ended Anglian settlement west of the Pennines which had 
developed earlier in the century. There was, however, extensive Norse 
settlement in Cumbria beginning late in the ninth century and continuing 
into the tenth. Most of this Norse settlement was from the Viking 
settlements in Ireland but it did not wholly displace the existing 
Celtic population and Celtic elements were still present in the 
7 language and the resulting society was probably more the result of 
8 fusion than of conquest Norse colonisation in the region should not 
be underestimated, however, and the Hiberno-Norse settlers penetrated 
large areas of land between the Kent and the Derwent, as well as in the 
Cumbrian Mountains, where the prevalence of the word 'fell' still 
testifies to their influence. 
There is no compelling reason to believe that the Norse settlers in 
Cumbria were effectively subject to either of the existing Norse 
monarchies in York or in Dublin. It appears, rather, that the collapse 
of Northumbrian control over Dumfries allowed the reunification of 
Cumbria with Strathclyde which, in all probability, once again extended 
its boundary as far south as the Eamont. If the West Saxon monarchy 
was exerting a form of hegemony over the other kingdoms in England at 
this time, this can only have existed in the most tenuous form over 
Cumbria and Strathclyde. 
6 D P Kirby - The Making of Early England ( 1967) , 76 
7 Place names of Cumberland v3, xxiii; Duncan - Kingdom, 88-89 
8 F M Stenton- Anglo-Saxon England, (Oxford 1971), 331 
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The accession of Aethelstan to the West Saxon throne presaged important 
changes in this situation, however. With a substantial power-base in 
Mercia, Aethelstan was able to occupy York and he went on to exert his 
nominal hegemony over Cumbria in a much more direct way than had been 
done previously, In 927 he forced Owen, King of Strathclyde, to 
perform a sort of 'homage en marche' together with Ealdred of 
Bernicia and Constantine II of Alba/Scotland in a ceremony near 
Penrith. The power of the West Saxon monarchy was graphically shown in 
934 when an extensive campaign into Scotland was followed by the 
defeat of a coalition consisting of the Norse King of Dublin, Constantine 
II, and Owen of Strathclyde at Brunanburh in 937 9 . The heavy 
casualties suffered by the men of Strathclyde made it easier for the 
West Saxons to mount an attack on Cumbria 10 , and when they did, 
11 
resistance was on the whole ineffective In 945, Edmund, having 
first put down a revolt in Northumbria, mounted a campaign into Cumbria 
which he thereafter entrusted to Malcolm, King of Scots, to hold on the 
12 
condition that he be his helper 'by land and sea' 
13 It has been suggested that Edmund's grant to Malcolm represented an 
expansion of Scottish influence south of the Solway but this argument 
has attracted little support. It seems more probable that English 
14 Cumbria was abandoned by Strathclyde at this time 
9 ibid 332 
10 ibid 343 
11 Kirby - Making of Early England, 88; Duncan - Kingdom, 93 
12 D Whitelock, D C Douglas and S I Tucker - The Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle (1961), 72 
13 Kirby - 'Strathclyde and Cumbria', Trans of C&W II, v62, (1962) 89 
14 Duncan - Kingdom, 93 
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Scottish hegemony was, however, increasingly extended over Strathclyde 
which, it seems probable, formed a form of appanage for the eldest son 
of the King of Scots. These princes enjoyed no power over Cumbria and 
their importance was demonstrated further in 966 when Edgar .invested 
Oswulf of Northumbria with an estate which stretched from the Tees to 
15 
the Solway . The gains made by Oswulf of Northumbria, west of the 
Pennines, were balanced and in part compensated for by the extension of 
the powers of Scots control over Lothian but this process, in turn, 
further reduced the importance of the Kingdom of Strathclyde. Indeed 
its independence was effectively ended, as was demonstrated by the 
fact that Malcolm II of Scots was able to nominate as king Malcolm, 
son of Dubh 16 . In this context it is very difficult to believe that 
the Strathclyde monarchy was in any way capable of exerting its 
influence permanently over Cumbria but it is certain that its armies 
did make occasional raids there 17 . These raims, however, did nothing 
to weaken the control of the Earls of Northumbria over English Cumbria. 
The Danish attacks on Southern England in the last years of the tenth 
century provided the Scottish kings with an opportunity to atte1npt to 
extend their power over northern England more effectively. The kings 
of Scots were not, however, always equal to the opportunity. Firmly 
established on his throne in 1005, Balcolm II led his forces into 
Northumbria in the following year only to receive a crushing defeat at 
the hands of Uhtred of Bamburgh. So far from gaining by his expedition 
Malcolm, in fact, paid for his ambition with the loss of much of Lothian 
to Uhtred. 
15 ibid 96, Stenton - Anglo-Saxon England, 362 
16 Kirby- 'Strathclyde and Cumbria', Trans of C&W II. v62, (1962) 70 
17 Duncan- Kingdom, 97 
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Malcolm had his revenge over Uhtred at the Battle of Carham in 10181 
a revenge the more thorough since Earl Uhtred paid for his defeat with 
18 his life at Cnut's Court • According to Symeon of Durham, Malcolm 
was supported at Carham by Owen the Bald of Strathclyde and it is 
19 possible that Owen was, in fact, killed in the battle . The history 
of the kingdom of Strathclyde, after the death of OWen, is obscure but 
it seems probable that it remained subject to the dominance of the 
kings of Scots. It is certain, for instance, that in 1034 Duncan, 
the successor of Malcolm II, was styled as the King of Strathclyde. 
Whether Strathclyde again extended into Cumbria at this time is a 
subject of some uncertainty. There is place-name evidence which 
suggests colonisation from Strathclyde but this is equivocal. 
Internal colonisation, as well as renewed settlement from north of the 
Solway, may have been the cause of Celtic element place-names which 
appeared at this time and there is no other evidence that the border 
of Strathclyde lay at Stainmoor for any significant length of time. 
The evidence of colonisation from Strathclyde does have one plausible 
explanation however, it seems probable that one of Malcolm II's 
grandsons, Maldred, obtained Cumbria, south of the Solway, on his 
marriage to a lady of the Northumbrian house, while Duncan remained in 
possession of Strathclyde. 
18 A A M Duncan - 'The Battle of Carham 1018', Scottish Historical 
Review, v55, (1976) 27; B Meehan- 'The Siege of Durham, the 
Battle of Carham and the Cession of Lothian', ibid 
19 T Arnold - Symeon Monachis Opera Omnia, (Rolls Series 1882-85) v2, 
156. A 0 Anderson - Early Sources of Scottish History, (Edinburgh 
1922), vl, 550 
20 Duncan - Kingdom, 98 
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If this interpretation is correct then Symeon of Durham's enigmatic 
entry that 'Eadulf .. Brittones satis atrociter devastatit' may well 
refer to a campaign to enforce Eadulf's plans for the region, made 
21 
sometime between 1039 AD and his death in 1041 
A thesis which support renewed English, or at least Northumbrian, 
influence in Cumbria during this period is wholly consistent with much 
that is known about what is arguably the earliest text with which a 
local study of Cumbria had to deal: the 'Gospatric Writ' 22 This 
document, however, raises as many questions as it answers and it has 
been well said that if any convincing motive could be suggested for its 
forgery the writ would be very poor evidence indeed for eleventh 
C b . 23 century urn r1a . In default of any such motive, however, the writ 
must be accepted for what it purports to be, a fourteenth century copy, 
albeit an imperfect one, of an eleventh century private writ granting 
24 
exemption from geld Leaving aside the potentially very serious 
difficulties surrounding the provenance of it, the Gospatric Writ fits 
well into what is known of the history of Cumbria in the mid eleventh 
century. The peace proclaimed by the writ runs in the name of Siward, 
Earl of Northumbria, from 1041 to 1055 and this suggests a degree 
of Northumbrian influence in the region which seems highly credible. 
21 Symeon Monachis, v2, 199 
22 The writ itself is preserved at Carlisle among the Louther 
muniments but it has been printed frequently. F E Harmer Anglo-
Saxon Writs (Manchester 1952) provides the best edition. 
23 Place Names of Cumberland, v3, xxi 
24 Harmer - Anglo-Saxon Writs, 421 
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In greater detail, it seems wholly reasonable, as has been suggested in 
25 
the County History that Siward, having defeated MacBeth in 105~ 
followed up his victory with a campaign aimed at asserting his authority 
in Cumbria. 
The writ provides evidence that in at least two senses Cumbria stood 
somewhat apart from the rest of Northumbria and was imperfectly 
integrated into the loose organisation of the Earldom. Firstly it is 
clear that if at the time the writ was issued, Cumbria was no longer 
recognisably Celtic (that is British or Welsh) it had been so within 
living memory, for it referred to the lands that had been British. 
This is confirmed independently by Florence of Worcester who, 
describing Rufus' expedition to Carlisle in 1092, called the s.ite of 
h k • I l I ub ll • • • . • l I 26 t e lng s cast e Lug a la quae vacatur Brltannlcae Calr eu . 
Secondly, Gospatric claimed exemption from the geld. 27 As W E Kapelle 
has suggested this exemption is only comprehensible if Cumbria was 
included in England at the time of its issue. It seems probable too 
that the exemption granted by the writ reflects the inability to collect 
taxes as much as it is likely to record the munificence of a lord to his 
follower. 
Gospatric's Writ refers to the lands that were British and in practical 
terms it is probable that this was more accurate than to say that the 
region was either English or Scottish. It was a debatable land which 
both kingdoms aspired to control. 
25 ~, v2, 234 
26 B Thorpe - Florent Wigorniensis Monachis Chronicon ex Chronicis 
(1849), 20 
27 WE Kapelle- The No:r::man Conquest of the North, (1979), 43 
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At the root of this contest lay the important routes into English 
territory through the Tyne Gap and over Stainmoor and these increased 
the region's strategic value to both attacker and defender. The 
strategic importance of Cumbria can hardly have been lost on Malcolm 
II of Scots and it is hardly necessary to suggest that Malcolm felt 
aggrieved by Siward's conquest of Cumbria to explain why Malcolm was 
keen to gain control of the area and it is hard to see in what sense 
28 it could be called Malcolm's ancestral lands 
Malcolm's tactics were unsubtle and indeed it has been suggested that 
the purpose of many of his expeditions was booty and prestige rather 
than organised conquest. Malcolm was, however, possessed of a certain 
unscrupulous cunning as he displayed in 1061 when he took advantage 
of Earl Tostig's absence and possibly also of his own breach of trust 
to mount a campaign into Northern England. By such tactics it seems 
probable that by 1069 he had succeeded in extending his frontier to 
the Duddon 29 . There is room to doubt how effective was Malcolm's 
control over Cumbria before the Norman Conquest. There is no reason 
to believe, for example, that Malcolm's 'ancestral right' to Cumbria 
was recognised by the local nobility. Symeon of Durham regarded 
30 Malcolm's possession as simply a triumph of violence over law . 
Most probably Malcolm's conquest consisted chiefly of the exertion of 
a vague hegemony over local lords. 
28 ibid 90 
29 Palgrave - Documents, 70 
30 Symeon Monachis, v2, 191 
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The supremacy of Malcolm over Cumbria probably owed as much to the self 
interest of the local lords as to Malcolm's military strength and James 
Wilson's suggestion that Gospatric tried to maintain a degree of local 
independence, or at least room for manoeuvre, by playing off Scotland 
31 
against England, is on the whole a convincing one 
Malcolm had done little to increase his authority in Cumbria by the time 
of the Norman invasion of England and he made no good use of the 
disruption caused by the Conquest. Gospatric moreover showed himself 
just as willing to serve William as Malcolm and in 1067 he purchased 
the Earldom of Northumbria from William. He fell from grace however, 
the following year and was forced to seek refuge and possibly also 
32 
allegiance in Scotland The slaughter of Robert de Commines and his 
followers at Durham in 1069 and the appearance of a Danish fleet 
forced William to seek new allies in Northern England. Gospatric was 
again willing to align himself with the Conqueror, but was understand-
ably concerned about his own safety and submitted to William only by 
proxy. Entrusted with the Earldom of Northumbria once again, he had 
immediately to face the hostility of his former ally, Malcolm, who tried 
to use the disruption caused in the North during 1069 and 1070 to 
consolidate his earlier tenuous hold over Cumbria. Advancing South 
through Cumbria, which according to the Carlisle Chronicler, he 
33 
conquered in his own right, Malcolm turned east and wasted Cleveland 
As Professor Duncan has suggested, this campaign bears much of the 
appearance of a campaign planned to subdue a newly conquered province 
and it is significant that Malcolm was able to mount an attack into 
England over Stainmoor rather than down the east coast route. 
31 VCH, vl, 300 
32 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 149 
33 Palgrave - Documents, 70 
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Gospatric's outrage at Malcolm's conquest of his former lordship was 
expressed by a series of destructive raids mounted from Northumberland 
into Cumberland 34 . These raids, however, marked the extent of 
Gospatric's resistance to Malcolm and as the Scots retreated northwards 
through Northumberland the Earl was forced to take refuge in Edinburgh. 
His attempted counter-attacks, so far from limiting Malcolm's 
depradations in fact, merely enraged him, inciting him to commit 
atrocities against the population of Northumbria, though in the eyes of 
Symeon of Durham Malcolm needed little encouragement to begin an orgy 
of racial bloodletting. 
Though William was said to have been much enraged by the destruction 
Malcolm caused in Northern England there was little danger of Malcolm 
being able to assert his lordship over the region permanently, 
particularly since the barbarities which were an integral part of his 
campaigns achieved nothing but to convince local men that the Scots 
35 
king was a blood thir~::J savage Malcolm's marriage to Margaret may 
have borne the appearance of the beginning of a more subtle and 
potentially more successful policy and it was almost certainly as an 
expression of distaste for this marriage that William brought a strong 
36 force, with naval support, into eastern Scotland in 1072 . 
Other aspects of this campaign have been interpreted in a variety of 
ways however. Most recently W E Kapelle has argued that William's 
position when Malcolm submitted to him at Abernethy in Perthshire was 
37 
much weaker than it seemed 
34 Symeon Monachis, v1, 191 
35 ibid 195 
36 Duncan- Kingdom, 119 
37 Kapelle - Norman Conquest, 126 
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Apparantly unconscious of the strength of his position, Malcolm 
38 
submitted to William and became 'his man' Equally, there is no 
evidence that Malcolm dared to use the control of the heads of the 
valleys and dales, he is suggested to have held, to harry William as 
he withdrew and it may well be that Malcolm had no real taste for a 
confrontation with William's main force. 
The testimony of the Anglo-Saxon chronicle that Malcolm became 
William's vassal can be accepted as reliable but the text provides no 
support for this belief expressed by some historians that Malcolm 
received Cumbria to hold of William in return for his homage. In fact 
the argument that Malcolm did receive Cumbria from William does not 
rest on good chronicle evidence but on a complicated attempt to 
demonstrate Scottish influence in Cumbria between 1072 and 1092. 
This rests essentially on two legs. The first of these is the 
identification of the Dolfin who was expelled by Rufus in 1092 as the 
39 
son of Gospatric, sometime Earl of Northumbria W E Kapelle has 
recently cast doubt on this identification but even if it is accepted 
there is no reason to believe that either Dolfin or his putative father, 
Gospatric, held Carlisle of Malcolm rather than of William. 
The second part of the argument in favour of Scottish control or 
jurisdiction over Cumbria is more complicated and allusive. It depends 
to some extent on the favourable interpretation of Malcolm's position 
at Abernethy in 1072, If, as Kapelle has argued, Malcolm was in 
fact in a strong position at Abernethy then it is possible that he may 
have gained nominal control of Cumbria from William. Professor Duncan 
40 has drawn attention to the absence of any evidence to support this 
38 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 155 
39 Kapelle - Norman Conquest, 151 
40 Duncan - Kingdom, 120 
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There. is indeed abundant, though admittedly circumstantial evidence to 
suggest that Malcolm in fact lost control of Cumbria in the years after 
1072. The first of these pieces of evidence is the apparent absence 
of Cumbrians from Malcolm's army in 1079, t~hough .it ought perhaps to 
be noted that the presence of Cumbrians, or more probably Galwegians, 
in Malcolm's armies in 1061 and 1070 has escaped the notice of 
every writer on the subject before Kapelle, and seems to rest solely on 
the fact that Lindisfarne and other churches were sacked in 10701 
unchivalrous acts wholly alien to the spirit of Malcolm's armies, which 
were, we must presume, exemplary bodies of devout and disciplined 
christians. A second objection to the argument that Malcolm exercised 
control over Cumbria in the period 1072 to 1092 is provided by 
the fact that not once during these years did Malcolm try to invade 
England over Stainmoor rather than through Northumberland, particularly 
since after repeated raids in the North East can have offered strictly 
limited stores of booty. 
There is, however, a much more sophisticated argument which has been 
advanced in favour of Scottish Cumbria and it has been argued that 
Scottish influence persisted in the Eastern Highlands of Cumbria until 
as late as the mid eleventh or even twelfth century. This thesis has 
received new support in Kapelle's work but it rests originally on the 
work of James Wilson and G W S Barrow who both put forward the case 
for Scottish influence in Tynedale and Gilsland. The arguments, 
however, are not inter-related and they can be discussed seperately. 
The case that Tynedale was effectively Scottish in the twelfth century 
is based in part on the stipulation made by one Dolfin, son of Uhtred, 
a noble of uncertain ancestry, in becoming the liege man of the Prior of 
Durham that he did so saving his allegiance to the king of Scots and the 
41 king of England . 
41 Feodarium Prioratus Dunelmensis, (Surtees Society, v58, 1871) 56 
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While it is possible that this Dolfin was descended from one Waltheof 
of Tynedale, this is not in any way proven, as Professor Barrow had 
42 
made clear · , and it is no more certain that the kings of Scots held 
any form of hereditary rights in Tynedale before 1157. The evidence 
relating to Gilsland is more abundant and complicated, but it is also 
convenient to consider it in two parts. The first piece of evidence 
which must be dealt with is the charter of Henry II dated 1158, 
granting to Hubert de Vaux all the lands which Gille, son of Boet, held 
43 
on the day he died James Wilson asserted that de Vaux suffered 
difficulty in keeping possession of Gilsland on the grounds that his 
charter had repeatedly to be confirmed in 1165-66 and on Richard I's 
44 
accession This argument, however, can not be accepted without 
question, though it has also been bolstered to some extent from the 
document known as the Inquisition of Earl David. This was an 
inquisition made at the behest of Earl David into the extent of the 
lands belonging to the see of Glasgow. The jurors returned that the 
Bishop of Glasgow held no jurisdiction over any land that is today in 
England. Attention, however, has been drawn to the fact that among the 
45 jurors was one Fille, son of Boet As A C Lawrie pointed out there 
is no certainty that Gille, son of Boet, was the erstwhile lord of 
Gilsland, though he may well have been. Even if it is certain it were 
he, there is no reason to believe that either he, or the other 
'Cumbrenses' named in the inquest considered themselves to be exclusively 
Scottish. 
42 G W S Barrow- Regesta Regum Scottorum, v1, (Edinburgh 1960), 111 
43 VCH, v2 
44 ibid, v1, 305, 306 and note 
45 A C Lawrie- Early Scottish Charters, (Glasgow 1905), 50 and pp 
209, 304 
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Even more significant surely is the fact that the allegedly Scottish 
lands of Gilsland and Bewcastle were outside of the diocese of Glasgow; 
it might be more natural to have expected ecclesiastical boundaries to 
follow secular ones rather than to contradict them. In any case the 
belief that Gille, son of Beet, and his family resisted the Norman 
incursion into their lands is based on very inadequate evidence as 
J W'l d l 46 d . . . h . . ames 1 son rna e c ear , an lS cons1stent Wlt an 1nterpretat1on 
which will be discussed presently. 
In the absence of any convincing evidence for Scottish control of 
Cumbria after 1072 or just as implausibly after 1091, the region 
must be assumed to have been under the overall sovereignty of the 
~ai·>~ crown. However, the exercise of this power was almost wholly 
absent and the only real benificiaries of the confusion were the native 
lords of Cumbria of whom Delfin of Carlisle may only have been the most 
prominent. It seems, in fact probable, that from 1072 Cumbria was 
in effect independent of either kingdom. The region was not seen as in 
any way out of bounds to the Norman settlers, however. By 1086 land 
in the extreme south of the March, including Millom and Ulverston, had 
47 been surveyed and was probably under some form of rule by the Normans 
Such creeping annexation seems likely to have been resisted by the local 
nobles but any actions against them were conducted without the assistance 
of a royal campaign during the lifetime of William I. 
Without lands across the Channel to absorb his energies, Rufus was in a 
position to take a much more active interest in the north than his father 
had done. In a campaign in 1092 he made decisive changes to the north-
west. 
46 VCH, v1, 306 
47 Domesday Book (Record Commission), vl, 301 
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He drove out Dolfin from Carlisle and founded what must have been in 
effect a bastide which Florence of Worcester rather grandly described 
as a city built on a site that had stood empty for two hundred years. 
To support his military colony Rufus brought settlers 'with their 
wives and flocks' to the area. It seems likely that although initially 
these settlers were recruited from southern England many of them were 
of continental origin since place names in the district of Carlisle, 
48 dating from this time, reflect strong continental influences 
There is no doubt that Rufus' campaign represented an important 
extension of English influence in Cumbria. The Anglo-Saxon chronicle, 
which is the prime source for the period, contains nothing to support 
the contention that the gain was made at the expense of the king of 
Scots. W E Kapelle has argued that Malcolm attacked England in 1093 in 
protest at Rufus' conquest of Cumbria, which in his interpretation was 
Malcolm's territory before 1092, but there are difficulties in this 
analysis. Firstly, as has been discussed already, there is no evidence 
to link Dolfin with Malcolm. Secondly in 1093 Malcolm was advancing 
down the east coast when he met his death at Alnwick, which makes it 
hard to believe that the aim of the campaign was the reconquest of 
Cumbria. Recently A AM Duncan, who formerly inclined to the opinion 
that Malcolm's motive was connected to Cumbria, has proposed an 
alternative motive for Malcolm's attack in 1093, namely the loss of an 
annual rent and a group of manors in the south of England and this seems 
on balance to be the more reliable explanation of Malcolm's invasion, 
if indeed Malcolm needed any special reason to mount one of those 
49 
'bloodthirsty shopping trips' to which he was addicted 
48 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 169 
49 Duncan - Kingdom, 120; Kapelle - Norman Conquest, 150-154 
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There is very little contemporary evidence for the establishment of 
the first recognisably Norman lordships in Cumbria. Without doubt 
Rufus established one of his men as a commander and marcher lord in 
Carlisle in 1092 but we are ignorant of his identity and of the 
terms of his commission. The area of his rule, however, was probably 
limited effectively to the region around Carlisle, a division which 
probably prefigured the Cumberland Ward of the later county of the 
same name. A later, and notably unreliable, local tradition maintained 
that when William I established Ranulf Meschines as Earl of Carlisle, 
Ranulf in turn granted the lordship of Allerdale to Waltheof in return 
50 for his allegiance There are, it is clear, glaring inaccuracies 
in this tradition, and it is flatly contradicted by the evidence of 
the Testa de Nevill 51 . Despite this, it may very well be that 
Waltheof was granted possession of Allerdale, or very possibly 
confirmed in his tenure of it, by William Rufus and it is at any rate 
52 
certain that Waltheof later held Allerdale . If it were Rufus who 
recognised Waltheof's claim to Allerdale it is clear that his policy 
and his ability to carry out that policy in the region were strictly 
circumscribed. 
Henry I continued his brother's policy in the North of England but he 
pursued that policy with greater thoroughness. It was undoubtedly 
Henry who installed Ranulf Meschines in the lordship of Cumberland, 
probably shortly after 1106 and certainly before the foundation of 
Wetheral Priory in 1112. Henry also granted Ranulf's brother 
50 Bain II, 64 
51 Book of Fees,· (Public Record Office 1920), 3 vols, v1, 177 
52 VCH, v2, 241 and note 
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53 William de Meschines the lordship of Copeland , though it is 
possible that Waltheof's existing possession simply received the 
confirmation of Henry and that his independence was curbed. Ranulf 
Meschines established further baronies in the north of the region. 
The peninsular to the east of Allerdale, between the Eden and the 
Wampool, was formed into the barony of Burgh-by Sands which was 
entrusted to Ranulf de Trivers. Another large barony was created in 
the Esk Valley and in part of Liddesdale, this was granted to Turgis 
54 Brundos As discussed above there has been considerable debate as 
to whether Norman rule extended into the high ground in the east of 
Cumberland. The most recent account by W E Kapelle has asserted that 
it did not and has given full credence to the tale first related by 
Camden that William de Meschines, having been unable to keep control 
of Gilsland in the face of determined opposition from Gille, was 
compensated by a grant of Copeland. Though Wilson showed this belief 
to run at odds with the evidence of the Book of Fees it has been 
accepted by some later works most notably I J Sanders' English 
55 Baronies It is on this authority that Kapelle has made out his 
case and Gille, son of Boet, has been alleged to have opposed a grant 
which may very well never have taken place. In fact the example of 
Waltheof suggests that Henry had no intention of dispossessing the 
former land holders unless they actively opposed him and it seems 
highly probably that Gille and his successors simply continued to hold 
their land under Norman rule. 
Ranulf Meschines elevation to the Earldom of Chester, after the loss of 
the White Ship left a gap on the West March. Henry I filled this vacuum 
53 ibid, v1, 305 
54 ~' v2, 177-178 
55 I J Sanders -ENglish Baronies (Oxford 1960), 127 
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himself and took Meschines' land into his own hands. Having inspected 
the castle of Carlisle personally in 1122, he provided for improve-
ments to be made to the fortifications 56 . He took a more important 
step to provide for the government of Cumbria in 1133 by the 
establishment of the bishopric of Carlisle. Though the bishopric was 
endowed with the two baronies of Dalston and Linstock, it remained one 
of the poorest dioceses in England and the bishops' incomes were 
57 probably less than £100 per annum 
If it is evident that while Henry I was in power, David I of Scots was 
willing to accept English control of Cumbria 58 , there is little doubt 
that he was keen to expand his influence in Cumbria as soon as the 
opportunity should arise. Just as certainly David recognised that 
opportunity on the death of Henry I and by Christmas in 1135 he was 
in possession of Wark on Tweed, Newcastle, Alnwick, Norham and 
Carlisle 59 . Though Stephen brought a substantial force to meet him 
at Durham early in the next year, David was to be the beneficiary of 
the meeting. The English king ceded to Henry, David's son, lands in 
Huntingdon and more importantly Carlisle, promising in addition to 
consider Henry's claim to the Earldom of Northumbria 60 . It seems 
probable that Henry was able to exert his authority only over the North 
of Cumberland, the region Richard of Hexham described as Carlisle and 
that despite William FitzDuncan's claim to Copeland by inheritance from 
William de Meschines, William de Lancaster gained control over the 
56 VCH, v2, 241 and note 2 
57 F Barlow - The English Church 1066-1154 (1979), 117 
58 Early Scottish Charters, 54 
59 R Howlett - Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and 
Richard I, 4 vols (Rolls Series 1884-1890), v3, 145 
60 ibid 146 
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61 David's campaign of 1138 provided an opportunity to mount area 
a counter-attack and in the early summer of that year William FitzDuncan 
led a force, including a large contingent of Galwegians through 
Copeland into Furness then on to Skipton in Craven which he also 
62 
claimed, before defeating an English force at Clitheroe 
David's own campaign of 1138 was less successful than that of 
FitzDuncan and led to a heavy defeat at the Battle of the Standard 
though it is noteworthy that David was able to recruit men from 
Cumbria to his army and it was to Carlisle that the remnants of 
David's army retreated. Carlisle, moreover, remained the main base 
for David's attempts to dominate the North of England and in this 
David was la~~ successful. By 1139 he had gained control of 
Northumberland as far south as the Tees though without the castles of 
Bamburgh and Newcastle. David's adventures in southern England after 
Stephen's capture at Lincoln did little to advance his cause and in 
fact cost him the Honour of Huntingdon. Even in the North David 
proved to be unable to gain recognition for his possession of 
Northumberland and Cumberland though he did at length gain rights to 
the two Castles. Even held of the English crown, these were 
substantial gains and David's status as one of the dominant powers in 
Britain at this time was symbolised by Henry of Anjou's reception of 
knighthood from him in 1149 at Carlisle, at which time Henry 
promised to allow Henry of Scots to hold Northumberland on his planned 
accession to the English throne. David's tenure of Cumberland was 
further strengthened by Ranulf Meschines renunciation of his claim to 
the county by virtue of his grant from Henry I in return for Henry's 
61 W Hulton - Furness Coucher Book (Chetham Society 1847-49), 24 
62 Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, v3, 156 
63 
own cession of the Earldom of Lancaster 
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Scottish power in northern England arguably reached its greatest 
height in the last years of Stephen's reign when David was able to 
install William FitzDuncan forcibly in Skipton and in the following 
year to establish his grandson as Earl of Northumberland. This 
extensive power, however, depended on two things, the ability of 
David and the corresponding weakness of Stephen. Despite the 
support of Eustace FitzJohn at the Battle of the Standard Northumberland 
at any rate, displayed no positive enthusiasm for Scottish rule and 
its allegiance to the young Earl had to be assured by the taking of 
hostages. 
The death of David I and the establishment of Henry II's rule in 
England presaged ill for the Scottish tenure of northern England. 
Henry was determined to restore direct English rule to the Solway -
Tweed boundary and by 1157 he was in a strong enough position not 
only to insist on the return of Cumberland, Northumberland and 
1 d b . . . h . 64 Westmor an ut to ga1n 1t w1t out res1stance . In return for this 
resignation, Malcolm IV was granted the distant Earldom of Huntingdon 
while William de Warenne, erstwhile Earl of Northumberland, gained 
only a small estate in Tynedale. Henry II's charter to Hubert de Vaux 
has already been noticed briefly, and it seems likely that the family 
of Gille, son of Boet, having held their land throughout the reign of 
Stephen were among the relatively few who resisted Henry's reconquest 
and were in consequence dispossessed. It was in any case prudent for 
Henry to establish a subordinate in the border barony and this act 
63 VCH, vl, 243 
64 Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, vl, 105, 106 
fitted in well with_ H.enry' s attempts_ to secure the border, notably 
the res.toration of the castles. of wark. and Norham~ Henry's 
precautions were put to the tes.t during the young King's rebellion 
when despite the alliance between young Henry and W.illiam the Lion 
they proved succes.sful. After ini.tial successes in 1174 W.illiam' s. 
conquests. were limited hy his. failure to capture Carlisle which. was 
well defended by Robert de Vaux and the war ended in hlliniliation for 
the Scots King. By the treaty of 1174 he was forced, not only to do 
homage to Henry, but also to his s.on and to surrender five strategic 
65 
castles. south of the Forth. • William's earlier claim to the norther 
counties. of England Wd..j wholly over-ridden and he also lost his estates 
in Huntingdon and Tynedale~ 
On Richard I's access.ion he relaxed the yoke of servitude and dominion 
66 from the Scots king hut William's. li.ege homage was retained The 
Scottish lands in Tynedale and Huntingdon were returned but Richard was 
not prepared to cons.ider William's. clim to the Earldom of Northumbria, a 
claim which als.o may have included Cumberland and allowed the Bishop of 
Durham to purchase the title 67 • William's des.ire to gain control of 
the Northern counties was restated at Richard's re-coronation in 1194 
without succes& but without apparently damaging relations between Richard 
d 'll' 68 an W1. 1..am ~ An elaborate s.cheme running in the face of the cus.tom 
governing the Scots success.ion by which_ William's heir, Margaret, should 
marry Otto of Saxony with. the couple gaining Cumberland, Wes.tmorland and 
Northumberland as a dowry also came to no_thing, partly as a result of 
65 Stones, Relations, no 1 
66 ibid, no 2 
67 J C Holt- The Northerners., (Oxford 1961), 204 
68 R L Poole - Domesday Book. to Magna Carta, (Oxford 1961)_, 280 
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opposition in Scotland1on the birth. of a male heir to William in 
1198 69 
William may well have heen disappointed by the succes,sion of John and 
it might have been to his advantage if Arthur of Brittany had 
succeeded to the English Throne. He w.as. probably still more 
distressed by John's refusal to consider his claim to poss.ession of 
northern England, Des.pite William's. initial caution it is clear that 
relations between himself and John were poor and that William 
recognised i.n John a greater determination to hold on to the northern 
counties th.an Richard had demons,trated. In th.e worsening climate of 
relations between John and William renew.ed claims. for the northern 
counties fell on unsympathetic ears, though John was prepared to 
70 
allow William to retain lands in Tynedale . This did not lead to 
any settlement of the larger issues. at stake, however- Indeed 
relations deteriorated further and were only partially resolved by a 
meeting between th.e two kings. at Norham in 1209. Undoubtedly a treaty 
was. made between John and William at Norham but this document was lost 
and it is only pssihle to reconstruct it indirectly. It is certain 
though that the agreement was to John's advantage rather than Williams. 
William was forced to pay John £10,000 to have his goodwill as well as 
entrusting his daughters. to John for marriage. If William had any 
hopes that he migh.t gain the Northern counties by means of a hypo-
thetical marriage for his heir, no mention of this was made in the 
7l treaty 
69 ibid 281; Duncan - Kingdom, 240 
70 T D Hardy - Rotuli Litteratum r;lausarum 1204-1227 (Record 
Commission 1833), 43 
71 Stones - Relations, xiv 
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A further provision of the settlement concerned the marriage of 
William's son Alexander and while the Scots King may have hoped that 
he was promised a royal marriage, in practice it was only undertaken 
that he should be married without disparagement 72 The details of 
the treaty however confirmed the effective sovereignty of John over 
much of Scotland and as in Henry II's reign English power was 
extended to curb a rebellion in Galloway. Scottish claims to English 
Cumbria were annulled. 
If there was any conclusion to be drawn from William's attempts to 
regain the northern counties it was surely that the resources of the 
Scottish monarchy were, in any normal circumstances, inadequate even 
to attempt the task. Shortly after his succession, however, Alexander 
II was presented with an unprecedented opportunity as a result of 
John's dispute with his baronage. Alexander's plan of campaign was 
one that would have been familiar both to his ancestors and his 
successors. In mid October 1215 he took his whole army across the 
Tweed to Norham and laid siege to the castle. Despite Alexander's 
admirable persistence, he laid siege for forty days, the castle did 
not fall. Even so the campaign achieved considerably more than the 
Melrose chronicler allowed, at least in theory. Three days after the 
start of the commencement of the siege Alexander took the homage of 
the Northumbrian rebels and received in turn seisin of the northern 
counties from the hand of the rebel leader Eustace de Vesci 73 and 
it is possible that the rebels in Cumberland made over Carlisle to 
Alexander. 
72 Duncan, Kingdom, 251 
73 Anderson- Early Sources of Scottish History,_ vl, 405 
C Thompson and C Innes - Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland 
(Record Commission 1814), 108 
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John was well informed of developments in the north and took rapid steps 
to curb them. In the last week of December 1215 he brought a 
powerful force of routiers into northern England forcing the rebels in 
Yorkshire to flee north where they joined forces with the Scots king, 
doing homage to him at Melrose on the 11th January. Alexander, however, 
was no more able to protect their lands than he was to protect his own. 
John's forces harried as far as Haddington then he marched south as fast 
as he had come. Probably during February Alexander's temporary gains 
74 in Cumberland were recaptured and entrusted to Robert de Vipont 
Alexander reacted immediately but this time his chief target was 
Carlisle. The assault on the castle, however, was unsuccessful and 
the Scots army was unable to penetrate beyond the Eden, possibly as a 
result of the difficulties of crossing the winter-swollen river. A 
more effective campaign was launched by the Scots in the summer of 1216 
and on the 8th August the city of Carlisle fell though the castle 
held out a few days longer. Alexander and his allies advanced into 
England despite the loss of Eustace de Vesci at Barnard Castle. By 
September, after an astonishing march, Alexander did homage to Louis of 
France at Dover for the lands in northern England, of which he had been 
enfeoffed by the rebels. ' Johns final offensive into the midlands may 
have prompted Alexander to start a retreat, but perhaps even more 
surprisingly than the earlier advance, this too was conducted without 
75 
major loss 
There can be no doubt that by the time of John's death Alexander had 
made considerable gains. He had gained cession of the three northern 
counties, even if he had still to establish effective control over them. 
74 Rot Litt Claus, v1, 247 
75 Anderson - Early Sources, v1 413 
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Nonetheless he was able to bring real influence to bear on Carlisle. 
During a vacancy in the see, Alexander had been able to bring his 
wishes to the attention of the cathedral chapter just as effectively as 
he might have done anywhere in Scotland itself 76 • Despite this there 
were increasing signs that the climate was changing against Alexander 
and that the regency goverrunent viewed his ambitions in the north of 
England with no more favour than John had done. The re-issue of the 
Magna Carta ominously avoided any mention of the rights of the King of 
Scots and after the defeat of the rebels at Lincoln the reckoning was 
brought closer. In September 1217 an order was issued to the 
Archbishop of York, the Bishop of Durham and lay northern magnates 
instructing them to be ready to assist in the recovery of Carlisle if 
Alexander refused to surrender it to Robert de Vipont 77 In December 
1217 I the Archbishop of York came north to Berwick where he released 
Alexander from excommunication but on his return south he made a detour 
78 by Carlisle where he received seisin of the city of Alexander's mandate . 
Alexander himself left Berwick for Northampton where, though he was 
greeted with honour, he was still constrained to do homage to the young 
Henry III for the lands he held in Huntingdon and Tynedale while the 
question of Alexander's claims to other lands in the north of England 
t d f th t f H 1 , 't 79 were pos pone or e erm o enry s mlnorl y . The legate Pandulph 
later produced a settlement of the disputes between the two kings but 
but this concentrated less on the question of the northern counties than 
on the former arrangements for marriage alliances. Alexander at last 
married Joanna while his sister Margaret was married to Hubert de Burgh. 
76 CPR 1216-25, 111 
77 ibid 1 93 
78 Anderson- Early Sources, v1, 425 
79 Duncan - Kingdom, 525 
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The question of Alexander's claims to the three northern counties was 
overshadowed by internal affairs for several years in both kingdoms 
but it re-surfaced in 1235. Despite a papal injunction ordering 
him to accept the terms of the treaty of Falaise Alexander was 
determined to press for nothing less than the whole three counties as 
well as repayment of the £10,000 which John had obtained from his 
80 father . Henry clearly believed that Alexander was preparing to use 
force to gain his demands but there is no evidence to support this 
belief. After negotiations between the two kings and the magnates of 
the two realms at York a form of compromise was reached. In return 
for abandoning his claim to the three northern counties Alexander was 
to be granted two hundred pounds worth of land in Northumberland and 
Cumberland though the land chosen was to exclude any towns and castles. 
The land was to be held .in demesne by Alexander by a nominal service 
of one goshawk while enjoying every liberty and immunity. In part this 
promise was made good, but though the list of priveleges Alexander was 
to hold was an antiquaries delight, the treaty made clear that the land 
in question was to remain wholly subject to the English crown and, in 
practice, Alexander enjoyed rights which were only marginally more 
81 
extensive than those enjoyed' by his less exalted neighbours The 
treaty of 1237 left the choice of the manors open and the matter was 
only settled in 1242 when according to the judgement of the Bishop 
of Durham1 Alexander was granted the manors of Langwathby, Salkeld, 
Scottby, Sowerby, Carleton and sixty librates of land in Penrith in 
82 Cumberland as well as the lordship of Tynedale in Northumberland 
80 Stones - Relations, No 6 
81 ibid, No 7 
82 C Chart R 1226-1300, 268 
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It has been suggested that the belated settlement of Alexander's claims 
market the opening of a new phase in Henry's relations with Scotland 
during which incentive replaced coercion. It seems hard to find any 
evidence to support this contention, however, and in 1260 Alexander III 
considered that Henry had failed to fulfill the obligation he had made 
83 
to his father and he revived the Scottish claim to Northumberland 
Moreover, the repeated delays in the provision of the land Alexander 
84 had been promised had led him to have little faith in Henry's word 
For his part, Henry found little difficulty in finding grievances, real 
or imagined in Alexander's conduct. 
It seems very likely that the expulsion of Walter Bisset from Scotland 
on suspicion of complicity in the death of Patrick of Atholl was an 
important step in creating a crisis of relations between Henry and 
Alexander. Bisset found a refuge at Henry's court and his attacks on 
Alexander found a ready audience. Despite this, it seems unlikely that 
the campaign which Alexander mounted in 1244 was in protest at Henry's 
harbouring of the dissident Bisset. Matthew Paris asserted that in 
1244 that Alexander .had claimed that hE? neither held nor sought to 
hold any part of his kingdom from the English king and it seems, as a 
result, that Alexander was seeking to remove any form of English 
85 
supremacy from his kingdom Such a bid for independence may have 
seemed especially threatening to Henry, beset as he was by a rebellion 
83 H R Luard- Flores Historiarum, (Rolls Series 1890), 3 vols, v2, 
459 
84 CCR 1231-42, 142 
85 H R Luard - Matthew Paris' Historia Anglorum, 7 vols, (Rolls 
Series 1872-73), v2, 489 
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in Wales. Even more ominous was the co-operation of Alexander's 
brother-in-law John de Courcy and the construction of castles on the 
Anglo-Scottish border. The construction of such castles would have 
been consistent with a decision to remove Henry's influence from 
Scotland and both Matthew Paris and Fordun suggest that the 
construction of castles was the cause of dispute between the two 
k . 86 lngs Henry reacted to the construction of the castles as to a 
direct threat and an insult to his realm and gathered what all the 
chroniclers agree was a large force and marched north to exact what 
87 
the Lanercost writer called the 'ancient submission' from Alexander 
Alexander responded by raising as large a force as he could but in the 
event hostilities were avoided as a result of the mediation of the 
Archbishop of York and Richard of Cornwall. Alexander gave some 
vague promise of allegiance and probably to forestall a possible French 
allegiance Henry betrothed his daughter Margaret to the future 
Alexander III. Despite the exceeding youth of both bride and groom, 
the marriage was welcomed on both sides of the border and the goodwill 
generated by the marriage was evident during the minority of Alexander 
III. The good relations between the two kings were only, in part, 
matched on the border itself but these disputes were confined to the 
local level and may very well have benefitted from the fact that both 
88 kings declined to become directly involved 
On Alexander II' s death in 1249 a lc·ng minority was inevitable and 
either through family sentiment or political expediency, Henry III and 
86 ibid, 490, 496 
87 W D Simpson - Hermitage Castle, 4. As Simpson made clear, there is 
noreason to doubt that Matthew Paris would have regarded Hermitage 
as being part of Lothian which was understood as the whole region 
souH, D( ~t Fo,.~. 
88 Matthew Paris Hist Angl, v2, 489, 493, 494 
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his agents were bound to play a large part in that minority. Whatever 
the intricacies of Henry's policy in these years, and any clear policy 
is hard to discern either in Henry's dealings with Scotland or towards 
his northern nobles, there is no evidence that Henry had any intention 
of either annexing Scotland or of subjecting it to his direct rule. 
If the kings of England claimed a vague, perhaps simply ceremonial, 
suzerainty over the Kings of Scots, such claims did not define relations 
on the March. By around the year 1250 we might fairly conclude that 
Cumbria was effectively the English West March against Scotland, whether 
or not the Church of Carlisle could point to a time when the region had 
89 been part of Scotland . Cumbria however, marched with an area with 
which it shared many links, similarities and though the border may have 
been scrupulously defined at the accession of Alexander III of Scots or 
Edward I of England, it remained a political and legal boundary rather 
than a military one. 
89 Duncan - Kingdom, 538 
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I 
The economy of mediaeval Cumbria was directly dominated by agriculture 
and the nature of that agriculture was in turn dictated by the region's 
geography. Landscape, soil disposition and climate limit the range of 
crops which can be cultivated today but the options they imposed in the 
middle ages were still more restricted. Taken as a whole the region is 
an unpromising one but with a considerable degree of variation within 
it. The result was that two quite distinct types of agriculture were 
practised in the region, one on the high ground, the other in the lower 
1 
areas 
Cumbria is dominated by high ground, indeed it contains the highest 
points in England, while on the east it is bounded and, to a degree, 
isolated by the highest stretch of the Pennine Chain. The central 
highland zone of Cumbria, where the mountains form a central hub to the 
region contains the least promising ground for agriculture. Within 
2 
this area less than 2% of the land is suitable for arable cultivation 
Westmorland lies almost wholly within the highland zone and it has 
been calculated that only 5% of the ground there can be used for arable 
cultivation. 
While substantial areas of Cumberland are also mountainous it contains 
the two main arable areas in Cumbria. The first of these is formed by 
the Eden Valley and this joins with the second arable zone, the 
Carlisle Plain. The Carlisle Plain itself extendffrom Brampton in the 
east where a depression in the Pennines allows access to Northumberland 
through the Haltwhistle Gap and Tynedale to the west coast bounded by 
1 A 0 Ogilvie - Great Britain: Essays in Regional Geography 
(Cambridge 1928) , · 339-356 
2 E Miller - 'Farming in Northern England in the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries', NH, v11 (1975), 3 
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the Irish Sea and the Solway Firth. The Carlisle Plain also forms a 
coastal flange on the west side of the Cumbrian Mountain dome providing 
an area of good soil, by local standards, around Cockermouth. As the 
coastal plain progresses southward it narrows and becomes increasingly 
less suitable for crop cultivation as much of the land lies above the 
600 foot contour. Though the plain widens again further south, allowing 
increased cultivation, this area is still less favoured than in the 
north. 
The red alluvial soil of the Carlisle Plain is, in itself, reasonably 
fertile but during the Middle Ages its productivity was low. Climate 
was in a large degree responsible for this. Rainfall on the west 
coast is inevitably high and the growing season is short, often 
allowing insufficient time for the crops to ripen before the onset of 
winter. In Skipton in Yorkshire, corn was said to be rotten on the 
stalk before it could be harvested and this was probably frequently 
h . umb . 3 t e case 1n C r1a too . At Cockermouth in 1266, for example, 
the barley grown from 21 bushels of seed had to be excluded from the 
reeve's account because it was still standing unharvested in the rigs 
4 in October 
Even within the Carlisle Plain, stock raising was an important element 
in local agriculture. In the highland areas of the region it was the 
mainstay of local farming. Despite this the highlands did not provide 
the best grazing available locally which was on the coastal plain. On 
the high ground pasture, despite the absence of arable cultivation, 
grazing was still in short supply. 
3 ibid 2 
4 SC 6/824/6, m2 
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Andrew Pringle, in the eighteenth century, calculated that around 
hr f 1 d d f d 5 t ee-quarters o Westmor an consiste o waste groun . Much of the 
vegetation in the waste ground has little nutritional value for stock. 
Severe winter conditions, moreover, mean that stock must be brought on 
to lower lying pastures for long periods of time. Competition for 
grazing rights was as a result extremely intense and disputes common. 
In an amicable settlement of a dispute, which had originally been 
commenced by an action of novel disseisin before William de Saham and 
his fellows at Appleby in 1278, Robert de Crossby Garratt quit-
claimed to Robert L'Engleys all his rights in the park of Swithinbank 
6 in return for grazing rights in the common pasture of Crossby Garratt 
Such settlements were by no means uncommon in the northern counties and 
the form of the settlement belies the extent to which such disputes were 
contested and the a~rtance of the gain made in this instance by Robert 
L'Engleys. In other cases the animosity which such contests engendered 
was less thoroughly concealed. In 1275 1 in the libery of Tynedale, 
the Archbishop of York quitclaimed "for the sake of peace" his rights 
to pasture in Stawardgate to William de Swinburne 7 . If grazing land of 
any kind was scarce, land which could support stock throughout the year 
was rarer still and as a result more highly prized. Land-holders were 
prepared to go to extreme lengths to protect it, even leading to 
apparent defiance of royal writs. In one case, Adam de Carlton, having 
won an action before the justices in Eyre against John de Lancaster for 
the return of 2000 acres of pasture in Barton in Westmorland "which 
provided grazing for the whole year" was forced to summon Lancaster 
5 A Pringle - A General View of the Agriculture of Westmorland 
(Edinburgh 1794), 6 
6 CRO D Lons/L Deeds C.G2; see also T.2 a settlement between 
Henry de Threlkeld and Thomas de Derwentwater 
7 NRO Swinburne MS 1/64 
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to the court of King's Bench to answer why he had not executed the 
award. In the event even this profited Adam nothing because John de 
Lancaster was able to prove that he had been serving in Scotland at 
8 
the time of the award and as a result was allowed to go without day 
It is very easy to guess at the enormous importance of livestock farming 
in upland Cumbria but it is almost impossible to quantify that importance 
in exact terms. We have no direct evidence for the economy of large 
scale livestock farming as we have for the mixed range farming practised 
at Cockermouth. Nevertheless, two generalisations can be made. Firstly 
there was a wider range of livestock than is customary today. Sheep and 
cattle were reared on a very large scale. Pigs were perhaps as plentiful 
but were kept in smaller concentrations. Goats were also important. 
When William de Greystoke granted his follower Adam de Blencow lands in 
Newbiggin, Blencow and Penruddock, during the reign of Edward III, he 
explicitly included the right to have common pasture for Adam's cattle, 
goats and swine 9 In terms of absolute numbers there can be no 
reliable estimates of the sizes of flocks but they were clearly very 
large. In the mid thirteenth century, the forest of Langdale provided 
10 grazing for over 600 cattle . At Beetham in Westmorland in 1254 
one manor provided accomodation for 80 cattle. Livestock farming in 
the lowland areas overlapped closely with that in the upland zone as a 
result of extensive transhumance, but it was probably much larger in 
scQ/e and much more profitable. The sheep flocks belonging to the monks 
of Holm Cultram has been estimated to have numbered as many as 10,000 
11 during the late thirteenth century 
8 KB.27/165, m32d 
9 CPR 1348-50, 248 
10 H E Hallam - Rural England (Glasgow 1981), 195 
11 Reg Holm Cultram, 367E, Miller 'Farming in the North', NH V11 (1976) 
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The estate accounts which survive for the Forz estates at Cockermouth 
allow us to see local agriculture in greater detail and though the 
numbers of livestock there may not have been as large as at Holm Cultram, 
livestock farming at Cockermouth was clearly well organised and 
important. The lord's livestock were managed by a specialist stockman. 
In one of the earliest accounts, for 1265-66, Adam the Stockman 
accounted for £9.14s.6d. from the profits of his activities but clearly 
he also had power to arrange grazing for his charges and to sell off 
what was not required. This had raised 7 shillings 12 . The accounts 
for 1268-69 provide further information. Arrears from the previous 
year totalled £1.19s.1d. In the usual fashion this sum was charged to 
the stockman's account as money received. The other receipts were 
provided by the sales of livestock and produce. The largest sum, 
£8.4s.1d came from the sale of wool from the 494 sheep in the flock. 
Milk and milk cattle were also sold, raising over £7. Other sales of 
livestock included a bull, 7 cows and 15 sheep which raised a total of 
13 £2.9s.8d. The sale of carcassess realised a further £1.1s.1d 
The stockman's account for ten years later shows some changes. This 
account included not only sheep and cattle but also cart-horses and 
draught oxen. The reeve accounted for the sale of one cart-horse from 
a total of 33 but he was also required to record the colts born to his 
charges since the last account. In the year a total of three foals had 
been born, 1 male and 2 females. The cattle herd had also increased 
slightly in size to number 42, which included 1 bull. Five calves had 
been produced and these were the only cattle sold. Sheep were still the 
most important animal kept by the stockman and the number of animals 
in the main flock appears to have remained almost constant. 
12 SC.6.824/6, m1d 
13 SC.6.824/7, m4d 
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This, however, was not the total of sheep kept on the Countess' lands. 
The reeve of Birkby accounted for £5 raised from the sale of wool from 
the 219 sheep for which he alone was responsible and this suggests that 
the flock kept there was almost as large as that kept by the stockman. 
In the stockman's account breeding activities were very important. In 
a total of 506 animals, 211 were lambs born that year. Of these 135 
were sold while the reeve had to account seperately for the male and 
14 females in the remainder which were kept 
Evidence from the sale of wool at Holm Cultram, which was probably 
closely similar in quality, suggests that at this time most of the 
15 Cockermouth wood was of high quality , even though a group of 
merchants later complained to Edward III that the wool from the 
northern counties was of such poor quality that it was incapable of 
16 being sold for a worthwhile price 
Livestock farming played only a limited part in the overall economy 
of the Cockermouth estates. In 1268 the total paid tc the receiver 
of the Cockermouth estates from the stockman was £18.13s.7d in the 
17 
overall total of £121.0s.4d . While this was one of the largest 
individual contributions, second only to that paid by the borough of 
Cockermouth, it was only some 13% of the total income of the estates as 
a whole. 
The limitations placed on local agriculture by soil conditions and 
weather placed severe restrictions on local arable farming. The range 
14 SC.6.824/14, m3d 
15 Reg. Holm Cultram, 367E 
16 CPR 1340-43, 165 
17 SC.6.824/7, m4d 
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of cultivation and of profitability was narrow. Oats was dominant 
18 
among cereal crops almost to the extent of mono-culture . Though rye, 
barley and wheat were grown in places the region as a whole provided the 
greatest possible contrast with the fertile bread grain lands of 
southern England. Today,it has been calculated, oats provides 60% of 
the grain grown in Cumbria, in the mediaeval period the proportion was 
much higher 19 The barony of Liddell on the border with Scotland 
paid rent valued only in terms of oats. This rent was valued at 1 mark 
20 per 12 bushels Exactly the same was true of those scattered areas 
of Westmorland where arable cultivation was possible as at Sizergh and 
21 Helsington 
The account for the granary at Cockermouth in 1268-9 illustrates the 
general position well, though it is possible that Cockermouth was more 
than usually productive as a result of better than average soil and 
more efficient management. Four grain crops were grown and these were 
accounted for seperately, while oatmeal formed a seperate heading. 
The quantities were measured in skeps, windells and strikes, measures 
particularly associated with the north of England. A strike may be 
taken to approximate a bushel. A windell, three strikes and a skep 
22 
equal to four windells or twelve bushels . For convenience all 
quantities have been expressed in bushels. There was an enormous 
imbalance between spring sown and winter sown crops. This remained 
true even though 21 bushels of barley remained unharvested in the 
field at Michaelmas. Barley and rye were the least important crops. 
18 Miller- 'Farming in the North', NH, v11 (1976), 8 
19 Ogilvie - Essays in Regional Geography 
20 Bain CDS, v2, no 208 
21 Miller - 'Farming in North', NH, v11 (1976), 8 
22 Oxford English Dictionary 
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Only 66 bushels of rye were grown and of this total 36 bushels had to be 
reserved for use as seed the following year. Barley suffered a particu-
larly bad year as has already been noted. Wheat was the next largest 
crop. A total of 101 bushels were harvested and with the exception of 
two bushels which were allowed to the reeve of the castle, all of this 
was taken to the castle. 23 None apparantly was used for seed 
The pre-dominance of oats was striking. The total quantity grown was 
2,922 bushels, though this total did not include a further quantity of 
oat-meal. This quantity had been grown from 1,020 bushells of seed, 
suggesting a yield ratio of just under three-fold. Of the crop 
produced around 40%, or 1,152 bushels, were consumed on the estate 
itself to feed draught animals and estate workers. The remaining 
1,772 bushels were delivered to the reeve of the castle and it was 
probably from this stock that the seed for the next year was drawn. 
The oatmeal was, in general, used to provide allowances to shepherds, 
ploughmen and other estate employees. 
The accounts for the year, from Michaelmas 1289-90, display very 
little overall change on those from 1268-69. It would be unwise, 
however, to attempt to compare the two sets of accounts precisely 
because Birkby, one of the most productive arable vills, was accounted 
seperately from the rest of the grain production. Nonetheless, the 
accounts for 1289-90 support the picture of relative importance 
of the various grain crops provided by the earlier accounts. At Birkby 
the reeve accounted for 26 bushels of wheat, 15! bushels of rye, 62 
bushels of barley and 864 bushels of oats. Thus even on a highly 
specialised agricultural vill oats provided over 90% of the grain grown. 
23 SC.6.824/6, m2 
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The account of the granary at Cockermouth is more comprehensive. As in 
the previous account it includes a quantity of oat-meal paid in by the 
reeve of Broughton, in this case 202 bushels. A total of 34 bushels of 
wheat was collected by the reeve. Of this 8 bushels were sown over two 
acres, three roods. The remaining 26 bushels were sold. 35 bushels of 
rye were collected and 111 bushels of this were sold, 1 bushel was 
delivered to the reeve of the castle and the remainder was reserved for 
use as seed. Of the 74 bushels of barley delivered to the reeve of the 
castle 62 were sold and three acres were sown at the rate of three 
bushels to the acre. Oats were again much the largest crop, a total of 
1,766 bushels being grown, not including the 202 bushels of meal 
collected, of which all but 7 bushels was paid in rations to estate 
staff. Even so the quantity of oats grown was ten times that of the 
24 
other crops 
It is worth considering one more account, that for Bolton in Allerdale 
forfeited by Alexander of Moubray for his adherence to John de Balliol. 
The total income of the manor of Bolton was drawn from a variety of 
sources but grain crops were obviously important. Their sale accounted 
for E13.7s.1d from a total of E28.1s.Od. As rough comparison with the 
accounts of the Forz estates at Cockermouth will show this was a 
. 25 
relatively high proport1on Only three types of cereal were grown, 
rye being absent. The most valuable aspect of the account for Bolton 
is that as well as recording the quantities of grain grown the money 
raised from the sale of produce is recorded. The quantities of corn 
produced and the money raised from their sale can be displayed in the 
following table. The quarters used in the original have been converted 
to bushels. 
24 SC.6.824/14, m3 
25 SC.6.824/2, m1 
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Crop Bushels % of Yield Esd % of Total Cash 
Wheat 168 20 £7. 4s.2d 50.2 
Barley 32 4 £1. 4s.4d 8.5 
Oats 624 76 £5.18s.7d 43.3 
Total 824 £13. 7s.1d 
Two points stand out clearly. Firstly oats were again the largest crop 
by a wide margin. Equally striking is the fact that the relatively 
small quantity of wheat grown provided clearly the largest section of 
the cash receipts. 
The Bolton in Allerdale accounts provide a valuable insight into the 
criteria governing the management of cereal farming in the region and 
show the relative desirability of wheat over other cereal crops. Not 
all areas were capable of supporting wheat, however, and oats were the 
only crop grown throughout the region. Within that area, though, there 
were variations in yield. At Cockermouth, as we have seen, the yield 
was almost three-fold but more broadly based calculations have 
suggested that the overall ratio of return within Cumbria was in the 
region of 1.8 fold 26 This was easily the lowest average of return 
from a broadly based comparison reflecting the whole of England. At 
Bolton Priory in Yorkshire, for example, where growing conditions were 
broadly similar, over a spread of seven manors, the average yields of 
27 
oats were 2.5 fold 
26 E Miller and J Hatcher - Mediaeval England; Rural Society and 
Economic Change, (1978), 216 
27 I V Kershaw - Bolton Priory, the economy of a northern monastery 
1286-1325, (Oxford 1973), 41 
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Throughout mediaeval England barley and oats were sown more densely 
28 
than wheat At Cockermouth we have already seen an example of 
barley being sown at a ratio of four bushels to the acre. In 1289-90 
rye and barley were sown at the increased rate of six bushels to the 
29 Oats too was generally sown at a higher density than in acre 
southern England resulting in a higher gross yield per acre. The 
compensation this provided for poor yields per bushell is easy to 
over~estimate, however. More grain was indeed produced, though at a 
cost in soil fertility and the net yield remained small in useful terms. 
Of the oats grown at Cockermouth castle in 1289-90 from a total of 
528 bushels collected at the granary, 360 bushels were reserved for 
the following year's seed, almost 68%. Wheat and barley were more 
productive in terms of grain sown giving returns of 3.3 and five fold 
but these figures tell rather less than the whole story since these 
crops were grown only on a small proportion of the available acreage. 
30 
They were, moreover, confined to the best available land 
The region's basic food crop was oats. Wheat and barley may have been 
grown but they were useful, if unreliable, cash crops rather than 
staples. Oats was at least dependable even if its yield tended to 
be low and for this reason it was preferred by the region's small 
holders. The limited resources available to this group almost 
certainly resulted in still lower yields than were obtained on the 
large seigneurial farms such as Cockermouth and Birkby where seed 
could be exchanged between different manors as was practised by the 
reeves of Birkby and Cockermouth in 1289 31 · Manure "ras probably 
28 Hatcher and Miller - Rural Society, 216 
29 sc.6.824/14, m3 
30 Hatcher and Miller - Rural Society, 216 
31 SC.6.824/14, m3d 
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also more freely available on seigneurial fields. In coastal Cumberland 
sea-weed was available as an additional fertilizer an this may 
have raised yields in coastal districts. In 1289, for example, the 
Abbot of St. Mary's York granted William de Rottington permission to 
make a road 12 feet wide through the lands of the cell of St. Bees to 
32 
take sea-weed "terram suam compostandem" 
If a shortage of fertiliser contributed to the low arable yields which 
prevailed locally the field system may also have had adverse effects. 
Cumberland clung tenaciously to a field system of celtic origin which 
survived then until relatively recent times. The system of cultivation 
corresponded almost exactly to the run-rig system which prevailed in 
33 lowland Scotland . As late as the eighteenth century in the arable 
lands of the Eden Valley the land was divided into crooked dales twenty 
to fifty feet in width and up to a thousand feet in length, these being 
distributed between individual cultivators 34 . Unlike the Scottish 
system, however, there was no use of the in-field/out-field system. 
The available manure was spread evenly and probably thinly over the 
cultivated land. The result was a shared level of indifferent yields 
35 
rather than the extremes produced by the system in use in Scotland 
The diet of the local people, with the exception of the lords, was 
directly dependent on the limitations imposed by local agriculture. 
Oats, the most widely cultivated crop, was inevitably the most 
generally eaten. In this Cumbria conformed to a pattern common to the 
32 CRO, D.Lons/L., Deeds, WH.5 
33 H L Gray- English Field Systems, (1959), 240 
34 ibid 227 
35 ibid 413 
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rest of the northern England but unusual within mediaeval Europe as a 
36 
whole. For the most part in Europe oats were grown as a fodder crop . 
At Cuxham in Oxfordshire the oats grown were mainly used as animal 
37 feed . At Cockermouth on the other hand, though oats were fed in 
large quantities to draught animals, they were also the staple food of 
the estate workers, as they were of the rest of the regional population. 
As a food crop oats has disadvantages. Though oatmeal can be ground 
from the grain easily enough, it will not rise and thus it is impossible 
to bake a conventional loaf. As a result the local diet probably 
included large quantities of porridge or brose. Andrew Pringle 
reported that the bread of the ordinary people of Westmorland was made 
from a paste of oat-meal and water mixed into a disc about 20 inches in 
diameter. This was then baked on a girgle or griddle over a fire. 
According to Pringle, the resulting oatcake called clap-bread formed 
the staple diet of the inhabitants of the region. A striking feature 
of Pringle's account of the diet of the eighteenth century Cumbrian is 
how closely it corresponds with Jean le Bel's account of the oatcakes 
which the Scottish troopers cooked and ate while they were on campaign 
in 1328 39 Clearly diet was a factor which gave the mediaeval 
Cumbrian more in common with his Scots neighbours to the north than 
with his compatriots to the south. 
36 N J G Pounds- An Economic History of Mediaeval Europe (1974), 191 
37 P D A Harvey - A Mediaeval Oxfordshire Village, Cuxham 1240-1400 
(Oxford 1963), 47 
38 Pringle - General Account, 39 
39 J Viard and E Depres - Chronique de Jean le Bel (Paris 1904), 
51-52 
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II 
Lordship on the West March was, as it was in Domesday England and in 
Scotland, much more than the possession of large scale agricultural 
estates. Lordship was distinguished by the possession of a wide range 
of rights and powers and these can be considered as economic powers, 
financial resources available to the lords of the West March and held 
exclusively by them by virtue of their position. As in Scotland these 
rights included the right to control the exploitation of the woods 
within their lands, though with the exception of royal forests, the 
control of fisheries within their estates, tolls for passage through 
their land, the right to enforce compulsory milling at seigneurial 
'11 d h f' f h . . l 40 ml s an t e pro lts rom t e selgnerla court . None of these 
powers was unique to the March of Scotland, they were to be found in 
varying degrees and combinations throughout England, but they combined 
in Cumbria to create a pattern of lordship which was distinctive to the 
region. 
An important factor which conditioned the regional style of lordship 
was the basic poverty of the West March as a whole. The limited range 
of agriculture which could be practised meant that agricultural profits 
tended to be low. Moreover, since even indirect forffi$of income, such as 
the profits of justice, drew ultimately from the wealth created by local 
agriculture the cash available from these sources was, in absolute terms 
and on a national scale, limited. In simple monetary terms, the lord-
ships of the West March compared poorly with large estates in southern 
England. The lordship of Liddell one of the largest estates in 
41 Cumberland, was valued at £295.16s.2d . The average income from the 
Cockermouth estates in the last quarter of the thirteenth century might 
40 R Nicholson- Scotland the Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh 1978), 7 
41 Bain, CDS, v2, no 208 
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be estimated at between £120 and £200 but whilst Cockermouth is the best 
documented lordship it is not always a reliable guide to the profit-
ability of lordship in the region, even within coastal Cumberland as a 
result of the contribution made to the estate revenues by the borough of 
42 Cockermouth . There were, without doubt, profits to be made from the 
lordships of Cumbria, but they must be considered in perspective. For 
example, the lordship of Denbigh in the March of Wales has been valued 
43 
at over £1,000 a year during the early fourteenth century To take 
an example from nearer to the West March, the Earl of Lancasters 
44 
estates in Pickering were worth almost £600 . The honours of the 
West March did not produce such large sums in gross receipts, it is 
probable that they did not even produce such a high ratio of profit 
over expenditure. One important consequence of this fact must be 
considered therefore before proceeding further. The magnates of the 
West March fell into two categories. The first were those magnates who 
held estates spread throughout England including the West March. 
Isabella de Forz provided a typical example of this group, for though 
Cockermouth was a major holding in the area, Isabella de Forz played 
no noticeable role there. Much the same was true of the lords of the 
Wake family. The other holders of major local estates with only a few 
exceptions, the Cliffords and the Multons of Egremont, were men of the 
second rank of baronial status, unless they held extensive estates else-
where as the FitzWilliams of Greystoke did. During the thirteenth 
century, for example, the Lucies of Aspatria whose lands were restricted 
42 see below 
43 G A Holmes - The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth 
Century· England (Cambridge 1957), 97 
44 D Oschinsky - 'Notes on the Lancaster Estates in the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Centuries'. Transactions of the Historic Society 
of Lancashire and Cheshire (1968), vSO 
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to Cumberland and Northumberland were of very little national 
importance. The result of this situation was that, at least before the 
reign of Edward II 1 the lords of the West March formed no clear and 
coherent group as the Welsh Marchers did on occasions and the region did 
not stand as a power base for opposition to the crown. Those lords who 
held widespread estates often tended to pay a greater attention to their 
estates elsewhere than to those in Cumbria and this mitigated agains the 
emergence of a distinctive regional group. This, however, was in no way 
the same as neglect, either of the profitability of their estates or of 
their judicial powers. These were exercised, often with great rigour by 
seigneurial officials and bailiffs, though there are clear examples of 
lords who found it difficult to exercise effective control over their 
bailiffs. This, however, was not reflected in the powers exercised by 
the bailiffs in their lords' names or the contributions they forced 
their lords' men to make to his finances. 
The lords' incomes were derived from a variety of sources but as E.A. 
Kosminsky was among the first to recognise, seigneurial monopolies 
1 1 . . h 45 p ayed an extreme y lmportant part ln t em On the West March one 
of these, suit of mill, was enforced with particular rigour. It was 
among the most common causes of court cases and as a concomitant aspect 
of tenure it was levied from free and unfree tenants alike. It also 
formed an important part of the revenues derived from seigneurially 
controlled boroughs. Multure was frequently exacted in the form of 
produce, a portion of the corn ground and it added very significantly 
to seigneurial incomes. On Baldwin Wake's lands at Liddell for example 
there were five water mills which raised a total of £50 for Wake, and 
this was pure profit to the lord since the free tenants who owed suit 
45 E A Kosminsky - Studies in the Agrarian History of .England in the 
Thirteenth Century (Oxford 1956), 187 
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to the mills were also obliged to provide for their upkeep At 
Liddell, in fact, the profits of the mills were more valuable than the 
rents paid for the farm of the demesne. A similar pattern emerges from 
the accounts from the manor of Ulvedale in 1330. Rents totalled 
£14. 4s. 10d, but the sale of oatmeal collected from the right of 
multure accounted for a further £9 6s. Od, almost 40% of the total 
income of the manor. In the following year the total declined to 
£22 7s. 10d but the profit of the mills remained important at £6 1Ss. Od 
47 
or around 30% . In the account of the reeve of Crosby, late in the 
reign of Henry III, the income derived from the farm of the mill was, 
at £4, not only the largest item in the total owed by the reeve but 
was over half the total raised from the vill 48 . Broughton, perhaps, 
bears out Kosminsky's emphasis on the importance of seigneurial 
monopolies still better. The mill produced for the lord a total of 360 
bushels of oatmeal, a quantity which was 12.S% more than the produce 
49 
rent paid by the demesne then at farm . In the borough of Cockermouth 
in 1289 - 90, the farm of the seigneurial fulling and flour mills 
provided £19, again the largest of the seigneurial rights which were 
1 . d so exp o1te Though few precise figures are available, this pattern 
probably obtained throughout the whole of the area. The importance of 
the right of multure was not confined solely to the large liberties of 
the region, it was used by, and deeply important to smaller land-holders 
as well. Thus the free tenants and military tenants of the great 
liberties might be able to demand suit of mill from both their 
46 Bain, CDS, v2, no 208 
47 E.372/179 Cumberland 
48 SC.6.824/6, m2 
49 SC.6.824/14, m4 
SO ibid, m2 
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agricultural tenants and from other members of the gentry who held of 
them as Richard de Vernon claimed in the case of Richard le Brun at 
51 Rockcliffe 
Multure was probably the most important of the seigneurial monopolies 
but it was by no means the only one. At Liddel, the bake-house was 
also a seigneurial monopoly, though one which raised a paltry profit 
52 
of only 2s 1as did the bakehouse at Kirkoswald Such low profits were 
probably a result of the scarcity of hard grains which meant that most 
grain was cooked and consumed at home in the form of oatcakes. Just as 
the lord controlled his men's bread he also controlled their beer . If 
he did not possess monopolistic brew-houses, as Eustace de Balliol did 
at Kirkoswald, the assize of Beer was a basic judicial right enjoyed by 
the lords of the region and this gave them control over the consumption 
of ale within their lordships. In practice many lords did not take 
fines for breaches of the assize but used their jurisdiction to charge 
for licences to brew. Generally, however, the sums realised were small 
and certainly they were much smaller than the profits which were levied 
through the seigneurial mills. The jurors asked to testify to the value 
of the assize of Bread and Ale in William de Mulcaster's lands in 
Copeland reported that the right was worth no more than 1s 6d in a 
53 year 
The powers of the lords of the West March extended over the control of 
local fishing and the frequent references to deaths by drowning in the 
Eyre Rolls suggest that this was an important local activity. Control 
of the fisheries provided another example of seigneurial monopoly though 
51 CP.40/180, m63d 
52 Bain II, no 208; Bain I, no 2556 
53 POW, 125 
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often the fishery was let at farm. In the forest of Derwentfells such 
fisheries were worth almost £1 from a total of £13 which the forest 
. . . 54 
paid towards the total of the Cockermouth estates • In Anthony 
Lucy's account for Penrith in 1329-30 a fishery let at farm 
realised £8 and this sum may well have been reduced by the repeated 
Scots raids during Edward II's reign 55 Seigneurial control of 
fishing was not confined to sub-letting of fisheries, however. The 
lords of Copeland, the Lucies and the Multons of Egremont claimed and 
were allowed the right to take fines for the use of nets of a mesh of 
56 less than four inches Fines could also be imposed, as was done at 
57 Cockermouth, on those caught fishing out of season Another 
seigneurial monopoly was the exploitation of the minerals which were 
to be found in the hard rocks of Cumbria. Again these profits were 
controlled by the holders of the great franchises. In both the 
baronies of Egremont and Cockermouth small sums were raised from the 
farm of mining operations. In Derwentfells £2 was raised from the 
farm of a leadmine while at Egremont in 1322 mines either of coal, 
58 
or more probably iron, raised half a mark 
The West March was predominantly a rural region and with the important 
exception of Appleby the boroughs in the area were all directly 
dependent on rural estates. Of the remaining towns, most were extremely 
small indeed, Egremont has been described as less a borough than an 
inflated vill and the burgesses were the only ones in England who owed 
54 SC.6.824/6, m2 
55 E.372/179, Cumberland 
56 PQW 113; Lucy Cartulary, 52, Typescript at CRO 
57 SC.6.824/14, m3d 
58 ibid, SC.6.824/19 
Page 49 
agricultural services to their lord 59 . The boroughs were not farmed 
out ~ bloc but remained closely supervised by seigneurial officials 
so that there was only a difference of scale between a small vill and a 
borough like Cockermouth or Egremont even though, on occasions, these 
60 
returned members to parliament 
With the exception of one account for Egremont, conclusions on the 
importance of boroughs in aristocratic incomes can be based only on 
evidence from the Cockermouth estates and as a result may be misleading. 
The information available from Cockermouth suggests, however, that the 
profits of the borough were an extremely important part of total 
revenues from the honour. The borough, in fact, provided the largest 
item in the accounts. In 1265-66 the borough paid a total of £24 
from an overall total (arrears deducted) of £121 Os. ld 61 The next 
year the contribution from the borough was larger, both in absolute and 
in relative terms, at over £40 in a total account of £148 lOs. lOd. 
In 1289-90 Simon, son of Richard the Reeve, accounted for an even 
larger sum and again this displays the strength of the control 
exercised on behalf of the Forz estates over the borough. The total 
from the borough was £87 16s. ld but even when the sum of £39 4s. ld 
in arrears are deducted, the large figure of £48 12s. 5d was realised. 
Of this £19 came from the farm of the seigneurial mills, £2 5s. 9d from 
the profits of the borough court, a fishery paid £6 13s. 4d and the 
tolls of the borough paid £7 6s. 8d. Only £11 2s. ld was paid in simple 
62 
rent, though this also included 4s. paid in kind in the form of wax 
59 M W Beresford - The New Towns of the Middle Ages (1967), 415 
60 Parl Writs, vl, li, liv 
61 SC.6.824/6, ml 
62 SC.6.824/14, m2 
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The sole surviving account for Egremont discloses a substantially 
different pattern from that at Cockermouth but it is highly possible 
that an account from before the outbreak of war would have been mor<. 
similar. Farm of seigneurial mills was again important, and from 
Easter to Michaelmas 1324, £7 13s 9d was raised from this source. 
Mulcts and fines at Ravenglass and Egremont realised a further £3 lls 
11d 63 . Much of this sum was probably the profit of tolls levied on 
produce sold in the market and fairs in Egremont and Ravenglass. The 
Lucy Cartulary records the level of tolls collected in Copeland. The 
holder of each staff paid 4d to the lord but tolls were also levied on 
goods brought for sale, half from the seller and half from the buyer. 
The toll on a shod horse was 4d, an unshod horse was charged at 2d. 2d 
was also levied on each pair of pigs or sheep while the buyer and seller 
of a bar of iron had each to pay 1d 64 . The lord's bailiffs controlled 
the collection of tolls closely. Each vendor coming to market was 
required to deposit a pledge equal to the value of the tolls owed if 
the whole of his stock was sold, and was allowed to claim the return of 
his pledges for any stock left unsold. Tolls were also levied for 
passage through Egremont and other lordships even though the goods were 
not intended for sale there. 
The most forcible expression of the lords of the West March's feudal 
power was to be found in their judicial powers. There was a wide range 
of seigneurial courts on the Scottish border and there was a hierarchi-
cal relationship existing between them but the courts were not, in a 
general sense, inter-dependent. There were different courts serving 
different purposes and for different suitors. At the lowest level, as 
63 SC.6.824/19 
64 Lucy Cartulary Typescript, 49 
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every free man held his court for his tenants, so there was a court for 
every manor. This provided the lowest level of judicial lordship on a 
great honour and it was a relatively humble institution. Arguably it 
was less concerned with the administration of justice than with estate 
management. The manor court was held by the reeve of the manor who had 
to account for its issues to the higher estate officials. The account 
presented by the reeve of Papcastle for 1266-67 will show the type 
of business transacted in the manor court. There were four entries, 
one of these was an entry fine valued at 13s 4d. One shilling was 
collected on the marriage of one of the tenants. Three small fines 
accounted for the remainder of the profit of the court, two for pasture 
65 
offences and one for an unspecified trespass If we leave aside the 
entry fine, the money raised from the Papcastle court was very small, 
both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the total raised from 
the manor, which was around £5. A s~milar court held at Bolton in 
Allerdale was little more profitable raising only 14s 4d from a total 
66 for the manor of over £28 • 
Similar in jurisdiction to the manor courts were the courts held by 
the forester of Derwentfells and in the bailiwicks of Allerdale and 
Copeland. The bailiwick courts were held by seigneurial officials, a 
grade more lffiportant than the reeves of agricultural vills, but though 
they also played a judicial role, like the manor courts, they were more 
useful as foci for the running of the estate. The bailiwick officials 
were responsible for collecting rents and carnage dues and they were 
also charged with controlling succession to tenancies. The offences 
which were heard in the bailiwick courts were closely similar to those 
over which the manor courts had jurisdiction. In the forest of 
65 SC.6.824/6, mld 
66 SC.6.824/2, mld 
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Derwentfells the profits raised from the forester's court were 
remarkably large, a fact which reflects both the importance of the 
forest in local life and the power of the lord within the bounds of 
his forest. Tenants in the forest belonging to Isabella de Forz 
included other important figures and like less prominent tenants these 
could be amerced. Among the list of petty amercements levied on two 
local ecclesiastics for similar offences. The Abbot of Fountains was 
fined £12, while the Abbot of Furness was fined £6 13s 4d 67 . These 
were unusually large sums, however, and none of the other accounts for 
Derwentfells forest studied show such high profits. In the years from 
1265 ~ 67 the profit of the court of the forest was £4 6s Od though 
it is worth noting that this sum was still greater than the issues from 
rent and produce. 
Alongside the petty civil and administrative jurisdictions exercised 
by the estate officials, there was also a criminal jurisdiction. It 
seems probable that estate officials acted as serjeants of the peace 
within the great baronies. This duty probably consisted principally 
of taking pledges for appearance in seigneurial courts. Other duties 
may have included taking possession, in the lord's name, of the 
chattels forfeited by those executed by the judgement of the liberty 
court. In 1278, for example, the serjeant of Copeland accounted for 
the chattels of Robert Stainton, a thief who had been beheaded. These 
68 
were valued at £1 17s 8d . Though the serjeant of Copeland was 
responsible for collecting and siezing StaintonJchattels, the 
serjeants and bailiffs exercised high justice only in the form of 
summary execution where guilt could not be denied. The only seigneurial 
67 SC.6.824/6, m2 
68 SC.6.824/10, m2 
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court which enjoyed powers of high justice were the courts held at the 
chief manors of the great local liberties at Egremont and Cockermouth. 
These courts exercised a wide range of criminal jurisdiction 69 and 
their powers were a clear illustration of seigneurial power. Despite 
this they made less of a contribution to aristocratic finances than 
their exalted powers might suggest. It was true on the West March, as 
it was elsewhere, that high justice was a matter of "grand mots; petit 
profits" 70 In 1289-90 on the Cockermouth estates the chattels of 
71 felons amounted to less than £2 in a total income of almost £200 
The chattels of felons in fact appeared less as the source of a 
regular substantial part of the lord's income but rather as an 
occasional small windfall. The same was true in other courts holding 
power over life and limb. At Egremont in 1322 the profits of the court 
were worth £1 13s. 4d. in a half year, a sum which was less than a 
72 quarter of the money raised from the mill of Egremont The court of 
Penrith, which also heard cases of high justice, occasionally with 
scant regard for procedure, was more profitable but only marginally so, 
and the profits of justice accounted for less than a tenth of the total 
73 income derived from the manor 
The courts held by the holders of the greatest liberties over criminal 
cases were matched by virtually co-incident but seperate honorial courts. 
69 see below, Chapter 2 
70 B Guen'ee ~ Tribunaux et Gens de Justice dans la Baillage de 
Senlis a la Fin due moyen age (Paris 1963), 266, quoted in 
J R Sweeney - 'High Justice in Fifteenth Century Normandy; 
The Prosecution of Sandrin Bourel', Journal of Mediaeval 
History, v10 (1984), 306 
71 SC.6.824/14, m2 
72 sc.6.824/19 
73 E.379/179, Cumberland 
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These were the highest level of courts operated by liberty-holders on 
the West March. They were essen~ially civil courts deciding matters of 
land tenure and succession and adjudicating between free tenants. Their 
activities, 
monopoly of 
however, were ve~ tightly circumscribed by the royal 
justice and in practice the honorial courts seem to have 
been competent to implement succession by heirs rather than to decide 
between rival claimants which was the exclusive preserve of the royal 
courts. Even so the power to demand attendance from free tenants and 
to amerce them for defaults was highly profitable despite the 
restrictions placed on the operation of seigneurial courts by Magna 
74 Carta and Henry III For example, in 1267-68 £6 lOs. Od. was 
raised from fines imposed on the free tenants of the honour of 
75 Cockermouth Much larger sums were envisaged by some lords and 
ladies. In 1289, Idonea de Leyburn distrained John de Greystoke for 
a relief of £100 for succession to the lands of Dufton, Brampton, 
Yanwath and Bolton in Westmorland. Though it is not clear whether 
Greystoke had eventually to pay the relief demanded, a substantial 
relief has undoubtedly to be paid and such sums provided a useful, if 
variable addition to the incomes of the largest land holders in the 
76 
region 
The enormous gulf which seperated the pennies and shillings raised from 
the manor court of Papcastle and the sum of £100 which Idonea de Leyburn 
hoped to gain from John de Greystoke shows the variation which was 
possible in the profitability of different forms of lordship. At the 
lowest level, on individual manors, a level which was probably closely 
74 see J R Maddicott 'Magna Carta and the English Local Community 
1225-59', Past and Present, v102, (1984) 
75 SC.6.824/6, m2 
76 Hist and Antiq I, 16 
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comparable with the situation enjoyed by the members of the local gentry 
who held only one or two manors, the profits were very small and played 
only a small part in seigneurial income. At the opposite end of the 
spectrum, as at Cockermouth, the profits of justice were much more 
important. Again the best means available for quantifying this 
importance are accounts from Cockermouth. Fragmentary accounts do 
exist for Egremont and Appleby, but these are too incomplete and to~ 
much affected by the result of the devastation existing in the region 
at the end of Edward II's reign to be relied upon. The earliest 
Cockermouth estate accounts, for 1267-68 and 1268-69 distinguish 
clearly between income from the profits of justice and from other 
sources and for this reason these accounts provide the most accessible 
method of investigating the importance of judicial income. The figures 
77 for these years have been displayed in the following table 
30 Nov. 1265 - 29 Sep. 1266 29 Sep. 1266 - 15 Aug. 
Total Income (all sources less arrears) 
£113 12s 1 Od £121 18s 6d 
Rents (Borough and Rural) 
Rural £71 9s lld E 50 18s 7d 
Borough £20 1 Os 2d E 38 4s Od 
Total £92 Os 1d E 89 2s 7d 
Profits of Justice 
Rural £16 12s 8d E 27 14s Od 
Borough E 5 Os ld E 5 ls 11d 
Total £21 12s 9d £ 32 15s 11d 
77 SC.6.824/6 
1267 
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Income from Borough of Cockermouth 
Rents £20 lOs 2d £ 38 4s Od 
Profits of Justice £ 5 Os 1d £ 5 ls 11d 
Total £25 lOs 3d £ 43 5s 11d 
Income from agricultural manors and forests of Derwentfells &c. 
Rents &c £71 9s lld £ 50 18s 7d 
Profits of Justice £16 12s Bd £ 27 14s Od 
Total £88 2s 7d £ 78 12s 7d 
Total Income from Estates £113 12s 10d £111 18s 6d 
These accounts reinforce the importance of the relative poverty of the 
lordships of the West March. Total income in both the periods of 
account considered was low and the income derived from the sources other 
than the borough was lower still. The portion of the total profit of 
the honour of Cockermouth derived from the borough was in fact remark-
ably high at from around a quarter to almost a third. By comparison 
in an account for a group of manors held by the Clare family in Dorset 
the profits from two boroughs accounted for less than a ninth of the 
78 
total . To take another point of comparison from the March of Wales, 
in the lordship of Denbigh, the borough of the same name was responsible 
79 for less than 3% of the total income 
The income derived from the seigneurial control of justice was also 
important but it was subject to considerable fluctuations. In the two 
years studied, for example, it varied between a fifth and a third of 
the total value of the estates' rural income. In Denbigh, the ratio 
was much lower, perhaps surprisingly, at only some eighth part of the 
78 Holmes - Estates of Higher Nobility, 145 
79 ibid 97 
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rural income, though in cash terms the sum was much higher. Comparisons 
with lordships in other regions in England again bring out the limited 
profits available from estates on the West March. They also suggest 
that the proportion of those profits derived from the perquisites of 
courts was, to a degree, unusual. As we have seen, the cash realised 
from the collection of felon's chattels was limited, but the fact that 
the courts of Egremont and Cockerruouth were almost equivalent to the 
hundred courts in southern England made them courts of first instance 
for the local population, bringing in numerous petty cases and in 
consequence a variety of small amercements and perhaps just as important, 
the right to take fines for defaults. Bearing this in mind it is worth 
comparing the profits of Cockermouth with the profits from an honour 
where similar powers were exercised. On the English estates of the 
Abby of Bee, the bailiwick of Ogbourne was enfranchised with powers 
which made it closely comparable with Cockermouth, infa~~'f 
exemption from the shire and hundred courts, the view of frankpledge 
and the assizes of Bread and Ale. The total profits of justice at 
80 Ogbourne amounted to some 32% of the total income from the bailiwick 
This figure compares very closely with that from Cockermouth. On the 
Clare manors in Doreset the inclusion of three and a half hundred courts 
which the family held in the account raises the total profits of justice 
to almost exactly the relative importance they enjoyed at Ogbourne and 
81 Cockermouth 
The comparisons which can be drawn between the profits of justice at 
Ogbourne and at Cockermouth illustrates both the fact that possession 
of powers of justice conferred important revenue raising powers and the 
80 M Morgan - The English Lands of the Abbey of Bee (Oxford 1946), 
63 
81 Holmes - Estates of Higher Nobility, 145 
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fact that in relative, though not in absolute, terms there was a clear 
relationship between the level of judicial powers that were exercised 
and the income which could be derived from them. Thus while the 25-30% 
of the total income derived from the profits of justice at Cockermouth 
was in keeping with what seems to have been the national pattern, the 
example of Cockermouth is important because, unlike Ogbourne, it was one 
of a range of similar lordships not a specially priveleged area with few 
local paralells. The West March depended on private jurisdiction for 
local law enforcement and as a result private jurisdictions enjoyed both 
wide judicial franchises, and perhaps more importantly, wide areas of 
land in which to operate. There is good reason to believe that this 
was more important than the nature of the powers exercised. 
The evidence suggests that it was lordship, the power of one man, woman 
or their agents over other men, that created the profitability of the 
estates of the Western Border. The most dramatic examples of this power 
were to be found in the lord's powers of life and limb but this was an 
extreme, and possibly unusual example. The exercise of the seigneurial 
power of the gallows was rare and of limited profitability, the power 
associated with control of the private forest as at Derwentfells was 
much more common and as a result, profits from it were more regular and 
important. Even more prosaic but yet more profitable was the exercise 
of the seigneurial monopoly of milling. This power lacked the drama and 
the apparent status of the private powers over life and limb but in simple 
cash terms it was more important. At Penrith in 1330 the profits of 
justice were only a third of the income that was drawn from the mills 
82 let at farm . Though definitive figures for the whole of the March 
are impossible to estimate, this ratio could probably be extended to 
82 E.372/179, Cumberland 
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cover the whole region without undue distortion. In short, therefore, 
if lordship is described as the extent of one man's power over another, 
the greatest display of seigneurial power was the private gallows. If, 
however, we try to see the lordships of the West March as simply sources 
of profit, there is no doubt that the seigneurial monopoly of the mill 
was of greater value than any other power. 
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III 
The relative poverty of the great estates of the West March had an 
important effect upon the way in which they were administered during 
the thirteenth century. As has already been noted many lords held land 
spread throughout the whole of England and divided their time amongst 
them by means of an elaborate peregrination. Different estates were 
visited for different periods of time according to their importance and 
according to purely personal preferences. For many local lords their 
estates on the West March occupied a low place in their interests and 
priorities. There is, for example, no evidence that Isabella de Forz 
ever bothered to visit her estates in Cockermouth. The lords of Liddell, 
the Wake family, seem to have displayed only a little more interest in 
their northern lordship. In the late thirteenth century the site of the 
castle at Liddell contained only a few wooden buildings and these were 
much in need of repair. Equally telling was the fact that the park there 
83 
contained no deer . In addition, unless the Wake was prepared to make 
do with oat bread, wheat flour would have had to be bought in or brought 
from another estate, none was grown on the estate. 
The limited interest taken by Isabella de Forz in the Cockermouth estates 
was reflected in the way in which the estates were managed. The lady 
Forz may not have cared to make the long trip to Cumberland, but the 
estates were expected to pull their weight. Individual estate officials 
were made individually to account for the money in their charge. In 
1270 for example, the account from the livestock farming was care-
fully divided into seperate accounts for the two workers in charge, 
precise sums were credited to each man and steps were taken to ensure 
payment. The aim was the collection of the largest possible surplus 
which was then transported to another of the Countess's manors, usually 
83 Bain, CDS, v2, no 208 
Page 61 
Burstwick. Cockermouth was simply run as an out-station required to 
contribute to the overall income of Isabella but its contribution was 
transformed to the most easily transported form, cash. The same criteria 
applied while the estate was run by keepers appointed by the crown, 
since the keepers were required to account at the Exchequer for what-
ever sum the estate was then valued at. Regrettably no accounts have 
been found for the period after Cockermouth was granted to a local 
magnate, Anthony Lucy. 
Within the overall priority of maximum income, different styles of 
management were tried at different times. In the early years of 
Edward I's reign at Souerby there was no direct farming. The demesne 
was leased out for £3 6s 8d. There was also a variety of other tenants, 
some in free socage, others in bondage. Land was held at various rents, 
commonly 4d per acre. The local land market was enjoying some degree of 
prosperity, however, as was witnessed by the fact that it had been 
possible to impose an increment of 36 shillings on the farm charged for 
84 
two mills The practice of renting out land continued when the 
manors of Penrith and the other manors formerly of Alexander III _ 
...Jc>(' k~t'l ... {'() AA~ k.;'i<f·} 4<4."\.{) , .. IL<I'-
New assarts were also still being made at nearby Souerby and 
the policy of renting out land remained fully in force. In the 
dependent manors of Scotby and Carlton, the land at farm included both 
the demesne and the chief messuages. 
The most detailed evidence available for changes in the management of 
local estates is, again, to be derived from the Cockermouth accounts. 
This evidence tends to complicate the picture which can be drawn from 
the accounts for the Penrith manors which seemed to suggest a relatively 
84 J Stevenson - Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland, 
(Edinburgh 1870), no 21 
Page 62 
buoyant local economy, and there is some reason to believe that the 
attempts made by Isabella de Forz' bailiffs to increase the income from 
Cockermouth began to meet with diminishing success. 
At the commencement of the surviving accounts from Cockermouth at the 
end of the Baron's Wars, the estate was run firmly on the basis of land 
let out to farm. At Birkby in 1265-66 not only were pasture and 
meadows let out to rent, but arable land was also. Nor was this 
intended as a temporary move for the plough horses from the manor were 
sold. This policy, however, was not especially remunerative for the 
manor's income was less than £1. At Papcastle in the following year, 
a similar pattern could be found. Most of the land there was let out 
for comparatively low rents. The account shows further signs of the 
limited profitability of the manor under this regime for it was 
heavily burdened with arrears, which amounted to almost a quarter of 
the sum with which the reeve's account was credited. The same trend 
can be observed in the account of the bailiff of Allerdale for 1266-67 
where the accumulated arrears outweighed the actual income for the 
year. At Crosby, though the account was not burdened with so large 
amounts of arrears from previous years, the reeve had still been 
unable to collect £2 worth of rents which amounted to almost a quarter 
of the money he owed. Only in the case of forest bailiwicks of 
Inglewood, only a small part of which was in fact controlled by the 
Forz family, and the more important bailiwick of Derwentfells were 
large incomes foreseen and, more importantly, were they actually 
85 
collected 
85 SC.6.824/6, m2 
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The situation ten years later shows some degree of change though the 
apparent improvement in the overall position of the estates is not 
wholly borne out by close scrutiny. The total receipts charged to the 
account of the receiver of the Cockermouth manors are much increased to 
a figure of £321 15s Od but this total was swollen by large sums of 
arrears charged to the receipt side of the account in the usual fashion 
for this time. The account is in fact headed by a sum of £99 6s 1d 
owed in arrears and other quantities owed in arrears are concealed 
elsewhere. The reeve of the borough of Cockermouth, for example, owed 
over £40. The bailiff of Allerdale again owed more in arrears than he 
did for any other reason. At Broughton the reeve managed to pay off 
only 2 shillings of the arrears he owed. Only in the forest of 
Derwentfells was it possible to balance the books and the forester was 
able to pay off almost all the arrears with which his account was 
86 
charged 
The accumulation of substantial sums of arrears in the estate accounts 
for Cockermouth seems to suggest that the estate's profitability was 
less than might have been wished and it is clear that far from enjoying 
the benefits of any notional boom in farming the estate was trying to 
impose tighter management. High in the list of steps taken to bolster 
the financial position of the estate was a relentless pursuit of old 
debts. The account of Thomas de Weston, a trusted estate official, 
whom Denholm-Yaung suggested was a reliable and moderate official 
87 
"growing old in the service of his mistress" displays a ruthless 
effort to improve the estates finances quite at odds with this cosy 
image. Former reeves, foresters and serjeants were forced to account 
86 sc.6.824/14 
87 N Denholm-Yaung - Seigneurial Administration in England (Oxford 
1937), 36 
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for debts incurred during their periods of office. These old debts 
were all added to the charge of Weston's account, inflating its notional 
total by over £100. In practice, though, very little of this money was 
88 
collected 
The attempts made to collect old debts were only one part, though a 
major one, of wider ranging steps to increase income from Cockermouth. 
Some steps were more constructive. Some small expansion was under way. 
The small income of £1 15s. Od from a vaccary established at Gatescarth 
was one of a series of new headings in the account. Other new payments 
were made from Husthwaite and Satterthwaite but it is not completely 
clear if these were new areas under cultivation or whether these manors 
had previously been :run from other farms and were now split off to 
allow more precise supervision. At Birkby, other steps were taken to 
increase income. Sales of grain and wool were increased. Wheat, 
barley, rye and oats worth £5 13s Od was sold and other sales including 
that of wool worth £8 10s Od brought the total profit from this source 
to £18 Ss 4d, a significant increase on the income from produce 
generated in 1266-67. Even with this addition, however, and some 
moves to bring manors under direct cultivation, difficulties remained. 
At Birkby, the total income from the manore, from the sales of 
produce and from land still let out to rent was £46 13s 4d while the 
reeve was required to pay a total of £48 4s lOd in expenses and to the 
receiver of the Cockermouth manors, income falling short of expenditure 
89 by £1 13s 4d which the reeve hade to make up 
The evidence of the Cockermouth estate account is not unequivocal and 
88 SC.6.824/14 
89 ibid, m2 
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since the accounts were designed to display responsibility rather than 
profit or loss, per se, calculations based on these considerations are 
slightly artificial and, in a sense, do less than justice to the 
comprehensive nature of the surviving accounts. However, there is a 
telling consistency to the accumulating series of arrears and the 
failure of the officials to collect them. It is very hard not to 
conclude that the profitability of the Cockermouth estates was 
declining and that the late thirteenth century was not an 'indian 
summer' of profitability which other estates enjoyed. There is some 
evidence to suggest that a similar trend was in operation on other 
local estates. On such example is provided by the lordship of Liddell. 
As has already been noted the castle and outbuildings on the chief 
messuage there were decayed and much in need of repair. Just as 
significant was the neglect of a fulling mill, which was valued at only 
4 shillings and needed its wheel replaced. Mills, however, were one of 
the most profitable of seigneurial resources. A bakery also stood in 
d . . 90 lsrepalr The same pattern can be found in the Barony of Kendale 
at the extreme south of the March. In 1283 the inqu.isi.tion held i.nto 
the holdings of William de Lindsey found that the manor of Windermere 
cost more to keep up than it produced for its lord. The manor of 
Brachlaw which had formerly been worth 3s 4d was now in the hands of 
the lord, probably since no-one wished to rent it. A fishery in the 
Kent was also without a farmer, though it had formerly produced 5 
h 'll' 91 s l lngs • Again this is limited or equivocal evidence but it seems 
more consistent with a stagnant or even contracting economy rather than 
an expanding one. 
90 Bain ~· v2, no 208 
91 CIPM II, no 447 
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If the fortunes of the agriculture on the West March, at the end of the 
thirteenth century, are open to varying interpretations there has been 
agreement that during the following years they suffered almost 
catastrophic decline. The standard account of the destruction caused 
by the Scots raids has been that of Mrs Jean Scammell in an important 
article in the English Historical Review in 1958 92 . This assessment 
concentrated heavily on the English East March and provides little 
comment on the western Border. The East March suffered severely but 
unevenly. Northumberland suffered most. The Archbishop of York's 
93 
manor of Hexham was almost completely destroyed In Durham the 
devastation was less severe, protection money was paid regularly and 
its organisation was facilitated by the coherence of the community 
within the Durham franchise. The West March was less well organised 
than the Palatinate and though protection money was paid by some 
districts, Cumbria also suffered extensive plundering. 
Though there is insufficient evidence to delineate precisely the 
extent of the destruction caused by the Scots, there is no doubt that 
the effects were comprehensive and severe. The tenants suffered most; 
the lords of the region were free to retreat to their estates in safer 
parts of England and many of them did so. They were also free to 
arrange their estates to their best advantage and most seem to have 
realised the need to abandon any direct involvement with agriculture. 
Lands and utilities were leased out at farm and the risks as a result 
were borne not be the lord but by the farmer. At Egremont in 1322 
the Multon lands were all rented out. Even so the value of the lord-
ship had declined from a figure probably around £100 per annum to only 
92 
93 
J Scammell- 'Robert I and the North of England'; EHR, V73, 
(1958) 
ibid 93 
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£47 . . d f 94 1n a per1o o over a year Other lords suffered still more 
striking losses. Though we have no direct evidence for the value of 
the Cliffords lands in peace time there is no room to doubt that the 
sum of just over £40 which was realised from Appleby and its dependent 
manors, was only a fraction of what the estate had formerly been worth 
95 The vill of Rokeby, for example, had completely disappeared. 
Cockermouth was similarly devastated. By 1312 the value of the 
estate had fallen dramatically and from August 1309 to ,1une 1312 
96 
only £97 18s ld had been realised from the honour In the following 
years the situation grew still worse, many of the tenants of the manors 
abandoned the area and cultivation was ended on large areas of the 
97 
estate . In the Eden Valley at Penrith, an area of waste pasture 
which had formerly been rented out for £10 lOs Od, was valueless and 
. 98 
without tennants 1n 1330 . At Souerby, 278 acres of land could 
only be let out without profit though it had formerly been worth 5d per 
acre and mills and other buildings had also been destroyed. 
While it is easy to find examples of damage to individual manors and 
estates from accounts, there are limits to the conclusions that can be 
drawn from such evidence. Overall conclusions on the destruction caused 
are much more difficult and it is not, in general, possible to asses 
the extent to which the values of local estates were effected. Penrith 
and its dependent manors provide one example of the difficulties of 
drawing comparisons between the administration of estates in peace and 
94 SC.6.824/19; Just 1/132, m28 
95 E.l99/46/3 
96 E.l99/7/3 
97 SC.6.824/18 
98 E.372/179 Cumberland 
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and war time. For example, though.accolli~ts exist for 1286 and for 
1330 it is not possible simply to compare the two totals and 
attribute the discrepancy to the damage caused by the Scots. The 
accounts for Penrith and the liberty of •rynedale in 1286 and 1287 
show a difference of almost £200 on two similar accounts probably 
because many customary rents were payable only every second or third 
year. Such wide discrepancies render comparisons based on the Penrith 
manors of limited value 99 . The use of inquisitions post mortem 
provides another tool to attempt to assess the dislocation caused by 
the Anglo-Scots war. Again evidence for material destruction comes 
easily to hand. Even within local towns there was substantial 
destruction, nine burgages in Kendal belonging to Ingelram de Gynes 
100 had declined in value from £2 to only 6 shillings Even before 
the worst period of raids, which Mrs Scammell has suggested, began in 
1311 there was widespread devastation. In 1310 the manor of Cargou 
101 in Westmorland was reduced to a waste . Eight years earlier at 
Levington, while the March still enjoyed the protection of Edward I's 
protection, the manor had been so thoroughly burned as to be valueless 
102 
, though Levington, like other manors very close to the actual border, 
probably suffered particularly early and especially severely. On a 
general basis, perhaps the most comprehensive estimates are those 
prepared by C.M.L. Bouch for the ecclesiastical foundations of the 
. b d 1 . f l' . . 103 reg1on ase on va uat1ons or re 1g1ous taxat1on . BotJL:h calculated 
the values of the lands belonging to a total of thirteen institutions 
in the two church districts in Cumbria; the diocese of Carlisle and 
99 Palgrave - Documents, no 21 
100 ~' VI, no 503 
101 ibid, V, no 218 
102 Bain II, no 1402 
103 CML Bouch- Prelates and People of the Late Counties (Kendal 1948), 
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and the Archdeaconry of.Richmond. All of these had suffered severe 
losses. The estates of the Bishopric declined in value from 1291 
to 1318 from £126 7s. 7d to only £20. The Priory estates also were 
reduced in value from over £90 to again only £20. The estates of 
the canons of Lanercost and the nunnery of Armathwaite suffered even 
more, being described as wholly waste in 1318. The lands belonging 
to Holm Cultram fell in value from £206 Ss. 10d to £40 while 
Wetheral's lands were reduced in value from over £50 to only £4. 
It is almost as hard to assess the speed and completeness of the 
recovery of local agriculture as it is to estimate the precise extent 
of the original damage. A rental belonging to the Priory of 
Wetherall, first brought to attention by Professor Barrow, to some 
extent stands as a contrast to the very extensive damage caused in 
the rest of Cumbria. The rental is included, perhaps accidently for 
it is unique, in the manuscript copy of the Register of Wetherall 
P • d ;t d t "1 d f h • I 1 d • "1 1 d 104 r~ory an ~ e a~ s rents ue rom t e Pr~ory s an s ~n G~ s an . 
The rental details the sums owed in 1327. The rents owed were in 
arrears and in fact most of the tenants owed rents for from ten to 
twelve years previously. The document also contains a power of attorney 
granted by the Prior of Wetherall to Hugh of Broad Gill (Gill Latorem) 
to collect the rents owed and detailed in the schedule. Hugh was given 
full power to collect the moneys owed by distraint and distress and 
evidently his efforts were successful. He was able to collect not 
only all the money rents owed but also another rent which was paid in 
the form of a pound of wax annually. Still another rent, twelve years 
in arrers, was owed in the form of a pound of cumin, this too Hugh 
collected in full. This success has prompted Professor Barrow to 
104 Carlisle Dean and Chapter MS at CRO, Register of Wetherall 
Priory, ·schedule bound at end. 
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observe that such was the simplicity of the local economy, even after 
105 
only a few years of peace recovery could begin The Wetheral rental 
is slender evidence for this belief, however. While it is true that all 
the rents owed were, indeed, collected the entire sum involved was only 
£6 4s 4d while the total rent due annually was just £2 Bs 6d. This was 
a tiny sum compared with the losses incurred in the rest of the March, 
indeed if Bouch's valuation of the Wetherall estates is correct it was 
only around a twelfth of the Priory's annual income. The rental and 
the record of the successful collection of the sums due pose other 
questions. If the money was available why did the Prior have to wait 
so long for it? Apparently it had taken three years of peace for the 
Prior to take any steps to recover his debts. This was perhaps less a 
sign of how quickly recovery had proceeded than of how heavily estate 
administration had been disrupted. A further and much more difficult 
question to answer concerns Hugh of Broad Gill, what means did he use 
to collect the Prior's money? Was Hugh a mediaeval 'minder'? 
Like the damage caused by the war itself the speed with which the West 
March recovered from the impact of the war is extremely hard to 
quantify. There is, however, no reason to believe that given a long 
enough period of peace Cumbria could not have made a complete recovery. 
This was exactly what the region was denied, however. Active 
campaigning recommenced the year that the Prior succeeded in obtaining 
the rents his Gilsland tenants owed. The border remained an active area 
of campaigning for almost the rest of the middle ages and the chances of 
sustained recovery were as a result, slight. Destruction was not a 
solitary experience which could be repaired once and for all but a 
regular and predictable hazard and it was this which led to the dramatic 
105 Barrow - Bruce, 342 and note 
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losses which can be found in the valuations placed on estates in the 
region over a long period of time. Liddell, for example, had fallen 
in value from marginally less than £300 in 1282 to only around £70 
in 1349 106 To return to Mrs Scammell's argument, in one sense 
this was no more than an inconvenience for the Wake family, they held 
other manors in the rest of England and even in peace time they had 
devoted little attention to Liddell. For those further down the social 
scale, those whose holdings did not extend beyond the March, the 
consequences were much more serious. Sometime early in the reign of 
Edward II a local soldier, Richard de Denton, petitioned to be granted 
the forestership of Inglewood since his lands had been wholly wasted 
107 by the Scots and he had not other means of supporting himself In 
fact Denton was to enjoy a long and successful military career which 
allowed him to enlarge the family estates in a way that might not have 
been possible in peace time 108 . Others were less fortunate. Whether 
or not the economy of the West March was reaching the limits of its 
possible expansion at the end of the thirteenth century, there can be 
no doubt that the material destruction, depopulation and campaigning 
were so severe, and more importantly so sustained that the outbreak of 
war on Edward I's attempt to conquer Scotland marked a decisive break 
in the organisation of seigneurial administration on the West March. 
It is to be regretted, however, that the scanty survival of primary 
sources for agrarian history of this period makes it impossible to do 
more than sketch the way they managed their lordships in the most 
vague terms. 
106 Bain CDS, v2, no 208; Bain CDS, v3, no 1542 
107 NP no 98 
108 A selection of the family deeds of the Denton family are preserved 
at Carlisle among the Lonsdale muniments but as a result of the 
way they were arranged earlier in their career it is no longer 
possible to recreate the collection entirely, though the box marked 
Denton contains the larger part of them. 
CHAPTER II 
THE LORDSHIPS OF THE WEST MARCH 
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I 
The history of the West March. is indivisibly linked with the history of 
the great border lordships of Cumbria and of the families who held them. 
It could not have been otherwise s.ince the creation of the lordships of 
Cumbria 1 often ante-dated the establishment of the machinery of royal 
government in the region and the two grew to their final form, not in 
i.s.olation, but by symhios.is.. The resulting structure was one of great 
complexity where public and private rights were closely interwoven, 
though. the mixture varied from one lordship to another. Saving the 
important difference that Cumbria was an integral part of England, 
there were close similari.ties between the lordships of the West March 
and thos.e in the. March_ of Wales: and in Norman Ireland. Like Wales and 
Ireland, Cumbria was. a region where Norman military lordships were 
superimposed on a background which was predominantly Celtic. Simply 
because Cumbria was subject more directly to the supremacy of the 
English Crown, the situation there may have been more complex than in 
Ireland or in Wales. Th.e lordships of the Wes.t March were not created 
in one s.troke on a tahula rasa but they evolved relatively gradually 
and were remodelled and revised over a long period. The resulting 
lLybrid was a region which. was geographically distinct and which was 
governed by its own ins.titutions whi.ch linked English feudalism and 
tradi.tions. of Celtic self government and these, in turn, were 
conditioned by royal policy and family ambition. 
The oldes_t lordships. in Cumb.erland were created during the reign of 
Henry L Though. the establishment of Ranulf Meschines in the lordship 
of Carlisle represented the continuation of the policy pursued by 
William Rufus, it is only from the reign of Henry I that it is possible 
to write the tenurial history of the region in any meaningful way. 
1 For reasons that will be discussed further below, but briefly since 
there were few baronies in Cumbria in the strict sense, the term 
lordship has been preferred, even at the risk of repititiousness. 
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Both Henry and Ranulf Mes.chines played an active part in the feudal 
settlement of the area but the earliest grants are recorded as having 
been made by Meschines. Ranulf's plan appears to have been largely 
defensive and the three lords.hips he created were intended to guard the 
northern approaches to Carlisle. Turgis. Brundos was installed in a 
large lordship stretching in a long strip from the Solway estuary up the 
Esk into the high ground in the east, to protect the approaches from 
Scotland by land. Just as importantly, for it should be remembered that 
the mos.t used route from Scotland was. that across. the Solway fords, 
Robert de Trivers w.as. es.tab.lished in the peninsular of Burgh-by-Sands 
controlling the access. to thos.e fords.. A third barony, Levington, 
filled the central gap in this protective screen. 
While there is no evidence that Henry I. took Ranulf Meschines' lands in 
Cumbria into his own hands. as. the price of Ranulf' s accession to the 
,.., 
Earldom of Ches.ter "", there is no doubt that Henry did take the lordship 
of Carlisle into hi.s. own hands, probably as early as 1122. This was an 
important period in the development of the feudal geography of the 
region. I.f Ranulf had intended that the lordships of Burgh-by-Sands 
and Liddell and Levington w.ere to be dependent on his holding of Car lisle, 
Henry overturned this. plan and converted the baronies into simple tenure 
in chief. Henry followed the same pattern in creating the barony of 
Greystoke, a large holding in the fells west of the River Eden, for 
Forne, son of S.igulf, and this. tenure descended into one family without 
partition for over three hundred years. 
The Book of Fees also ascribes the creation of the two great lordships 
2 H A Cronne, 'Ranulf de Gernons., Earl of Chester 1129-53', 
Transactions of the Royal His.torical Society, Series 4, v20 (1937) 
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3 
of the Cwnberland coast to Henry I though, as suggested earlier, it 
is possible that these 'creations' in fact simply ratified a situation 
arranged by Ranulf Meschines. Whether or not this was true, by the end 
of Henry I's reign, two large discrete lordships had been created, one 
Allerdale, held hy Waltheof, s.on of Gospatric, stretching from the 
Wampool to the Derwent, while the other, Copeland, reaching from the 
Derwent to the Duddon in the s_outh_ was held by William de Meschines, 
Ranulf's younger brother. As ProfessDr Barrow has pointed out the clear 
geographic boundaries of these districts and their co-incidence with 
local ecclesiastical boundaries. strongly sugges.ts that thes.e lordships 
were based on earli.er divisions and it is possible to reconcile this 
hypothesis with the evidence provided by the writ of Gospatric 4 Even 
i£ the early feudal settlement of the region was not based on pre-
existing divisions., the early pattern of s.ettlement was clear and simple 
but this rugged and pleasing s.implici.ty did not long endure. Indeed 
some of the large and recognisahly geographic lordships had begun to 
break up even before others. had been 'brought into the feudal fold'. 
As a result i.t is necessary to try to untangle the early his.tory of the 
lordships from such evidence as. survives. and from the complexities 
created by the frequent intermarriages. among the families. of the 
Norman settlers. .. 
The early history of the lordships. of the West March is often told with 
the aid of a series: of inter-related pedigrees which originated in a 
series. of cases aris.ing from attempts by the heirs of Aveline de Forz 
3 Book of Fees, v2, 177, 178 
4 Barrow, 'Pattern of Lordship and Feudal Settlement', Journal 
Mediaeval History, vl (1976) 24; VCH vl, 241 and note 
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5 
to gain recognition for their claim to inherit The use made of 
these documents has varied as. has the prevailing opinion of their 
provenence and value. The problem was solved by James. Wilson in the 
county history who recognised them not as the 'monkish. legends' they 
were. formally held to be hut as. lawyers. brie£s compiled by the claimants 
for use in the cases over the honours of Cockermouth_ and Skipton. 
Whether lawyers ought to be regarded as. more reliable w.itnesses than 
monks. in general, the Des.cent of Multon and Lucy is not to b.e regarded 
as. trus.tworthy evidence on the early tenurial his.tory of Cumberland, 
though it can on occasion shed light on points of detai.L 
The bas.is. of the descent of the lordships. of the Cumberland coast is 
the des.cent of the lordship of Copeland, itself probably the greatest 
of the judicial immuniti.es. in the area. On the death of the earliest 
known lord of Copeland, Willi.am Meschines, his son Ranulf succeeded to 
his. lands, but Ranulf di.ed without male heir. Copeland as a result 
passed to William's daughter and heir, Alice, whose mother was Cecily 
de Rumelly the daughter of Robert, Lord of Skipton. At some time before 
1138 Alice married William FitzDuncan, the nephew of David I of Scots. 
Early in Stephen's reign David gained control of Cumberland and it is 
clear that shortly after William and Alice were in control of Copeland 
and this tenure is well regarded by grants they made to the Priory of 
6 St. Bees The Descent records that William FitzDuncan also held 
5 There are several forms of the document. It appears in the Reg 
St Bees, no 498, in Bain, CDS v2 no 64, which is reprinted in Reg 
St Bees as Appendix no 8. Other texts are to be found in the 
Register of Wetherall Priory, ed. J E Prescott (1897), Placitorum 
Abbreviate (Record Commission 1811), 323. The descent was discussed 
in Parliament where other copies appeared. J Strachey, Rotuli 
Parliamentorum and others (1965), 170, 191 303, 347. Another copy 
is in the Lucy Cartulary. The best treatment of the document and 
of the descent of the family is CT Clay's Early Yorkshire Charters 
v7, (Yorkshire Record Society Extra Series 1947) 
6 Reg St Bees, nos 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 
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Allerdale though it is known from other evidence that Waltheof was 
succeeded in Allerdale by his son Alan 7 and it seems more likely that 
a claim was transmitted to William's. offspring through him though he 
never held the lordship in person, and William and Alice's son, William 
of Egremont, is known to have succeeded to Allerdale as well as to 
8 Copeland William of Egremont dLed lacking an heir of his body, 
however, and his lands. were divided among his s.isters, Cecily, Mabel 
and Alice as co-heirs.. 
Cecily succeeded to Skipton in Craven and married William le Gros, Earl 
of Aumale, though s.he clearly maintained her claim to Allerdale and 
Copeland. Mabel was. married to Reginald de Lucy, and it was she who was 
reported to hold Egremont and Copeland in 1212 9 The youngest of the 
sisters was given in marriage to Gilbert Pipard, according to the 
10 Descent, taklilg wi_th her As.patria, Allerdale and Cockermouth . While 
this. would he insufficient evidence taken alone, the Pipe Rolls 
corroborate this version.. In the s.eventh year of Richard I the Five 
Vills. of Copeland belonging to Robert de Curteney, Alice's second 
11 husband, paid three marks. that their verdict be heard favourably and 
it seems highly probably that it was at this time that the five townships 
of Dene, Brigham, Clifton, Eglisfield and Crakesothen, which lie South 
of the Derwent and therefore originally in Copeland, were joined to the 
castle of Cockermouth of which they formed a highly enfranchised banlieu. 
Alice and her husbands also held Caldbeck and Aspatria which were later 
7 Bain ~' v2; no 64; Reg St Bees, no 14 
8 ibid, no 27 
9 Book of Fees, v2, 178 
10 Bain II, no 64 
11 Pipe Roll 7 Richard I, Pipe Roll Society, v64 (1929), 216 
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to descend to the Lucy family. In 1206 Alice and Robert de Curteney 
12 paid £200 for seisin of Caldbeck • Some time before March 1215, 
however, Alice died leaving no heir of either of her husbands and her 
estates. fell to be partioned.. Ali.ce' s heirs were the descendants of 
her sis.ters Cecily and Mabel though_ it appears. that a dispute had 
developed over the distribution of William of Egremont's lands even 
before Alice's death~ In 1200 Richard de Lucy, the son of Mabel, gave 
300 marks for pos.s.es.s.ion of lands in Copeland and for a reasonable 
parti.tion of the lands whi.ch_ he claimed against Robert de Curteney and 
Baldwin de Bethune, Earl of Aumale. Significantly, the margin heading 
13 for this entry is not Cumberland but Copeland • It is. probable that 
Richard de Lucy, Reginald's. son, was in p'\Js.es.sion of a lordship 
consisting of Copeland with the exception of the Five Vills of 
Cockermouth based on Egremont~ Ri.chard de Lucy died without a male heir 
and his heirs were his. two daughters. by his wife Ada de Morvill who was 
in her turn a co-heir to the barony of Burgh-by-Sands .. 
Three such eligible brides w_ere valuable commoditi.es. in the later years 
of John's reign and in 1213 Thomas de Multon of Fleet in Lincoln paid 
14 1000 marks for custody of the ladies of Egremont to whom he married 
his two sons by a previous. marriage, I"ambert and Alan. Shortly afterwards 
Thomas completed his family's acquisitions in Cumberland by marrying Ada 
de Morvill, the mother of his. son • s wives. himself. There were thus two 
partitions which s.tood to he made in the early years of Henry II.I. 
Firstly a settlement was required between the claims of the ladies of 
Egremont and William de Forz who had succeeded to the claims of his 
12 T D Hardy, Rotuli de Oblatis et Finibus, (Record Commission 1835) 
352 
13 ibid, 45 
14 ibid, 482 
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mother and his granmother Cecily de Rumelly. A seperate partition was 
also required between the ladies of Egremont and their husbands. It was 
these settlements which created th.e lordships of Cockermouth, Aspatria 
and Egremont as they were cons.tituted in the thirteenth century. 
I_t seems. hard to escape the conclus.ions that William de Forz received 
rather more than jus.ti.ce in the partition that was. made between himself 
and the heires.s.es. of Egremont~ In 1215 he was ordered to be given 
s.eis.in of Cockermouth., part of Aspatria and Caldbeck as well as Rudston 
. h . . h h' 15 Ln Nort ampton ~n Nott~ng am s ~re Even when a further partition 
~as. made between Forz and the ladies. of Egremont, he came well out of 
the deal. Cockermouth remained to him by right of seniority, being the 
cq;gu.t honoris. Forz als.o gained a moiety of Aspatria and the mills of 
- 16 
Crosshy and Birkby • Even this parti.tion displeased the Earl and it 
is clear that he attempted to delay proceedings. es.pecially over the 
contentious. matter of the division of the forest. Finally, a partition 
~as. made whereby Forz retained Derwentfells while the ladies of Egremont 
were given the res.t of the Braithwaite fells. 
The partition between the ladies_ of Egremont, in part, reflected older 
territorial divisions.. By right of ainesse 1 Mabel retained Copeland, 
wi.th. the exception of the Liberty of the Five Vills outside the borough 
of Cockermouth, centred on Egremont_ The younger sister Ali.ce and her 
husband Alan sued against Mabel in 1230 and the record of this suit 
provides good evidence on the lands. ajudged to them. Alice and Alan 
were to hold Aspatria wi.th_ the exclus.ion of the lands previously 
granted to William de Forz.. They also received Braithwai.te Fells and 
15 Ratuli Litterarum Clausarum, vl, 191 
16 Bain I, no 889 
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another upland area in Caldheck as well as Buttermere and Loweswater 
17 
wi.th. a moiety of Broughton and other lands in Allerdale Both 
families however continued to cast envious. eyes on the honour of 
Cockermouth. and after the death_ of Aveline de Forz in 1274 both 
families tried to press their claims in a long and celebrated series 
of cases .. 
The descent of the lordships of Copeland and Allerdale has been treated 
at some length and th.e complexity of the descent demands it. The 
descent of these two lordships involves the history of no less. than 
four of th.e major families. of the region. Cockermouth, the liberty of 
the Five Vills., part of As.patria and part of the forest betw_een the 
Cocker and the Derwent continued in the possession of the Forz family 
until 1292 when they reverted, or were caus.ed to revert, to the crown. 
Copeland, with. the exception of the Five Vills. descended in the family 
of Lambert de Multon and Mahel de Lucy, this branch. of the family being 
generally referred to as. th.e Multons of Egremont or occas.ionally as the 
18 Multons of Ireland s.ince they also held extensive es.tates there 
Aspatria, Caldbeck and Braithwai.te formed the patrimony of the 
descendants of Alan de Multon and Ali.ce de Lucy who continued the 
surname of de Lucy. The father of hath Alan and Lambert de Multon, 
Thomas de Multon of Fleet, having provided for th.e sons of his first 
marriage provided perhaps better s.till for his. son by this marriage to 
Ada de Morvill, Thomas who married, before 1240, Maud sole heiress of 
19 
the de Vaux barony of Gils.land Thomas I. of Fleet's. son, of the 
s.ame name, began the family of the de Multons of Gils.land, though. through 
17 ibid, no 1106 
18 R Frame, The English Lordship in Ireland (Oxford 198.2), 54 
19 CCR 1.237-42, 188 
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his mother, Ada, he also inherited half the lordship of Burgh-by-Sands, 
20 
thus establishing for his family a very strong position on the border . 
The rest of Burgh-by-Sands also devolved to the lords of Gilsland during 
the lifetime of Thomas II de Multon. William Briewerre purchased the 
marriage of Joan, the co-heir of Ada de Morvill, for his nephew Richard 
de Gernon in 1202 but no male heir resulted from the marriage and on 
Joan's death in 1247 the barony was further divided between her own co-
heirs Ada and Helwise 21 Ada died without male heir in 1271 and her 
sister Helewise, who married Eustace de Balliol, a younger brother of 
John de Balliol, Lord of Barnard Castle, in the following year. Her 
heir for the moiety of Burgh-by-Sands which she held on her death was 
Thomas III de Multon of Gilsland, a prospect which seems to have been 
much to her family's distaste, probably because Thomas II de Multon was 
a leading member of the baronial party during the disturbance of the 
Realm while Eustace de Balliol was a prominent leader of the royalist 
22 party The last representative of the Multons of Gilsland, Thomas V, 
died in 1313 leaving a daughter Margaret whose marriage during the reign 
of Edward II raised Ranulph de Dacre to the front rank of local society. 
The Multons of Gilsland, the Multons of Egremont, the Lucies of 
Aspatria and the Forz of Cockermouth were among the leading families 
of the West March but neither were they the only magnate families in 
the region nor was the region divided solely into large lordships. The 
particular complexity of their inter-related family histories which 
resulted in the creation of the lordships of Cumberland coast 
necessitates extended discussion but other cases, such as the barony of 
20 see Multon's obituary from Mathhew Paris, Historia Anglorum 
v2, 439 
21 Rotuli de Oblatis, 184 
22 CIPM, v1, nos 752, 811 
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Greystoke or the lordship of Liddell were not subject to division 
during the period under s.tudy. In other cas.es, such as. the barony of 
Levington, the problem was excessive sub-division, making it impossible 
to trace the descent in detail without exces.s.ive discussion of the family 
history of increasingly less important families.. The holders of the 
portions of the barony of Levington merged into a wider group of smaller 
tenants in chief who formed an important local stratum in the area, 
particularly in th.e north of Cumberland, the area originally included in 
the lordship of Carlisle taken into royal custody by Henry I. The 
holders of these tenures can be broadly categorised as forming the 
local gentry and they were economically very similar to the mesne 
tenants of the greater liberties., though the degree of integration 
between these two groups varied.. The final element in the tenurial map 
of Cumberland was land which. was. re.tained in the hands of the crown. 
There were important royal manors. in Cumb.erland, particularly around 
Penri.th. After 1242 a number of these manors were formed into the 
liberty of the kings. of Scots., for a time the most highly privileged 
immunity in the region, but after John de Balliol's fall from Edward I's 
grace the manors were again taken into crown possession. 
So far this study has dealt exclusively with Cumb.erland. Westmorland 
however was accounted as_ part of the March of Scotland just as much as 
its northern neighbour and there were understandably close links between 
23 
the two counties Westmorland, or Westmarieland, first appeared as 
a fiscal area in 1176, though it was initially a sub-division of 
24 Yorkshire The county was essentially an agglomeration of two great 
baronies, Kendale and Appleby, the latter being originally more closely 
attached to Carlisle. Appleby continued to look more towards Cumberland 
23 Bain .~ L' t flO ).I DJ 
24 VCH, vl, 311 
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while the barony of Kendale had perhaps closer links with north 
Lancashire~ 
The barony of Kendale was originally granted to Iva de Tailleboys but 
it passed into the control of the lords. of Workington who s.tyled 
25 
themselves. as the de Lancas.ters • By 1184 the family became extinct 
in the male line and the heiress Helewise was granted to Gilbert Fitz-
26 Reinfrey who was to rise high in the confidence of John Despite his 
part in the rebellion agains._t John, Gilbert was able to pass on his lands 
intact to his son William who revived the name of de Lancaster. On his 
death in 1246 the barony was. partitioned between his sisters Alice and 
27 Helewis.e and their husbands Walter de Lindsey and Peter de Brus . Half 
the barony comprising half the town of Kirkby in Kendale (present day 
Kendal) with_ a manor based on the shores of Lake Windermere remaining in 
the possession of Walter de Lindsey and his family, falling eventually 
to his grand-daughter Chris.tiana and her husband Ingelram de Gynes. The 
other moiety, the Kent valley, fell to he divided among the heirs of 
Peter de Brus and was. increasingly partitioned among co-heirs rsulting 
in a proliferation of small and probably neglected holdings. 
The main body of the county of Wes.tmorland was formed in the early 
thirteenth century for one of John's closest lietenants. Robert de Vipont. 
The gradual way in which Vipont 
was allowed only little by little to gain control of W.estmorland s.hould 
not blind us to the fact that, particularly after John's death, Robert 
was able to establish himself as the master of the greatest of the 
25 Sanders, English Baronies, 56 
26 Holt, Northerners, 225 
27 CIPM, vl, no 114 
Page 83 
28 lordships of the West March. • The terms of John's grant to Robert de 
Vipont raised him and his. heirs a degree above the ranks of the other 
lords of the region for i.t conveyed rights which were held more 
generally by the crown than by a tenant in chief. Though the lordship 
was held nominally as. four knight 1 s. fees, Vipont gained control of almost 
an entire county. He was. granted the whole bailiwick of the county of 
Westmorland and th.e services. and fealty of all the tenants of the crown 
there with th.e exception of those who held by knight service, in effect 
only the lords of Kendale were exempted. Even the lords of Greystokes' 
29 lands of Dufton in Westmorland were held of the lords of Appleby 
Technically, the lordship of W.estmorland was not elevated into a liberty, 
like Cockermouth for example, but the hereditery shrievalty was in a real 
way more us:eful. It could even be argued, and the lords of Appleby 
certainly believed, that Vipont and his. heirs enjoyed a jurisdiction 
which extended over the lands. of the lords of Kendale and the rights of 
the hereditary sheriffs. of W.es.tmorland in Kendale provided a dispute 
whi.ch. smouldered on from the reign of Henry III to that of Henry VIII. 
Jurisdictionally and territorially the lordship of Appleby was the most 
important of the lordships of the West March and its holders enjoyed a 
position of pre-eminence in Cumbria which was a central feature in the 
history of the region. It was no accident that the later holders of 
Appleby, the Cliffords, were to be the dominant local power in the West 
March for much of the later middle ages, and this ris.e will be discussed 
in detail, for the pres.ent it suffices to note that their power and 
influence were built on the foundations. laid by Robert de Vipont or if 
28 T D Hardy, Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, (Record Commission 1835), 
25, 27, Bodleian Library-MS Dodsworth 70 1 J.2s. A confirmation 
is printed in CPR 1396-99, 267. See also Historical Manuscripts 
Commission-MS Wells, v2, 549. Holt, Northerners, 226 provides 
comment. 
29 Hist and Antiq, vl, 17 
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the lordships of the West March are considered as merely tenurial blocks, 
Appleby was the most important .. 
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II 
So far, the lordships of the West March_ have been discussed simply as 
areas on a territorial map. In one sense one might view them just as 
counters in an elaborate tenurial game, generally pass.ed down within 
one family, but sometimes lost to another, or if necessary partitionable 
into neat fractions. among co-parceners.. When we go beyond this level of 
discus.sion, however, we are immediately aware that the lordships of the 
W.es.t March were part of a frontier society and a society which possessed 
recognisable and, on occasion, unusual local customs. Both these facts, 
together w_ith the history of the region were ins-trumental in creating 
the dis.tinctive righ_ts. and pow.ers. of the lordships of the West March as 
they existed in the thirteenth and fourteenth_ centuries ... 
The first point which must be made is a very simple one but one whose 
importance necessitates its being s.tated precisely. The West March was 
explicitly and completely part and parcel of England in the way that 
much of the March_ of Wales. was not. The lords of the region, in 
consequence owed service to the English crown for the lands which they 
held directly of the crown. The terms. on which they were held, if we 
exclude ecclesiastical poss.ess.ions. s~uch as the Bishops of Carlisles' 
liberty of Dals.ton which_ were held in frankalmoign, may be divided into 
two categories.~ In one group w.ere the lordships which were created by 
Henry I. or Ranulf I Mes.chines and whi.ch continued to be held in the 
thirteenth_ century on the s.ame terms_ as. they were created. A second 
group was held on quite different terms, and although this group com-
prised only four lordships, Gilsland, Appleby, Kendale and Copeland, 
though_ the case of Copeland is. in some respects rather different, these 
were among the most important holdings. in the region. Unlike the other 
lordships in Cumbria, these four, or perhaps more precisely three, were 
held by knight s.ervice. 
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It is perhaps easiest to deal with. the knight service tenures first. 
It is clear that these impos.tions. of knight service on the lordships of 
the Wes.t March was limited to those lordships. which came into the control 
of the crown from the reign of Henry II. onwards and this represented a 
s.ignificant modification of the existing system of service owed in the 
area. Th.e creation of the lordship of Appleby has already been discussed 
but it is evident that John's. policy with regard to military service was 
a continuation of that of Henry II In 1200 John converted Gilbert 
FitzReinfrey' s lands. in Kendale from carnage tenure to tenure as one 
knigh.t • s. fee 30 and in this: John was. following the precedent set by 
Henry II. When Henry II_ regained control of Cumberland from the king 
of Scots, he installed Huhert de Vaux in Gilsland as lord of Gilsland 
crediting the fee with tw:o knigh.t' s. fees in preference to the existing 
carnage tenure customary in the area. 
The introduction of knight s.ervi.ce into Cumbria provides, on close study, 
another clear example the separation of the region's development from 
that of the rest of England. Though cons.iderable and learned effort 
has been devoted to th.e task of tracing the origins and modifications of 
knight service in England from the Norman Conques.t onwards 31 , it must 
freely be admitted that much of this. is simply irrelevant to the history 
of the West March. From 1066 to the accession of Henry II, knight service 
was of no importance in Cumbria and there is no profit to be gained from 
trying to apply discussions of the inter-relation between hides and 
knight's fees to the region. The knight's fee which was created in 
Cumberland were not in their inception intended as military tenures in 
the way which has been generally imagined, that is, one cavalryman from 
30 Maitland - 'Northumbrtan Tenures', 92 
31 A recent discuss.ion is provided by S Harvey 'The Knight and the 
Knight's Fee in England', Past and Present, v49_ (_1970) and see 
the literature cited there. 
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a given area of land~ Th_ey can only mak_e s.ens.e as fis.cal rather than 
military uni.ts. In the firs:t place they can have had nothing to dow 
wi.th the defence of the Border, this. was an obligation which did not 
need to be elevated into a form of tenure seperate from the existing 
style of land-holding. Secondly it s.eems in a high degree unlikely 
that the tenures by knight service in Cumbria were created in order to 
provide military manpow.er for the Angevins' continental wars. The 
clue to their purpose. is. provided, however, by the dating of the creation 
of the first of the lordships. of the Wes.t March to be erected into 
tenure by knight service, Gilsland. This, as we have s.een, was granted 
to Hubert de Vaux as two knight's. fees. in 1158.. This was precisely a 
year after Henry II had recognised the unsuitability of the existing 
system of knight's fees to raise a force for war, even in Wales, Henry 
h . d d th k . h h ld 'd h' d 32 av1ng provi e at every tw.o n1g ts s ou prov1 e a t 1r . The 
knight's fees in Cumberland and later in Westmorland were intended to 
provide not the extens.ion of a truly 'feudal' military system into 
Cumbria but to broaden the basis. of taxation for the crown in a region 
newly restored to its authority. Indeed since the usual method of 
taxation during the Angevin era was. Scutage, it was only by the creation 
of, wholly nominal, knight's. fees. that the region could be effectively 
and regularly taxed_ The s.uggestion that the knight's fee tenures were 
introduced into Cumb.erland and W.estinorland as units for the levying of 
taxation, rather than as. military fees in the strictes.t sense seems, at 
first sight, to run contrary to a suggestion made by Rachel Reid in her 
33 important essay Barony and Thanage • In fact Rachel Reid's conclusion 
was completely the reverse; the lordships. of the West March, she 
asserted, did not pay feudal aids. This conclusion, however, was based 
on misleading evidence, the Feudal Aid taken for the marriage of Blanche 
32 ibid, 35 
33 R Reid- 'Barony and Thanage", EHR, v35 (1920), 183 
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. 34 
the daughter of Henry IV ln 1407 . This. is of high. interest for the 
fifteenth century but its value for the his.tory of the region before 
then is minimal. Much better evidence is. provided by the Pipe Rolls of 
the reign of Henry III, a s.ource which Miss Reid did not use. In 
1245-46, for example, an aid was. levied for the marriage of Henry III's 
eldest daughter and the sums paid from Cumberland were exactly what we 
should expect. Thomas de Multon of Gilsland accounted for forty 
s.hillings for his two knight l s. fees. while Mul ton of Egremont accounted 
35 for twenty shillings. for the one fee in Copeland What then of the 
claim that the lordships of Cumberland did not pay feudal aids? It is 
not, in truth_, wholly fals.e but the facts are complicated. It is true 
that the feudal side granted on the marriage of Blanche of Lancaster 
no feudal aid was. paid from Gilsland then held by Thomas de Dacre or 
from Cockermouth. then held by Ralph Nevill of Westmorland. In the case 
of Gilsland i.t was. ass.erted that the liberty was exempt from feudal 
aids. As we have seen, how.ever, this. claim was not borne out by the 
practice of the reign of Henry III... The puzzle thus created can be 
solved, however, if we consider the case of Egremont which was also 
held by the Earl of W.es.tmorland after the temporary eclipse of the 
Percies. The lordship of Egremont had heen divided into three on the 
death of John de Multon and hy the time Henry, first Earl of 
Northumberland, two of these parts belonged to the Lucies. By 
inheritance from Maud de Lucy, Henry Percy's second wife, the Percies 
gained control of these lands while one third of Egremont descended to 
John de Harrington.. Since up until the reign of Ed'f/ard I, Egremont 
had been asses.S'!at one knight's fee we should have expected Harrington 
to have accounted for 6s 8d and Nevill to have paid the remaining 
34 Feudal Aids, (Public Record Office 19.20) , vl, 244 
35 F H M Parker - The Pipe Rolls of Cumb.erland and Westmorland 
1226-1266, {Kendal l905l 115 
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l3s 4d owed for Egremont. This, however, did not happen. Harrington 
paid his portion but Nevi.ll' s lands were alleged, like Gilsland, to 
be exempt from feudal aids.. Since both Harrington and Nevill held 
parts of Egremont from the same partition, this was clearly absurd, 
for tenurially there was no di£ference between the two. The truth 
seems to be that the powerful Nevi.lls and Dacres were able, in effect, 
to refuse to pay the feudal aids. though this refusal was cloaked in 
spurious claims to exemption. Significantly, however, the much less 
powerful Harrington was. not suffi.ciently influential - the temptation 
is to use the word overmighty - to escape payment as Dacre, Nevill 
36 
and later Henry Percy were able to do • For the present purpose 
though. it is sufficient to note that whatever exemptions the later 
magnates of the Anglo-Scottish border were able to appropriate, the 
origin of the knigh.t' s fees of the W.est March were, as the aid of 
1240 showed, financial rather than military. So far from being 
exempt from feudal aids, as Rachel Reid believed, they were rather 
created as units for the payment of feudal taxation. 
There is no doubt that the services owed by the rest of the tenants-
in-chief of the Wes.t March, and by the mesne tenants too, were 
different in kind from those owed by comparable tenants in Domesday 
England. As we have seen, knight service did exis.t on the West March 
but it was in general an exception. The lords of the region did owe 
the crown two forms of service in its place and these may, for 
conveni.ence only, be referred to as border service. There was firstly 
a clear military duty. This was in one sense the counterpart of the 
general forinsec service but on the March of Scotland it took a very 
36 Feudal Aids, vl, 245 
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definite and comprehensible form 37 The jurors in the inquisition 
post mortem of Joan de Morvill s~t out precisely what the military 
obligation expected of the barony of Burgh-by-Sands was, if the king 
should pass into Scotland by way of Cumberland, going in the vanguard 
38 
of the army and returning in the rearguard The Book of Fees shows 
that this was exactly the service owed by the tenants of the March, 
both. the great and the less. great. John de Reigny, for example, held 
Newton Reigny by the service of providing a squire equipped with a 
39 
hauberk to go in the van and rearguard of the king's army 
Though., as Maitland demonstrated, this. form of tenure persisted through 
the middle ages, i.ts preci.s.e legal implications were rarely worked out 
in detai.L In one cas.e Odard de Wigton who held by the usual service 
40 
of 'outward' it was ruled that this was a form of grand serjeanty 
and thi.s term mi.gh.t be applied generally to other holdings in the region. 
The military implications. w_ere worked out w.i th more attention, however. 
In 1224 Richard de Levington, having been summoned to attend the siege 
of Bedford, against Fawkes de Breaute, failed to attend. The sheriff 
of Cumberland was forbidden to distrain him to attend, however, because 
he held not by knight service but by carnage. Even Maitland, who 
commented on this. cas.e, failed to bring out the essential point. It 
w.as, not that Richard was not a military tenant but rather that he was 
bound to do service agains.t the Scots and nowhere else, but even this 
was not explicitly mounted service. There were close similarities 
37 F W. Maitland - 'Northumbrian Tenures' in Collected Papers , 
(_cambridge 1911), v2, 99, 97 
38 CIPM, vl, no 106 
39 Book of Fees, v2, 198 
40 F W Maitland - Bracton's Notebook, (Cambridge 1881), no 1270 
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between this si tuati.on and that on the March of W.ales.. Indeed the two 
areas enjoyed closer links between one another than with the rest of 
England. The W.elsh. Marchers. commonly claimed that they held their land 
only by the servi.ce of defending it and by doing so defending the realm 
41 itself This type of service was. clearly understood on the West 
March, though it is fair to s.ay that this type of obligation is less 
visible than th.e van and rearguard service, no doubt because the 
responsibi.li ty to defend one's land was. self evident to the mediaeval 
noble. It is clear too that the crown continued to regard the 
horderers. as hound to serve as the first line of defence against the 
42 Scots. 
Like the lords of the Welsh March. the lords of the West March owed 
little service to the feudal levy. In contrast to Northumberland 
43 
where many baronies owed hath. carnage and one knight's fee , carnage 
on the West March was. incompatible with knight's service. It was as 
an alternative that military service was credited to Kendale not as 
an addition. The only exception to this rule was Copeland, which was 
considered as one knigh.t' s. fee, though it has. been plausibly suggested 
that this referred only to the lordship of Millom, an important mesne 
tenure, held of Egremont for one knigh.t' s. service 
44 
The rolls of 
service for the campaigns in Wales bear this out though the evidence 
must be treated with caution. At first sight the testimony of the 
41 R R Davies - Lordship and Society in the March of Wales, 
(.Oxford 1981), 251 
42 ~, vl, 77 
43 Book of Fees, v2, 199 and following 
44 Reid - 'Barony and Tha~,~·; EHR, v35, (1920}, 183 
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muster rolls seems to run in direct contradiction to this thesis. 
Service is recorded, not only from the baronies held by knight's fees, 
Appleby and Gilsland, but als.o from lordships held by carnage. Thus 
Thomas de Lucy and Ralph FLtzWi.lliam recognised service, apparently 
for lands in Cwnberland 45 but this is, in a sense, an illusion. The 
proffers of servi.ce seem to have been recorded not under the county 
from which they were due hut under the county with. which the lord was 
most closely associated. For example, though Thomas. de Lucy made fine 
for one knight's fee in Cumberland in 1282, it can be shown that this 
was owed for Lucy's lands in Northumberland and half the barony of 
Langley which with Allerwash., Fours;tanes. and Wardoun were assessed in 
Lucy's inquisition post mortem as. one knight's fee 46 • The same 
principle will explain the four and a quarter knight's service 
proffered by Ralph FitzWi.lliam for his. uncle John de Greys toke's lands. 
Again the heading is Cumberland but for the four fees owed two are 
clearly recognLsable as having been owed for the moiety of the barony 
of Morpeth which Greystoke held of the inheritance of Margaret de 
Morlay whi.le the remaining two and a quarter were owed from Greys toke's 
lands in Yorkshire. 47 No service w.as. proffered for Greystoke itself 
It is worth setting this discussion in context. The argument set out 
above attempts to show only that the lords of the English North-West 
frontier, except those who held explici.tly by knight • s service, such 
as Clifford and Leyburn, did not ow.e service anywhere but in Scotland 
as an inescapable part of tenure, the sole exception to this rule being 
45 Parl Writs, vl, 204, 209 
46 CIPM, v3, 218 
47 Book of Fees, v2, 201; Parl Writs, vl, 230. Greystoke also 
accounted for four and a quarter fees in Northumberland, 
clearly a duplicate entry. 
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Copeland.. In 1300 Thomas de Mul ton of Egremont made fine for two 
serjeants, presumably owed for the seigneurie of Millum, rather than 
for Egremont itself, for which Multon owed the usual military service 
48 
as.socia ted with carnage tenure This is not to suggest, of course, 
that the lords of the Wes;t March. took no part in campaigns outwith the 
region, any more than, for example, those magnates who held on the 
March. of Wales, though_ they refused to do military service for their 
lands. elsewhere, were unwi.lling to go to war against the Scots. A 
parallel principle held good for the lords of the Wes.t March. As we 
have seen they were willing, or rather obliged, to do service for 
their lands elsewhere in England as. they were not for their lands in 
Cumbria, but it did not follow that the lords of the West March were 
unwilling to put their resDurces. at the disposal of the king, on 
occasion, beyond the limits. of their strict obligation. Though Matilda 
de Multon of Gils.land fined in lieu of the service of two knight's fees 
owed for Gilsland, her son Thomas de Multon also took part in the 
49. 
campaign against the Welsh. There were, however, yet others who 
though. they owed no duty to serve against the Welsh were still summoned 
to go against them as John de Hudlestone of Mi.llom and Wi.lliam de 
Derwentw.ater, a mesne tenant of the honour of Cockerrnouth,were, 
probably because both were reckoned as experienced soldiers, though it 
should be noted that it appears to have been much easier to be included 
on the lists of those liable to be summoned than to be removed from 
them once included. Roger de Leyhurn w.as repeatedly summoned after his 
death. However, neither Hudlestone nor Derwentwater appear to have 
gone on campaign nor do they appear to have been penalised in any way 
for not so doing. 
48 Palgrave - Documents, 222 
49 Parl Writs, vl, 239; CPR 1281-92, 35 
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The general obligation of the borderers to do s.ervice agains.t the Scots 
has already been discussed and as a result it was natural that 
successive English kings should look to the marchers first when dealing 
forcibly wi.th the Scots. Henry III felt entitled in 1258 to demand 
that the marchers of Cumberland, Westmorland and a number of named 
liberti.es serve under Edmund of Lancaster in a planned expedition in 
so 
support of Alexander I.II Edw..ard I behaved in a s.imilar way. In 
1291 he summoned for the opening of the sessions of the Great Cause at 
Norh.am a display of force calculated to impress, if not actually 
intimidate, the Scots.. For much of thi.s force Edward looked to the 
51 North of England Si.gni£1-cantly, Edward was able to summon, not 
only most of the active lords cf the region, but also three ladies on 
busLiles.s connected wi.th_ Scotland. There were, however, limits to the 
service which could he demanded from the borderers. In 1297 Robert de 
Clifford and Henry Percy w_ere to declare that the unpaid service done 
by the men of Cumberland and W.estmorland on a foray against the Scots 
should not stand as. a precedent, an agreement that Edw.ard I later 
52 
ratified 
The borderers staked their case in 1297 on their distinctive form of 
tenure and it is clear that they wEre unwilling to allow the 
accelerating war effort to erode their special status. As has been 
discussed, only four of the lordships of the West March were held by 
knight service. As a result, though, like the Welsh March, the 
Western Border contributed very little to the feudal levy but a clear 
distinction can be drawn between the two areas in respect of the other 
incidents of feudal tenure. On the Welsh March these were very 
50 Bain CDS, v2, no 2103 
51 Parl Writs I, 256. 
52 Bain CDS, v2, no 899; CPR 1292- 1301, 305 
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incompletely enforced. In Cumbria, however, though mos.t of the 
lordships were held by carnage the crown was. able to ins.ist on its 
rights much more effectively. Before discussing these points in 
detail, however, it would be valuable to clarify the issue of carnage. 
Fortunately the work of a series of scholars has made this. a simple 
matter and it need not be expanded unduly. Essentially, as William 
Rees has shown, carnage, noutgeld or horngeld was a cattle payment of 
celtic origin though by the end of the twelfth century it had come to 
be fixed as a money render. Carnage was. directly comparable wi.th the 
Scottish cain or the Welsh comn1orth. and in Cumbria was often levied 
b . 11 t . . 11 53 1.-annua y or r1.-enn1.a y • Ultimately all the carnage paid by 
the West March was owed to the crown and this was another important 
difference between the Anglo-Scottish. and the March of Wales. In Wales 
the lords alone collected the commorth payments, in Cumbria as in the 
case of Liddell Strength the lord migh.t only act as. the collector of 
a revenue which. was. ultimately ow.ed to the crown. Even in the one 
case where the carnage payments. were collected for the exclusive use 
of the lord, in the barony of Appleby, this right was held not under 
royal s.uffrance but by specific royal grant of the service of all the 
tenants who did not hold by mi.li.tary service. 
The importance of carnage tenure declined during the middle ages. In 
the twelfth century, with the exception of Egremont, tenure by carnage 
and by knight service seem to have been regarded as incompatible, and 
there were some advantages. to holding by carnage in view of what has 
already been said concerning taxation but the clarity of the distinc-
tion between the two faded in time and claims by the borderers for 
53 W Rees - 'The survival of Ancient Celtic Cus.tom in England'; 
J R R Tolki.en - Angles and Britons, (Cardiff 1963).; 
G W S Barrow - 'Northern English Society in the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Centuries:'; Nli, v4 (1969), 15 
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exemption from the incidents. of feudal tenure by virtue of tenure by 
carnage met with stiff resistance. In 1223 William de Forz, Earl of 
Aumale claimed that as the estates of Richard de Lucy were held by 
carnage no wardship was ow:ed to the crown from them. The Earl's 
claim convinced Rachel Reid but it left the justices unimpressed and 
l't 11 d 54 was not a owe . In any event, the Earl probably did his case 
no good by admitting a claim put forward by Thomas de Multon on behalf 
of the crown, that the marriage of the heirs. belonged to the crown. 
Another case underlines. this point and interestingly it concerns the 
lordship of Wigton, which. was: accounted as. a grand serjeanty. According 
to an inquisition taken hy the sheri££ of Cumb.erland, Odard de Wigton 
held Melmerby with S.tainton, Blakehale and Warwick in chi.ef and paid 
carnage for them. He also held Wigton of the Earl of Aumale paying 
carnage for it. On Odard's death his lands were taken into wardship, 
there being no sign that prerogative w.ardship was. not enforced until 
the majority of his heir, W~lter de Wigton. Melmerby, indeed, was held 
in wardship even after the coming of age of Walter but the case is 
valuable in that it establishes. that wardship was owed by carnage 
tenants whether they held in chief 55 .or mediately That the Earl's 
claim was directly contradi.ctory to that made by his father in 1223 
need not be rmarked, indeed the Earl show.ed himself a greater respector 
of the law than the crown. By the reign of Edward I the official 
attitude to the obligations of carnage tenure was absolutely clear. 
In 1275 the Barons of the Exchequer were able to inform the king that 
all who held in chief in Cumberland and Westmorland owed wardship and 
56 
marriage to the crown 
54 Bain I, no 864, Reid- 'Barony and Thanage', EHR, v35 (1920) 183 
55 Bain I, no 2129 
56 Calendarium Genealogicum Henry I.II and Edward I (Public Record 
Office 1865), v2, no 43 
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Since the carnage payments were fixed sums, their financial importance 
declined with inflation and as. a result the relative importance of the 
. d 57 th h th '1' military aspect of border tenure lncrease , even oug e illl ltary 
obligation was a limited one. When Richard II granted the Clifford 
lands in Westmorland to Ralph Nevill, Earl of Westmorland, his charter 
provided a valuahle gloss on John's. original grant to Robert I de Vipont. 
Noting that John had granted Vipont 'the services of all those who held 
by homage, fealty and a certain fixed rent called carnage', the charter 
went on to record th.at this form of tenure • gave and always has. given 
58 
wardship, marriage and relief and was in effect military service' 
If Richard's charter protests too much. about the past it is still 
valuable evidence about how carnage tenures were regarded at the end 
of the fourteenth. century. 
As w.e have seen th.e grand serjeanty of the de Wigton family was 
recognised as owing wardship and marriage. It ow.ed relief also and in 
accordance with Magna Carta, this was assessed at £5 59 . The payment 
of a relief was als:o demanded on s.uccession to the greater lordships 
of the region. In Cumberland the larger lordships were generally 
assessed as baronies or as fractions. of baronies and as such the 
reliefs were levied on a s.cale appropriate to that rank. Few of the 
lordships of the region, however, were directly co-incident with whole 
baronies as they were assessed at the Exchequer. Greys.toke was one 
and paid the relief of £100 60 • Other cases were less simple. 
Egremont and Aspatria were reckoned as consisting of half the barony 
57 W Rees - 'Survival of Celtic Custom', 158 
58 CPR 1396-99, 361 
59 E.392/125 Cumberland 
60 Pipe Rolls of Cumberland and Westmorland, 178 
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61 
of Copeland and a quarter of Allerdale and were thus. ass.essed at £75 • 
On succession to Gi lsland, Thomas. I de Mul ton of Gils.land was charged 
the sum of £40, a figure which. s.eems to relate neither to a barony nor 
62 
to the two knight's fees with which Gilsland was credited Other 
estates were burdened w_i th reliefs. which are not readily explicable and 
the distinction between baronies and other estates enjoying extensive 
judicial powers was blurred on the West March, and it is for this reason 
that the great estates of thE region can be more helpfully described as. 
lordships than as. baroni.es. 
It is. worth summar.Ls.ing the feudal obligations owed by the lordships of 
the West March, leaving as.ide technical arguments over the size of 
reliefs and the distinction betw.een land held by knight service or by 
carnage, They owed homage, fealty and as has been discussed already 
wardship, marriage and relief. The only distinction was in the type of 
military service owed, whether kni.ght s.ervice or simply by service 
against the Scots. With. this. stipulation the borderers owed exactly 
the same dues as. the feudal tenants. of Domesday England. This, indeed, 
was only natural as the whole of the March of Scotland, not just the West 
March, was an internal margin of England, not an external feudal glacis 
like the March of Wales., but part and parcel of the realm. This fact, 
as important as it was. simple, profoundly affected the legal status of 
the lordships. of the West March. It was the vital factor which 
differentiated the legal status of the lordships of Cumbria from those 
63 
of Wales, which in other respects they closely resembled • The lords 
of the West March stood as the heirs not of the independent princes of 
61 E.372/127, E372/137, Cumberland 
62 Pipe Rolls of Cumberland and Westmorland, 178 
63 Barrow - 'Pattern of Lordsh.Lp and Feudal Settlement'; Journal 
of Mediaeval History, vl, (1970) 
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Cwnbria such as owen the Bald but of lords. like Dolphin, whereas. the lords 
of Wales claimed to have inheri-ted the righ.ts and pow.ers of the Princes 
of Wales. As a result, th.e lords of the West March owed, they did not 
command, the rights of prLiller seisin and prerogative wardship as the lords 
64 
of the March of Wales and Bishops of Durham did 
The lords of the W.est March_ held wide judicial rights, but they were bound 
to enforce the common law of England and they were not permitted to declare 
65 
and ammend the law as the lords. of Wales claimed the right to do To 
this end royal justice scrutinised the workings of the seigneurial courts 
of the region, at leas.t until the discontinuation of the eyre system. 
Equally, the inferior legal status. of the courts of the West March compared 
either with Durham or the March of Wales is demonstrated by the fact that 
the peace which was enforced by the lords of the West March ran in the 
king's name not in their own, again in contrast to Wales or Durham where 
66 
the lords or the bishops claimed the right to enforce their own peace 
As a result the lords of the West March were answerable to the crown for 
false judgements made i_n their courts and for appeals against errors of 
judgement were reserved to the royal courts. Finally, and the point is 
almost self-evident, the lords of Cwnb.ria were wholly within the juris-
diction of the royal courts and they and their men could be summoned, 
albeit in accordance with their priveleges, to answer in the king's court 
or to vouch to warranty without exception. The March of Scotland was, as 
noted above, a parcel of the realm elevated into a series of immunities, 
but these were immunities not exemptions from the law of the realm. They 
were inseperable from the law of England and indeed they were created and 
67 governed by that law . 
64 Davies - Lordship and Society in March of Wales, 151, 152 
65 tt\e"" 
66 Just. l/132, m28 
67 Compare the si.tuation on the Welsh March. Davies - Lordship and 
Society, esp. 221 
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III 
Family Histories and genealogies. as. w_e have seen may influence the 
development of landed estates, for example, by forcing their partition, 
but they may in another respect bB distanced from the consideration of 
the estates themselves.. The analogy of lordships as. counters in a 
family gam~of terri tori.al expansion has. been used already, and in this 
sense it is possible to regard an estate in the W_est March as equivalent 
to a barony in say Kent or Lincolnshire. As soon as we move beyond this 
level of discussion,~wever, w.e are brought into direct contact with the 
differences between the lordships of the West March and those in the 
rest of England, both. in their practical role and even in their physical 
geography. The estates. of the West March were part of a larger pattern, 
it is true, but that pattern united them more with Wales, Scottish 
Galloway and Anglo-Norman Ir~land than with Domesday England. Clear and 
important similarities existed between these areas, not only in regard 
to cornage payments and a distinctively celtic system of law enforcement 
but also in the extensive financial and judicial rights which their 
lords enjoyed. These righ.ts, indeed, represented a blend of public and 
private righ.ts which were mixed together in an almost indissolub.le 
fusion. Secondly, the lordships of the West March were in a real way 
territorial. While the lords of the West March were not the exclusive 
landlords of all the land wi.thin the bounds of their seigneuries, for 
example,within the barony of Burgh~by-Sands there were some manors which 
\·<ere•yet no part of the barony, nor holden of it', the lordships did 
68 possess a territorial identity and integrity rare in Domesday England 
Particularly in coastal Cumb.erland, geographical boundaries to lordships 
coupled with extensive seigneurial franchises meant that the lords of 
the region exercised effective power and jurisdiction over dis.tinct and 
recognisable areas of land. 
68 Hist and Antiq II, 216 
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The lords of the West March frequently enjoyed rights over their men, 
a group which was often much_ broader than their tenants, and their 
rights often went far beyond the powers associated with land-lords or 
rentiers. Within the greatest of the border lordships the lords or 
their agents exercised powers to command, to compel even those who 
were not their tenants as well as. the right to do justice on them and 
69 
even the power to execute them These widespread judicial rights 
were among the most important features of lordship in the March and the 
. 70 
seigneurial gallows stood as ready remlnders of the fact . Unlike 
those of the lords of the March. of Wales, the judicial rights of the 
lordships of the West March w.ere held, in strict legal theory, by 
delegation from the crown and in varying degrees and extents but such 
niceties of legal doctrine would have been lost on the men of the 
march who must have felt the exercise of their lord's power on an every-
day basis. It would be an error to dissect the interplay of the crown 
and the lordships of the west March. at any one period and then to apply 
the pattern disclosed indiscriminately over the whole of the middle 
ages; the lordships and their powers evolved gradually and changed over 
a long period. In particular, though it is most easy to study the 
workings of the border lordships in the reign of Edward I, for it is 
that the evidence from the courts of the Justices in Eyre and the 
central courts of King's Bench_ and Common Pleas is most abundant, it is 
clear that this era was no more settled than those it followed or those 
it preceded and the March stood on the verge of decisive change as a 
result of Edward's attempts to dominate Scotland. One can even go 
further and say that, legally, the reign of Edward I was a period less 
69 R Boutruche,- Seigneurie et Feodalite, (Paris 1970}, v2, 83 
70 An example can best be provided from Annandale where conditions 
were closely similar. A certain grange was described as being 
'on the way to the gallows'. Bain, CDS, vl, no 1861 
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of new developments than of clarification and definition. The truly 
decisive changes were made considerably earlier. 
The Anglo-Norman kings, perhaps with the exception of Stephen, took a 
more direct interest in the North of England in general and in the 
West March in particular than did their successors, although this 
interest was, in general, subordinated to their dealings with Scotland. 
Of all the Anglo-Normans Henry I enforced perhaps the most important 
development. Henry conditioned the feudal development of the region, 
checking the growth of the most far reaching type of Marcher immunity 
as it had developed on the March. of Wales. The conquest of the West 
March was led by the crown or its clearly nominated agents and the fiefs 
there were granted out on precisely delineated boundaries, whether or 
not these lines represented existing boundaries. The lords of ~1e new 
march were not left, as were their peers in Wales, free to help them-
71 
selves to as much land as they could take and hold effectively 
The crown was th.e direct feudal s.uperior of the lordships of the West 
March and the contrast between this situation and th.at on the Welsh 
March can be explained by recognisab.ly different timescales of settle-
ment in the two areas. The Normans had penetrated deeply into .Wales 
by the time of the Domesday s.urvey in 1086 but in Cumbri.a the conquests 
had barely begun by that time 72 The lordships of the West March, 
created perhaps as much as fifty years after those in Wales, were 
brought into being by a monarchy which was more powerful, and probably 
also more watchful. As a result the lords of Cumb.ria were to be more 
closely answerable to the crown. More importantly, Henry I. also took 
71 J G Edwards- 'The Normans and the Welsh March'; Proceedings of 
the British Academy, v42 (1956), 167 
72 ibid, 157 
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a direct stake in the region, retaining a large part of Ranulf Meschines' 
lordship of Carlisle in his own hand, firmly establishing royal control 
of the vital strategic castle of Carlisle. Royal power on the West 
March was to be more than theoretical, it had a castle and a sheriff to 
enforce it. There were, however, limits. to the powers of the early 
royal officers on the border. Henry•s sheriffs of Carlisle exercised 
their office within only a part of the later county of Cumberland and 
the great lordships, especially Copeland, were clearly outside his 
jurisdiction. The royal sheriffs accounted, indeed, not for Cumberland 
as a whole but for a rather smaller bailiwick, the district of Carlisle 
rather than the later county. 
Henry I had made important progress toward the integration of the West 
March into England by the time of his death. Legally he had put the 
matter beyond doubt, but much. remained to be done. On Henry's death, 
however, the process w.as to be reversed rather than continued. David I 
of Scots gained control of Cumbria and for the rest of Stephen's reign 
the region was recognisably scottish. The disruption this process 
caused, on a practical level, might eas.ily be exaggerated. David I did 
not enforce a tenurial revolution, for example, William FitzDuncan 
succeeded to the lordship of Copeland by reason of his. marriage to 
73 Alice de Rumelly rather than by right of conquest Henry II. followed 
a closely similar pattern when he res.tored Cumbria to English supremacy. 
Again there was little disruption and few. forfeitures. There was only 
one exception to this policy, Gilsland. Robert de Vaux was granted 
Gilsland in 1158, presumably after the forfeiture of the successors of 
Gille, son of Boet, whose close Scottish connections probably disposed 
73 Early Yorkshire Charters, v7, ll; Reg St Bees, no 16 
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74 
them to oppose the re-integration of Cumberland into England The 
ease with which Henry II achieved the conquest of Cumberland in 1157 
belied how much remained to be done. It was not enough to simply 
restore the situation as, i.t had exis,ted under Henry I, governmental 
power had to be increased in line with the advances that had been made 
in the rest of England, and this. had to be achieved in an area which 
75 
was to all extents newly conquered The task was further complicated 
by the rebellion of the Young King in 1176, which was the occasion of a 
renewed Scots invasion of Cumb.erland but in truth the government of the 
West March had been almos.t completed before then. In 1174, for the 
first time, the district was designated, not as the county of Carlisle 
76 but as. Cumberland More s.ignificantly perhaps, the county included 
the great liberty of Copeland, for the first time, though its lords 
continued to guard their immunity jealously. 
There are close and important parallels to be drawn between th.e lord-
ships of the West March, and the lordships of Norman Ireland and there 
are good reasons why this should be so. The establishment of the Irish 
lordships were the products of almost exactly the same period as those 
77 
of Cumbria The links between these two .areas were, in fact, closer 
than those between the Marches of Scotland and of Wales, for whereas in 
W~les the Marcher immunities had developed with little resistance from 
the crown, in Cumbria and Ireland the lordships were the product of the 
inter-action between Norman settlers and well established Celtic 
74 Facsimile in~' vl, 320 
75 W L Warren - Henry II (1973) 54.. See also Carte l in J Boussard" 
Le Gouvernement de Henri. II Plantageneh (Paris 1956}_ 
76 Public Record Office Listi and Indices, v9, (List of Sheriffs) 
under Cumberland and Westmorland 
77 A J Otway-Ruthven - A History of Mediaeval Ireland (19.68) 
C.£p PP 8~ , lf>l, IOJ 
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lordships, but thi.s fusLon took place under the influence of a monarchy 
whLch had an increasingly well developed perception of its s.uperiori ty, 
if imperfect means to impose that supremacy in practice. The result 
was that the tenurial and judicial supremacy of the crown was, in 
theory, absolute. In practice, however, the power of the crown was 
spread unevenly and irregularly and the region was governed on the 
most practical level by a mixture of royal shire administration and 
baronial self government. Moreover, there was no one absolute pattern 
for this synthesis, but a whole series graded from Copeland, which was 
perhaps the greatest of the border liberties, to less privileged lord-
ships at the other end of the s.cale. 
The degree and antiquity of the liberties of the West March was striking. 
As in the other areas of Norman-Celtic lordships many of the powers 
exercised by the lords of the Scottish Border were, whatever their 
precise legal standing, es.sentially those which had been exercised by 
independent pre-conquest lords but it is easier to recognise this fact 
than to trace the history of these powers during the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries.. W.e have no direct evidence, for example, on the 
rights which Ranulf Mes.chines held as lord of Carlisle. Indirect 
evidence, however, does allow us to pursue the enquiry. Around 1124, 
David I of Scots granted to Robert de Bruce a large castellerie in 
Annandale and searching for a pattern on which to grant Bruce judicial 
rights in his fief, looked, very naturally, across the border to England. 
Annandale was to play a closely similar role to that played by Meschines' 
lordship of Carlisle and the two lordships were matched in terms of 
background and population. Bruce was therefore granted 'illis 
consuetudinibus quas Ranulf Meschines. habuit in terra sua de Carduill 
et in terra sua de Cumbraland i.llo die in quo unquam meli.ores et 
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liberiores habuit' 78 It might be expected that these powers were 
extensive. A confirmation of Bruces son's rights tends to argue against 
this however. William the Lion explicitly reserved to himself the royal 
pleas of premeditated assault, rape, arson and robbery. Bruce was, 
however, allowed a degree of self government, namely that the offices of 
royal bailiffs should be performed by one of his own men though this man 
79 
was to be chosen by the crown An inquisition held in 1304 makes the 
situation still more clear, the sheriff of Dumfries might not enter the 
liberty of Annandale as Annandale had its own coroner, but he was to be 
80 
chosen at the king's pleasure Leaving aside the question of the 
right to a private coroner, it is worth comparing these rights with 
those held in Cumbria. Now, as we have noted, there is no direct 
evidence for the terms on which Ranulf Meschines held Carlisle but it 
seems improbable that William Meschines and Waltheof held rights in 
Copeland and Allerdale which were greater than those held by Ranulf. 
Evidence from the thirteenth centry suggests that by that time their 
successors did hold powers which were in excess of those held by Ranulf 
Meschines, on the testimony of Annandale. All the lords of Cockermouth, 
Egremont and Aspatria prescribed to have, and were allowed, pleas of the 
crown without exception. To take just one of the pleas of which Bruce 
was denied cognisance, rape. Appeals for crimes of rape were heard in 
81 
the liberty court of Egremont Therefore, though Bruce's rights in 
Annandale were on a pattern which was closely similar to that of the 
lordships of Cumberland, his rights were less extensive than those of 
the lords of the greatest Cumbrian liberties, they were more comparable 
78 Lawrie - Early Scottish Charters, no 48 
79 ibid, 308; Bain, CDS, v1, no 105 
80 Bain, CDS, v2, no 1588 
81 PQW, 112-114 
Page 107 
with the rights held in the liberties. of eastern Cumberland, Gilsland, 
Greystoke and Liddel Strength. Bruce had infangthef, for example, 
signified by his seigneurial gallows just as did the lords of Gilsland82 . 
Both lords, like the lord of Greystoke, claimed the right to have the 
king's precepts carried out by one of their own officers and that royal 
officers might not enter their lands except by their permission, though 
it is questionable if this permission could be refused. Again though it 
is evident that the powers of the Cumbrian lords were more extreme for 
th.e bailiffs were not to b.e chosen by the crown as Bruce's coroners were 
to be but by the lords themselves 83 
The rights which the lords of the liberties of Copeland and Allerdale 
were markedly superior to those enjoyed in eastern Cumberland and these, 
in their turn, were more highly enfranchised than were the lords of 
Annandale. Since Bruce's righ.ts in Annandale were originally modelled 
on those of Ranulf Meschines, thi.s provides a potential difficulty but 
two possible explanations sugges.t themselves for the discrepancy. 
The first is that the rights enjoyed by the lords of Copeland 
were identical with those held by the lords of Annandale and that the 
Scottish kings were able to s.uppres.s the full regality of the powers 
whi.ch Meschines and Bruce at one time held. This hypothesis seems 
unconvincing, however, William the Lion's confirmation explicitly refers 
to the rights held by the first Bruce. Moreover, it would have been 
surprising to have found the Scottish. crown restricting baronial powers 
84 in an area in which the kings spent remarkably little time The 
82 ibid, 126, Bain CDS, vl, no 1691, ~' vl, 320 
83 PQW, 112-114 
84 Barrow - 'Pattern of Lordship and Feudal Settlement'; Journal of 
Medi.aeval History, vl U957), 128 
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second possibility is that the charter granted to Robert de Bruce 
reflects the true extent of the powers held by Ranulf Meschines and 
that these powers were simply pres.erved, not restricted, by William 
the Lion. If this. theory is correct then it follows that either the 
lords of coastal Cumberland were granted greater immunities than was 
Ranulf Meschines, whi.ch. seems unlikely, or they were able to expand 
the degree of judi.cial and administrative immunity which they were 
originally granted until i.t attained the extent disclosed by the Quo 
~
Waranto enquiries. 
The history of th.e West March, and especially that of Copeland, is 
consistent with this sugges.tion. As w_e have seen the lordship of 
Copeland was established well before the later county of Cumberland. 
Moreover, Copeland continued to preserve its own status as a county in 
its own right. In 1182 Cecily de Rumelly was styled as the Countess 
of Copeland and the title s.eems. to have been in general use throughout 
h l 'f . 85 er 1. etJ.me • As late as 1213, when Thomas de Multon made a proffer 
of 1000 marks for the custody of the daughters of Richard de Lucy the 
margin heading was Copeland not Cumberland and other examples are 
86 Even in 1258 Copeland was regarded as seperate from the common 
87 
county of Cumberland • This persistence also took more practical 
forms. In 1176 it was described as an area seperate from Cumberland 
for the purposes of the eyre and it is clear that the immunity of the 
region meant th.at th.e sheriff could exercise only very limited power 
88 
over the lordship 
85 Pipe Roll 31 Henry II., (_Pipe Roll Society, v34, 1913)_ 184, 186 
Early Yorkshire Charters, v7, 20 
86 Rotuli de Oblatis, 482 
87 Bain, ~' vl, no 2103 
88 W Stubbs - Gesta Henri.ci Secundi Benedicti Abbas, (Rolls Seri_es 
1867) vl, 108 
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The first illustration of the success of the lords of Copeland in 
resisting the increase in royal power in the region is, provided by the 
development of royal forest. Much of the county of Cumberland was 
afforested by Henry II. The fores.t of Inglewood formed an area bounded 
approximately by straiglLt lines. connecting Crofton, Broughton, Edenhall 
. 89 
and Warwlck on Eden • The creation of royal forest was a dominant 
feature of Henry IJI s policy and it is clear that he was not satisfied 
by the extent of Inglewood and wi.shed to afforest still more land. A 
local tradition prevelant in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
held that Alan, son of Waltheof, granted Henry II Allerdale forest and 
this testifi.es to two important points. Firstly, that rights over the 
forest were regarded as an important aspect of lordship in Curnberland90 
Secondly it may well record Henry II' s aggressive policy of terri.torial 
expansion. Since Willi.arn of Egremont, who succeeded to Allerdale 
probably did so some time after 1162, it is possible that A;Lan, son of 
Waltheof, was in poss:es.si_on of Allerdale in the earliest years of Henry 
II's reign and did grant the king the forest of Allerdale as the inquest 
91 
taken during the reign of Edward I. records. . The most probable time 
at which such a grant took. place is the years 1157-58 when Henry II was 
active in the north, re-establishing his authority in Cumbria. It may 
even have been that the cession of the forest of Allerdale was. the pri.ce 
Alan paid for remaining in possession of his lands after Henry II's 
reconquest. Whether or not this speculation is correct there is no 
doubt that the royal forest was extended into Allerdale or that this was 
a demonstration of formidable royal power. If Henry was able to extend 
89 Pipe Roll 24 Henry II, {_Pipe Roll Society, v27, 1915), 26 
90 F H M Parker - 'Inglewood Forest Part 3'; Tran~_of C&W II, v5 
(1905) 1 40, 41 
91 Bain, ~' v2, no 64; Reg St Bees, no 498; Parker -'Inglewood 
Forest Part 2 '~ Trans. of C&N II, v6, (1906) 1 160 
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the royal forest into Allerdale, however, he was. not able to do s.o in 
Copeland. The area between the Derwent and the Duddon was never part 
92 
of the royal forest As W.H. Liddell has aptly observed, the timing 
of the creation of the forest of Inglewood explains why the forest of 
Copeland was not integrated into it, for at the time when the forests 
were created in Inglewood and Allerdale, Copeland was vi.rtually outside 
93 
the royal shire government The local view that lordship in the 
regicn ccrnprehended the control of local forests has already been 
mentioned, and this belief was borne out in practice both before and 
after the creation of th.e forest of Inglewood. Thus even the lords of 
Millom, sub-tenants of the honour of Egremont, could like their superior 
lords grapt land while reserving to themselves t.he right of venison 
'secundem consuetudinem patriae' 
If Henry II was unable, or it is possible unwilling, to enforce the 
creation of a royal forest in Copeland, the government of Richard I was 
no more able '_:o imr:ose increas.es in the power of the shire government 
at the expense of the great liberties of the region. The institution 
of the office of coroner, or keeper of the pleas of the crown, provides 
an illustration of this. The keeping of records of cases which were 
likely to result in pleas cf crown v:as net new in 119.4 but this activity 
was placed on a regular basis and charged to a specialist group of local 
ff . . 1 94 o 1c1a s • Three knigh.ts and a clerk were to be chosen for this 
purpose in each county and it seems probable that they were expected to 
have jurisdiction both within and wi tl:out liberties 95 This was 
92 w H Liddell - 'The Private Forests of South west Cumberland I; Trans 
of C&W II, v66 (]966), 107 
93 Reg St Bees, no 2, Illus Docs, no 22 
94 R F Hunnisett- The Mediaeval Coroner, (Cambridge 1961), l, 2 
95 W Stubbs - Select Charters and ether Illustrations of English 
Constitutional History, ed and revised H W C Davies (Oxford 1921) 
254, cap 20 
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d . . 96 certainly the view taken by the Edwar lan wrl ter Flet~ • Such a 
jurisdicti en did r.:ot t~xist in Cumbria. As we have seen, the lords of 
the liberties of Greystoke and Gilsland claimed the right to have the 
coroner's duties carried out by their own bailiffs and the lords of 
Copeland and Allerdale claimed the right to have their own coroners 
from time out of mind. This 'remarkable fact' to which Maitland drew 
attention illustrates the fact that for many administrative purposes 
the great liberties of Cumb.erland, particularly those of coastal 
Cumberland, were self governing and they were exempt from the jurisdic-
. f h l h' 97 tlon o t e roya s l.re . They developed parallel institutions, 
they were bound by law to do so, but they developed them seperately from 
the shire. Their exemption from the shire was codified by the Quo 
Warrantoenquiries and probably even before, in the form of the franchise 
of 'return of writs' but this was only a recognition, perhaps even a 
98 diminution of the rights. which. existed previously Even this 
rationalisation, however, disclos.ed the fact that in a large stretch of 
terri tory running from the Wampool to the Duddon, with the exception of 
a few islands of territory such as. Torpenhow, while the king's writ did 
run, it was enforced only by private bailiffs. The sheriff and his 
staff might only enter in th.e event of default by the lord or his agents. 
The right to returns of writs. was. not unique to the West March, it was 
widely held throughout England but generally it was confined to 
relatively small areas. In Cumberland whole baronies, such as Cockermouth 
and Egremont were covered b.y the franchise or by closely related immuni-
ties. One example \vill suffice to show the practical effects of this 
situation. In a case involving John de Hudlestone, lord of Millom, over 
96 HEL, vl, 583 
97 PQW, 112-114 
98 M T Clanchy - 'The Franchise of Return of Wri.ts.', Trans. of the 
Royal Historical Society, Series 5, vl7 Cl967l. 1'1 
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land in the lordship, w_ri ts had to he s.en t first to the lord of Egremont, 
though Hudlestone was an .irr.rortant b.aron in his own right. As. Chief 
Justice Hengham recognised, these rights w.ere virtually annexed to the 
great estates of Cumberland and the extensive and elaborate partitions 
made amongst the lordships. of coas.tal Cwnberland neither hindered their 
99 
development or thei.r effectiveness. 
The distinquishing feature of the lordships of the West March was the 
nature and extent of their po~ers over their men, a group much wider than 
simply their tenants, since they had, in effect certainly, inherited 
powers which were those of princes rather than those of subjects. In 
practical terms the lords of Copeland exercised powers whi.ch were 
identical with those exercised by the crown in the rest of Cumberland. 
The serjeants of tne peace, for example, were appointed and controlled 
by the lords of Egremont and Cockermouth in exactly the same way as they 
100 
werE by tr·e crown in the rest of the county Another important 
feature of marcher lordship was the close intermingling of private and 
public rights and nowhere was. this so clearly visible as in the lord-
ship of Appleby. This lordship was both a vast landed estate comprising 
much of the present county of Wes.tmorland, including the strategic 
castles of Appleby, Brough under Stainmore and Brougham and in effect a 
very comprehensive judi.cial liberty. The herdi tary shrievalty of the 
county of Westmorland was the oldest established such office in England 
and it represented an important recognition by John of the difficulties 
101 
of governing the March of Scotland The lordship was created in 
99 P Brand- 'Quo Waranto Law in the Reign of Edward I'; Irish 
Jurist, New Series., vl4 (19.79), 152, 163, 170; CP.40/l43, ml39 
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1203 and the reluctance w_ith_ whi_ch_ John relinquished control to Robert 
de Vipont reflect both the king' s. distrus_t of one of his. lieutenants_ 
and, more importantly, a de5ire to circumscribe the rights that w_ere 
102 being granted away . Though_ Vipont and his_ heirs were expressly 
denied control of pleas of the crown, there can be no denying the fact 
that the creation of the hereditary shrievalty was. a clear reversal of 
consistent royal policy during the tw_elfth century. Professor Hi_lton 
wri.ting of the B.eaucharops/ power as hereditary sheriffs of Warwickshire 
has des:cribed the situation precis:ely, 'from the local point of view 
there was as overpowering a combination of feudal landed power and 
control of public authori.ty as. could be found in an old established 
103 franchise' This power, moreover, w_as not limi.ted to the lands 
which were not held directly of the lordship of Appleby but it included 
104 
a police power within the lands held of the barony of Kendale as well . 
The role of the serjeants of the peace will be discussed elsewhere, but 
there can be no doubt that as. in Copeland the serjeants of the peace 
there were more effectively seigneurial offi.cials than public ones. 
Moreover, though nominally a royal offi.cial, the hereditary sheriff of 
Westmorland was more effectively exempt from royal control than were 
even his most priveleged neighbours in Cumberland. The hereditary 
sheriff or his deputies were responsible for the execution of all royal 
writs, summonses or other bus.ines.s. Little, however, could be done in 
the event of default, in contrast to the case of franchises of return 
of writs where an order could be issued for the sheriff to carry out a 
royal writ using the clause non omittas propter libertatem. In cases 
of default by the hereditary sheriff, it was possible to addres.s. writs. 
102 Rot Literarum Patentium, 27 
103 R H Hilton - A Mediaeval Society, (.Cambridge 19Bl), 233 
104 CCR 1281-92, 109 
Page 114 
to the coroners of the county, but s.ince at leas.t one of thes.e, like 
any under-sheriff was: almost certain to have been a tenant and, almos.t 
as certainly, a retainer of the Vipont;or the Cliffords. this. procedure 
105 
was. usually ineffective The unique legal and tenurial powers 
enjoyed by the lords of Appleby mean that it makes sense to regard 
Appleby as simply the greates.t of the border liberties even though. its 
lords did not enjoy the extensive franchises common in Cumberland. 
They were, however, the holders. of royal rights of law enforcement, 
though by recent delegation rather than by ancient tenure. 
There was also much. of the appearance in the powers of the lords of 
Cumberland of res.tricted regality, they were not only, in one sense, the 
crown's hereditary agents, they deployed many of the rights of the 
crown as their own. That the lords. of Allerdale and Copeland held the 
pleas of the crown was., of course, the mos.t obvious example of this. 
Other examples are easily found, the right to the royal righ.t of sea-
wreck was enjoyed by local lords from antiquity and the s.ignificance 
of the right was hardly negated by the fact that in practice the most 
106 
useful aspect of it was; the taking of s.eaweed for use as fertiliser 
The monks of Holm Cultram evidently regarded this as. an es.tablis.hed 
local custom and were only deprived of i.t on a legal technicality, 
namely that their charter did not mention sea-wreck explici.tly 107 • 
Roger de Hengham stated an important principle, however, by stating 
that wreck was a royal right, though. wi.th more judicious pleading the 
monks of Holm Cul tram might w.ell have held on it as the lords of Copeland 
did. The same was true of the 'very royal' plea of vee de naam which 
105 Hunnisett - Mediaeval Coroner, 135. There were two coroners in 
Westmorland, one for Appleby and one for Kendale. 
106 Just. 1/132, m32d; HEL, v2, 573 
107 PQW, 130; Reg Holm Cultram, nos: 263, 263A, 264 
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108 
was also held by the lords, of Copeland and Allerdale . The lords. of 
Copeland possessed a large count of regali.ties in their court, but the 
exercise of these regalities was. res;tri.cted judicially and practically 
by royal justice. 
The first example of these res.tri.ctions. is provided by the process of 
outlawry. Despite the gradual devaluation of the power of outlawry, 
this remained a decis.ive and speci£i.cally royal power. It was a 
signal mark of the powers enjoyed by the lords of Copeland and Allerdale 
that they were entitled to employ a form of this. process. Indeed they 
were empowered to use the whole process., with one very significant 
restriction, that the final s.entence of outlawry might only be promul-
gated in the county court. An example will make the process more clear. 
Thomas de Cleator was. appealed in the court of the liberty of Egremont 
109 
on a charge of breach of the peace hy one Robert of --- . It was 
tes.tified before the Jus.ti.ces in Eyre by the roll of the coroner of 
Egremont that Robert had pres.s.ed his. s.uit to the eighth court of the 
liberty, which w.as held every three weeks, so that his suit was before 
the court of a total of twenty four weeks. Therefore the suitors of the 
court came to the next county court, 'as it was not permitted to them 
to use the process of outlawry' and asked that Thomas. be solemnly 
promulgated as an outlaw and this. was done. The cus.tom, or better 
right, was well established by the reign of Edward I. It was known to 
the writer of Bracton's Note B.ook, for example, w.ho recorded that in 
the liberty of Copeland that 
'if anyone commits an offence for which he may be outlawed 
by the law of the land, he may be exacted at all the courts 
108 PQW, 112-14 
109 Just. 1/132, m28; Just. 1/131, ml. On both MS.S the appellants 
'surname' is illegible. 
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which the lord of that liberty holds. to the term of 
five county courts. then the record of that court may 
be presented in the county and by the testimony of 
the court he will be outlaw.ed at only one exaction. 
"ad unicam interrogacionem utlagabatur"' 110 
No mention of this custom is. made in The Laws and Customs of England 
but it is clear that it was in line with. the rules for the promulgation 
of outlawry explained there, namely that the appellee should be exacted 
for a total of five county courts and only at the last promulgated as 
111 
an outlaw . The power of the liberty court of Egremont, which was 
enjoyed by the lords. of Cockermouth, did not detract from the power of 
the county court which was the only legal place for the process of 
outlawry to be utilised, hut unquestionably the liberty courts 
exercised part of the power which in other shires belonged, without 
qualification, to the county court. In the Notebook the case involving 
Copeland is marked for referral for further discussion with the king 
but clearly the custom survived unchecked and was recognised as being 
lawful. Attempts to ci.rcumvent the jurisdiction of the county court 
completely were not tolerated however. On one occasion when the court 
of Egremont proceeded directly to outlawry of a man appealed of murder 
the liberty was taken into the king's hand and Multon was forced to 
112 
make fine of £10 for i.ts. return 
This case illustrates two important principles involving the liberty 
courts of the West March. The first is one that has been discussed 
110 Bracton's Notebook, no 1154 
lll Bracton - On the Laws. and Customs. of England, ed. S E Thorne 
(Cambridge Massachus:sets 1968), 352..,.4 
112 Just. 1/135, mm19, 32d 
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previously, the existence of regalian powers in the powers of local 
lords, of which control of part of the process of outlawry is. one 
example. The second point is closely linked, it is the subordination 
of liberty courts to the sys.tem of royal justice.. In a limited way 
this. subordination was exercised by the county court, but in the matter 
of outlawry this. supervision seems: to have been limited to a formal 
process, there is no evidence that the circumstances. of the appeal or 
its subs.equent conduct were examined beyond the testimony of the 
coroner's roll. The mos.t effective form of royal supervision over the 
private courts of th.e West March was. provided by the Justices in Eyre 
and their visitations served, not only to enforce the judicial supremacy 
of th.e crown, but also to scrutinize the proceedings of them, compelling 
strict observance both of the law of the land but also of the limits of 
each court's powers:. In one sense it is fortunate it was so, for our 
knowledge of the workings of the local courts of the region depends 
ll3 
very largely on the information provided by the Eyre rolls 
The superior jurisdiction of the Eyre over the courts of the region was 
demons.trated in two ways:.. The first of these was supervisory in the 
mos.t s.tri.ct sense. The jurors. were ins.tructed to report to the justices 
not only the activities and exces.s.es. of th.e royal officers. of the 
regi.on but also thos..e of s.eigneurial bailiffs. The actions of local 
courts and this included the actions of liberty courts, were 
scrutinized and any errors. of proceeding or blatantly illegal actions 
were punished, though. local customs. of es.tablished legality were 
114 
respected Secondly, and more importantly, the hearings of th.e 
113 There viere three eyres. in the period studied, 1246, 1278-79 and 
1292-3~ Only one part of the records. from 1246 s.urvives, Just. 
l/130A. For full details s.ee D Crook - Records of the General 
Eyre, (.Public Record Office Handbooks, v20, l9B2J_, 108 
114 See below 
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eyre superseded and suppres.s.ed the operations of the courts of the 
region. The proclamation of the eyre s.topped all actions in the 
inferior courts and the cognisance of all cases before them pas.s.ed to 
115 
the king's superior court Only the most priveleged liberty courts 
in England, for example that of the Cinque Ports, might sit while an 
eyre was in session and there. is. no evidence to s.uggest that any of the 
116 liberty courts of Cumbria were exempt from the general rule • 
Criminal cases from throughout the county carne before the eyre and were 
decided as were ci vi 1 cas.es. though the liberty courts had, in any case, 
no cognisance of these. In a further demonstration of the supremacy of 
the royal courts, the chattels. of felons. executed or outlaw.ed by the 
judgement of the Jus.tices. in Eyre were forfeited to the crown rather 
than to the felon's own lord. This, custom was well established before 
the reign of Edward I and it is clear that its enforcement by Vauxs' 
and Cressingharns' eyres represented the prevailing custom rather than 
an attack on seigneurial prLvelege. Though many local lords claimed 
the right to the privelege of the chattels of any of their men who were 
executed, they did so in cas.es. only where the felon was condemned in 
their own court. In the partitioned barony of Kirklevington they were 
only claimed in cases where the felon was executed under the jurisdic-
117 
tion of infangthef 
Other right.s were respected if claimed. In 1292 the Bishop of Carlisle 
was allowed the privelege of executing Simon, the son of Simon de 
Orreton, for arson and for causing the death of his father. The 
Bishop's seneschal, Robert de Warwi.ck, came into court equipped with 
115 W S Holdsworth - A His.tory of English Law_, vl (].922), 266 
116. W C Bolland - The Eyre of Kent, (Selden Society, v24, 1909) 
xxxiii, xxxiv, lix, lx 
117 PQW, 120 
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I 
the. charter reciting the Bishop~ righ.t to execute their men 
if taken within the bishop's; liberty as. the unfortunate Simon had 
118 been . Henry III's charter allowed the Bishop the forfeiture of 
Simon's chattels, but on this occasion this was small compensation for 
the great destruction the blaze which. Simon had started caus.ed in the 
city 119 
If the Justices in Eyre exerci.sed a jurisdiction which ranged over 
liberty boundaries and juris.dictions, the exercise of this competence 
was, nevertheless, di.ctated by the great liberties. Again this 
operated on two levels. The first of th.ese was provided by an ill-
matched assortment of three special jurisdictions, the liberty of the 
Abbot of Byland at Warcop in Westmorland, the liberty of the mine at 
Alston and the King of Scots liberties of Tynedale and Cumberland. Two 
of these, that of the Abbot of Byland and that of the lead miners at 
Alston were entitled to a special sitting of the eyre in those places. 
These were in a sense inferior si.ttings. of the eyre however. At 
Byland the justices themselves, sat to hear civil pleas involving the 
liberty but these sessions were held before a reduced compl~ment of 
h . . 120 t e JUStlces The liberty of the mines at Alston also had its own 
session but this did not even merit a si.tting of the royal justices 
themselves. Two experienced local men were deputed to go to Alston to 
121 hold hearings in accordance wi.th the aricles of tb.e eyre In 1278 
the justices were Hugh. Milton of Hoff, a cadet of the family of the 
Multons of Gilsland, and Robert de Warwick whose later vigilance as the 
118 Just. 1/137, m30; C. Chart. R 1226-1300, 136-7 
119 Lanercost, 145 
120 Crook - Records of General Eyre, 146 
121 Bain, CDS, v2, no 147 
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seneschal of the Bishop of Carlis.le has already been mentioned 
The liberty of the Kings of Scots was the largest, most judicially 
privileged, but also the mos.t short-lived of the special liberties of 
the region. The liberty existed from 1242 until the death of Alexander 
III of Scots and consi.sted of the lordship of Tynedale in the extreme 
west of Northumberland and the manors. of Carlton, Langwathby, Salkeld, 
. 'th 123 Scotby, Souerby and land ~n Penr~ . This great but rather empty 
lordship had been granted to Alexander II as the price of the renuncia-
tion of his claims to the northern counties of England and within that 
f . d . h d . '1 124 area the king o Scots was prom~se every r~g t an pr~v~. ege 
Though there were some similarities between the lordship of Tynedale and 
the palatinates of Durham and Chester and even with the lordships of 
the March of Wales, the parallels were limited. Though. Henry III 
granted Alexander such rights as. 'leyrwite' and 'flymenfryth' as well 
as more orthodox righ.ts over murder, forestall and theft, the practical 
details of the arrangements. of this jurisdiction were spelled out with 
great rig our. Pleas. of the crown wi.thin the liberty were to be attached 
by the coroner of Cumberland, not a s.eigneurial official as. was. the case, 
for example, in Cockermouth. Moreover, though the kings of Scots were 
entitled to appoint their own jus.tices to hear and determine pleas. of 
the crown, these sessions were part of the general eyre and had to be 
conducted according to tl1e article~ of the eyre drawn up for the rest 
of England, which were delivered to the bailiff of the liberty who 
123 see M F Moore - The Lands of the Scottish Kings in England, 
New Jersey 19.73 ff 3- 2.1. 
124 Stones - Relations, 21 
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passed them on to the justices appointed by the kings of Scots 125 
This, however, should not be allowed to exaggerate the judicial 
independence of the liberty of the kings of Scots. It was not an area 
where the king's writ did not run except for a short period when Bishop 
Bek succeeded in annexing Tynedale to the liberty of the Bishopric of 
Durham. During the kings of Scot's tenure of the liberty it was 
expressly stated to be covered by the franchise of return of writs as 
126 
was Cockermouth or Egremont As a result the activities of the 
bailiffs of the liberty were subject to review by the justices in 
eyre. In 1278 as a result of the trespasses of the bailiffs there, 
the liberty was ordered to be taken into the king's hands. It appeared 
that the bailiffs, including one of the Swinton family, had abused 
their power by distraining for debt any whom they chose, whether or not 
126 it was justified This was the supervisory and corrective function 
of the eyre that we are familiar with, but other evidence suggests that 
in other respects too the exemptions enjoyed by the kings of Scots were 
less extensive than might be supposed. The foresters of Inglewood 
frequently entered the lordship and took.lodging even though by 
127 
charter they were forbidden to do so The persistent trans-
gressions of the royal foresters, especially under the stewardship of 
Roger de Lancaster, also bring out an important fact about the liberty 
of the kings of Scots. The liberty was, in fact, poorly established, 
unlike t-he great liberties of the coast it had only a short history 
and perhaps more importantly its boundaries were not based on 
recognisable geographic lines as theirs were. Again unlike the 
older established lordships of Copeland and Allerdale the right 
enjoyed by the kings of Scots were precisely set out in Henry's charter 
125 Calendar of Chancery War:ra.JI~ (Public Record Office 1927), 34 
126 Stones- Relations, 21; Bain, CDS, v2, no 1339 
127 Bain, CDS, v2, 37; GC M Fraser- A History of Anthony Bek 
(Oxfordl971 )~ <t.C\-<=t~ 
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and even though these were extensive there was no es.caping the fact that 
Alexander II lost from the precis.e definition of his righ.ts by the 
Bractonian lawyers of Henry• s court in comparison with the powers. which 
his near neighbours might enjoy by tenure from time out of mind. 
The other lordships of the Wes.t March. were subject to the jurisdiction 
of the justices in eyre in a more direct way than was. the king of Scots' 
lordship but even so their existence still dictated the way in which 
th.e justices carried out their work. Ordinarily presentments for th.e 
pleas of the crown were made by juries representing hundreds, wapentakes 
or boroughs. The administrative divisions. of the county which. this 
system assumed were absent from Cumberland. At the time of the eyres in 
Cumberland even th.e wards whi.ch corresponded to the divisions of other 
counties were not wholly developed, indeed the eyre seems to have played 
an important part in their development. As a result though presentments 
were made by the bailiwicks of Leath. and Eskdale and by the Cumberland 
and Allerdale bailiwicks, the main work of presenting the pleas. of the 
crown was carried out by juries representing liberties. The divisions 
which presented crown pleas. were seigneurial rather than governmental. 
Thus as well as jurors representing Carlisle there were also juries 
representing the boroughs of Cockermouth and Egremont. More signifi-
cantly the rural population of south~west Cumberland was represented by 
jurors from the llberty of Copeland outside the burgh, the lordship of 
Egremont, and the liberty of Cockerrnouth, the highly enfranchised 
129 banlieu of the Five Vills outside the borough The importance of 
juries drawn from liberty boundari.es was not confined to coastal 
Cumberland however. Though a presentment was made from Leath and 
128 Parker- 'Inglewood Forest Part 2'; Trans of C&W II, v6 (~906) 
159 
129 Just. l/132, mm28, 30d, 31 
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and Eskdale, a seperate return was. made by jurors from the vill of 
Kirkoswald which was one of the chief holdings of th.e Multons of 
Gilsland where they, like their cousins in Egremont, carried out law 
130 
enforcement in the first ins.tance 
In Westmorland th.e proceedings. of the eyre depended jus.t as much on 
the boundaries of the lordships there, or at least mirrored them and 
again it makes sense to regard the heridi tary shrievalty of Wes.tmorland 
as the greatest of the lordships of the West March. The proceedings of 
the eyre in Westmorland matched the judicial powers of the lords of 
Appleby. No distinction was. made between the lordships of Appleby and 
Kendale over which. the sheriff's staff exercised jurisdiction, hut the 
burgh of Appleby which fough.t a pers.istent battle with the Clifford and 
Leyburn lords of Westmorland during the reign of Edward I was represented 
131 by a separate jury 
In short, therefore, the evidence suggests that though the eyre system 
was conceived as operating through the orthodox county organisation 
which existed in Domesday England even before the Norman Conquest, where 
that organisation was imperfectly developed, as it was. in Cumbria, it had 
to operate through such local structures as did exis.t. In Cumbri.a it is 
clear that the essential s.tructure was the lordship though. the powers of 
t.h.e county and of the lordship were by no means always distinct. 
130 Just. 1/137, m27 
131 Just. 1/982 
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Local government and law enforcement on the West March was governed and 
conditioned by the existence of the great lordships of the region. The 
lordships often provided the means of government and, as physical areas, 
also provided the geographical bas;is of government. They were more than 
simply administrative divisions of the county, as perhaps they later 
became; they were in the final analysis. areas in which pow.er and 
authority was exercised by an individual. It was the right to, and the 
pos.ses.sion of this power and authority which characterised the mediaeval 
lord. Moreover, though, as. has. been suggested, the nature and extent of 
this power was subject to the superi.or judicial lordship of the crown, 
lordship was a practical, almost tangible feature of everyday life on 
the West March and it is the practical exercise of lordship which we 
should try to understand. 
The powers of lords over their men were all-pervading and multifarious 
and they were borne by bo~ free and unfree men though in differing ways 
and degrees. The lord's power of command was expressed in a variety of 
forms. It was inherent in the homage ow.ed by free military tenants. 
It was even more obviously expressed in the duty of free tenants to do 
suit to their lord's court, failure to attend which could be punished by 
fines. Just as pervasive w.as. the duty of suit of mill. Suit at their 
lord's mills was demanded, and enforced, not only of unfree tenants but 
of free tenants as w.ell. As has. been argued in Chapter I this was an 
important and profi.table aspect of lordship and it was. zealously defended. 
Other examples of the subordination of one man to another are numerous. 
Among the tenants of the lordship of Egremont in 1339 to take just one 
instance, William Centenar, Robert de Flaundres, John Clerkman and his 
132 
son were all bound to mow a rood of good meadow for their lord 
132 CCR 1336-39, 476 
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The powers of the lords of the W.est March went far beyond s.irnple 
agricultural services however. Indeed, agricultural righ.ts were probably 
less important in Cumbria than they were elsewhere in England where land 
was more intensively cultivated. The March of Scotland, like that of 
Wales, was predominantly a pas.toral region and in such regions the power 
f d 1 h 1 d l33 of lord over man was o greater moment an va ue t an powEr over an . 
This, however, should not be confus:ed with. territorial lordship, the 
exercise of the powers of constraint and command over men within 
recognisable boundaries. This the lords. of Cumbria exercised in large 
degree and they backed it up wi.th. extens.ive powers of law enforcement. 
Territorial lordship requires. definition. In Cumb.ria i.t was. based less 
on the control of areas of cultivated land than control of the men within 
given boundaries. The enforcement of compulsory milling at the seigneurial 
mill is a convenient example. The tenants of Holm Cultram were bound to 
do suit at the mill of Burgh 'to the twenty first vessel', that is to 
grind their corn, or at leas.t the first part of it, probably the first 
twenty one skeps, at their lord's. .mill. This was a personal obli.gation 
rather than a tenurial one, ow.ed by the tenants thems.elves not from th.e 
land they held 134 . It was. also an active obligation, expressly stated 
not to be commutable for a money payment. Territorial lordship also 
included the right to control access. to the lordship and passage through 
it. There is good evidence to s.ugges.t that this right was commonly 
exercised by lords on the West March, and indeed throughout the former 
kingdom of Strathclyde. In the Bruce lordship of Annandale, travellers 
passing through were obliged to travel only by the s.traight marked 
road and by the charter of William the Lion the lords. of Annandale were 
133 Davies - Lordship and Society in the March of Wales, 131 
134 Reg Holm Cultram, no 25 (l)_ 
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explicitly allowed to take tolls. from them as they pas.sed through 
The same powers were enjoyed in Cwnberland, but they were not confined 
to the holders of the great liberties. Alexander de Bassenthwaite felt 
empowered to grant to the monks of Holm Cultram passage through his 
land, but also to stipulate that the monk's vehicles were to pas.s only 
136 by the accustomed road Other land-holders took tolls. for pas.sage 
through their land but in this. matter it is clear local practice and 
legal theory parted company. In 1278, for example, it was. presented 
that Matilda de Vaux, Lady of Brampton, took tolls without having any 
137 known power to do so Baldwin Wake's bailiffs went even further. 
They not only denied the king' s. bailiffs access to the manor to levy 
tolls from the market at Liddell but als.o refused to allow_ merchants to 
138 pass through his lands., towards, Scotland, unless they paid tolls . 
Thomas de Multon of Egremont was. gui.lty of a similar offence. His men 
took tolls from men passing through the lordship of Egremont, as indeed 
they were entitled to do, but on at least one occas.ion they exceeded 
their authority. Tolls. were taken from the men of Carlisle who claimed 
139 
to be quit of tolls throughout England • The burgesses of Appleby 
claimed a similar privilege but in practice they were forced to pay. 
Appleby was led at this. time by an ambitious and litigious. clan of wool 
merchants, the Goldingtons, who was.ted no time in suing Multon. 
Confronted with. the evidence of a royal charter Mul ton recognised the 
limitations of his position 0 He qui.tclaimed the right to take tolls 
135 Bain, ~~ vl, no 29; Lawri.e - Early Scottish Charters, 308 
136 Reg Holm Cultram, no 267F 
137 Just. 1/132, m27d 
138 ibid 
139 Just. l/132, mJ2d 
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from the men of Applehy, 
140 gaining one pound in compensation That 
a royal charter defeated the powers. of lordship need not be stated. 
The rights, or at leas:t practical powers, which lords. exercised over 
travellers passing through their land were matched by similar powers 
over those living within it. The right to hold a market and a fair 
was. one seigneurial privilege and it conferred on the lords additional 
rights within their lordship. These were again express.ed in financial 
terms. At Ravenglass and Egremont, Multon of Egremont held the right 
to take tolls from thos:e hringing goods to market. These were enforced 
even before the market commenced. Traders. bringing goods into the vi.ll 
had to give pledges for tolls. on all their stock with. the lord 1 s 
bailiffs and they were allowed to regain their pledges on stock unsold 
141 
at the end of the day Stallholders, in addition, had to pay the 
lord for the righ.t to hold their stall. The arrangements for the 
proclamation of the fair at Ravenglass. proclaimed th.e lord 1 s power in 
a much more obvious tl!ilay. When the lord 1 s. bailiff came to Ravenglass 
to proclaim the fair open, all the tenants of the forest of Copeland, a 
large though decreasing area within Egremont, were bound to come to 
142 Ravenglass to meet him The forest tenants w.ere als.o obliged to 
provide fodder for the hors.es of the serjeants of the liberty who 
accompanied the chief official. The power over men, to compel them to 
appear at a given time and place had other more practical manifestations. 
The lords of Egremont practised the righ.t to take prises, compulsory 
purchases taken from the markets. at Egremont and Ravenglass and paid 
140 Just. l/l30B, ml6; T Duffus Hardy - Rotuli Chartarum 
Londoniensi Ass.ervati (Record Commission 1837), 47; 
vl, 157; ihid, v2, 331 
141 Lucy Cartulary, 49-50 
142 Hist and Antiq, vl, 21 
in Turri 
C Chart R, 
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143 
for, if at all, at artificially low_ rates. Royal employment of this 
practice, though. on a wider s.cale, provoked widespread resenbnent and 
there is no reason to believe that private prises. were any more popular. 
The lord's power to regulate commercial life w.i thin his liberty merged 
almost imperceptibly w.i th. his. control of law enforcement. The closest 
links were probably at the lowest levels. The enforcement of the 
Assizes of Bread and Ale, though in the view of contemporary lawyers 
144 
essentially a right of jus.tice 1 was very closely connected w.ith the 
control exercised over markets. and fairs. The right to have control 
over the Assizes_ of Bread and Ale was. held virtually without exception 
by the lords of Cumb.ri.a and indeed in the Quo W.aranto enquiries it was 
established as an appurtenance rather than a franchise in the strictest 
sens.e, which would have required a specific royal grant in each case 
h th . h 11 d b . . 145 w ere e r1.g _t was. not a ow.e y prescr1.pt1.on • Established 
cus.tom in the Northern Counties. s.tress.ed the fiscal nature of this 
right. In Westmorland in 1281 Edward I and his council had expressly 
to condemn the practice of allowing breweresses to brew against the 
s.tatute for a whole year for one payment 146 , but it is likely that 
this prohibition may not have been effective. In Cumb.erland at 
ab.out the same time, local lords. were recognised to have the right to 
take fines. from persistent offenders rather than imposing corporal 
punishment as. was the rule in the res.t of England, excepting Northumber-
147 land The sums owed by the ale-wives of Liddell, commonly around 
143 CCR 1336-39, 476-7 
144 Brand - 'Quo WB.ranto Law_'; Irish Jurist, NS, vl4 (J9.79), 148, 169 
145 D W Sutherland - Quo Warranto Proceedings. in the Reign of Edward I 
COxford 19.63 )_, 4 
146 CCR 1279-88, J 08; A S C Ross. - 'The Assize of Bread'; Economic 
History Review_, S.eries 2, v9 Cl956) , 335 
147 Sutherland - Quo Waranto, 109 note 
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7 shillings, were probahly like the money taken by the lords. of 
d 'd f' 148 westmorland, a sort of levy which replaced in ivl ual lnes • The 
assizes of Bread and Ale and the fact that they were established as 
private rights rather than royally controlled franchises was at odds 
with the doctrine set out hy Ralph Hengham C.J. that the assizes were 
part of the royal pow.ers of justice which it was. the king' s duty to 
149 
uphold . In practice, they might be regarded as sources of private 
profit, albeit of limited value. 
Even in an area where the possession of franchises was widespread, 
rights of high justice w.ere more narrowly held than lesser rights, but 
the nwnber of lords who held the ri.gh.t to jus.tice of blood on the West 
March was broader than migh.t be the case in lowland England. The lords 
who held these powers and this. group included those lords who exercised 
the jurisdiction of infangthef , were holders of power over their men 
which was of a wholly di.fferent degree to those exercised by lords 
whose powers were confined, let us. s.ay, to the assizes of Bread and Ale. 
Judicial lordship took many forms on the West March but at its most 
basic level it included the right to imprison and the power of arrest. 
In Cwnberland the rights to try and execute felons were also widely 
held, most often in the form of the jurisdiction of infangthef. In 
Westmorland tl1ough the sheriff and the serjeants of the peace made 
arrests and summonses, often illegally, throughout the whole of the 
county and suspects. were imprisoned in the castle of Appleby. The 
right to hold trials on those arrested was reserved to courts of gaol 
delivery appointed by the crown. Despite this restriction, the powers 
148 Bain, CDS, v2, no 208 
149 Brand - 'Quo Waranto Law', 148, 169 
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of the serjeants of the peace in Westmorland were extensive. They 
regularly claimed the ri_ght to demand free lodging from the tenants 
of Kendale. They also were empowered to attach any suspect to appear 
at the next county court.. In other cases the practice known as. 
'surdi t de serjaunt' allowed the bailiffs. to impris.on men solely by 
their own allegation. As sugges:ted previously, though. in Westmorland 
the serjeants were nominally royal agents, in practice they were agents 
of their lord before those of the king 150 · 
In Cumberland, as. in Wes.tmorland, the enforcement of law_ and order was 
carried out through the serjeant& of the peace and in large parts of 
the county the serjeants w_ere appointed by the masters of the great 
liberties so that law enforcement was. again predominantly seigneurial. 
The extent of the powers exercised by the serjeants of the peace or by 
lord's bailiffs varied, but as might be expected, the greatest demon-
strations of seigneurial power were visible in the lordships of Copeland 
and Allerdale. Indeed the organisation of the lordship of Egremont, 
in particular, was very closely parallel to that of the county. Subject 
to the limitations dis.cus.sed earlier, the power of the lords of Egremont 
over law enforcement within their liberty was almost complete. Arrests 
were made by seigneurial officials. and they were enti.tled to hold in 
the gaol of Egremont cas.tle thos.e who had been arres.ted within the 
l 'b 151 l erty • The castle was not a particularly secure gaol but it was 
the centre of law enforcement for the liberty of Egremont. From there 
the lord or his bai.liff despatched men to make arres.ts and it was to 
the castle that the burgesses of Egremont were obliged to come in answer 
152 
to their lord•s summons. 
150 Just. l/982, m23, 23d 
151 Just. l/132, m28; CCR 1336-39, 4 76 
152 See for example Just. 1/132, m28; CRO D.Lons/L/Deeds W.H.4 
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'Ihe powers of the lord of Egremont were not res.tricted to those who held 
land directly of them. 'Ihus. in a case which_ came before the eyre of 
1278 Thomas de Multon was. summoned to answ.er the charge brought by 
Michael the son of Emma, that Thomas had sent his bailiff , Robert de 
Sari, to the house, which Michael held of the Prior of St Bees, to 
arrest him and afterwards: had kept him imprisoned at Egremont, the court 
fully accepted Multon's defence that he had had this done because 
Michael was guilty of an as.sault, the victim of which was not expected 
to live. Indeed, the court went further and judged that by allowing 
Michael bail, Multon had acted contrary to the law for he ought to have 
been kept in gaol at the castle until it was clear whether his victim 
153 
would die Anyone passing through Egremont, however, came under 
the jurisdiction of its lord. A thief who had strayed into Copeland 
from Cockermouth, for instance, was: executed without any objection 
154 being raised 
It need hardly be stated that the extensive power of e1e lords or their 
bailiffs gave th.em immense local influence. The lord or his bailiff's 
good-will could he a pow_erful form of protection, especially when the 
facts of a case might b.e in douht. The exact facts of the case brought 
by John, son of John de Hales and Ughtred de Fulmar, agains.t Simon de 
Stutevill, bailiff of the liberty of Egremont, Hugh. de Moriceby and 
Wi.lliam de Thwaites are still in doubt, but the case nevertheless 
provides a unique example of the practical workings of lordship in 
Cumberland. Ughtred and John complained that Simon de Stutevill and 
William de Thwaites, the constable of the peace in Egremont, had sent 
Thomas, son of Adam, to arrest them and thereafter had them detained in 
153 Just.l/132, m32 
154 ibid, m28d 
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the prison of Egremont castle. In reply Simon stated that John and 
Ughtred had attacked Thomas and it was. they who had brought him to the 
castle where they presented him to Stutevill as a malefactor. Here 
the two stories converge. According to Simon he recognised Thomas, 
son of Adam, and more significantly recognised him as one of his lord 
Thomas de Multon's men with. the result that he decided to free him. 
That settled the matter Thomas, s.on of Adam, gave a pledge that he would 
prosecute John and Ughtred in the court of Egremont and was allowed 
to go quit. John and Ughtred, however, were committed to gaol until 
155 
the gaol was to b.e delivered 
The degree of pow.er demonstrated in this. case was almost bound to provoke 
resentment. It may well have heen as a result of such opposition that 
Thomas de Multon made an agreement with his men 'toching' in the 
156 Elizabethan phrase 'their subjection and government' printed by 
James Wilson in his edition of the Register of St. B.ees. This agree-
ment may well have resulted from the case just discussed since the 
first name in th.e list of the 'communitas patriae' is John de Hales. 
De Multon agreed that not only should the number of those entitled to 
make arrests be res.tricted to six s.w:orn serjeants, one horse and one 
foot serjeant between the Ellen and the Derwent and two horse and two 
foot serjeants between the Ellen and the Duddon. In each area the 
serjeants were als.o to have a groom, 'garcia' , who was not to be sworn 
157 into office and as a result w.as. to make no summonses or attachments . 
This agreement, which. had close similarities with similar res.trictions 
on the powers of the serjeants of the peace, which will he dis.cussed 
155 KB.27/104, mSd; KB..27/106, mm2d, 3d are closely related cases 
156 Reg St Bees, Illus.t Docs, no 30b 
157 Lucy Cartulary, 50 
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more fully in Chapter 4, w.as aimed at precisely the problem raised by 
Hales and Fulmar's case against Simon de Stutevill, the power of lords 
to appoint their men to make arres.ts even when their men were not 
holders of any sworn office. 
The powers of the lords of eastern Cumberland paralleled the powers of 
the lords of Egremont to a degree, though as has already been suggested, 
their powers were less extensive. Most of them claimed the right to 
restrict the influence of the king' s officers within the borders. of 
their liberty, how.ever, at least to some extent. John de Greys toke 
claimed that royal bailiffs. migh.t only enter Greystoke to make attach-
f 1 f th d 1 th . th h. . . 158 ments or p eas o e crown, an on y en w~ lS perilllss~on 
In the lands of Matilda de Multon and John Wake the procedure was for 
the bailiff to bring the writ or summons. to the chief manor of the 
lordship to ask the bailiff's permission to execute it. The bailiff 
of the liberty would then accompany the royal official while the 
159 
required summons or attachment was. made This was obviously a 
time consuming procedure and it mi.ght be expected that it was not 
intended to be an effective means for enforcing the criminal law. Most 
arrests for felony were the work of seigneurial bailiffs. In Kirk-
oswald and the other lordships. of eastern Cumberland, arrests in the 
first instance were made by the lord's bailiffs, only later did the 
crown become involved. 
The method of procedure was. direct and arbitrary and once again it is. 
clear that the powers. of the local lords. exceeded, in practice, what 
the letter of the law allowed them. The jurors of Kirkoswald in 12g2 
158 PQW, 116 
159 Just. l/135, m7 
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reported that the lord's. bailiffs. regularly made arrests solely on 
. d' 16.0 
suspicion rather than on the basis: of any ~n ~ctment Thomas de 
Multon of Gilsland's powers went still further. Anyone who was. held 
to be suspect migh.t be imprisoned in Kirkoswald until the next court 
held in the vill. If any suit was. brought against the suspect there 
they were taken by the lord's men to the king's gaol and held there, 
161 probably until the gaol was delivered If no suit was offered 
him, the powers of the lord were even more striking. The suspect might 
be held until the next court when the procedure was repeated. At the 
thi.rd court, if unchallenged, the suspect might at last go free. 
The custom in Kirkoswald has. close links. with a system of arrest and 
remand found in Westmorland during the same period and it provides 
another example of the powers of local lords over all those passing 
through their lands. These powers. w.ere restricted within eastern 
Cumberland by the limited circums,tances in which the lords could do 
full justice over their men. With the exceptions of Egremont and 
Cockermouth, seigneurial courts. migh.t try felons only in cases where 
the jurisdiction of infangthef was appropriate. The Quo Warranto 
enquiries disclosed this. ri.ght to he very widely held in Cumberland 
and even in Dufton in W£stmorland which was held of the Clifford 
162 lordship of Appleby Infangthef, in strict doctrine, conferred 
the right to try cases of theft where the suspect was. found in 
163 
possession of the stolen goods This was, in practice, a much 
more important and extensively used right than it appears. to th.e 
modern eye. In lieu of more elaborate means of detection, the finding 
160 ibid 
161 Just. 1/137, m27d 
162 PQW, 786 
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of stolen goods was. the surest way of es.tabl.ishing guilt in cases involv-
164 
ing either the theft of goods. or of li ves.tock The right of 
infangthef may also have allowed its possessor to obtain jurisdiction 
over cases of theft. This. was probab.ly the process by which John de 
Greystoke's court at Dufton, presided over by his steward, judged a 
f h . h d'd ,. t . 165 plea of the t w 1c . 1 not perta1n o 1t. 
Though the jurisdiction of infangthef may, on occasion, have allowed 
the liberty serjeants of the peace to execute felons whose guilt was 
. d . d 166 th . h f . f th f 'f . d . man1fest or a m1tte 1 e r1g t o 1n ang e 1 1 carr1e out 1n 
full, significantly enhanced the power of a lord's court. For example, 
one Hugh de Bulwe, having been arrested by the bailiff of Robert 
de Bruce's lordship of Glassonby, was. brought before the court of 
Glassonby. In his defence Hugh s.tated that he had not stolen the ox 
which he had in his. keeping when he had been arrested but that he had 
bought it from one Willi.am le Lung. William was present in court and 
denied the charge made by Hugh. and offered to prove his case by combat. 
It proved to be a successful defence, William won and Hugh, in 
consequence 1 was hanged. The justices. were suspicious of these pro-
ceedings, suspecting either illegali.ty or an unwarranted accretion of 
power. Bruce•s attorney Adam de Crokedaik claimed the right to hold 
such trials from antiqui.ty and the sui tors of the court were brought to 
testify that the duel had been waged according to their judgement and 
that the judicial duel was. law£ul in a court-baron holdi.ng the right of 
164 R B Pugh- 'Reflections of a Mediaeval Criminologist', 
Proceedings of the British Academy, v59, (1973), 88 
165 Hist and Antiq, vl, 16; PQW., 786, Just.l/9.82, m30 
166 W Page - Northumberland As.s.ize Rolls, CSurtees Society, v88, 1890) 
70 
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infangthef. The judges., however, w.ere only satisfied when a subs tan ti al 
local jury, drawn from Leath, Eskdale, Cumherland bailiwick and 
Allerdale and including major local landholders such. as John de 
Hudlestone, lord of Millom, and Hugh. de Multon of Hoff confirmed the 
167 
correctness of proceedings in Bruce's court 
The local men who bore out B.ruces use of the right of infangthef were, 
in one sense, doing rather Jnore than giving a verdict on jus.t one case. 
They were also making a statement about local cus.tom and law enforce-
ment. If we consider the case of John de Hudlestone, as lord of Millom, 
he was himself a user of the right of infangthef between the rivers of 
the Duddon and the Esk, within the lordship of Egremont, he could hardly 
record a verdict which. diminished the righ.t of infangthef without, by 
168 
the same decision, weakening his. own position 
Despite the wide variations. in the powers exercised by the lords of the 
West March, the right of infangthef was one of the most important 
elements of judicial lordship. I.ts. importance as the prime judicial 
right of the lords. of the region and the fact that it was. held by so 
many of the local landholders., means that it should, on the whole, be 
given a more important place in the history of the lordship in Cumbria 
than the most extreme examples of seigneurial pow~r typified by the 
lordship of Egremont, though much depends. on the chances. \-.'hich govern 
the survival of manus:cript material.. The right of infangthef typified 
in one respect the more extreme powers of the lords of the West March 
over their men, the righ.ts of arres.t, trial and execution. There was, 
however, another level of rights enjoyed by local magnates and thes.e 
167 Just. 1/135, m6d 
168 PQW I 123 
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~ights were especially important in a fiscal sense. These were the 
profitable and important rights of control over the Assizes of Bread 
and Ale and the widespread right to take tolls for passage through 
their land. Even more important was the slightly mundane power to 
compel their men to mill corn only at the seigneurial mill and to 
charge them heavily for the service. 
The economic rights and powers of justice which were exercised by 
the lords of the West March were rarely, if ever, unique to the 
region but the nature of lordship there did contrast markedly with 
169 lowland England The chief source of this contrast lay in the 
generality with which rights of high justice were held. Even lords 
who were not tenants-in-chief, such as the de Wigtons of Wigton or 
the Hudlestones, lords of Millom, might exercise high justice in the 
fom of infangthef. Such rights were an essential part of lordship on 
the West March just as the seigneurial monopolies played a vital role 
in the income of local magnate families. Moreover, judicial lordship 
was an essential part of local law enforcement, lordship and law 
enforcement were indeed very often co-incident, justice being carried 
out by seigneurial officials with just the same degree of severity or 
laxity which they brought to their other tasks of estate management. 
The disruption of the traditional forms of lordship and estate adminis-
tration during the wars with Scotland could only have, therefore, the 
most serious consequences. 
169 Hilton - Mediaeval Society, 24 
CHAPTER 3 
LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND MAGNATE LEADERSHIP 
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The establishment of a broadly accepted consensus on the main themes 
of English mediaeval political his.tory has led workers to turn their 
attentions to other, hitherto neglected, areas. Two of the most 
important of these have been the analysis of the way in which aristo-
cratic influence was brought to bear by means of the retinues that 
were organised among regional gentry and an attempt to reconstruct 
the arena in which the aristocratic affinity functioned. Efforts 
have also been made to trace the development of these 'county 
communities' in the middle ages. 
The historical county community has. its. roots deep in the Anglo-Saxon 
counties of lowland England hut even more importantly the county 
community has developed as an orthodoxy of regional history as 
compelling as any of the revisions or counter-revisions of Bishop 
Stubbs judgements. It is worth_ examining the evidence for the county 
communities, both for its own merits and to assess its relevance to 
the West March. The first is in the twBntieth century regional study. 
It is in the nature of historical writing to s.eek to impose, or 
discover, some overall signi£i.cance to the chosen period of study. A 
convenient answer to this. need has. recently been found in an institu-
tion which seems originally to have been brought to light during the 
elaborate di.scussions which s.urround the English Civil War. 
1 
'In every English shire there was a group of native 
families at the heart of local society •... but in much 
of the north, the wes.t and the s.outh. of England, the 
obligarchy of indigenous families was very powerful 
and it was impos.sible to rule the shires without its 
1 
support' 
I Roots - 'The County Comunity', (in E W_ Ives ed.); The English 
Revolution, (_1968), 51 and s.ee dis.cus.sion throughout. 
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The idea has fallen on receptive soil and mediaevalists have shown 
themselves more than willing to subscribe to this doctrine, whose 
very intangibility means that it can be super-imposed with little 
violence to the sources. M.J. Bennett, for example, has written that 
'Cheshire gentlemen were well accus.tomed to acting together in a 
variety of capacities and their informal activities confirm the 
existence of a close, if completely informal, network of relations 
" 
which embraced the entire county' ~ There was, however, a signifi-
cant difference between groups of gentry supporting one anothers 1 
land transactions and coherent political communities, though the one 
has often, unjustifiably been assumed to have been merely an extension 
3 
of the first Notwi.thstanding the unsatisfactory evidence for the 
existence of the county communities, they have been increasingly 
developed and have been allotted as. important a role in the political 
history of the thirteenth century as in that of the seventeenth. For 
Dr J .R. Maddicott the shi.re communi.ties., which he has found even in 
Westmorland, were at the forefront of the opposition to Henry III's 
style of government. The shire communities were not, in this inter-
pretation, simply arenas for action or discussion. They were, it is 
suggested, dynamic bodies which not only formed opinion but initiated 
action independently. 'The assertiveness of local opinion was. not 
merely a reaction to pressure from above. It possessed an internal 
dynamic of its own, derived largely from the strength of the local 
community and from the leadership provided by a powerful knightly 
4 
class' 
2 M J Bennett - Community, Class and Careerism, (Cambridge 1983), 24 
3 See the review by R H Hilton in Social History, v9 (1984) , 
especially 233 
4 Maddicott- 'Magna Carta and the Local Community'; Past and 
Present, vl02 (1984) , 63 
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Though Dr Maddicott has suggested that the hypothesis of the county 
community holds good for even the extreme north of England, there are 
5 
severe difficulties in applying the idea to the West March . There 
are a variety of reasons why this should be so. Firstly the role and 
importance of the counties of Cumberland and Westmorland differed 
from that of shires in other regions of England. Secondly the vital 
factor shaping local alignments and attitudes was not self-confident 
county communities but the dominant influences of local magnates. 
Finally, though local retinues and affinities were organised in ways 
that were very closely s.imilar to those in other areas the gentry of 
the West March were not the prosperous. and substantial knights who 
formed the county communities. in areas such as Gloucestershire but men 
6 
who were much more dependent on the goodwill of their lords 
It is in Westmorland th.at Dr Maddicott has found one of the earliest 
examples of a county community prepared to act collectively to assert 
its rights, but in fact i.t is hard to s.ee the county of Westmorland 
in this light. It was in many ways profoundly different from the shires 
of southern England which_ may indeed have pos.ses.sed a degree of 
intrinsic cohesion~ Westmorland was. not a natural county as. perhaps 
Kent or Norfolk were, it was. simply a region formed by amalgamating 
two great and s.ignificantly divergent lordships, produced not in the 
7 dim Anglo-Saxon past but as late as the reign of Henry II As a 
result of the remodelling of the county by King John, not only were 
the local gentry insulated by the power of the lords of Appleby but 
a very significant cause for disunity was injected into this rough 
5 ibid, 65 
6 N Saul - Knights and Esquires, (Oxford 1981) i'lo, 'it(, 
1 
If.~. 
7 See above - 'Introduction' 
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hewn administrative division and there was very little community of 
feeling between the men of .the lordships of Appleby and Kendale. This 
was evident at the institution which in other counties served as the 
focus of local solidarity, the county court. The county court of 
Westmorland was the source and expression of local rivalry and discord. 
Early in Henry III's reign the men of Kendale were compelled and 
distrained to do suit at the county court of Westmorland against their 
8 
will and against that of th.eir lord, William de Lancaster . This 
conflict continued throughout the middle ages and it underlay relations 
between Kendale and the rest of Westmorland. In the early years of the 
reign of Edward I there were repeated complaints at the way in which 
the agents of the lords of Appleby encroached on the liberties of the 
lordship of Kendale in efforts to impose a more direct form of lordship 
9 
there • The dispute resurfaced during the reign of Edward III as the 
Cliffords sought to again compel the men of Kendale to do suit at the 
. h' h th f d 1 d d . d 10 county court, a su1t w 1c e men o Ken a e resente an res1ste • 
This was indeed what we should have expected, for as Maitland wrote, 
11 
suit of court, whether at vill or county was 'no right but a burden' 
Even in the reign of Henry VIII i.t remained true that the shire court 
of Westmorland was the site of political struggle more than of unity 
and it was recognised as a severe defeat for Henry de Clifford when he 
12 
was unable to compel suit at the county court on the men of Kendale 
8 C Curia Regis R, vll, 547-9 
9 See below, Chapter 5 
10 C.260/64/32 
ll HEL, vl, 537 
12 M James - 'The First Earl of Cumb.erland and the Decline of 
Northern Feudalism'; NH, vl (19.69) , 48 
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Two further cases. will demonstrate the degree of disunity which existed 
in the county of Westmorland. The first is the complaint of the 
'knights and worthy men' of Westmorland at the failure of local lords 
to grant to their own men the concessions regarding forests that had 
l3 been granted to the realm as a whole • The genuinely significant 
point about this complaint was that it was not the work of a county 
community nor even of the men of one county. It was the work of a 
geographical region, South. Westmorland, North Lancashire and Furness. 
The complaints moreover w.ere not directed at royal government. They 
were directed against the dominant lords of the region who, it was. 
claimed, had not allowed land to be dis:afforested in the way envisaged 
for the crown by the Charter of the Forest of 1225 14 • It was an 
equally clear illustration of the fundamental divergence within the 
county that on the outbreak of hostilities between the king and Simon 
de Montfort in 1258 Wes.tmorland divided politically along the boundari.es 
of the two lordships of Kendale and Appleby. Robert II de Vipont threw 
his energies wholeheartedly into the cause of the Provisions of Oxford 
while the lords of Kendale, with. the ob.vious exception of Robert de 
Ros, proved themselves to oe among the mos.t staunch of Henry III's 
supporters. Though a detailed s,tudy of the surviving charters fl.-om 
Westmorland would be a protracted task, broadly they seem to confirm 
the overall pattern that has been suggested. For example, a grant of 
land in Crossby Garrett made by Henry de Suleby to William L' Engleys. 
was witnessed by Robert de Askeby, then sheriff of Westmorland and 
others, Jordan de Querton, John de Morvill, William de Sandford, Wido 
de Smardale and Walter de Barclay, men who were geographically drawn 
from a very limited area, much less wide than the county as a whole, 
13 Maddicott- 'Magna Carta and Local Community', 64 
14 CPR 1216-25, 575-6 
but who were all even more significantly minor satellites 
15 
of Appleby 
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Cumberland displayed even fewer s-igns of a 'county community' than did 
Westmorland and this was wholly unders.tandable. Still more than 
Westmorland Cumberland was: an agglomeration of great lordships. grafted 
onto the stem of the 'power' of Carlisle which had been held by Ranulf 
Meschines. Suit to the county court was owed only sparingly. The 
lords of the great lordships were generally exempt from the county and 
their tenants owed suit, not to the county but to the courts. of the 
liberties. Even those who ought to have attended at the county did 
not do so unless they were compelled. Hugh de Cres.s.ingham and his 
fellows, for example, heard that William de Ireby had withdrawn the 
suit he owed to the county and his. heirs in Glassanby, Robert de Bruce 
16 
and his wife Christiana had continued to evade their obligations 
The county court was not in fact the central meeting place for the 
whole county but only for a narrow~ s.egment of it. Deeds which we can 
reasonably expect to record transactions. initiated in the county court 
are witnessed by men of purely local standing, not hy men drawn from 
throughout the county.. A quitclaim made by the rector of Denton to 
Bishop John de Halton was, for example, witnessed by men drawn only 
from the immediate environs of Carlisle such as Nicholas and Richard 
d Wh 'tf' ld h 1 1 1' . d . . h b' h . 17 e ~ ~e w ose careers were very c os.e y ~nKe w~ th t e ~s opr~c . 
The great lordships displayed strong centrifugal tendencies and indeed 
functioned more as local communities. in their own right than as. part 
15 CRO D.Lons/L/Deeds, CG.l 
16 PQW, 124 
17 CRO D.Lons/Denton, D.3 
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of the greater community based on the county. The mos.t distinct of 
these communities was based on the lordship of Copeland and afterwards 
on the liberty of Egremont. Legally this area was almost self-governing 
and it is clear that the centres. of local life were the castle of 
Egremont and the monastery of St. Bees.. The pattern was set early on. 
When William de Meschines founded the monastery as a cell of St. Marys 
York he called the local community to witness his benefaction. The 
witnesses were a narrow group confined almost exclus.i vely to the 
18 
tenants of his lordship The same pattern was. visible during the 
whole of the history of the cell. During the latter half of the 
thirteenth century a gift to the priory of land by Agnes de Cornay was 
witnessed by a group of eight witnesses, seven of whom were recognisably 
linked with Copeland~ They included not only Robert de Harrington, 
who may well have been buried at St. Bees, William de Boyvill, William 
19 de Thwai tes and the toponymic William de Waberthwai te An even 
more important illustration of the local community at work in Egremont 
was an agreement made b.etw.een the lord of Egremont, Thomas de Multon, 
and the men of the lordship who s.ealed the agreement 'for themselves 
and for the community of the country, patriae•. The parties. to the 
agreement, John de H.ales., Gilbert de Curwen, lord of Workington, Ralph 
de Lampl ugh and Thomas: de Cleator were men of such obvious. links with 
West Cumberland th.at it is. impossible to beli.eve that they meant by the 
20 
term 'patriae' Cumberland, not the old county of Copeland 
The disunity which existed in the counties. of Cumb.erland and Westmorland 
was particularly evident in times. of crisis. The collapse of the 
18 Reg St Bees, iii 
19 ibid, no 443, see also KB .• 27/l04, m3, for John de Hales 
20 Lucy Cartulary, 50 
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defence of the border under Edward II placed the initiative firmly on 
local institutions. As Mrs Scammell has pointed out, the Bishopric 
of Durham was among the fir&t to pay protection money to the Scots. 
The Bishopric, the best documented of the local communities of the 
north of England, appears to have posses.sed a high degree of internal 
organisation and its distinct local identity facilitated the raising 
21 
of money and its payment to the Scots. . Northumberland lacked such 
clear organisation and as. a res.ul t s.uffered heavily. On the West 
March there was considerable resort to attempts to pay the Scots off 
and the divisions by which. money was raised are instructive. In 1312 
the Lanercost Chroni.cler reported that ransom was paid to. the Scots 
22 by Cumberland, Westmorland and Copeland • The Chronicle of St. 
Mary's York provides more detai.l. It recorded that protection money 
was paid from Northumberland but also from Gilsland, Allerdale, 
umb 23. c· erland and Copeland . The Chronicle, probably iri this s.ection 
written at St Bees clearly reflects local thinking, that the effective 
local divisions. were those of the great lordships and that • Cumberland' 
in fact was not the whole of the county hut only the area in the north 
of the present county, formerly the Cumberland ward. This pattern was 
not confined to the extreme north~ When the Scots hegan to raid deeply 
into Yorkshire they were paid off in the same way as. the borderers 
tried to do. Moreover, in North. Yorkshire the effective ins.titutions. 
were the local communities of Beverley, Knaresborough. and the 'county' 
24 
of Richmond 
21 Scammell - 'Robert I and the North of England'; EHR, v73 (1958) 
22 Lanercost, 230 
23 H E Craster - Chronicle of StMary's York, (Surtees Society, 
vl48, 1934), xi, 54 
24 Lanercost, 248, 235, 228, 233 
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If the raising of money to pay off the Scots allows us to see the local 
communities in action, it also shows that the lords played a vital role 
in this process. When the Scots. raided into Furness in 1322 it was the 
local lord, the Abbot of Furness who was responsible for meeting the 
Scots commanders to pay ransom so that the region should escape from 
being plundered or burnt. Further north the role of the lords was even 
greater. The St. Mary's Abbey chronicle stressed that it was because 
there was no lord in the castle of Egremont that James Douglas was able 
25 
to raid into Egremont and plunder the church of St. Bees Lacking a 
leaderJthe men who opposed Douglas were killed. In short it is clear 
that in times of crisis the local communities of the region were not 
autonomous bodies of independent local gentry but rather networks of 
clientage round the great lordships, communities which depended on 
their lords both to organise resistance and even to lead them in 
surrender. 
Having defined the environment in which the gentry of the West March 
operated it is worthwhile to try to examine the gentry themselves in 
greater detail. The gentry of Cumberland and Westmorland were, in 
general, less w_ealthy and substantial than their approximate peers 
further south. One result of this relative poverty was that there 
w_ere fewer belted knights than in counties in lowland England and it 
is. possible that those who were there were less prosperous men too. 
Poverty was not the only reason for this. Cornage tenure which was 
characteristic to Westmorland was held during the thirteenth century 
to be incompatible with knighthood 26 Though the importance of 
cornage tenure diminished during the middle ages, and it had lost its 
special status almost completely by the sixteenth century, it served 
25 Chronicle of St. Mary's. York, 54 
26 CPR 1247-58, 508 
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to narrow, and to narrow_ s.ubs.tantially, the gap betw.een the military 
d f h . 27 tenants and the freehol ers. o t e reg1on According to figures 
which can be extracted from the Clifford feodary, compiled during the 
career of Roger III. de Clifford, of 20 tenants by corn age whose holdings 
can b.e cons.tructed, 7 of them held land worth less than £10 in value. 
As. a result these carnage tenants. were very close economically to the 
more prosperous of the tenants at will. From an analysis of the 
remainder of those of the Clifford's tenants whose lands can be examined, 
a clear pattern emerges.. The remaining 13 members of the gentry can be 
divided into four categories. according to the value that the feodary 
placed on their lands. when held in w~rdship. Half of this group 
enjoyed incomes. of les.s. than £40 annually. In detail, two, Thomas de 
Mus.grave and Richard de Warcop had an income of between £30 and £40 while 
tw_o, Alan de Cabergh and Robert L'Engleys. had £20 to £30 and two, John 
Mauchel and John Boyvill held les.s. than £20 worth of land. There were, 
however, several relatively prosperous members of the Cliffords tenantry, 
seven of whom held land w_orth more than £40 in value. This group 
include Mi.chael de Harclay, Robert de Askeby, Thomas de Helbeck and 
Ranulph. I. de Dacre and it is clearly significant that this group 
included men like Helbeckwho were the lords of Appleby's closest 
28 
agents. . The figures which can be extracted from the feodary for this 
time are limited and they do not include the whole of the Clifford lands, 
though they are likely to have detailed the most important and wealthy 
of the local gentry. Those who held over £40 worth of land seem likely 
to have been the exception rather than the rule. The broad mass of the 
gentry of Cumbria seems likely to have had more limited resources. 
Around 1240, for example, Richard FitzAldred of Louther provided his 
27 James-'Decline of Northern Feudalism', NH, vl (1969), 57 and note 
28 Feodary ~t.. _ ~t~ 
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daughter Maud with a marriage portion that compris.ed only three acres 
of land in Louther and one toft of land, sixty feet by forty feet in 
29 
size This was not unprecedented in the north of England; but it 
would surely have surprised the established gentry of the plains of 
England. Though the top level of the Clifford's tenants would also 
have looked askance at an alliance with a family of such limited means 
the numbers of those at the top level of the local gentry were small 
and since they were heavily dependent on the favour of local lords for 
their advancement they tended to lack the political independence and 
ass.ertiveness that it has been suggested was one of the hallmarks of 
the gentry communi.ty. This was particularly true in Westmorland where 
the lords of Appleb.y were the immediate superior lords restricting 
contact with the crown, one of the formative factors it has been 
sugges.ted in the development of the county communi ties. As a result 
of this situation the gentry of Cumbria were recognisable as having 
followed the leadership of their lords rather than acting independently. 
During the rebellion of John's. reign, for example, it is noticeable 
that armed opposition to the king was confined almost exclusively to 
30 thos.e men who did not hold of Rob.ert de Vipont The same was true 
of the men of Kendale whos.e poli.ti.cal alignment follow.ed that of 
Gi.lbert Fi tzReinfrey exactly. Lt remained true during the reign of 
Henry II.I. The baronial party on the W.est March was led by local 
.magnates who supported de Montfort not by a coalition of disaffected 
but prosperous and self-confident gentry. Nowhere was this more clear 
than in the lordship of Appleby where, while Robert II de Vipont was 
active in the support of de Montfort, the gentry of his lordship 
supported him in the plundering of Inglewood forest and the election 
29 CRO D.Lond/D/Louther, LO.S 
30 Halt - Northerners ,l+'i 
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of conunissioners to enforce de Montfort's revolution. When Vipont 
died, however, deprived of a leader the men of Westmorland made peace 
and n:.tpidly re-aligned themselves behind new lords. 
In times of crisis the West March looked to its lords for leadership, 
just as thos.e lords could look to their men for support. The extent 
of that support in times of need, however, depended on their degree 
of local influence. In this., all lords were very far from equal and 
the amount of support which could be mustered depended on the size and 
organisation of a lord's affini.ty. The affinity was, in fact, a vi tal 
part in the exercis.e of effective lordship for it was through the 
affinity that vital agents were found to fill key roles in estate 
adminis.tration and judicial lordship, such as the bailiffs of Egremont. 
Broadly the lords. of Cumberland and Westmorland can be divided into 
three categories. of increasing local influence, with the Cliffords 
alone in the mos.t pow.erful category. In the least powerful group were 
those lords who, for various reasons, took little part in the running 
of their border es.tates and can, as. a result, be expected to have had 
little influence there. Often these lords were absentees for greater 
or lesser periods of the year. Among the most prominent members of 
this. group was Isabella de Forz. As lady of Cockermouth she held one 
of the most important es.tates. in the region and in the liberty of the 
Five Vills outside the burgh, it included one of the greatest exemp-
tions from royal jurisdiction in Cumberland. The castle itself was 
als.o potentially an important fortification on the border though there 
is. little evidence that i.t w.as in a good state c;,f repair. Despite 
these as.sets. Isabella displayed very little interest in Cockermouth 
and i.t is. most improbable that she ever made the trip to Cockermouth 
31 to s.ee i.t for hers.elf One result of this policy or preference 
31 N Denholm-Yaung - 'The Yorkshire Estates of Isabella de Forz' 
Yorkshire Archeological Journal, v3l (1932-34), 413 
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was that Isabella's. control over even the more important members of her 
affinity, her estate managers, was. ineffective. Even trusted bailiffs, 
s.uch as Thomas de Weston, illegally took money from brew-wives to allow 
them to brew contrary to the statute though Isabella remained wholly 
32 in ignorance of this. A s.econd res.ul t was that Isabella's influence 
w:ith the rest of the local gentry was negligible. The Wake lords of 
Liddell appear to have been in a similar situation. The decay of the 
chief buildings of Liddell testified to the limits of the interest 
they displayed in the border and they exercised little more control 
over their men. Baldwin Wake's. bailiff, Richard de Stratford, was 
found by the eyre j us.tices. to have appropriated two stray horses without 
permission and it was only a personal intervention by Wake which 
33 prevented the liberty from being s.eized in to the hands of the crown 
Abs.entee lordship did not have to be ineffective, however. The affinity, 
when well organis.ed, served to protect its lords interests even in his 
abs.ence. Thus., when s.crutiny of the proceedings of the court, held in 
the name of Robert II.I de Bruce, revealed what the justices in eyre 
s.us.pected were serious. irregulari.ties, arrangements were set in train 
through Bruce's. retinue to defend his righ.ts. The court had originally 
been held by Ralph. de Bolton, one of Bruce's clerks, but for the 
important business. of the hearing before the eyre the case w.as. taken 
over hy an experienced local man, Adam de Crokedaik, who had served 
Bruce as. a bailiff earlier in his career. Crokedaik 's defence was an 
effective one and Bruce's rights w.ere preserved without any involvement 
b h . t all 34 y llD a This. w.as. not, however, an isola ted example. 
Crokedaik served Bruce over a period of some years and th.e partnership 
32 Just. 1/137, m5. Denholm-Yaung took a more favourable view of 
Weston. Seigneurial Administration, 87 
33 Just. 1/135, m3d, Just 1/132, m33 
34 Just. 1/135, m6d 
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was beneficial for both parties.. After Bruce's death his widow 
35 
rewarded him with a grant of the manor of Glassanby 
The Lucies and the Multons of Egremont, members of the second group of 
local magnates, possess.ed better developed local connections than their 
co-parcener Isabella de Forz though. of the two the Multons were the 
more influential. In part this may have been a result of feelings of 
local identity and community whi.ch s.till attached to the old county of 
Copeland but there were probably two other important reasons. Firstly 
the Multons were important lords, not only in Cumberland but also in 
Lincolnshire and in Ireland and as a result they could offer more 
extensive and effective patronage than either the dowager Isabella de 
Forz or the Lucy fami.ly whose holdings. were largely confined to 
Cumberland and Northumberland. The Multon family, however, so far as 
the limitations. of the evidence that survive allow us to conclude, seem 
to have simply pursued a more active policy in the West March than the 
Lucies, perhaps becaus.e given their unchallenged control of the liberty 
of Egremont was. more profitable than control of Aspatria. The Multons 
poss.essed a well organised local retinue which it is possible to trace 
in detail. One branch of thi.s retinue was formed by liveried estate 
officials., men such as Peter de Mottington or Simon de Stutevill who 
36 
served the family as bai.liffs of Egremont Intermeshed with this 
group was a wider body of local gentry of very similar status whose 
activities centred round the castle of Egremont and who performed minor 
offices for the lords. From this broader group the inner circle of the 
lord's retinue was recruited, hut the retinue of a magnate whose lands 
were widely dispersed reflected this fact. A list of Multon's followers 
35 Bain, ~, v2, nos 709, 712 
36 Just. 1/137, ml 
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who were granted protections before crossing to Ireland with him in 1305 
illustrates this point well. lncluding Thomas de t·lulton himself the 
party numbered 16 in all. Of the fifteen retainers listed only two~ 
:Uchard de Hudlestone and John de Lamplugh both tenants of the honour of 
Egremont can be linked with Cumberland. A further five including John 
of Lincoln~ ~lilliam of Spalding and Hilliam Laxman of Fleet can be linked 
easily with i'!ulton's important estates in Lincolnshire. The remaining 
eight are harder to place~ though they seem to have had no discernable 
links with Cumberland 37 • Despite this it is clear that the family did 
recruit SO!Ite of it's most trusted men from Egremont. John de Cleator ' ·· 
38 
served as attorney for !'1ulton while his lord \vas in England in 1302 
39 John de Taileur of Egremont performed the sQme office in 1313 
Like other lords Thomas de Nul ton of Egremont seems to have based his 
military retinue round a core of reliable family retainers. In the small 
contingent Nulton led in pursuit of Bruce in 1307 were three men who had 
close links with Egremont. John de Lamplugh had been in Hulton's retinue 
in Ireland in 1305 and he brought one esquire 7 Simon Fraunceis. Among 
the others we1:e Thomas·:de Copeland and John de Taileur. Only one of the 
force, Ralph ~Jareschal, cannot be linked definitely with Egremont and 
it is possible that the proximity of the war made the Cumberland men 
more eager to serve than their fellows further south. Thomas de Lucy's 
retinue is less well documented 7 but it seems likely that it Has -, 
considerably smaller than r!ulton of Egremont's. Lucy enrolled 
protection for only his most immediate and impor*a•t folloHers who, in 
fact, numbered only t\vo, his brother Anthony and his steward Thomas de 
41 Ireby I reby \vas probably one of the more prosperous 
37. CPR 1301-1307 9 337 
38. ibid,9 
39. CPR 1312-1317,26 
40. Bain CDS no 1923 
41. C.67/I6 
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of the local gentry of Allerdale and in 1292 he had been listed as among 
those who held a whole knight's fee but who had not yet been dubbed as 
k . h 42 a n1g t The Ireby family seems to have looked to local magnates 
for advancement. Thomas' father, Alan de Ireby, had served as Constable 
of Cockermouth castle and later as bailiff of the estates of Alice de 
43 Lucy The reversion of Cockermouth to the crown after the death of 
Isabella de Forz left the Ireby family 1to a degree,without obvious 
leadership but the defect was. apparently remedied by entering the service 
of the Lucy family. It is s.ignificant 1 however 1 that the Lucy family at 
this time drew its supporters. and retainers from only a very localised 
area. The same pattern appears. to have been in force in the east of the 
county. In 1298 John Wake's re.tinue in Scotland included only one man 
who can be satisfactorily linked with Cumberland, Robert de Tilliol, who 
held Solpert of the lordship of Liddell 44 The work of K.B. McFarlane 
did much to rehabilitate the nobility of med.iaeval England and to stress 
the respectability of the creation and maintenance of retinues of gentry. 
Considerable stres.s. w,as. laid on the law abiding and practical use to 
which an aristocratic affinity could be put but it is possible that this 
process has been carried too far. Particularly in the north of England 
the aristocratic affinity could be used to threaten and coerce opponents 
45 
and use illegal means to pursue territorial plans This was a develop-
ment which has been considered to have reached its peak in the later 
fourteenth century but it is clear that even before then lords in the 
region maintained links with groups of less respectable men than those 
who were used to swell their worship at court and they were prepared to 
42 Just. l/137, ro5d 
43 SC.6.824/lO, mld, Just. l/132 1 m33 
44 Bain, CDS v2, no 1050 
45 K B McFarlane - The Nobility of Later Mediaeval England (Oxford 
1971)_ ~¥ /0"-
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us.e these contacts. in a very forceful w,ay. On other occas.i.ons. lords 
were prepared to stoop to illegality themselves in order to pursue their 
ends. 
The lords. of Redes.dale of the Il.Ip.:f;ravill family were among the most 
regular exponents of forceful, violent and illegal acti·on to impose their 
domination on the local community. In 1346 for example, Gilbert d' 
Umfravill was able to impos.e on a group of local gentry a bond by which 
they bound themselves to deliver William de Swinburne the Younger at 
either of Umfraville's castles of Harbottle or Prudhoe within a 
46 
specified time or face a severe financial penalty Gilbert's grand-
father, also Gilbert, had been equally forceful in his assertion of 
local power. According to an appeal made by William de Douglas, during 
the aftermath o£ the Barons. War, Umfravill had attempted by deception 
to gain control of his lands. ~~en this ploy was discovered and William 
had_b.een restored to his lands, Gilbert sent a force of outlaws 
fro~ his liberty of Redesdale, under one John de Hirlaw, to Faundon 
where. they as:s:aulted William and nis family and servants before carrying 
47 
W..illiam himself off to Harhottle wl:iere he. was imprisoned William 
had enlarged on his sufferings for the court's benefit and his case was 
defeated on a technicali.ty but it seems very probable that Umfravill 
had in fact arranged for the assault and abduction. Umfravill maintained 
close contacts with. convi.cted felons, probably so that they were available 
to carry out this type of task for him. A few years afterwards it was 
found that he had res.et John, son of William, a known robber in his 
liberty of Redesdale and to another notorious robber, Walter Denyas and 
48 his gang he had actually granted letters of conduct and protection 
46 NRO Swinburne MSS, 1/ 64 
47 Northumberland Pleas. from the Curia Regis and Assize Rolls 
(Newcastle 19.22)_, no 776 
48 Bain, c~~, v2, no 147 (45) 
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If these complaints w.ere true it was hardly surprising if the jurors 
wished to avoid earning the Earl's emnity by recording a verdict against 
him. Other Northern lords. us.ed s:imilarly direct tactics. That man of 
God, Anthony Bek, was. one of thos.e who was most active in this. Faced 
with opposition from the monks of Durham, Bek called up a force of men 
from his lands in Tynedale to add the threat of physical force to the 
other methods he w.as. using in the dispute. The force appears to have 
been easily mobilised and organised around the foresters of Bek's lands 
in Weardale and Tynedale 49 . Bek. o:O:viously became convinced of the 
efficacy of this. approach. and he tried it again towards the end of his 
life during a dispute with. the. Earl of Warwick over the control of 
Barnard Castle. The force w.as again mustered around the foresters of 
the Bishop's highland estates and was. led by one Hugh de Wales, a man 
who later became notorious as. the leader of a band of schavaldurs and 
50 
robbers who terrorised Northumberland in the early fourteenth century 
It seems probable that Bek's force was recruited through a procedure 
very closely related to the affinity. The leaders of his force were 
the officials from his estates in the region but there may also have 
been indentures of retinue with some men as William de Swinburne had 
51 
with Thomas de Rede. of Redes.dale, though details are ab.sent . The 
significant thing is. that s).lch. forces. were recruited b.y means of 
institutions common to the. wnole. of the north, and indeed the whole of 
England. 
J:t seems clear thi3,t lords. in the. Wes.t March were also ready to use 
similar means to those us.ed by Bek and Umfravill and the recruitment 
49 Fraser - Bek, 143 and note 
50 C M Fraser -·Records. of Anthony Bek (Surtees Society, vl52, 1947) 
209-lJ 
51 NRO, Swinburne, 1/110 
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of suitable supporters repres,ented no di_fficulty. One factor which 
made the recruitment of gangs. of low~born retainers more easy was the 
small economic gap which exis.ted be.tween local gentry and freeholders. 
For example, John de Whale who w.as described as having the rank of only 
a serving man in 1264 when he w.as. in Robert II de Vipont' s retinue when 
they broke into Inglew.ood fores.t was. almost certainly the same John de 
Whale who was. a minor .me.mb.er of the local gentry connnunity. J'ohn de 
Whale appears as a wi.tness. to a deed o.etween Christiana de Lancaster 
and Roger de Lancas.ter and he s.erved on a jury called to determine the 
Abbot of Shap's claim to Bretherdale in 1292 52 . Like more substantial 
members. of the local communi.ty, John de Whale looked directly to the 
lords. of Appleby for leadership and like their lords the gentry of the 
W.es,t March displayed a d.t-s.tinctly ambivalent attitude to the law. 
Robert de Vipont 's. Jl).en, for excunple., were the pool from which local 
jurors. had to be drawn hut~o~t had taken an active part in the plunder-
ing of Inglew.ood :f;ores.t. Others were implicated in more serious crimes. 
Geo:i;:f;rey de. Melkanthorp, who served aa Sheriff of Westmorland and 
constable of Appleb.y Cas.tle, was. accused in 1285 of being one of a 
group who had come. ar1t1ed to the. house of Eustace le Trewick and carried 
53 
off forcibly goods. to the value o.:l; £20 Another subsheriff, Gilbert 
de Brunnolsheved, was known as a notorious associate of thieves and 
54 
outlaws. . Robert de Clifford continued to find a place in his retinue 
for Robert de Vipont of Alston, a man with a long record of illegality 
behind him. This. record included caus.ing a man to be imprisoned in 
Wark Cas.tle unti.l he paid to b.e released for claiming to be a subject 
52 F H M Parker - 'Inglewood Forest, Part 3', Tra,ns of C&W I~I, y9 
(1909) 4; Ft>J Ragg - 'De Lancaster', ibid, vlO (J.9lO)_, 453; 
Ragg- 'Charters to Byland Abbey', ibid, v9, 256 
53 C.Inq.Misc., vl, no 1207; KB.27}88, ml5d, 16; Just. 1}988, rnl 
54 Just. l/986, rnlO and see below Chapter 5 
55 
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There seems little reason to doubt that levels of organised violence 
among lords on the Anglo-Scottish border increased as the state of 
war on the border became endemi.c but it is very hard to find any clear 
change in the types of violence or in the way gangs were recruited and 
controlled. Often the disputes. in which violence was involved 
remained constant over long periods of time. One long running dispute 
existed between the lords of Kendale and Appleby over the jurisdiction 
of the sheriff within Kendale. Another even more bitter dispute 
exis.ted over the precise line of the division between the counties of 
Yorkshire and Westmorland. This. was a matter which had a more direct 
effect on the lords whos.e lands adjoined the border than on royal 
officials since it w:as their lands which were most affected. The 
dispute appears to have first appeared as a source of dispute in 1285 
when Thomas de Normanville and Guichard de Charron were appointed to 
make an inquisition before knights from Yorkshire and W.estmorland and, 
if necessary, Lancashire as w~ll into the true meets and bounds of the 
tw.o counties 56 . The dispute appears to have slumbered for a while 
but it re-appeared as a major source of hostility in the early reign 
of Edward III. Robert II de Clifford took up the matter in no uncertain 
manner. According to a petition presented in parliament by Henry 
FitzHugh, both parties tried legal means first. FitzHugh recovered 
3000 acres of pasture in Mikelton in Teesdale from Clifford by an 
assize of novel disseisin but Clifford retaliated by launching a 
counter assize claiming that the land was in fact his and belonged to 
57 
the manor of Brough under Stainmoor and was thus in Westmorland 
55 Bain, CDS, v2, no 147 
56. CPR 128b·92, 200 
57 Rotuli Parliamentorum, v2, 81 
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An assize was. eventually ordered to be taken but FitzHugh continued to 
face a variety of opposition from Clifford and his men. One of Clifford's 
moves was to object to the inclus.ion of Peter de Richmond in the panel 
58 
of jurors on the grounds. that he received robes and fees from FitzHugh 
Clifford also continued to try violence in addition to this legal 
challenge, however. Even before the matter had been taken up in 
Parliament, Clifford had tried force as well. He was alleged to have 
supported a group of armed men, including Robert de Leyburn of Musgrave, 
Thomas de Musgrave, Thomas Pinder of Helbeck, Henry Warcop, John the 
Forester of Musgrave and Gilbert Thomas servant of Musgrave who had 
59 
come to Mikelton and assaulted FitzHugh.'s servants Later Clifford 
took. a hand in person and when s:ome of FitzHugh's men imparked some 
cattle which. they claimed had strayed onto his lands Clifford led a 
force including again Thomas de Musgrave, Robert de Leyburn of Musgrave 
60 
and others in a raid to rescue the Westmorland men's cattle 
After FitzHugh had been successful in court, Clifford tried the most 
direct threat of all. He came with a large force of knights and other 
armed men and so threatened the sheriff of York who had come to give 
FitzHugh seizin of the disputed land that the sheriff was unable to 
carry out his. office for fear of heing killed 61 The affair was 
clearly threatening to get out of hand and Edward's government fell 
back on a perambulation to be made by local magnates whose judgement 
would command respect in the region. In 1338 Ralph. de Neville, John 
Kirkby of Carlisle and Anthony de Lucy were ordered to make the view of 
the boundary though there is no evidence that a final solution was ever 
58 CPR 1334-38, 318 
59 CPR 1330-34, 583 
60 CPR 1334~38, 216. 
61 C.Inq.Misc., v2, no 146.9 .. 
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reached. FitzHugh. was to have his revenge on Clifford for the attacks 
and threats his men had suffered, however. When commissioners were 
appointed to examine the conduct of the sheriffs in neighbouring 
counties, Henry FitzHugh and Peter de Richmond were appointed to 
examine the conduct of the Sheriff of Westmorland. Not surprisingly 
the conduct of Clifford's nominee, Thomas de Musgrave, was found 
62 
unsatisfactory and he was ordered to be removed 
does not seem to have heeded the order. 
Clifford, however, 
Though Clifford had clearly escalated the dispute by bringing armed 
knigfLts from his retinue, there were clear parallels in the force which 
Clifford had used earlier on and that which Bishop Bek was in the habit 
of using against hi.s. opponents but there were also closer local 
parallels and reasons which compelled the government to take a tolerant 
view. In 1346 a dispute erupted between the garrison of Carlisle and 
the local citizenry during which several of the townsmen were killed 
and the community of the city in consequence brought a complaint against 
63 
the garrison The government, however, was in a weak position to 
insist on strong action. While the Bishop had been charged to maintain 
a large force for the. defence of the city it had failed to deliver the 
necessary finance. Such failings forced the government to rely on the 
goodwill and co-operation of local magnates and on this occasion had to 
be ensured by granting pardons. to Kirkby's men 64 The pattern was one 
which recurred constantly and the local magnates, such as Lucy and 
Dacre, learned to ~ake use of it. The government came increasingly to 
depend on aristocratic retinues to defend the border but this was not 
62 CPR 1340-43, 112; CCR 1339-41, 660; List of Sheriffs, 150 
63 CPR 1345-48, 83 
64 CPR 1349-56, 50 
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in any way a new development, the. W.est March had always. been governed 
through. the great lords, who in turn used their retinues to ensure 
effective local administration and lordship. The affinity was also 
a tool in the struggle for local dominance and this aim was often 
considered of highe.r importance than strict obedience to the law. 
This. was moreover not a development which occurred only after the 
outbreak of war, even before the war local lords continued to maintain 
close contacts with those on the wrong side of the law. As a result 
the study of local crime and the means by which local affinities 
were used to establish regional influence are virtually inseperable. 
CHAPTER IV 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LOCAL CRIME 
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The maintenance of acceptab.le. levels of law enforceijlent w.:as one of 
the most basic duties of the mediaeval king. It was also one of his 
most intractable problems. I£ the. crown was expected to provide 
peace and security for all to go about their lawful business unmolested, 
this had still to be achieved without the imposition of measures which 
savoured of novelty, of forei·gn provenance or of undue severity. In 
1253 Henry III was forced to abandon a plan aimed at preventing 
robberies by forcing the inhabitants of the district in which the 
robbery was commited to assume financial responsibility for it, for 
l precisely these reasons If such opposition made the provision of 
effective policing more difficult, the demand for better maintenance 
of law and order persis.ted and indeed grew louder. Moreover, many of 
the complainants· were. outraged victims and active criminals by turns, 
and much recent research has been at pains to demonstrate that local 
crime was often the work of those who on other occas-ions were charged 
2 
with the maintenance of the peace. 
Peacekeeping has troubled historians almost as much as it did 
contemporaries. It is almost impossible to discern whether the 
perception of contemporaries that the problem was worsening was 
accurate. The preamble to the Statute of Winchester in 1285 stated 
that robberies and homicides were increasing from day to day and this 
3 
opinion has been accepted by the most learned modern commentators 
G.O. Sayles, for example, judged that under Edward I 'the rule of law 
had already passed its zenith' and that Edward I failed to impress 
1 
3 
M T Clanchy - England and its Rulers (Glasgow 1983), 234 see also 
D C Cox -- 'Peacekeeping without Frankpledge', Transaction of the 
Shropshire Archaeological Society, v60 (1965-76), 81 
r'}~! I'll.. 
See for example Saul - Knights and Esquires, J A Tuck - 'Richard 
II and the Border Magnates', NH, v3 (1968}, 31 
Stubbs - Select Charters, 464 
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4 
upon his people the need for respecting the law There is room 
to question whether even in the era of the most highly regarded English 
juris.ts., Henry Bath., William Raleigh and Henry Bratton, it was safer to 
till one's fields or to go on a journey and whether the high standards 
of jurisprudence were matched by correspondingly high standards of 
crime s.uppression. There is surely a case to be argued that the 
appearance of rising levels of crime is at least in part the result of 
the survival of increased quantities of material and increasingly 
detailed information in surviving material. Work based on anecdotal 
evidence, including J.G. Bellamy's Crime and Public Order in the Later 
5 
Middle Ages bear out this point in a variety of ways • Though the 
cases discussed are all pertinent to the subject under discussion 
their inclusion is not dictated by the legal or social importance, 
per se, but solely hy the survival of documentation concerning them. 
As a result the book lays. disproportionate weight on the fourteenth 
and especially on the. fifteenth. centuries. The limitations of anecdotal 
evidence and, in some cases, the development of electronic calculating 
·machines have led to attempts to assess the crime problem in mediaeval 
England by other means. Notwithstanding the limitations of the evidence, 
statistical analysis has been brought to bear on a variety of legal 
records, most usually records of gaol delivery. The results have not 
always been of high value. Among other conclusions of comparable 
worth one study proved that knives and hatchets to be the preferred 
weapons for homicide and night to be the most usual time for the 
6 
commission of crimes Such grotesque calculations have not deterred 
4 G 0 Sayles - Select Cases in the Court of Kings Bench under Edward 
II (Selden Society, v74, 1955), liii 
5 J G Bellamy - Crime and Public Order in the Later Mediaeval 
England (Cambridge 1973} ~1- ~t3 
6 B Hanawalt - Crime and Conflict in English Local Communities 
1300-48 CToronto 1979). "\See also the review 5y J R Maddicott in 
History, v65 (1980) 467 ~ 
~'I, 1ea, tOI. 
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imitators, nor has the prudent observation made by R.B. Pugh that no 
accurate assessment of the level of mediaeval crime can be based on 
. 7 
records of gaol dellvery alone • Gaol delivery rolls reflect only 
the number of low born criminals and further only those who were 
apprehended. Appeals of felony were also heard before Common Pleas 
and King's Bench and by specially appointed commissions of oier and 
terminer. Moreover, it is highly likely that, as Pugh suggested, many 
professional criminals were able to evade capture, leaving those tried 
at courts of gaol delivery to consist of the novices and opportunist 
thieves. Attempts to assess guilt or innocence among those brought to 
trial pose still further difficulties. The jurors generally made little 
attempt to discover the truth about individual charges and delivered 
their verdict on the strength_ of the accuseds reputation alone. Nor 
can i.t even be argued that each accusation at least represented a crime 
that had been committed, whether or not the actual culprit was present. 
Malicious prosecutions were by no means unknown. Further, many 
prosecutions were brought against several defendants for crimes committed 
jointly. Finally since a large proportion of charges were brought as a 
result of appeals brought by approvers, confessed felons, who seem to 
have cast almost indiscriminate allegations of complicity in crime in 
an attempt to escape executi.on, the relationship between crimes committed 
and prosecutions was an indirect one. Opinion has differed about the 
value of the testimony of approvers. Many local jurors rejected it 
almost entirely, hi.storians have often showed less discrimination 8 • 
The result is that though statistical evidence may complement anecdotal 
material it does not replace it and neither can provide definitive 
judgements. 
7 Pugh- 'Reflections of a Mediaeval Criminologist', Proceedings of 
British Academy, v59 (1973), 101 
8 H R T Summerson - 'Crime and Society in Mediaeval Cumberland', 
Trans of C&liJ II, v83 (1983) 113 
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Though. there were special difficulties concerning law enforcement in 
Cumbria the region was a part of the overall common law jurisdiction 
of the English crown and i.t shared all the difficulties of that system. 
Cumbria was, however, on the periphery of the common law organisation 
and perhaps for that reason it was less well served by the machinery of 
justice than other regions. William of York, one of Henry III's justices 
provided one example of prevai.ling attitudes when he wrote begging to be 
excused from going on eyre in Cumberland since the long journey and the 
local climate were injurious to his health 9 Other justices were 
prepared to suffer the various hazards Cumbria offered but of their 
deliberations we know little, full records survive for only two eyres, 
1278 and 1292, while only a fragment survives from the visitation of 
1246 10 Other common law sources. are correspondingly meagre. Few 
local men were enthusiastic enough to make the journey required to 
li.tigate in the court of Common Pleas or in the increasingly central 
Kings Bench, and many of the cases begun there ended without judgement 
for either party. Sometimes it is not possible to discover if the 
limited information w.e. possess is the result of governmental inertia 
or of the destruction or loss of manuscripts. In 1307 a group of 
justices were commissioned to sit for sessions under articles of 
Trailbaston for the Northern Counties of England. Their sessions becameSO 
prolonged, however, that they never reached Northumberland, Cumberland 
ll 
or Westmorland A second group of justices was accordingly appointed 
but it has not yet proved possible to correlate the sittings of this 
group, Robert De Bures, John de L'!-sle, Henry de Guildford and Hugh de 
Louther with any surviving roll and i.t may well be that no sittings were 
9. C A F Meekings - 'Six Letters concerning the Eyres of 1226-28' 
~, v65 (1950), 497 
10 Crook.~ General Eyre provides full details ~~~~l. 
ll A Harding - 'Early Trailbaston Proceedings from the Lincoln Roll 
of 1305' in Mediaeval Legal Records ed. R F Hunnisett and J B Post 
(1978)' 146 
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ever held. Whatever the reason, the result is. that there is no evidence 
from Cumbria for the widespread practice of conspiracy and maintenance 
which the trailbaston commissioners discovered to exist routinely in 
other parts of the North of England. If no such abuses were practised 
on the West March, the region was unique within England, but of the 
details and extent of such crimes we know nothing. A similar gap in 
the evidence is to be found in the Hundred Rolls collected by 
commissions of enquiry after Edward I's accession which contain nothing 
relating to Cumbria. Thus though gentle-born and aristocratic criminals 
must have existed on the West March, we know almost nothing of their 
activities and the evidence which survives largely concerns offenders 
of humble rank. This is doubly to be regretted since the relation 
between local gentry and local criminals is a question of first 
importance to all workers on Border History. 
The evidence which. survives. suggests that the law was enforced in 
different ways on the West March and in lowland England. These 
differences started at the most basic level. In 1292 the jurors chosen 
from Westmorland confronted tne jus.tices with a declaration that 'no 
Englishry nor murdrum is pre.s.ented in the county court, nor is there 
any tithing (decem) in the county, nor frankpledge nor mainpast' 12 
Here the jurors made claim for a broad range of immunities, but since 
the claim was recorded in the rolls without adverse comment it seems 
that it was allowed. The immunities claimed fell into two parts. 
Firstly Westmorland claimed exemption from payment of the murdrum fine, 
originally an impost levied on districts in which a corpse was found 
which could not be proved to be English 13 This had become simply a 
financial perquisite enjoyed by the crown in cases of unexplained 
12 Just .1/986, ml; Just .1/988, ml 
13 HEL 1 vl, 90 
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homicide and the eyre rolls testi;fy indeed that it was not paid in 
Cumbria. The second claim made by the Westmorland jurors was of greater 
importance. The men of the county asserted their right to be exempt 
from the basic machinery of law enforcement which prevailed in Domesday 
England. The writer of 'Bracton' considered that every male over the 
age of twelve years should be part of the frankpledge system by 
membership of a tithing, a group sworn to uphold the peace and to 
restrain and present for trial any of their number who offended and to 
answer financially if they did not. Those not in a tithing might 
satisfy the requirements by membership of an equivalent institution 
such as a mainpast, the household of a lord who could ensure the 
appearance of an offender in court just as a tithing would do 14 Now 
it is very easy to understand the absence of these. The presentment of 
Englishry, though it had similarities with Danish laws, was a tool of 
Norman settlement and pacification during William I's reign. William 
was never truly master of the West March, nor did the custom take root 
15 later . The absence of the tithing must be explained by turning still 
further back. The tithing was, essentially, a product and an institution 
of the West Saxon monarchy and the influence which the kings of Wessex 
and their English successors exerted in Cumbria was still less than that 
of the Normans. It seems probable in fact that the tithing system was 
not established anywhere in the old kingdom of Northumbria 16 Indeed 
as a standard measure the tithing was absent from a remarkably large 
part of the crown's dominions. It was absent too from Wales and the 
Marches. In the early fourteenth century the community of the county 
of Shropshire claimed exemptions similar, though more extensive, than 
14 ibid, v2, 569. 
15 See Introduction 
16 HEL, vl, 89 
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those claimed in w_estmorland in 1292 17 . This provides evidence that 
the March of Wales had close similarities with the Scottish March and 
both had more in common wrth each other than with lowland England. 
The men of Shropshire disclaimed any obligation to pay the murdrum fine 
or to present Englishry and they also proffered that there were no 
ti.things nor mainpasts in the county suggesting that even in areas of 
strong seigneurial pow.ers a lord was under no obligation to render 
account for crimes commi.tted by his followers unless he had knowledge 
of them. Only in one significant aspect did the claim made in Shropshire 
exceed that made in Westmorland. The men of Shropshire claimed to be 
immune from the accusations of approvers. This followed logically from 
the absence of the tithing and mainpast which. formed a defence against 
such appeals. In Maitland's words 'decent people who were in frankpledge 
were not compelled to answer his (an approvers) accusations'. In Cumbria 
accusations by approvers were 1in contrast1 the main stock of courts of 
gaol delivery. 
The gap in the s_.ys.tem ot law enforcement which resulted from the absence 
of the frankpledge organisation was tilled by the serjeants of the peace. 
The serjeants of the peace were itinerant bailiffs, appointed by the 
crown through the sheri£fs or, in areas where the enforcement of the 
law_ was a seigneurial -monopoly such as Copeland, by the chief lord. 
The serjeants were found throughout England and they were identical with 
the Welsh cais. The same institution was also to be found in lowland 
19 Scotland . Their powers were extensive, they included the duty to 
investigate those serious crimes reserved to the crown and to attach 
17 Cox- 'Peacekeeping without Frankpledge', 81 
18 ibid 86 
19 R Stewart-Brown - The Serjeants of the Peace in Mediaeval England 
and Hales (Manchester 1936), 99, 46 and note. Barrow - 'Pattern 
of Lordship and Feudal Settlement'; Journal of Mediaeval History 
vl (1975) ll'l, t')O 
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suspects. This pow_er was not alw.ays restricted to whose against whom 
the evidence was convincing. Though clause 38 of Magna Carta declared 
that no man should nenceforth be put on trial on the unsupported 
allegation of a bailiff, this was precisely what the serjeants of the 
peace continued to do 20 In W:es.tmorland the serjeants were claimed to 
have the right to arrest anyone whom they suspected of any crime and to 
hold him until the next county court even though this implied trial 
21 
without indictment At that court even if no-one would proceed 
against him, he could be remanded on bail or held in custody until the 
second sitting of the county court, at the third the process was 
repeated and an inquisi.tion was taken before the four vills nearest to 
the place where the. crime was alleged to have been committed. The 
custom in Cumberland was closely similar. Suspects might be seized in 
Kirkoswald on suspicion alone and held until the first meeting of the 
liberty court, where they could be tried without indictment being first 
taken. If no-one would bring a suit against them they were taken to 
tne royal prison at Carlisle. where again they would be forced to appear 
')') 
in the county court in case anyone wished to proceed against them LL 
In some cases the cus.tom was s.till more arbitrary. The serjeants were 
empowered to carry out executions on felons whose guilt could be 
immediately established. This power was not, moreover, exercised 
solely by serjeants appointed directly by the crown, it was also 
operated by bailiffs in liberties whose lords held the power of 
infangtheof. In Northumberland, during the reign of Henry III, the 
jurors of Alnwick reported a case which they testified demonstrated 
20 J C Holt- Magna Carta (Cambridge 1965), 226, 326, 327. This 
became cap. 28 of the 1225 re-issue. 
21 Just.l/982, m23 
22 Just.l/137, m27 
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local custom. A hermit by the name of Semanus de Botlesham was robbed 
by one Gilbert de Niddesdale who left him by the roadside believing him 
23 
to be dead Gilbert fled but during his flight he was taken into 
cus.tody on suspicion by the king' s serjeant, Ralph de Belford, who took 
him to Alnwick. Unfortunate.ly for Gilbert, Semanus recovered from the 
attack. enough to arrive at Alnwick in time to accuse Gilbert of robbing 
him. This Gilbert confessed and the serjeant then forced the hermit to 
behead him much, probably, to the holy man's surprise and horror. Such 
dramatic justice was quite familiar on the West March too. In the eyre 
of 1278 the jurors of Leath and Eskdale recorded that Matilda, the 
daughter of Robert Lareol, had killed one Alan, son of Peter. She had 
been arrested and hanged immediately after the commission of this 
24 
crime In cases of theft the procedure closely resembled that in 
Northumberland as an entry from Cressingham's roll will demonstrate. 
Robert de Hinderwood, Adam de. Hoton and two others came to the market 
of Carlisle to sell two oxen and a horse 25 • These, they were 
suspected of having stolen, and they were arrested. Robert, however, 
escaped from custody and fled towards. Scotland but before he could get 
there he was arrested and immediately beheaded according to the custom 
of the. county (sicut moris est in patriae) presumably on the grounds 
that flight could be cons.trued as an admission of guilt. Robert had 
good reason to have feared the justice he would have received at the 
hands of the court held by the major and bailiffs of the city for all 
his associates were found guilty and hanged. In general terms, the 
jurors of Carlisle went on to state that they were allowed to arrest 
anyone suspected of theft of livestock and to try them. If convicted 
23 Three Early Assize Rolls for Northumberland, 70 
24 Just.l)l32, m25 
25 Just.l}l37, m26 
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the accused were hanged, if not they were released quit and they cited 
the case of Gilbert of Tynegate to lend substance to their claim. 
Gilbert had been arrested at the suit of Emma of Dalston, at Dalston 
within the liberty of the Bishop of Carlisle on suspicion of having 
stolen two oxen. Therefore he w~s handed over to Adam of Ulvesby, the 
Bishop's seneschal who caused him to be hanged and since he had been 
arrested at the suit of Emma the two oxen and the rest of his chattels 
were forfeited to her use. What is particularly interesting in this 
case is that the custom dated not from time out of mind but only from 
the time of Bishop Ralph de Ireton who had been appointed to the diocese 
in 1279. 26 Here we see local custom, which in this instance was 
declared to be in prejudice of the king's rights, developing as the 
Bishop tried innovatory and illegal measures in an effort to encourage 
more persistent prosecution of offenders. It is not wholly clear why 
this custom was ruled to be illegal but three possible reasons suggest 
themselves. Firstly it is certain that this was a form of trial without 
indi.ctment and as such. illegal. Secondly the appellant was given custody 
of the accused's chattels though there was no suggestion that they had 
been stolen from her. Perhaps the most likely possibility, however, is 
that in the cases where an appeal was abandoned. Edwardian practice 
required that the suit be not dropped but taken up at the king's suit. 
The powers of the serjeants of the peace were central to exercise of 
this arbitrary style of justice. They were also active in less serious 
crimes. In the liberty of Tynedale the tradition of arbitrary justice 
administered by seigneurial bailiffs, though in this case the coroner, 
remained. An unknown thief was found guilty of the theft of four geese 
2.7 
and by the judgement of the coroner one of his ears was cut off 
26 Lanercost, 102 
27 C H Harsthorne- 'The Iter of Werk'; Proceedings of the Society of 
Antiquaries of Newcastle on Tyne, v2 (1858), xliii 
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The powers of the serjeants of the peace were also expressed in more 
mundane ways. They were supported by the right to take puture, or 
compulsory hospitality, an impost which was also owed for the support 
of royal and seigneurial foresters. The fact that puture was widely 
owed did not affect the. fact that it was bitterly resented by those who 
had to provide it. It was complained that in Westmorland the serjeants 
took money in lieu of lodgings to which they claimed they were entitled 
and that they took many more lodgings than they ought. Probably the 
practice was that the serjeants took lodging from one house in a vill 
but forced all the others to contribute as much in kind to avoid the 
28 burden They also arrested men without reasonable cause and compelled 
men to make fine to be released, or so at least it was alleged. The 
serjeants, it should he clear, were not community policemen receiving 
the suspicions of local people and trying to act on them while gradually 
weeding out accusations brought by malice from those brought correctly. 
The serjeants of the peace w_ere the sharp end of a harsh and often 
predatory style of lordship, disliked and feared by local people who 
were forced to provide them with accomodation and food without receiving 
payment. The farms of bailiwicks in Westmorland were reported to be set 
at over £10 and the result was that the serjeants were forced to make 
extortions to recoup their investment. Further, so far from being 
careful to weed out malicious prosecutions; according to the 
suitors of the county of Westmorland, the serjeants were in fact the 
instigators of many malicious accusations since their unsupported word 
was enough to bring a man to trial unless he was prepared to pay 
29 them a fine 
28 Just.l/982, m23 
29 Summerson - 'Crime and Society'; Trans of C&W II, v83 (1983), 112 
takes a more optimistic attitude. 
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The situation was not significantly different in Cumberland. In 1292 
the jurors chosen from the vill of Kirkoswald reported that men were 
arrested there, not on indictment but only as a result of the suspicion 
30 
of a bailiff By the reign of Edward II nothing had changed, 
arrests were still made without indictment on the unsupported allega-
31 
tion of a serjeant or a bailiff The sheriffs of the county enjoyed 
no better repute and were certainly not regarded as impartial investi-
gators of crime, the "lieges of Cumberland" could point to many 
grievances which they had suffered at the hands of the sheriffs 32 : 
Like others who fell under the supervision of the serjeants o£ the 
peace, the men of Cumberland were keen to see a reduction in the level 
of their policing operations and of their actual numbers. Agreements 
to bring this about were common, as were attempts to end the power of 
the serjeants to bring men to trial on their unsupported allegation. 
The men of Galloway, for example, petitioned Edward I to free them £rom 
the grievance of surdit de serjaunt 33 In England the process had been 
going on longer, In 1'7estmorland agreement was made before the justices 
in eyre limiting both the powers and the numbers o£ the serjeants, 
though this proved to require reinforcement by a special statute passed 
34 by the king's council In Cumberland the process was further advanced 
and had begun under Henry III who had conceded to the men of Cumberland 
that the county should be patrolled by only four horse serjeants, each 
35 
of whom was to be supported by two foot serjeants 
3o Just.l/137, m27 
31 NP, no 62 
32 ibid, no 63 
This agreement 
33 Bain CDS, v3, no 1874. In general see W C Dickinson - 'Surdit 
de Serjaunt', Scottish Historical Review, v39 (1960) 
34. 
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covered only the body of the county, however, not the great lordships 
and it was fifty years later that Thomas de Multon of Egremont made a 
similar concession to the men of his lordship 36 Even when such 
modifications of local institutions became common, local communities 
continued to be aggrieved by the imposition of surdit de serjaunt, 
immediate executions and summary arrests. This was more than just a 
difference of procedure. A contemporary Scottish petition constrated 
this style of law, essentially Celtic, ~ith the English law of jury 
. 1 37 tr1.a . It was this. English mode of the justice which the men of 
Cumbria felt themselves to be denied. The importance of this difference 
may be further underlined by contrast with the operation of the law in 
lowland England. In Lincolnshire it was recorded in the reign of 
Edward II as. the custom of the county, that no-one should be executed 
while under arrest for any reason or while in bonds, rather he should 
38 he taken in custody to the sheriff 
It is probably reas.onable to see in the persistence of surdit de serjaunt 
in Cumberland rather more than simply local conservatism. The practice 
also reflects local priorities and problems. It underlines the 
importance of the great liberties in the way the Cumberland was policed. 
In the major lordships the detection and suppression of crime was the 
preserve of the lord of of his bailiffs. In the liberties of Gilsland, 
Greystoke and Liddell, royal bailiffs were forbidden to enter without 
permission from the bailiff of the liberty. This was granted only for 
specific purposes, such as to make an attachment for a plea of the 
crown, but it was restricted for a number of practical reasons. 
36 Lucy Cartulary, 50 
37 J Stevenson - Liber Sancte Marie de Melros (Edinburgh 1837), no 
316 
38 Select Cases under Edward II, 89 
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Firstly in cases of theft, most of the lordships of even the second rank 
were areas in which the lord exercised the right of infangthef. Since 
the most common and effective means of detecting and proving guilt was 
to find the suspect in possession, this meant that most cases of theft 
fell under the juris.diction of the lords in whose lands the offence 
was committed. Secondly though, as has been suggested, the royal 
bailiffs could enter the major lordships for specific reasons they 
might not travel through them as they went about their patrols. Even 
when the suspect was known the time consuming process which required to 
be followed allowed the suspect ample time to flee. If criminals were 
to be caught it had to be done speedily and so there was a certain 
practicality to local customs which involved arrest on suspicion, 
especially in an area where even the law abiding part of the population 
was highly mobile. 
There were other attractions to encourage the use of the right of 
infangthef rather than the slower procedure of trial by indictment and 
jury. The customs recorded in the Lucy Cartulary record that anyone 
taken with the :mainour, that i.s under the jurisdiction of infangthef, 
should be taken to the castle of Egremont and tried there. Those who 
were indicted, however, were to be taken to the royal gaol at Carlisle40 : 
The quo waranto enquiries showed why the difference was important. The 
heirs to the barony of Kirklevington were summoned to answer by what 
right they claimed to have the chattels of all felons from their lands 
who were condemned and executed, Richard de Levington made it clear, 
however, that this was not what was claimed but only the chattels of 
those felons who were executed under the jurisdiction of infangthef. 
In other cases the chattels were forfeit to the crown 41 This appears 
3~ ~~e o.~~t C!,'\(}~kc 1.... 
40 Lucy Cartulary, 50 
41 PQW, 128 
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also to have held good for the lordships of Egremont, Cockermouth and 
Aspatria. If felons from these lordships were tried at courts of gaol 
delivery at Carlisle it appears. that their lords lost their right to 
the chattels. It was thus in the interests of local lords to neglect 
the law requiring trials. to be held only by indictment and to proceed 
summarily. The widespread right of infanthef fulfilled this role very 
well since the finding o£ allegedly stolen goods established that there 
was a case to be answ.ered, though it was possible for one accused under 
this law to establish their innocence at trial. In one case, heard at 
the court of Robert de Bruce at Glassanby, the accused sought to prove 
his. innocence by combat. Hugh Bulwe having been arrested in possession 
of an ox which. it was suspected he had stolen, claimed that he had, in 
fact, been sold ~~ by one William le Lung, a declaration which may be 
considered as. an appeal of felony brought against William. William, 
who was present in court, denied the allegation and offered to prove 
fiis innocence by combat and the duel was accordingly waged. Hugh lost 
42 
and w:as. immediately hanged This combat was, in a degree, anachron-
istic since before the end o£ Henry III's reign an appeal of felony was 
generally held to he justiciable only by a jury trial 43 . Appeals by 
approvers. did continue to end in combat but Hugh de Bulwe had made no 
confess.ion of theft and there is no other evidence to suggest that this 
should be considered to have been an appeal by an approver. The 
procedure which had been used was thus unusual and the disapproval of 
the justices is evident. Though Hugh de Bulwe was not an approver, the 
jus.tices may have felt that in hearing a case which ended in combat, 
Bruce's men had exceeded their authority, for the right to hear appeals 
of felony was a closely guarded one. Certainly it was only after a 
42 Just.l/135, m6d; Just.l/137, ml3d 
43 M T Clanchy 'Highway Robbery and Trial by Battle in the Hampshire 
Eyre of 1249' in Mediaeval Legal Records, 29 
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local jury of men of standing had declared the procedure to be lawful 
in a lordship holding infanthef that Bruce was allowed to go without 
day. 
The persistance of trial by combat to settle an appeal of felony raises 
two interesting questions. The first of these is simply why trial by 
battle should have remained available after it had virtually disappeared 
44 from the rest of England as well as from Scotland • One part of the 
explanation may have simple conservatism, that the gradual amelioration 
of the system of justice made slower progress on the West March than it 
did elsewhere. Another possible reason may have been connected with 
the persistence of trial as the only acceptable form of proof in the 
Leges Marchiarum. Though this code affected, specifically, the border 
alone the procedure it used may have helped to condition local attitudes. 
If this were so then a further difficulty requires resolution, this was 
the nature of the combat which was waged between Hugh de Bulwe and 
William le Lung. Sufficient evidence has been assembled, including the 
famous picture from the Hampshire eyre roll, to indicate that a 
consis.tent pattern governed the organisation of trials arising out of 
appeals by approvers. The weapons were hammers or axes, recalling small 
picks more than anything else, while the shields used were large and 
rectangular. 45 No body armour was used . Such equipment was expensive. 
In the Ha~pshire eyre of 1249 the cost of equipping one of the combats 
was £1 7s. 3d. There is room to doubt if such elaborate preparations 
were made in the private court of a small border liberty, particularly 
if the court could call to mind another precedent, and since the case 
44 See in general G Neilson - Trial by Combat (Glasgow 1890) 
D M Walker - 'Evidence' in Introduction to Scottish Legal History 
(Stair Society, v2o, 1958) , 303 
45 Clanchy -- 'Trial by Battle', 29 
Page 176 
did not involve the appeal of an approver. In the March laws, anyone 
appealed of theft by a person from the opposite realm was forced to 
46 
fight a duel with spears and swords at the march of the two realms 
In 1280 it was recorded that the party in the duel from England was 
allowed a shield if he desired one. This may well have proved to be a 
more readily available precedent than practice in such distant areas 
47 
as Hampshire 
The most di£ficult problem facing any worker on the borders is the 
development of that distinctive brand of institutionalised lawlessness 
which can be described as 1 Reiver Society•. There are even severe 
difficulties in describing what this term precisely means. Even an 
extensive monograph devoted to 'Riever Society• such as that produced 
by Dr Sheila Dietrich, though providing some valuable discussion of the 
48 problem, provides no succinct definition of the term . Initial work 
on the problem in the mediaeval period has been undertaken by Dr Anthony 
. 49 Tuck but much remains to be done • The materials which survive, 
however, are meagre and offer only the thinnest support for argument. 
First of all, a definition of border lawlessness is required. One 
aspect of the problem is the study of how the border affected the 
nature of local crime and law enforcement and this is in itself a 
substantial field of study. Another difficulty lies in the assessment 
of the overall level of crime in Cumbria. A high level of crime was 
46 H R Luard- Annales Monastici (Annales de Burton), (Rolls Series 
1864), v4, 256-.7 
47 Bain CDS, v2, no 183 
48 S Dietrich - 'Liberties and Lawlessness; Reiver Society in Tudor 
Tynedale' (Cornell University Ph.D Thesis, Ann Arbor Michigan 1973) 
4~ J A Tuck - 'Northumbrian Society in the Fourteenth Century•, NH 
v6 (1971)., idem 'Richard II and the Border Magnates •, ibid, v3 
(1968) 
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one of the distinguishing characteristics of the later mediaeval 
border, with two crimes being particularly common, large scale thefts 
of livestock and murders carried out by way of feud or counterfeud 
among groupings of men united by ties of kinship, usually called by 
the later term of surname groups which existed among the lower levels 
. 50 
of socLety • These surname groups form one of the most intractable 
problems in the study of the region, the difficulty growing more 
severe the further back in time they are sought. Though the surname 
groups were a common local institution, their importance has perhaps 
51 been overestimated and in some cases almost perversely romanticised 
In light of these difficulties it is worth examining the various 
problems in detail, particularly to attempt to discover if significant 
changes occured as the result of the disturbance of Edward II's reign. 
A, useful s.tarting point for an attempt to assess the level of crime in 
Cumberland is. a detailed analys.is of one of the surviving eyre rolls, 
though it is well to understand the limitations of the evidence it 
offers. The roll chosen, Just.l/137, originated in the eyre of 1292 
and it is that of the chief justice, Hugh de Cressingham. It is in 
generally good condition, though. a few membranes are slightly torn at 
the foot and a handful of entries are not visible to the naked eye. 
The roll is one of the fullest surviving from Cumberland and it is 
principally concerned with pleas of the crown. Though the contemporary 
rolls, Just.l/136 and Just.l}l35, contain the quo waranto hearings 
heard in this eyre, some related material is contained on Just.l/137, 
Most of it, however, consists of pleas of the crown in the traditional 
sense. It also contains a delivery of the gaol of Carlisle by 
50 ibid, 29 
51 G M Fraser - The Steel Bonnets (1971) is perhaps the best of 
the popular accounts of the Tudor borders. 
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Cressingham and his fellows. The. analysis has been undertaken as far 
as possible using the method used by Meekings, though difficulties 
exist in applying this technique to Cumberland, even though the base 
52 
of the analysis is judicial proce.ss rather than guilt or innocence 
One example of how local custom differed from that in tne rest of 
England is provided by the practice of summary execution already 
discussed. Not all felons came to trial. In the case of Isabel de 
Morland who was arrested near Penrith on suspicion of theft, procedure 
was very summary. Haying escaped from gaol, she was recaptured and 
immediately beheaded, even though it was admitted that she was not 
53 indicted nor even suspected of any crime This case should warn us 
not to place too great faith. in the accuracy or reliability of local 
justice. The eyre roll also records the cases of felons who had 
already been tried before justices of gaol delivery, whose records have 
been lost. These cases have been excluded from consideration. One 
result of this is that a number of convictions have had to be passed 
over, with some consequent distortions. Other distortlons have 
entered the calculation as a result of the pressure of time. Those 
cases which would have required ultra-violet light to read have had to 
be ignored, and cases of 'felons hanged' have als.o been left from 
calculation. In other cases, s.pecial circumstances in the case have 
meant that it must be discussed seperately rather than fitted into an 
arbitrary category. 
A total of 160 cases of homi.cide were recorded. In three of these the 
victim was unknown and in one case the presenting jury could not name 
anyone as a suspect. In one case a homicide which had been committed 
52 C A F Meekings - Crown Pleas of the Wiltshire Eyre 1249 (Wiltshire 
Archae logical and Natural History Society Records Branch, vl6 )_ 
53 Just.l/137, ml4 
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in Westmorland was reported and in another the crime had taken place 
in Scotland. This case also involved an inquisition taken into the 
law governing the law: and custom of the March and had started as an 
f h . . d 54 appeal o omlCl e . Only 31 defendants were brought before the 
court to answer the charges brough.t against them. Most of these fared 
w.ell at the hands of the court. Twenty three were found innocent, were 
found to have acted in self defence or were found to have been party to 
death. by misadventure. Four were allowed to defend themselves by the 
proffer of a pardon. Five in all were convicted and three of these 
were clerks, only two w.ere hanged. Probably at least one other was 
fortunate not to suffer in the same way, for having fled at the approach 
of the eyre justices, he later decided to return and after having done 
so was acquitted by the. jury. A further group of suspects whose guilt 
was just as certain, abjured the realm after confessing their guilt 
and left, proD.ably for Scotland or claimed sanctuary in the liberty of 
the Prior of Wetheral. Both. practices had their risks. After Simon 
Grytram had killed one Hugh. Lamoys he fled for sanctuary to Wetheral. 
A little later he seems to have left the priory precincts and was 
pursued by one of the king' s. serjeants. Fleeing him Simon fell into 
55 
the Eden and drowned , Like. outlaws those who abjured the realm 
were not permitted to return, though some did. William Langrigg was 
one outlaw who returned home but after doing so he was arrested and 
given over to the custody of the vills of Bothel, Seton and Brettby 
from whose custody he escaped. He was, however, arrested and beheaded 
in Westmorland 56 • In all six suspects confessed their crime and 
abjured the realm. Nine sought sanctuary at Wetheral. The remaining 
54 ibid, ml2d 
55 ibid, m9.d. This cas.e has been included under the headings of 
both homicide and misadventure. 
56 ibid, m20 
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112 suspects were recorded as having fled after the commission of their 
crimes and were ordered to Be exacted or waived in the case of the . 
females. Ten appeals of homicide were also entered. In one of these 
cases ooth the appellant and the appellee died before the arrival of 
the justices. In three cases the appeals were not pursued and were 
taken up at the suit of the king. In none of these cases did the 
original appellant appear. There was a total of twelve defendants, 
of whom seven were present in court. None was found guilty, whether 
present or absent oy appeal. By comparison a total of 211 people died 
as a result of misadventure. Most of these died by drowning but almost 
every other possible cause of fatality, livestock, mills, trees, was 
also represented. There were also two cases of suicide. In the Wiltshire 
eyre of 1249 for a different comparison, there were 53 cases of 
h . 'd 57 om~c~ e . In a different March county, Shropshire, the total of 
presentments of murder was higher at 183 and there were also nine 
appeals of homicide. In Northumberland in 1279 from a total of 68 
presentments four murderers had been hanged, one had abjured and 65 had 
58 fled and had been exacted or waived 
Presentments of theft in various forms were just as common. There were 
a total of 76 cases of burglary, the majority of these, 43 cases were 
the work of malefactors of whom nothing was known. In the remaining 
33 cases, suspects were named but of these 28 fled and were exacted or 
waived and one died in prison. Of those who were present for trial 
only one was convicted and hanged. Larceny accounted for 48 presentments. 
Thirty of the suspects fled and were exacted br waived. Nine had 
admitted their offence and abjured the realm. One died in prison, eight 
57 ibid, ml2d 
58 A Harding - Roll of the Shropshire Eyre (Selden Society, v96, 1981) 
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were present in court to answer. Of these 1four were found guilty and 
hanged, one made fine and three were declared not guilty. There were 
also four cases which required special treatment. One was the case of 
theft which was decided by combat at Glassanby. Another case concerned 
the city court of Carlisle, which had executed two men on suspicion of 
the theft of livestock. Another had been executed after fleeing from 
59_ 
custody there A simpler case resulted from the hearing held for 
the liberty of Alston. One Adam Tod was pursued by Andrew de Thornton 
60 
on the ground that he had stolen cattle in Tynedale Thornton and 
Robert Scot the bailiff of Tynedale arrested him and took him to Wark 
in Tynedale, where they arranged for him to be hanged. The last of the 
exceptional cases also concerned Alston. One Simon de Alston, having 
heen indicted for theft, fled in terror and as a result forfeited his 
chattels. The jury, however, considered him to be innocent, though 
61 
whether or not truthfully we cannot discover There were also 
appeals concerning robbery, two of which also included allegations of 
wounding. One appeal of robbery, though not pressed by the original 
appellant was found to be proved when brought at the king's suit. Two 
appeals of robbery and wounding, also brought at the suit of the crown, 
were found to be proved. Both were found to be the work of clerics .. 
Two cases of robbery emerged from the presentments of the juries. One 
suspect fled and was exacted, the other was present and convicted. 
There were also seven cases involving rape. Under the terms of the 
s.tatute of Westminster suits for this crime had to be pressed by the 
vi.ctim within 40 days: after the. offence, though if the victim failed to 
I 
5ring her suit the case was brought at the kings. This happened in all 
the cases brought oefore the eyre. There was a total of 18 defendants 
59_ See above 
60 Just.l/137, m28 
61 ibid, m28d 
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including accomplices. Tw.o died b.e£ore the trial, nine. were pres.ent 
to answer in the court and of these three were found guilty. The 
other six were acquitted as was one who was not present. One man was 
declared to be suspect in his absence and was ordered to be exacted. 
Other cases of violence agains.t the person were common. Of 15 appeals 
for assault and breach. of the peace against 18 defendants, 12 were 
found guilty, a much higher conviction rate than in other categories. 
The resetting of offenders was. also reflected in the eyre roll but 
again the entries for this. offence show the difficulties of statistical 
analysis. Seven persons were accused of resetting. In one case 1 Simon 
de Hoton claimed that Adam of Dalston had committed a murder in London 
and had afterwards been she.ltered by his father Thomas of Dalston. 
This accusation, however, had been brought by Simon partly out of 
hatred for Thomas. and Adam and partly as a result of covetousness 
since Simon wished to gain possession of land held by Thomas, a fact 
that was common knowledge in the. neighbourhood 62 Both men were 
accordingly held to have been falsely indicted. In another case the 
defendant appealed to the. record of his acquittal by an earlier court 
of gaol delivery only to disclose a tale of judicial neglect and 
malpractice by members of the local jury and the equally awkward fact 
that the jury had been picked by one of his kinsmen. Two further 
defendants were present and being found guilty made fine. Three others 
were acquitted. The region, in general, and Alston in particular was 
found to be the resort from criminals from a wide area including 
Kendale, Yorkshire and Scotland and it is also clear that attempts to 
enforce the law were seriously hampered by corruption among local 
officials. 
62 Just.l/137, m6d 
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The figure which can be extracted from the eyre roll are, in one way, 
remarkably comprehensive. All crimes known to have taken place were 
recorded and as a result the total level of crime they record may well 
be close to the truth. The information about what actually happened 
in each case, however, is often submerged in a web of confusion. For 
example, it was presented that one William de Wethermellock, Elias de 
Orreton and Adam Cowherd had killed one Robert Harebraye. This crime 
resulted in the trial of two seperate groups of defendants. William 
and Elias fled immediately after the commission of the crime but later 
returned, were tried and acquitted. Ralph de Peskin and his wife Alice 
w.ere also tried and acquitted on the testimony of the jury. Meanwhile 
Adam Cowherd who had remained in hiding was declared to be suspect and 
63 
was exacted . In short, if murder was a common crime, which it 
appears to have been by comparison with Wiltshire, the arrest and 
successful prosecution of suspects was grossly inefficient. 
The eyre rolls were more. concerned with crime than with criminals. 
Exactly the reverse is true of another group of records, the rolls of 
gaol delivery. These were sessions held to empty local gaols of the 
accumulation of suspected felons which they contained. Trial was again 
by local jury but the. jurors were often less concerned about the facts 
of one incident than with the reputation of the suspect. Two documents 
from the reign of Edward I have been considered, the gaol delivery 
section of Cressingham's roll and Just.3/lO, A and B, a series of gaol 
deliveries made in the last years of the king's reign. As in the eyre 
roll proper the cases provide a mixed bag of information and as a whole 
they reflect poorly on the standards of local law enforcement. 
63 ibid, ml 
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In the gaol delivery secti'on of Just.l/137 there was one case of arson, 
that of the unfortunate Simon de Orreton who in trying to kill his 
father burned much of the. ci.ty as well and was, in consequence, hanged 
though because he had D.een captured in the liberty of the Bishop of 
Carlisle by the Bishop's oaili'ff rather than the kings' 64 The rest 
of the cases were less sensational. Three charges of resetting were 
brought. One of those accused of resetting offenders, Thomas Blake, 
had been arrested solely on suspicion, no indictment having been taken 
and he was acquitted. Of the other two defendants one was acquitted, 
one was found guilty and hanged. Theft was much more common and these 
cases have been seperated according to whether it was specified that 
livestock had been stolen. Of cases which were recorded simply as 
theft from a total of 45 suspects tried 16 were found guilty, 15 as a 
result of the verdict of a jury , whi1e one man confessed. Seven of 
these were hanged, eight were found to have stolen goods which were 
worth less than one shilling in value, often corn, while one of those 
found guilty was a pregnant woman who was sentenced to hang and given 
a stay of execution on account of her condition 65 • In cases specific-
ally stated to concern the theft of livestock 12 people were brought to 
trial. Three were found guilty and hanged. Seven were acquitted by 
the jury, one was allowed to go free on the record of an earlier trial. 
The remaining suspe.ct was ordered to oe detained until a jury could be 
brought from Furness where he. had also been indicted. Burglary was 
more common and there were 20 suspects placed on trial. Five were found 
guilty and three of these were hanged. One had stolen goods less than 
one shilling in value and one was a clerk. Three more were released on 
th.e record of an earlier court and one was remanded until he could be 
64 ibid, mJO 
65 ibid, m30d 
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brought before a jury from Lancashire. All the remainder were 
acquitted including three who were reported to have been indicted 
solely as a result of malice. 
No appeals by approvers were heard by the justices who delivered 
Carlisle gaol in 1292 but this deficiency is amply made good by Just. 
3/10B. The various courts whose proceedings are enrolled there, heard 
a total of 53 cases of theft. Thirty seven of these were the result 
of appeals by approvers. One approver, Hugh Rymother, a notorious 
thief, but also a cleri.c, made a total of 16 appeals of theft, one of 
resetting and 17 of robbery. None of these appeals was borne out by 
the verdict of the jury. Another approver, Adam Tod, was less 
ambitious, making only six appeals of theft and one of resetting. 
The jury rejected all of Adam's allegations and he was accordingly 
66 hanged • Of the remainder of those accused of theft, one was a 
clerk who confessing his crimes went on to accuse five other men. All 
were acquitted, however. Four of the remainder were found guilty and 
hanged but all the rest including those arrested on the appeal of 
approvers and one man who had been arrested on suspicion alone were 
acquitted. One other case did not get as far as trial, the thief 
having been executed immediately after apprehension. Twenty two suspects 
were tried on the charge of robbery, two of these had been arrested, 
one taken on suspicion and 19 had been appealed by an approver, in the 
case of 17 the approver was Hugh Rymother. One of those arrested had 
confessed his crime and brought an appeal against a group of four whom 
he claimed as former accomplices. He then withdrew his appeal, however, 
and was hanged. Those whom he had appealed were all acquitted. The 
remainder of the defendants were acquitted, one among them was a clerk. 
66 ibid, mm5, Sd, 6, 6d 
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There were seven case of murder, four of those accused were found guilty 
including a violent group of three clerics who were also found to have 
committed a variety of thefts and robBeries. The other convicted 
homicide was hanged. The remainder of those who were accused were 
acquitted. Finally there were four cases involving the resetting of 
offenders. One of the accused had been arrested solely on suspicion 
and was acquitted. Tw_o were appealed by approvers and they too were 
acquitted. Only one person, Matilda the Breweress, was convicted and 
hanged for resetting. 
Corruption was a persistent feature of local law enforcement. One 
feature of this was the bringing of malicious accusations. The reverse 
of this situation were cases in which those charged to suppress crime 
actually assisted criminals or took advantage of their acts. This type 
of case was equally common and offenders occurred in~- every branch of 
the system. Having been sent to Ayketon to arrest Thomas, son of Cecil 
of Ayketon, who had been indicted for a series of thefts, Richard Scot 
and Adam de Earys bailiff and sub bailiff of Cumberland Ward, were made 
an offer by Thomas. In return for two shillings they should allow 
Thomas to abjure the realm instead of bringing him to trial. Richard 
was tempted and he allowed Thomas to go free. He was unlucky 
however, his misdeed was discovered and he was fined half a mark. Even 
so he did not forfeit the confidence of his master, Michael de Harclay, 
67 then the sheriff who stood surety for the payment of his fine 
In other cases bailiffs were prepared to falsify an inquisition. 
According to the jury presentment, one John Raynot murdered John Malot 
on the king's road outside Cockermouth. The coroner John de Terriby 
67 ibid, m6 
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who was obliged by his office to hold an inquest into tfie deaili. did 
not do so in person but allowed h.is clerk, Nicholas de Hilde, to do it. 
The inquisition, however, was field by men of ill fame and placed the 
blame on one William, son of John. It turned out that both Terriby 
and his clerk had been bribed hy Raynot to procure this false indict-:. 
68 
ment . Seigneurial bailiffs were, on occasion, no more honest. 
Richard FitzBride had been indicted for theft and fled to the liberty 
of Egremont. There, after paying the bailiff Peter de Mottington £1, 
was allowed to stay free from pursuit by the shire officials and by 
69_ 
Peter himself 
A more complicated case of neglect and corruption came to light when 
Richard le Bere was brought to trial for robbery and resetting. 
Richard chose to base his de£ence on the record of an earlier acquittal 
by a court of gaol delivery held by Walter de Mulcaster, who had since 
died, Richard de Laton, Thomas de Derwentwater and William de Boyvill 
and he called for them to warrant his acquittal. The three surviving 
members of the commission came before the court and proceedings 
continued. William de Boyvill then made an admission, he could not in 
fact say whether Richard had been acquitted or not as fie had been in 
London when the gaol was delivered. This, in turn, forced the others 
to admit that jointly with Mulcaster they had delivered the gaol in 
Boyvill's absence even though this was in contravention of the terms 
of their commission. As a result they were committed to gaol until it 
was discovered whether those who, including Richard le Bere, had been 
released quit, had been acquitted lawfully or at the proc~tion of the 
justices. When the jury, which had acquited le Bere, was examined in 
68 ibid, m7d 
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greater detail further irregularities were discovered. I_t was found 
that two of the jurors were members of his wife•s family while the rest 
were tenants of Isabella de Forz and since Richard was the forester of 
the Cockermouth estate it was considered that he was well placed to 
70 influence them in his favour . In the end, however, it was considered 
that Richard had been acquitted by as substantial and independent a 
jury as was available and the case was dropped. Similar cases were not 
unknown, William Bulle who had been indicted for murder was acquitted 
after he had arranged for men, sympathetic to his case, to be elected 
71 
to the jury 
I_t is. possible in broad terms· to assess the overall level of crime in 
Cumberland during tne. last years· of the fourteenth century. The eyre 
rolls record all the detected crimes committed in the county since the 
last iter of the justices, there may have been a proportion which 
es.caped detection but this probably small, since concealment was a 
punisfiab.le offence. Bearing in mind tlie fact that Cumberland was 
les,s densely populated tlian counti'es in lowland England where agri-
culture was more profitable and productive, the overall level of crime 
~ee~s to have been high. The comparison between the figures for 
murder in Wiltshire in 1249 and Cumberland in 1292 is a crude one, but 
within its limits it is a suggestive one. There is also a telling 
coincidence of hi.gh levels of violent crime in Shropshire and Cumber-
72 land . 1292 was the last eyre to visit Cumberland and this fact 
profoundly altered the nature of the records that survive. Later 
figures on crime can only be extracted from records of gaol delivery, 
that is on suspected felons unlucky enough to be caught or to be 
70 ibid, m32 
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appealed by an approver. Given tne high level of acquittals by local 
jurors, it is impossible to discern from these records the actual 
level of crimes committed. Often the rolls do not specify one part-
icular crime but simply a type or types of crime. Secondly since 
prosecutions often depended on appeals by approvers there can never 
be absolute certainty that crimes had in fact been committed. The 
case of Hugh Rymother illustrates the difficulty well. It is impossible 
to discover whether the group which ~gh appealed was a well organised 
gang of criminals responsible for a series of crimes, with the member 
who was accused of resetting responsible for running a safe house and 
disposing of stolen property, as some of the later surname gangs were 
organised or whether Hugh. was simply providing a series of names to 
keep his captors busy. The former well may be considered more 
satisfactory but there can be no conclusion unless we are prepared to 
substitute the verdict the jury returned for our own. The fact than 
an enormous discrepancy exists between cases brought and convictions 
underlies any quantitative work on crime in the later middle ages and 
the numbers of those acquitted i'n the period 1335- 1457 has been 
73 
calculated at 93% , but there is no certainty that all of these 
suspects would have been convicted were it not for the leniency of 
juries. 
Despite the limitations of the evidence which is available, there is 
some value to a comparison of the figures for crime before and after 
the outbreak of the Anglo-Scots war, particularly in the levels of 
homicide. This comparison does not seem wholly consistent with the 
common belief that the late mediaeval border witnessed drastically 
increased levels of crime. In the years 1335-·1457 there were 27 cases 
73 Summerson- 'Crime and Society'; Trans of C&W II, v82 (1982), 118 
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murder brought to trial. Even if we accept the three-fold multiplier 
that Dr Summerson has followed Barbara Hanawalt in using, this does 
not provide evidence of a dramatic and worsening level of violent 
crime which is suggested to be one of the characteristics of the late 
mediaeval border. Here in a word we find one of the possible 
approaches to the discussion of reiver society blocked. 
Another line of approach, the type of lawlessness associated with 
gangs operating across the border and using the border to assist them 
in evading justice, suggests that there was very significant continuity 
between the years before and after the reign of Edward II. Disputes 
involving the theft of livestock across the border were governed from 
time out of mind by the terms of the Leges Marchiarum, a body of custom 
74 
and practice well established in local usage George Neilson 
believed that the Leges reflected the law of the twelfth century, 
basing this belie£ on the persistence and dominance of trial by combat 
in the code but G.W.S. Barrow has suggested an earlier origin still. 
In part this thesis. is based on the identification of • Camisford •, which 
was the appropriate place for the waging of the judicial duel for cases 
involving the eastern march, with Norham. The second support of this 
argument is the prominent place accorded to the priest of the church of 
Stow in Wedale which_ seems consistent with the popularity the church 
enjoyed during the tenth and eleventh centuries compared with the 
relative obscurity i.t suffered later 75 • The laws as they were con-
firmed in 1249 are concerned with a number of possible crimes, the 
theft of bondmen from their lord, theft of livestock and murder if 
committed by a man of one realm against a victim from the other. The 
laws are explicit about the part played by battle as the mode of proof. 
74 G Neilson - 'The March. Laws' (Stair Society Miscellany, vl, 1969) 
75 G W S Barrow -- 'The. Anglo-scottish Border NH, vl (1969), 39-40 
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All men living in Britain with the exceptions of the king's of England 
and Scotland could be called to do battle, though the bishops of Saint 
Andrews and Durham, like the kings, were allowed to have champions 76 
Duel was to settle questions of proof. The March Laws displayed an 
unusual attachment to the duel. In 1216 Innocent III wrote to the 
Archbishop of York condemning an abuse which he had heard of on the 
border whereby bishops, abbots and other clerics were obliged to fight 
a duel for offences which would be justiciable by duel if committed 
77 by laymen In 1237 the Papal Legate was presented with a complaint 
that clerics were not only forced to fight duels by the March Laws but 
if they or their champion were to be defeated they were beheaded. This 
78 it was claimed had happened to the Prior of Lidde in recent times 
The persistence of trial by combat and the fact that the laws continued 
to allow for the payment of wergi.ld rendered the Leges Marchiarum 
something of an anachronism in the reign of Edward I. There is some 
evLdence that Edward and his government took steps to curtail the 
influence of the March Laws. An inquisition, which was caledared by 
79 Bain seems to show the first steps in this process It was recorded 
that if any robber from Scotland should go to Brunscaith on the English 
side of the Solway and confessed his crime, then confess it again before 
77 C R Cheney and M G Cheney - The Letters of Pope Innocent III 
concerning England and Wales (Oxford 1967), no 1064 
78 Annales Monastici, v4, 256, 257. No satisfactory identification 
of Lidde has yet been found. Luard suggested Lechlade but this 
is not supported by C T Martin - The Record Interpreter (1911) 
nor is Lidde suggested as a possible variant of Lechlade in the 
relevant volume by the English Place Name Society. 
79 Bain, CDS, v2, no 183. This was not calendared in the Public 
Record Office edition of Inquisitions Miscellaneous as a result 
of its condition. 
Page 192 
the sheriff of Cumberland, he might have sanctuary. If however, he 
was pursued within forty days he might be summoned to do battle at 
the Solway. The defendant was in fact compelled to do battle or to 
pay damages in the case of theft or 'manbote' (wergild) in the case 
of homicide. These damages could be set by the aggrieved party at 
any level. In 1280 one Henry Scot, who had bought a mare at Carlisle 
fair, was challenged by Henry de Winchelse who claimed that the mare 
in fact belonged to him and according to the law of the March summoned 
Henry Scot to do battle at the Solway to prove his innocence. Scot 
was clearly unwilling to undergo the judicial duel and he appears to 
have tried to obtain a trial by jury. At this point, central 
government took an interest in the case and the king, in the formal 
phrase 'wishing to do justice in the matter', ordered the case to be 
adjourned until his imminent arrival in Cumberland when a local jury 
was to be summoned to report on the law and custom governing the March. 
The inquisition was duly held when the king arrived in Carlisle on 7th 
September 1280 and so far as the text allows interpretation it appears 
to have confirmed the laws as they had previously operated. There is 
also a suggestion that Edward directed that the case should be heard 
by an English court if Henry Winchelse should sue there, though the 
text does not allow certainty. The matter would remain wholly obscure 
were it not for a case heard before Cressingham and his fellows in 1292, 
80 the record of which was printed by Stevenson The case began with 
an appeal of homicide brought by Isabella of Dalrusken against William 
Wakeman for the death of Robert the Miller, Isabella's husband. 
Isabella failed to press her suit and the case was accordingly brought 
by the crown. William Wakeman came and defended himself, asserting that 
80 Just.l/137, ml2d; Stevenson- Documents Illustrative of History 
of Scotland, 357 
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Robert the Miller had been killed in the last Scottish war 81 , and 
he further questioned whether he ought to answer in court for an 
offence which was alleged to have taken place in Scotland. A jury of 
the county of Cumberland was duly brought to testify on the law and 
custom of the March. These findings again closely recalled the 
findings of the inquisition of 1280 but the jurors went on to add that 
the king had repudiated these customs about the ninth year of his 
reign. There is no documentary evidence for this suppression to be 
82 found but it seems highly possible that since Edward displayed an 
interest in the case he may have ordered that the custom be discontinued, 
simply orally. If this were so, the jurors were guilty of a slight 
inaccuracy since Edward was in Carlisle in September 1280, whereas the 
83 
ninth year of his reign did not begin until November of that year 
Edward I's apparent suppression of the Leges Marchiarum probably had a 
legal rather than a diplomatic purpose, since the Leges, with their 
stress on duel and the even more anachronistic persistence of blood 
prices, were out of tune with an era of legal reform. The end of the 
March Laws was of very limited importance however, and it did nothing 
to curb a much greater threat to law enforcement which was provided by 
the Scottish border. The Scottish boundary provided a sanctuary from 
pursuit both for Scottish criminals who had come to England to rob and 
plunder and to English criminals who wanted to avoid pursuit for a time. 
This was one of the problems characteristic of the late mediaeval border, 
81 It is not clear which war this referred to. 
82 The Close and Patent Rolls have been searched as have class lists 
for Chancery Miscellanea in the Public Record Office Searchroom. 
83 Itinerary Edward I, List and Index Society, vlOJ, 103; 
C R Cheney - Handbook of Dates for Students of English History 
(19781, 20 
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but it is clear that it was already a significant problem before the 
outbreak of the Anglo-Scottish war. As early as 1264, it was alleged, 
a group of men including Adam de Swalthwaite, Jordan Robryk, Michael 
le Muir, Richard son of Hugh, William de Galway, Roger de Galway and 
others came to Selcroft and Birkby taking advantage of the disturbance 
caused by the Baron's war and drove off 60 oxen. They returned shortly 
afterwards and drove off a further quantity of livestock 84 • The 
inclusion of Roger and William de Galway suggests strongly that this 
group, of malfactors originated north of the border, though there is 
no direct support for Bain's description of the group as 'border 
outlaws'. Raids by groups of Scots remained a problem after the end 
of the Montfortian rebellion. In 1265-6 the accounts for the Cocker-
mouth estates include a payment made to William Becock and others who 
had gone to Scotland in pursuit of a group of malfactors who had raided 
85 Derwentfells forest Early in Edward I's reign, the sheriff of 
Cumberland, Richard de Creppings, wrote to Walter Merton then Chancellor 
lamenting the number of robberies and murders which were committed in 
the county. Creppings blamed these crimes on Scots coming into the 
county but he also complained that the local people obstructed him by 
refusing to attend inquisitions without a special writ authorising 
86 
them . As the eyre roll showed the Cumbrians were capable of 
sustaining a high rate of crime without assistance and it may simply 
have been convenient to place the blame on the Scots. 
84 KB.26/l77, mlO; Bain CDS, vl, no 2392. There can be no 
certainty, of course, that William de Galway and the others were 
normally resident in Scotland. In 1278 it was presented that 
one William de Galway killed Alan of Broughton. He fled and was 
exacted. Just.l/131, mlO 
85 SC.6/824/ml 
86 F J Tanquerey - Receuil de Lettres Anglo-Francaises (Paris 1916) 
no 9 
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It is very possible on the other hand that a proportion of the crimes 
committed by malfactores ignoti were the work of groups of Scots 
criminals. On occasion it is easier to find Scots criminals at work 
in Cumberland. In 1292 it was presented that the house of Hugh 
Blakestavegill was burgled by John and Alan de Holgil of Annandale, who 
87 had fle~·immediately afterwards, presumably back across the border • 
In another case, Alexander de Capelle was arrested for killing William, 
s.on of Patrick, and taken into custody by the vill of Penrith. In 
custody Alexander asked to be taken to his house to talk with his wife. 
When he got there, however, he managed to get his hands on a bow and 
arrow and with these he succeeded in making his escape while at least 
88 
one of his captors hid beneath a cart and then he fled to Annandale 
There Alexander and his accomplice Robert de Hakethorp stayed until 
the heat of pursuit was over and then they returned home. Some years 
earlier John del W:ode, a Scottish criminal, was rescued from the gaol 
at Laysingby by a group of unknown Scots after he had been placed there 
for killing a man 89 
The presence of a significant amount of what can be called 'cross border 
crime' provides one example of continuity between the border in the 
thirteenth century and in the later middle ages. Cross border crime 
was only one element of reiver society, however. The operation of 
criminal gangs and surname groups was just as prevalent within England. 
Though the development of the surname groups was incomplete during the 
thirteenth century, there is reason to consider that it was the way in 
which. they operated which was of greater importance. A Scottish 
87 Just.l/137, ml6d 
88 ibid, mlO; Just.l)lJS, m6d 
89 Just.l/132, m3Jd 
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definition of the proolem posed :Oy the border stated that its cause 
w.as 'clannis of wikkit men coupled together be occasion of their neir 
b , I 90 dwelling togedder or e surnai!lls There were certainly criminal 
gangs operating in Curn:Derland before the war, as there were indeed in 
the rest of England. If Hugh Ryrnother was telling the truth he was a 
member of such a gang. Another small gang consisted of John de 
Thorkill, Thomas de Dene and William le Brett who were responsible for 
a series of crimes including robbery, burglary and murder, notwith-
. f h 11 1 . . . d 91 standlng the act t at a were c erlcs ln mlnor or ers . Other 
ganags appear to have been organised on the basis of 'neir dwelling 
together'. After Robert Bates of Brandreth was arrested for the 
murder of William le Panur of Brandreth, he was condemned and given 
over for execution. As he was being taken to the gallows, however, he 
was rescued by a group of armed men including Peter de Langbargh, Peter 
de Brandreth and Bertin de Ughtreset who allowed him to escape to the 
92 
sanctuary of Greyfriars church 
The surname groups are a recorded feature of the borders in the fifteenth 
ahd sixteenth centuries, but even then with the more voluminous and 
detailed information which those centuries generated their internal 
93 
organisation is deeply obscure Attempts to trace their existence 
earlier than the fifteenth century are almost precluded by the limits 
of the evidence and if their existence can only be shown by reference 
to the types of material which survive from the Tudor period, they 
90 Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, v3, 218 
9.1 Just . 3/10, mS 
92 Just.l/137, m6; Just.l/135, ml3d. Bertin de Ughtreset was 
later pardoned on the grounds that he had taken part in the 
rescue during a fi.t of temporary madness. CPR 1292-1301, 61 
93 Dietrich. Thesis, 39 
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must inevitably fail. Even those types of record which are conunon to 
both periods, notably judicial records, shed little light on the 
problem of the surname groups. This seems to raise a very real 
possibility that the emergence of the surname groups is less a change 
in the nature of local society than a change and increase in the 
evidence available for study. Some aspects of local society can be 
shown, however, to have served the same purposes as the surname groups, 
and if the attributes of those groups were wholly absent before the 
war, it is significant that the characteristics of later society 
developed with astonishing speed after the start of the war. 
The surname groups played a variety of roles. Firstly, they provided 
collective security against other local families, and less positively, 
provided a focus of organisation for raids on local farmers or on 
other groups with whom the surname was at feud. Secondly, they 
fulfilled a judicial role, arranging for the payment of fines and for 
pledges of good behaviour which. served as one of the means used to try 
to impose discipline on the local brigands. As we have already seen, 
juries on the border were regularly influenced by packing them with 
the accused's kins.men and this was probably another of the ways in 
which_ the surname groups protected their members. Finally they 
provided identity and protection by means of the blood feud which they 
mai,:ntained and perpetuated. It has. even been suggested that the 
exi:stence of these organis.a tions was one factor depressing the level 
94 
of homicides in the English. border in the later middle ages 
The first of these roles was an esl:;1ential one in every region of 
mediaeval England and it would be imprudent to see in the regular 
94 Sununerson- 'Crime and Society'; Trans of C&W II, v82 (1982), 118 
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appearance as pledges and mainpernors of family members and neighbours 
in Cumbria as a demonstration of kin solidarity which was significantly 
different in kind from that which could be found in the rest of 
England. There is, however, clear evidence for the rapid emergence of 
the type of judicial pledge that was used on the Tudor borders to 
control the surname groups. According to the petition delivered by 
John de Laysingby, Adam son of Thomas of Liddesdale and Adam his son 
had entered into a written bond to keep the king's peace forced on 
them by John de Wigton, this agreement being guaranteed by twelve 
95 pledges Despite this agreement John complained that Adam and his 
son had attacked, beaten and abducted him, taking him to Liddesdale 
until he paid 54 marks to be released. This type of crime was 
characteristic of the later surname groups but it also had some 
precedents in the earlier period. For example, Dionisia de Bechefeud 
complained that she had been abducted by and carried off to Jedburgh 
forest until she was rescued. In the Cumberland eyre of 1292 Richard 
de Soules was brought before the court charged with abducting Richard 
96 le Taylor and carrying him off the Scotland 
Comparison of crimes committed is, at best, inconclusive and as a 
result it is worth considering the other evidence for the origins of 
the surname groups. These are generally held to have developed 
earliest in Tynedale after the failure of effective lordship there 
97 
caused by the repeated devastation of the area by the Scots As 
Dr. Tuck has made clear, however, the evidence for this is unsatisfactory. 
It has been suggested that while lordship might gain at the expense of 
kinship ties, the converse has been suggested on the strength of this, 
95 Bain, CDS v3, no 66 
96 Bain, CDS v2, no 148 (42); Just.1/137, m30d 
97 Tuck- 'Northumbrian Society'; NH, v6 (1971), 27 
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that kinship ties IJl~Y, h.:we. grown s,t:t;onger as the. power of lordship 
weakened. As Jennifer M. Worl)lald has recently shown, however, there 
is on the evidence from Scotland no reason to accept that strong lord-
ll . 'bl 98 ship and influential ties of kinship were mutua y 1ncompat1 e • 
It may well have been that in Cumbria ties of kinship were not so much 
unimportant as unrecorded. There is also room to doubt whether there 
was so great a contrast of strong and weak lordship as has been 
suggested. As we have seen in the lordships of Liddell and Egremont 
much of the immediate exercise of lordship, of loca], organisation and 
leadership, was e.xercised by the lord's chief agents, members of the 
local gentry, rather than by the lord himself. It seems like.ly that 
the same pattern held good for Tynedale since Alexander II and his 
son were just as much absente.e lords as were later holders of the 
lordship and as were the lords of Liddell, Gilsland and Egremont. In 
fact, it could be argued that the commission of the lordship of Tynedale 
to a series of short term keepers would have been likely to strengthen 
rather than weaken the power of lordship operating in Tynedale by 
enhancing the position of the local gentry. The fact that some of 
these gentry became deeply involved in local crime neither weakened 
their influence, it was likely to strengthen it, nor did it necessarily 
represent a new development. Some local members of the gentry, the 
Viponts of Alston being one example, were deeply involved in crime. 
Gilbert d'Umfravill, one of the most notorious of the border lords, 
also maintained close links with local criminals and used them to further 
99 his own ends Other lords were no more law-abiding. 
9.9 
"f .17'1. vJer,..,~IJ ' 13/oeJJe..J. /{ ,.J.I&c) -~ '~"""'~I ~~ 13""'~ ;, "Hfh.l. 1 
W "'n c 1\'iro) e.~p c,l·4r. ; 
Tuck - 'Northumbrian Society', NH v6 (1971), 27; This is the 
root of most published comments on the surname groups in the 
later middle ages, for example, Summerson- 'Crime and Society', 118 
See above Chapter 3 
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One important aspect of the late mediaeval surname groups has not yet 
been discussed, the blood-feuds carried on by them. It is generally 
considered in Maitland's words that the blood feud 'disappeared with 
100 
marvellous suddeness' Maitland's judgement must be understood 
in context. It was based only on legal evidence and it referred only 
to the disappearance of the wergild from English law codes. The end of 
the wergild did not diminish the importance of kinship ties, nor could 
it. Mediaeval society depended on an intimate perception of family 
ties and levels of kinship, without these the elaborate laws governing 
marriage according to canon law could not have been applied. As we 
have seen, even juridically the idea of wergild did not disappear from 
the border until the reign of Edward I. Socially, the idea of family 
feuds continued to be important in England even after this time. In 
1321, for example, it made good sense for the writer of the Vita Edwardi 
Secundi to explain the Despenser's hostility to Roger de Mortimer on 
the grounds that a feud existed betw.een the two families which had 
begun when an earlier Mortimer had been responsible for the death of 
101 Despens·er 's grandfather at Evesham This was an attitude of which 
the sixteenth century norder reivers would have approved and understood. 
Other cases can be easily found, but perhaps the most important was the 
extensive feud which was carried on in Lancashire btween the families 
of the Hollands and the Banasters in the reign of Eward II, but which 
102 
may very well have dated back many years before then Evidence 
from the border itself is less easily available. Two cases, however, 
deserve special mention. The first is a tale told by Thomas Grey of 
Heton, himself a well placed authority on border affairs. Grey relates 
100 HEL, v2, 458 
101 Vita, 109 
102 G H Tupling - South Lancashire in the reign of Edward II 
CChetham Society Seri.es 3, vl, 1949), xliii 
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how there was a disturbance in Edward Balliol's campaigns in Scotland 
because the borderers killed an esquire who was in the army because 
someone of that surname (surnounl had been responsible for the death 
103 
of Edw.ard II . There is no suggestion that it was thought that the 
man in question has been personally guilty and the tale is only 
explicable if we accept that the borderers were already accustomed to 
think in terms of gaining revenge for the offences committed by one 
member of a family or clan on another. The second example is clearer 
and i.t is another example of how rapidly the institutions characteristic 
of the Tudor borders developed. In 1337-38 Joanna de Clifford and 
Edward de Fleteham peti.tioned Edward III to request the Pope to grant 
them a dispens.ation to allow them to marry though they were related in 
the prohibited degrees.. They wished to marry, they wrote to put an end 
to the many homicides. and evils which had been committed as a result 
of the emnity which existed between the two families 104 • It seems 
hard to accept that such emnities developed only after the reign of 
Edward II or that the. blood feud was re-introduced into the border 
after a period of virtual abeyance. It seems more probable that 
society developed its distinctive form on the border as a result of 
evolution from earlier patterns, though that modification must have 
heen deeply influenced by the establishment of a state endemic of 
warfare on the border. It is clear, moreover, that if the late 
mediaeval border suffered from a crime problem, this was not in any 
way a new development. Even before the outbreak of war that on the 
West March, if the law was enforced it was generally at the will of 
seigneurial bailiffs and frequently corruptly, often arbitrarily and 
103 
104 
J Stevenson - Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey (Edinburgh 1836) 165 
Bain, CDS, v3, no 1257. This document refers to the Clifford 
family of Northumberland, not the more important Westmorland 
family. 
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even by the standards of the day, ineffectively. In short the West 
March was always a dangerous area where the law was enforced only 
sparingly and incompletely, it did not become so only after the 
outbreak of the Anglo-Scots war. 
CHAPTER V 
THE RISE OF CLIFFORD DOMINANCE 
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I 
From the reign of Henry III to that of Henry VIII, and even beyond, 
the history of the West March was inseperable from the fortunes of the 
Clifford family. The Cliffords stood as the longest established and 
arguably the most powerful of the triad of magnate families which 
dominated Cumbria in the late mediaeval period. The dominance the 
Cliffords could exert from the twin bases of Appleby and Skipton was 
the product of long growth, both of landed estates and of political 
power. The history of this growth provides an enlightening study in 
local leadership and on another, though equally important, level it 
can be seen as the family history of one of the most important baronial 
families in England. 
The Cliffords' power in Westmorland was built on the foundations laid 
by John and by Robert I Vipont. John's creation of the h2reditary 
shrievalty of Westmorland was, at the tL~e, without precedent and in 
addition Vipont received the service, fealty, homage and cornage rents 
of the whole of the county of Westmorland, the barony of Kendale alone 
1 
excepted During the minority of Henry III Vipont served the 
regency government in a variety of roles, as a military commander 
against the Scots and, to Lady Stenton's surp;,se, as a justice in 
2 
eyre in Yorkshire As Lady Stenton observed, Robert was 'a man of 
action rather than of the law' and in the later years of his life he 
devoted his power to expanding his lordship in Westmorland. He 
acquired Brampton from Walter de Morvill who was also forced to 
relinquish the advowson of Kirby Thore and those of the chapels of 
3 Souerby and Meaburn Nicholas de Stutevill was also forced to 
1 See above Chapter 1 
2 D M Stenton - Rolls of the JUstices in Eyre for Yorkshire 
(Selden Society, v56, 1937), xxi, xxiii 
3 Hist and Antiq, v1, 269, 270 
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contribute to Vipont's growing estate. Stutevill made over to Vipont 
over £5 worth of land in return for only nominal services. He had 
also to make over land in Morland to the new regional power. Adam 
Tailleboys had the same experience, as Vipont succeeded in wresting 
control of Langrigg from him 4 . The steady march of the expansion 
of the family power in Westmorland was halted by the death of Robert I 
in 1228. 
Robert de Vipont was succeeded by his son John but there is little 
evidence to suggest that John had been able to significantly expand 
the family's position by the time of his premature death in 1240. On 
John's death the family was faced with a long minority. In 1242-43 
Henry III sold the custody of the Vipont estates in Westmorland, 
Nottingham and Northampton to Walter, Bishop of Carlisle, at an annual 
5 payment of £400 . Walter seems to have found little difficulty in 
raising the required income-and he paid the full farm demanded in the 
first year. The following year the Bishop paid a further £296 19s. Od. 
for the corn and livestock from Vipont's lands, probably a sign that 
the estates were being wasted for a quick profit. The Vipont lands 
continued at farm after the death of Bishop Mauclerk and the farm was 
taken over by the Prior of Carlisle 6 . The result of this type of 
administration was that the inheritance to which Robert II de Vipont 
succeeded was one that had suffered long wastage and in 1253 a 
commission was appointed to enquire into the damage that had been 
7 
committed while the lands were in the Prior's care 
4 M S Dodsworth - Bodleian Library, 70, ff19, 25v, 26v 
5 Pipe Rolls of Cumberland and Westmorland, 103, 109, 110 
6 ibid, 149 
7 CPR 1247-58, 504 
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The exploitation and neglect were not confined to the family estate. 
The castle of Brough and the chief castle of the lordship, Appleby, 
suffered just as severely. The knight's chamber at Appleby which had 
needed repair in John's reign fell down completely while in the Priors 
8 
care and not even the timber could be saved 
As great a problem for Robert II Vipont on his majority as the restora-
tion of the family properties and castles was to restore the local 
influence which had waned during his minority. In the early part of 
his career, Robert II seems to have given this matter a high priority. 
In 1256 he obtained exemption for seven of 'his men', Thomas de 
Hastings, William de Cundal, Alexander Manchel, William Warcop, 
Matthew de Rosgill, Willimn de Goldington and William de Chanteney 
9 from taking up knighthood on testimony that they held by carnage 
The following year Thomas de Segrave of the county of Westmorland was 
granted exemption from serving .on assizes in consideration of his 
10 
service in Wales at the instance .of his lord, Robert de Vipont 
Vipont's attempts to increase his influence in Westmorland by obtaining 
privileges for his followers or for those he saw as potential supporters 
were overshadowed by the increasing crisis which developed from Henry 
III's Sicilian scheme. Having suffered badly from Henry's government 
during his minority, Robert II Vipont was a natural recruit to the body 
11 
of northern 'malcontents' who joined the reform party Vipont's 
discontent brought in its train that of the whole of the local community, 
8 M Holmes- Appleby Castle (Oxford 1953), 173 
9 CPR 1247-58, 504 
10 ibid 578 
11 F M Powicke - The Thirteenth Century (Oxford 195.3), 173 
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which followed the leadership of its ancestral lord. When commissioners 
were appointed in August 1258 to enforce the Provisions of Oxford, three 
out of four appointed in Westmorland can be shown to have had direct 
links with Robert de Vipont. Robert de Askeby was a carnage tenant of 
the lordship of Appleby in 1283 as, almost certainly was John de 
'11 12 Morv1 . Though Robert de Stirkland held land in the barony of 
Kendale, his family also held Stirkland on the eastern shore of 
Ulswater, close to the Vipont holdings, and such proximity probably 
strengthened his links with Vipont 13 The fourth, Patrick son of 
Thomas, is harder to identify but he was probably the lord of Preston, 
Holme and Hutton in South Westmorland and he may have had closer links 
with the royalist barons of Kendale since his name did not appear in 
the lists of rebels in Westmorland in 1265 14 . Even when the opposition 
to Henry III achieved nothing more useful than poaching deer from 
Inglewood forest, Robert de Vipont led the way and his leadership was 
easily accepted by the local gentry. According to the Forest Eyre, 
which William de Vesey held in 1285, while returning from Carlisle 
around Christmas 1264, Robert de Vipont and his men had broken into 
the forest and taken 'deer without 15 number' Vipont's entourage on 
this occasion, if indeed it was only one occasion, included John de 
Morvill, Thomas de Helbeck, Michael Harclay, Thomas de Musgrave, a 
former under-sheriff of Westmorland, Nicholas de Musgrave, William de 
Warcop, Henry de Stevely and Thomas de Hastings. 
12 CPR 1247-58, 522 
13 Feodary SC)I.t- n.tl 
14 Hist and Antiq, v1, 203, 211, 271 
15 Parker - 'Inglewood Forest Part 4'; Trans of C&W II, v9 (1909), 4. 
The others were Robert de Rypers, Gilbert Engayne, John de 
Ormesheved, John de Whale - serving man and Robert de Bacon. 
Compare with Feodary. ')ctl. -J1f 
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Such local influence had other advantages, especially when linked to 
the hereditary shrivalty of the county. Indeed, it almost institution-
alised the abuse of the judicial system. In 1263 Vipont was summoned 
to answer John de Balliol, Alexander of Buchan and others who claimed, 
and continued to claim, half the lordship of Appleby by inheritance. 
Vipont may have had good reasons to try to delay the suit since the 
time was hardly a good one to join legal battle with Henry III's 
chief northern lieutenants and he essoined himself on the grounds of 
malo lecti. Four local knights were accordingly sent to view his 
condition. The group included Robert de Stirkland and Matthew de 
Rosgill, surprisingly since he had been excused from taking up knight-
16 hood • The Westmorland mens' failure to perform this task further 
obstructed the case and four knights from Yorkshire were ordered to 
make the view. The fact that Vipont was well enough to hunt the 
following Christmas may well suggest that Vipont's illness was a 
17 diplomatic one 
h . l 18. e1r rna e 
By 7 June 1264, however, Vi pont was dead without 
De Montfort's party was in the ascendant at the time of Robert de 
Vipont's death and the barons appointed John FitzJohn, a prominent 
supporter of de Montfort, to have custody of his land. FitzJohn was 
unable to build up the degree of local support Vipont had enjoyed. 
Local loyalties lay more securely with the Vipont family than with 
the Provisions of Oxford. In any case, despite the capture of Carlisle 
Castle by John d'Eyvill, probably between Christmas 1264 and Easter 
1265 19 ,the power of the baronial party was on the wane in Cumbria 
16 Bain, CDS, vl, no 2335 
17 See above 
18 CPR 1258-66, 322 
19 Parker- 'Inglewood Forest Part 3'; Trans of C&W II, v7 (1907) 
8, 9 
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during 1265. According to the Flores Historiarum the north was 
dominated by the king of Scots and John de Balliol 20 and by June 1265 
at any rate, Eustace de Balliol had succeeded in regaining control of 
21 Carlisle Castle . In this climate and deprived of leadership by the 
death of Vipont, the gentry of Westmorland gave up the cause of the 
rebellion. A large group of them came back into Henry's peace after 
being offered the chance to do so by Peter de Brus, John and Eustace 
22 de Balliol and others on 29 June Those who abandoned the rebellion 
included a number of Vipont's former men, William de Warcop, John de 
Morvill, Matthew de Rosgill as well as others who had taken part in 
the raiding of deer from Inglewood who included Michael Harclay, 
Thomas de Helbeck and Henry de Stavely. This marked the end of serious 
opposition to the royalist forces in Westmorland but the area was still 
regarded with a degree of suspicion by the government and in October 
1265 Roger de Leyburn and Roger de Clifford were appointed to pacify 
23 
the counties of Cumberland and Westmorland . The process did not 
proceed quickly and as late as the summer of 1267 Leyburn was still 
24 
entrusted with power to allow back to the king's peace former rebels 
Westmorland provided Henry's government with more than a simple 
military problem, however. It also offered an opportunity to reward 
20 Flores Historiarum, v2, 488 
21 CPR 1258-66, 399 
22 CCR 1264-68, 131-2. The full list was Gilbert de Culwen, Thomas 
de Musgrave, Thomas de Helbeck, Henry de Stavely, Robert de 
Yanwath, Thomas de Hastings, Matthew de Rosgill, William de 
Dacre, Ranulph de Dacre, Michael de Harclay, William de Warcop, 
Richard de Berwis, William de Cundal, Thomas de Newbigging, 
Robert de Moussard, Hugh de Souerby, Robert de Fraunceys, Wido 
de Smardale, Henry de Tyrel, Odo de Senhale, Thomas Buies, 
Gervase de Langton, John de Burton, Lionel de Querton, Gilbert 
de Kirklevington, Peter Abbot of Shap, Walter de Ravenby, Thomas 
de Derwentwater and Walter Tyle 
23 CPR 1258-66, 300 
24 CPR 1266-72 I 96 
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loyal supporters. Moreover, since Robert de Vipont's lands had come 
into the custody of the crown by reason of the wardship of his daughters 
rather than by reason of forfeiture the rewards could be distributed 
without dispossessing former rebels. Vipont's heirs were his 
daughters Isabella and Idonea, and there being no heir male these ladies 
were valuable matches. Four days after Evesham, as a result, on the 
8 August Henry granted the custody and marriage of Isabella to Roger 
Clifford, while Idonea was granted to the custody of Roger de Leyburn 
25 
on the same terms • Clifford, at least, was more than happy with the 
arrangement. In a petition to the king he asked that whereas he had 
formerly asked for a grant of lands worth £400 he was now content with 
what he had received and wished for no precise survey to be taken 
whether or not he had obtained more or less than that sum in value 26 . 
Both Leyburn and Clifford took swift steps to make their position more 
secure. In February 1266 they obtained pardons for the ladies of 
Westmorland for any trespasses committed by their father and within a 
month of this both the ladies had been married to the respective sons 
28 
of Clifford and Leyburn, both of whom were also named Roger The 
details of the partition between the two estates were settled at what 
must have been an imposing ceremony held at York, witnessed by the 
Archbishop, the Bishop of Worcester Godfrey Giffard and the Master of 
29 
the Hospital in England among many other notables . By this division, 
Roger de Clifford, by virtue of Isabella's seniority, gained Appleby 
and Brougham while Leyburn was allocated Brough, Kirby Stephen and 
25 CPR 1258-66, p435 
Hist and Antiq, v1, 270. Nicholson and Burn erred, however, in 
suggesting that Vipont was killed at Evesham. 
26 C.55/3, m3 
27 CPR 1258-66, 435 
28 ibid 532; CPR 1266-72, 48, 34 
29 CPR 1266-72, 290, 291 
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Mallerstang. Other lands were to be partitioned as equally as possible, 
as were Vipont's goods, though here the heirs were fortunate in already 
30 having had any debts to the crown discounted 
The elder Clifford and Leyburn faced the problem of transforming their 
nominal control of much of Westmorland into effective local influence 
and they attacked this matter even before they had arranged the marriage 
of their sons. The key to the problem lay in relations with the local 
gentry. A first step was taken in September 1265 when Clifford and 
Leyburn obtained a protection for a group of local gentry who had 
abandoned the Montfortian cause earlier in the year 31 This, however, 
was in some ways only a formal assertion of lordship and some of Vipont's 
former supporters refused to co-operate. In March 1267 a mandate was 
issued to the tenants of Idonea de Vipont ordering them to be 
32 intendant on Roger de Leyburn 
Clifford and Leyburn set about increasing their authority in Westmorland 
in precisely the same way which Robert Vipont had done ten years 
earlier. In 1268, for example, Leyburn procured for William Warcop an 
exemption from being put on assizes, juries, recognitions or from being 
d h 'ff · t h1's w1'11 33 . rna e s er1 aga1ns Roger Clifford obtained a pardon for 
34 Robert de Stirkland for the death of Alan Mussel Others may have 
needed less encouragement to align themselves with Clifford and Leyburn. 
In 1269 Robert de Askeby replaced Thomas de Musgrave as collector of 
the twentieth to be raised in Westmorland since Musgrave was already 
30 CPR 1258-66, 532 
31 ibid 452 
32 CPR 1266-72, 532 
33 ibid 258 
34 ibid 372 
35 
serving as Leyburn's steward 
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In June 1269 Roger de Clifford junior rendered his homage and was given 
livery of the lands to which he was entitled by reason of his marriage 
to Isabella de Vipont 36 Clifford was to enjoy only a relatively 
brief career in Westmorland before his death on campaign in Wales, but 
it is clear that his dealing with Westmorland were marked by a deter-
mination to assert and increase his rights there. Such aggressive 
lordship, inevitably provoked hostility, but despite this Roger III's 
lifetime marked a vital stage in the development of Clifford's 
dominance in the region. 
There is no reason to believe that the installation of Roger de 
Clifford senior as military governer of Westmorland was conceived as 
anything more than a temporary measure by Henry III's government after 
the defeat of de Montfort, or that it was in any way related to hypo-
thetical plans for expansion into Scotland. Relations between Henry 
III and Alexander III were close and the Scottish king had given Henry 
valuable material aid during the conflict with the barons and there can 
37 have been no reason to anticipate hostilities in the future . Further, 
when Clifford was granted custody of Vipont's former lands in 1265 there 
was no clue of the war which would break out under Edward I. The idea 
that Roger Clifford junior was in the vanguard of a move by the English 
nobility to a new frontier of opportunities is no more convincing. 
Clifford built up his estate just as any other lord would have done in 
a new holding, particularly early in his career. Certainly, some of 
35 ibid 399 
36 CCR 1268-72, 59 
37 Stones - Relations, no 7 
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the powers Clifford enjoyed derived from Appleby's position as a 
marcher lordship but their exercise was directed towards local 
dominance rather than imagined opportunities across the border. 
If there is no evidence that Clifford expected that westmorland would 
develop into a new March of Wales, it would be unreasonable to expect 
that Clifford's experiences in Wales did not affect the nature of his 
lordship in Westmorland. Roger Clifford senior clearly had faith in 
his son's abilities as in 1270 he arranged for his son to act as his 
38 
attorney while he went on crusade It seems likely in light of this 
that Clifford senior may also have involved him in the running of his 
estates in Wales. Some of this experience had direct parallels in 
Westmorland for there were several features common to both, the March 
of Wales and the Scottish Border. Important aspects of Clifford 
junior's policy in Westmorland were explicable in terms of his Welsh 
background. 
A tangible illustration of this policy was the reconstruction of the 
castle of Brougham, strategically located at the northern end of 
Clifford's lands where it also guarded the road from York to Carlisle 
at the crossing of the Eamont. Brougham had suffered even more 
severely from the Prior of Carlisle's neglect during Robert Vipont's 
minority than had Appleby. No mention of the castle \·las made in the 
partition made in 1269, suggesting that the building had fallen into 
total disrepair. d . d h. 39 Roger reme le t lS • A strong curtain wall was 
built adjoining the twelfth century keep which was renovated. Towers 
38 CPR 1266-72, 443 
39 J F Curwen - 'Brough Castle'; Trans of C&W II, v22 (1922) 
14~ ...... , 
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were placed at each corner of the curtain with the strongest of these 
guarding the gate. Above the gate a later member of the family 
recorded Roger's improvements with the simple inscription 'Thys made 
Roger'. Brougham's strategic potential has already been noted, but 
the construction of this fortress was probably built more with the 
intention of impressing Clifford's new found dominance on the local 
gentry than for purely strategic reasons. As such it must have been 
effective. The West March was not heavily fortified during the 
thirteenth century and those castles which did exist were generally 
in a poor state of repair. Even if a direct military use was 
envisaged it is probable that Clifford's experience in the Baron's 
War disposed him to envisage civil war as the occasion for this 
rather than a threat from the Scots. 
If the renovation of Appleby and the reconstruction of Brougham 
Castle were intended to impress the Westmorland gentry with the power 
and importance of their new lord, Clifford also took steps to find 
out the extent of the tenant's obligation to him and to enforce those 
obligations. It is probable that Roger Clifford was responsible for 
the compilation of the first of the series of feodaries detailing the 
carnage payments as well as the value when in wardship of the tenaments 
held of the lordship of Appleby, though the list may have been based on 
40 
an earlier version compiled by the Viponts' The purpose of the 
feodary was largely financial, to allow close exploitation of the 
feudal incidents to which the Cliffords were entitled in case of 
minorities. It also served to reinforce the dependence of the local 
40 Feodary. On dating see F WRagg - 'Appendix to Feoffees of the 
Cliffords'; Trans of C&W II, v2~ (192~) 33T. 
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gentry on the Cliffords. In a degree this was unnecessary since 
the possession of the hereditary shrievalty gave the family control 
of the machinery of government in the region and for this reason the 
Clifford castle of Appleby remained the focus of local life, as in a 
smaller way the Leyburn castle of Kirby Stephen was for the gentry 
of that area. After Roger de Leyburn's death without male heir in 
1284, however, the focus of local life became more firmly centred on 
Appleby. 
On important difference existed between the situation on the Welsh 
March and that which Clifford and Leyburn faced in Westmorland. In 
the March of Wales, boroughs remained closely controlled by local 
lords as Cockermouth was controlled by the Forz estate. At Cockermouth 
the borough revenues made an important contribution to the overall 
revenues of the estate. Appleby, however, claimed to be a purely 
royal borough owing no form of service to the lords of the castle, it 
was moreover led by the Goldingtons, a family who dominated the local 
wool trade, prepared to stand on its rights. The profitability of 
the control of Cockermouth which Isabella de Forz enjoyed, suggests 
that control of Appleby would have been just as lucrative and Clifford 
and Leyburn were prepared to make every effort to gain control. The 
result was a bitter and protracted dispute. Clifford and Leyburn made 
the first move in a formal way by demanding that the burgesses should 
do them homage as their tenants by carnage did, claiming jurisdiction 
over the borough on the strength of John's charter to Robert I Vipont. 
They back up this claim by distraint. The burgesses, however, were 
not intimidated and they brought a writ in King's Bench against the 
joint sheriffs at fee claiming that they owed no service to them since 
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they held no land outside the borough and that they held the borough 
solely of the king 41 In the next term of the court's session, the 
matter was again taken up and it appeared to have g~own in importance. 
It was recorded that whereas the king had heard complaints from the 
burgesses of Appleby that they had been distrained to do new and 
unjustified service to Robert Clifford, Roger de Leyburn and their 
wives, Isabella and Idonea. As a result Clifford and his co-defendants 
d t th ll . 42 were summone o answer ese a egatlons . Clifford, Leyburn and 
their wives were represented in court by an attorney and through him 
they freely acknowledged that they had distrained the burgesses to do 
them the services which they believed themselves to be entitled, namely 
of all the services from the tenants of the county of Westmorland 
except of those who held by knight service. These, they said, had been 
granted to Robert Vipont, and they were his true heirs. The burgesses 
countered this claim with the assertion that neither they, nor their 
ancestors, had ever done the services claimed and that they were in no 
way intendant on the lords of the castle. They also stated that they 
had done fealty to the lords of the castle as a result of duress alone 
and that this should not then be allowed to stand as a precedent. 
Having countered the claims made by Clif.ford and Leyburn, the burgesses 
then went on to the offensive, alleging further misdeeds by Clifford 
and the others. In particular they alleged that after they had attended 
the county court in September 1274 to petition the king, Clifford's men 
41 KB. 27/17, m20d 
42 KB.27/18, m20 
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had siezed some of the burgesses, John of Carlisle and Peter Wodeson 
and others and imp~isoned them until they paid £8 for their release. 
Clifford had followed this by sending his men to prevent the burgesses 
from harvesting their crops and by impounding the burgesses in the 
castle. The burgesses also claimed that Clifford had regularly sent 
armed men to disrupt the meeting of the market in Appleby so that is 
was impossible to sell goods there without bodily danger. Finally, 
they asserted in a testimony to Clifford's control of the countryside, 
that he had made it impossible for them to get any firewood from the 
surrounding area. Clifford and Leyburn were content to leave the 
truth of most of these allegations to a jury, but on the question of 
the arrest of Wodeson they told a story very different from that 
offered by the burgesses. They claimed that they had, in fact, been 
lawfully arrested for an assault on one of the lord's men, the assault 
had been so severe, they claimed, that at one point the man had not 
been expected to live. This matter too they referred to a local enquiry 
headed by Robert de Scarborough, John de Neville and John de Reygate. 
As Clifford was sheriff at fee of Westmorland, the enquiry was to be 
taken from a jury consisting of knights from Cumberland and 
43 Northumberland 
The case continued at Easter 1276 when the report of the inquisition 
44 
taken by Neville and the others was brought before the court The 
jurors reported on oath that John had granted to Robert Vipont the 
43 KB.27/18, m20 
44 KB.27/21, m32 
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whole of the bailliwick of Westmorland as it had come into the king's 
hands on the forfeiture of Hugh de Morvill except for those lands 
which were held by knight service. This appeared to support Clifford 
and Leyburn but the jury moved away from this position. They then 
said that the fealty and homage which the sheriffs at fee claimed had 
never been performed in the past and that the burgesses had previously 
performed fealty to the sheriffs only through two bailiffs who 
accounted to the sheriff for the farm of the borough. This fealty, 
however, was performed to the sheriffs only as he was the king's 
representative not through any lordship which the lords of the castle 
claimed over the borough. They also reported that the fealty which 
the burgesses had recently performed to the lords had been exacted by 
distraint as had any other service which had been done to the ladies 
and their husbands. The judgement of the court was.accordingly that 
Clifford, Leyburn and their wives held no lordship over the borough of 
Appleby and the burgesses were intendent on the king alone as any other 
of the king's burgesses were. Clifford, Leyburn and their wives were 
placed in mercy and the burgesses offered their farm directly at the 
Exchequer as a token of their status. Unabashed, Clifford and Leyburn 
entered a revised claim to the sum of 20 marks which Appleby paid at 
farm, still on the basis of John's charter to Robert Vipont. They were 
given a day to present their claim at the Exchequer and until then the 
money was to be placed under the seal of the borough. The plea 
appears to have been unsuccessful and the borough farm continued to be 
paid to the crown directly. 
The burgesses' victory in this case in no way marked the end .of the 
dispute however. The rural magnates were eager for revenge. Their 
next attempt to bring an action against the burgesses came before the 
justices in eyre at Appleby in 1278. Clifford and Leyburn brought a 
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case against Thomas de Goldington, William de Goldington, John de 
Cockermouth and a list of other defendants so extensive that it takes 
up eight lines of a very close hand, to answer why they refused to do 
suit of mill as, Clifford and Leyburn claimed, they ought to do and 
45 
were accustomed to do . This claim was in fact a variation of that 
which had been previously defeated in King's Bench. Since suit of 
mill was an obligation owed by tenants to their lord, and as such it 
offered an opportunity to re-open the possibility of subjecting the 
borough to their control. Perhaps even more important it offered the 
lords the chance to make very large profits from the corn to be ground 
46 
at the seigneurial mills William de Goldington who appeared for 
the burgesses was well aware of the dangers offered by such an action 
and answered that he could not answer such a claim without reference 
to the king's rights. The case was, therefore, adjourned to a higher 
court and finally came before King's Bench in Easter term of 1281 when 
de Vaux and his fellows, who had originally heard the case, were 
ordered to bring the record of the matter before the court. The affair 
was reviewed and placed on a jury of the counties of Westmorland and 
Cumberland, an apparent victory for Clifford and Leyburn since they 
were well placed to influence both the composition and the verdict of 
47 
the jurors Whether such methods were tried or not is uncertain 
but no verdict was brought and the case was adjourned first to the 
quindene of Hillary, then to Michaelmas and it had not yet come to a 
48 decision by the time of Roger de Leyburn's death in 1281 For 
Clifford, at least, the legal battle was only one aspect of a wider 
45 Just.l/982, m20d 
46 For the profits made from this source at Cockermouth see Chapter 1 
47 KB.27/62, m14 
48 KB.27/64, m14d; KB.27/67, mlO; KB.27/71, m4 
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struggle. An inquisition taken by John de Orreton at Carlisle in 
September 1280 shows the ability of Clifford to mobilise the country-
49 
side against his enemies Roger de Clifford, it was found, never 
commanded any person not to sell firewood to the burgesses of Appleby, 
but it was widely believed that this was his wish. The matter went 
further. Friends and neighbours, by reason of the ill-will which 
existed between Clifford and the burgesses, were unwilling to sell 
wood to the men of Appleby. Other pressures were less subtle. 
Geoffrey de Melkanthorp who held Melkanthorp of the Cliffords and who 
served as the constable of Appleby castle, chancing to meet the lord 
of Greystoke upbraided him for maintaining his master's enemies by 
selling them wood, though the jurors noted that this had been done 
without the knowledge of Clifford himself. Clifford's apparent 
ignorance of any illegal act, or of any even potentially improper 
action, was repeatedly stressed by the inquisition, even to the point 
of absurdity. One messenger who came to the Greystoke was explicitly 
stated not to have been sent there by Roger Clifford. Evidently even 
a hint from Clifford went a long way in Westmorland. 
Clifford's early death in Wales in 1284, particularly after Leyburn's 
death the previous year, must have looked to the burgesses of Appleby 
like an opportunity to expand their influence. The feud between the 
borough and the rural families did not end. Clifford's widow, by 
local tradition, a forceful personality who presided in the county 
court in person was to prove just as determined an opponent for the 
50 Goldingtons as her husband, and possibly a Inore adept one 
short term, however, the Goldingtons took full advantage of the 
49 C.InqMi_~~' v1, no 1207 
50 Hist and Antiq, v1, 273 
In the 
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opportunity created by Clifford's death. They excluded shrieval 
officials from the town on the pretext of the possession of the right 
of return of writs. Within Appleby they did very much as they pleased 
and doing business in the town became a hazardous matter for other 
merchants. The confusingly named York merchant, Peter de Appleby, was 
among the casualties. In Appleby to do business Peter found himself 
brought before the borough court without a writ to answer a vague 
h f t b ht . t h' b '11' d ld' 51 c arge o resspass roug aga1ns 1m y Wl 1am e Go 1ngton 
Peter complained of this treatment and the sheriff of Westmorland was 
ordered to summon the suitors of the borough court but this writ 
could not be executed because of the liberty which the borough held. 
The town's bailiffs were accordingly ordered to make the required 
distraint but they too did nothing. The sheriff of westmorland was 
therefore ordered to over-ride the liberty of return of writs and to 
go in person to the town taking a sufficient posse from the county in 
case of need. The under-sheriff, Robert de Morevill, a tenant of 
Isabella de Clifford and her appointee, can have had little difficulty 
in raising the posse for a task which must have had much of the 
character of a sally against the enemy. Further details become 
available when this or a closely related case came before the court of 
King's Bench later in the year. Thomas and William de Goldington 
were attached to answer Peter de Appleby after it had been found by 
inquisition that the Goldingtons had unjustly seized goods belonging 
to Appleby and had refused to restore them when ordered to do so. The 
jury which reported on the case gave a clear illustration of the power 
of the Goldingtons within Appleby. After an agreement made at York 
between Peter de Appleby and William de Goldington, William de Appleby 
51 CP .40/58, m44d 
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probably Peter's son, was sent to Appleby to collect a consignment of 
wool. When William arrived at the town both he and the 120 wool fells 
which he had come for were seized while his servant was robbed of E2. 
It was, the jurors further recorded, impossible for any merchant other 
52 
than the Goldingtons to do business in the town Thus established 
in the borough the Goldingtons made ready to take on Isabella de 
Clifford, perhaps hoping to take advantage of her widowhood. 
The pretext for the dispute was provided by a disagreement involving 
the manor of Meaburn Maud and a long running dispute between the 
families of de Fraunceys and de Hastings. This dispute dated back 
into the career of John de Vipont who was alleged to have granted 
53 Meaburn Maud to Richard le Fraunceys The Hastings family still 
harboured claims to the manor, however, and in 1288 Thomas de Hastings 
was accused of attempting to break into John le Fraunceys free warren 
at Meaburn. After this events became more confused resulting, 
according to the Fraunceys party, in a group of armed men being sent 
to Meaburn by Robert le Fraunceys where they killed Thomas de Hastings' 
brother, Nicholas de Hastings. A later jury found that only one member 
of this group, Robert de Appleby, was responsible for the death of 
Nicholas and that the crime had been the result of long standing 
hostility, but for the Hastings clan if this was ever known, it soon 
became irrelevant in a wider campaign against their local enemies. 
Among those enemies they numbered not only Robert de Appleby but also 
John le Fraunceys and William de Harclay, the son of the then sheriff 
of Westmorland, Michael de Harclay, who was also Robert le Frauncey's 
52 KB.27/94, m18d 
53 F W Ragg ~ 'Mauds Meaburn , le Fraunceys and de Hastings'; 
Trans of C&W II, vll ( 1911) 3 2.( 
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brother in law. The feud developed into a dispute between town and 
country and between the two families. After the fracas in which 
Nicholas de Hastings met his death, William de Barclay was alleged to 
have been sheltered by his father Michael while Robert le Fraunceys had 
been received by his brother, the vicar of Askeby. Faced with this 
sort of obstruction, the Hastings clan tried other means to gain their 
revenge. Alice de Hastings, Nicholas de Hastings' widow, brought an 
appeal for murder against the gang whom she claimed were responsible 
54 for Nicholas' death but failed to appear in court to press her suit 
Probably at this point, Alice sought support from her wide ranging 
family. Alices' own family was the de Threlkelds who had close links 
with the Goldingtons of Appleby. Nicholas de Hastings' two sisters, 
Amice and Christiana, were married to Thomas and William de Goldington 
while a nephew Henry de Threlkeld was a close associate of the 
Goldingtons 55 Such connections provided a possible method of 
revenge and the leaders of the borough were more than willing to help 
if it offered a change to re-open the dispute with the rural magnates. 
The first step the borough party took was to bring a new appeal of 
homicide in the borough court against Robert de Appleby, Robert le 
Fraunceys and other defendants whom Amice, Christiana and Isabel, the 
wife of William de Threlkeld, accused of Nicholas' death. Legally, the 
borough court could exercise no jurisdiction over an offence which had 
been committed outside the borough but, as Peter de Appleby of York 
had found, the Goldingtons found the borough court a useful tool in 
their own ends and they did not allow themselves to stick too precisely 
to legal procedures. Accordingly a group of armed men were sent to 
54 ibid, 332 
55 CP.40/143, m76. See also the Pedigree in Ragg- 'De Threlkeld' 
Trans of C&W II, v23 (1923) Ju.l~ 1"4-. 
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seize Robert le Fraunceys and Robert de Appleby and to bring them back 
56 
to the borough where they were brought before the court Isabella 
de Clifford did not miss the threat to her rights which this action 
constituted and rapidly obtained a writ to forbid the appeal from 
being heard in the borough court. The court was, nevertheless, held 
and the case heard though this proved in the long term to be a mistake. 
Isabella summoned them to appear in King's Bench in Easter 1287 and 
there were unable to deny that they had acted in defiance of the king's 
writ and also that they had acted illegally in entering Isabella's 
57 liberty to arrest Fraunceys and Robert de Appleby The borough was 
taken directly into the king's hand and William de Goldington was placed 
in mercy though a day was granted for the burgesses to replevy their 
liberty. 
The feud continued to develop and the burgesses continued to challenge 
Isabella's control of the countryside. One aspect of their challenge 
took the form of arresting malfactors outside the limits of the town 
and bringing them before the borough court rather than before the 
county court under whose jurisdiction they ought to have fallen. In 
1288, for example, Isabella complained that William de Goldington and 
others had arrested Richard de Rypers and Walter Clerk while they were 
58 in the custody of Adam and William Forester in the barony of Appleby • 
Isabella's complaint was not that these two were innocent but that the 
borough's men had usurped her rights by trying to do justice on them, 
a loss which she optimistically claimed was worthy of compensation of 
£1,000. That permanent obstruction of justice on the West March, 
default of jurors prevented the case from reaching a decision but even 
56 KB.27/102, m4d 
57 KB.27/104, m11d 
58 KB.27/106, m17; KB.27/114, m19 
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so the Goldingtons eventually fell foul of another tribunal 59 . In 
1292 the eyre found that the borough court of Appleby had made a habit 
of doing justice on those suspected of crimes committed outside the 
liberty and of executing men taken only on suspicion and the liberty 
. l d . . d t 60 was agaln p ace ln JU gemen In the face of this tide of well 
directed litigation the burgesses seem to have retreated from their 
confrontation with Isabella de Clifford though the lords of the castle 
were still unable to gain control over the borough. 
The assertive lordship which brought Roger Clifford into conflict with 
the burgesses of Appleby was a mark of Clifford's other dealings with 
Westmorland also. As hereditary sheriff, Clifford was responsible not 
only for the appointment of sub-sheriffs, who were responsible for 
much of the day to day running of the county, but was responsible for 
the serjeants of the peace who were the sharp end of law enforcement 
in the county. As has been suggested in Chapter 4 the powers of the 
serjeants of the peace were extensive and unpopular. Geographically 
their powers in Westmorland were another expression of Clifford's 
dominance in the county. The area in which Clifford's serjeants 
operated was not confined to the barony of Appleby but it also included 
the barony of Kendale. In addition the power to the county court 
extended into Kendale so that the shrievalty granted the lords of 
Appleby power over the lords of Kendale which they would not otherwise 
have enjoyed. Relations between the lords of Appleby and those of 
Kendale were, as a result, strained. In Henry III's reign William de 
Lancaster had complained that Robert de Vipont had arrested his men 
within the barony of Kendale on the pretext of the hue and cry and 
59 KB.27/114, m17 
60 Just.l/986, m8 
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that he had also forced Williilln's 1nen to do unaccustomed suit at the 
shire and wapentake courts, taking 20 oxen by way of distraint to 
61 
compel this attendance Robert countered by claiming that the 
county, which he held, had always been seised of the service of the 
men of Kendale, and no final decision appears. It is possible too 
that the men of Kendale succeeded in weakening the power of the lords 
of Appleby during Robert II de Vipont's minority but a clear focus of 
conflict remained. 
Roger de Clifford was keen to stress at every turn the extent of 
Robert de Vipont's rights and to demand the performance of those 
services to which he claimed to be legitimately entitled by right of 
his wife. This policy had two principal parts. Firstly the rights 
of the Cliffords' agents over the population were exploited to the 
full. Secondly, the powers over the barony of Kendale were to be 
resurrected and exercised to their fullest extent. Both aspects of 
this policy were to provoke opposition. In 1275 the men of both 
Westmorland and Kendale complained that whereas the sheriff at fee 
had been accustomed to have two horse and two foot serjeants to 
assist him, a great many more were now employed and that Roger de 
62 Clifford was arrenting bailiwicks for £10 and more yearly . The 
activities of these bailiffs provoked particular hostility for two 
reasons. Firstly the practice of extorting lodgings or taking payment 
in lieu of such lodgings. The second complaint was that the sheriffs 
held assemblies which they called tourns at which they compelled 
attendance and took fines in case of defaults of attendance. At the 
tourns, the complainants further alleged innocent men were indicted. 
61 C.Curia Regis R, v11, 547-9 
62 CPR 1272-81, 121 
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A commission of enquiry led by Geoffrey de Neville was appointed to 
examine the complaints 63 and the matter was examined at length by 
64 John de Vaux and his associates on eyre in 1278 There, after a 
restatement of the original terms of complaint, Roger de Burton, 
Gilbert de Whitby and Roger de Brunolsheved, who sued for themselves 
and for the county of Westmorland, stated that the serjeants of the 
peace ought not to take money in lieu of lodgings, nor place men on 
the county for life and limb unless they had been duly indicted, nor 
take money from those who failed to attend the sheriff's tourn as if 
they held the same powers as the king's justices in eyre. They 
further complained that while in John's time the tourn was held only 
once yearly, Roger de Clifford held it more frequently and not only 
amerced those vills which failed to attend but also scrutinised the 
verdicts offered by the vills and amerced all the vills if there was 
any discrepancy between the veredicta which they offered. Clifford 
answered these allegations firstly by disclaiming any right to more 
than the four serjeants of the peace which custom allowed him in the 
county. He was careful to stipulate that the serjeants of the peace 
were entitled to take one night's lodging if they entered the barony 
of Kendale to make an attachment, a claim which was consistent with 
65 
contemporary custom in the lordship of Copeland Clifford 
countered the claim thathis men made unjustified arrests by an 
appeal to precedent and local custom. He claimed that when the county 
was in the hands of John, the custom was that if any man was suspected 
of any ill-deed the serjeants were entitled to attach him to appear at 
66 
the next county court 
63 ibid, 181 
64 Just.1/982, m23 
At that court even if unchallenged he was 
65 Lucy Cartulary Typescript, 50 
66 Just.1/982, m23 
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remanded to the next court, or he might essoin himself to the fourth 
court under pledge where an inquisition might be taken from the 
four vills nearest to the place where the crime was alleged to have 
taken place to see if there was any charge to be answered. The answer 
concerning the sheriff's tourn reflected the fact that Westmorland 
had a long standing crime problem. He stated that one tourn was held 
each year where four men from each vill of the twelve towns in the 
county came to make inquisitions into thieves and their resetters and 
that this practice had been in force for forty years, dating back to 
the time when the county was in the hands of the crown during the 
minority of John de Vipont 67 Finally, on the subject of the renting 
out of bailiwicks, Clifford stated that he was fully entitled to do 
this by virtue of his position as sheriff at fee. 
With the agreement of both parties the matter was referred to a jury. 
The jurors reported that in the time of William de Stainton anyone 
taken on suspicion might be released on bail but since that time no-
one could be allowed bail unless they bribed the sheriff or one of 
his men, though they made an exception in the case of the current 
sheriff, Michael de Barclay, who was not guilty of this abuse. The 
jurors also reported that Gilbert de Kirketon had appointed coroners 
in the barony of Westmorland with the aim of combatting thieves at 
the instigation of the magnates of the county. Gilbert de Kirketon 
was succeeded as sheriff of the county by William de Stainton and it 
had been he who transformed the coroner's inquests into the tourn held 
by the sheriff at which attendance was unwarrantably enforced by fine. 
The sheriffs were also guilty of using this tourn to inquire into 
crimes which ought to have been heard by the justices in eyre. 
67 ibid, m l3J. 
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Finally the jurors confirmed that the sheriff at fee was entitled to 
rent out the serjeanties as he pleased but they also confirmed that 
the serjeants made heavy demands on the people of the county, extorting 
money as well as payments in the form of sheaves of corn and lambs 
68 
Even a hearing before the justices in eyre did not finally end 
Clifford's abuse of his power as hereditary sheriff. In part this 
resulted from the very fact that Clifford was the crown's principal 
agent in the county and if he chose to ignore royal mandates there 
was no easy way of forcing him to amend, as there was in the case of 
a franchise holder with return of writs. The only available channel 
to correct abuses or neglect by the sheriff was to send mandates to 
the coroners of the county. This, however, was not generally 
effective in light of the pressures the sheriff or his deputy could 
69 bring to bear on the coroners 
Edward I was forced to find an unusual and direct solution to the 
problem and it involved taking a close interest in the affair. In 
August 1280 Edward was in Westmorland and while in the county he and 
his council passed a series of statutes to correct the abuses 
practised by Clifford and his men. The first of these statutes recited 
that the sheriff's tourn was held in the county more often than 
necessary and wi.thout royal warrant and that henceforth the king willed 
that the tourn should be held once yearly, at set places and only for 
the purpose of indicting criminals as was done in the rest of the 
70 
realm • The second statute limited the power of the serjeants of 
the peace to make attachments on suspicion. No loyal men were to be 
68 Just.l/982, m23d 
69 KB.27/132, mlJ 
70 CCR 1279-88, 108, 109 
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aggrieved by attachment on suspicion and anyone who was arrested might 
be delivered to his neighbours under pledge until it was established 
whether there was enough. evidence to indict him. It was also ordered 
that commissions of gaol delivery, at which the serjeants had formerly 
compelled attendance by fines, were only to be held in accordance with 
royal commissions and that no fines were to be taken for defaults in 
attendance, while any amercements levied were to be judged and assessed 
in the county court not solely by the judgement of the sheriff and 
his serjeants, The final statute dealt with a different subject and 
ordained that the brew-wives of the county were not to be allowed, 
contrary to the statute, to brew for a whole year for one payment and 
that henceforth they were to be punished for each offence as was done 
in the rest of the realm. 
Though later ages were inclined to see in statutes something more than 
a written memorandum on a point of custom, it is clear that these 
statutes had a purely local importance and that they did not, in fact, 
make new law. They were aimed at enforcing the law as it existed, or 
at ending practices whLch were unlawful. They were, in no sense, a 
cons.titutional novelty creating a law which applied only to Westmorland. 
~or did they have the status which. legislation such as the Statute of 
Winchester enjoyed. It was for this reason that the statutes concerning 
Westmorland did not find their way into any collection of Statutes and 
survive only on the Close roll. They were purely administrative orders. 
Moreover, they had only a limited period of currency. After her 
husband's death, Isabella de Clifford, protested to the king that as 
Magna Carta had authorised two tourns yearly since if men were to be 
tried only by indictment and such indictments could only be taken at 
the sheriff's tourn. As a result on 12 May 1290 it was ordered that 
two tourns should be held each year at the due and accustomed 
71 places 
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The fact that the shrievalty of the county of Westmorland was in 
effect a private possession, closely comparable to the advowson of a 
church, was a vital factor in the enforcement of the law in the county. 
One of the situations which this made possible, that the holder of the 
shrievalty would use his power improperly for his own purposes had 
already been discussed. There was, however, another possible difficulty 
that the shrievalty should fall to be partitioned among co-heirs and 
that those co-heirs should disagree about the administration of the 
office. This situation arose at the end of the ninth decade of the 
thirteenth century. 
The chronological starting point of the affair is provided by an entry 
7" 
on the Lord Treasurera Memoranda roll for 1288-9 .... It records the 
presentation as sub-sheriff hy Isa:Oella de Clifford of Gilbert de 
Brunolsheved. Th.e pres:entation was made in due form, while Isabella 
presented Gilbert for the. offi.ce., Idonea de Leyburn held the right to 
assent to the appointment. On this occasion Idonea was prepared to 
accept Gilbert and after a short delay he was sworn in as sheriff, 
promising faithfully to carry out the duties of the office. He did not 
keep his promise, however. In Cressingham's eyre in 1292 Gilbert was 
brought to trial on the charge that he had retained in his service 
Robert le Wis.e, a thief who had later been executed, knowing him to 
have been a thief. The jury, which Gilbert had hoped would exonerate 
71 Morris - Mediaeval Sheriff in England to 1300, 203, note. 
Morris' reference was Chancery Miscellanes 133/7. This group of 
documents has since l5een :Oroken up among a num:Der of others and 
despite the assistance of Dr D.Crook I have been unable to trace 
th.e current reference. 
72 E.368/62, m5d 
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him, did quite the reverse and recorded in fact that Gilbert regularly 
consorted with known thieves and other felons. Faced with execution 
Gilbert claimed benefit of clergy though his chattels were forfeited 
and his lands ordered to fie wasted 73 • The account for these disclosed 
the profits Gilbert had gained from what must have been a sustained 
74 
life of crime. The value of his chattels was assessed at £365 8s. 6d • 
The justices then asked that anotfier sheriff be appointed to answer for 
the county. Thomas de Helbeck, an established local man, was chosen 
and took the oath in due form. This, however, displeased Idonea de 
Leyburn who later came into court and claimed that no sheriff might be 
appointed in the county unless she consented since she was jointly 
hereditary sheriff wi.th Rohert de Clifford, who was a minor, after the 
death of her sister. She did nonetheless consent to Thomas de Helbeck5 __ 
being appointed on a temporary oasis, saving her own rights, since 
Helbeck had already collected the chattels of felons for the purposes 
75 
of the eyre Idonea's challenge placed her in contempt, however, 
and it appears to have been ruled that her right to assent was 
considered to be a purely formal one, though it seems probable that 
the fact that Robert de. Clifford was in royal custody affected the 
deciSion. Thomas. de Helbeck continued to serve as sheriff during the 
king's custody of Robert de Clifford's lands but in 1295 Robert managed 
to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute with his aunt. Clifford 
presented Ralph de Manneby as sub-sheriff, and according to the agree-
ment reached between Isabella and Idonea asked Idonea to consent to the 
appointment. This Idonea duly granted in a letter written from 
76 Kimberworth_ in Yorkshire and Ranulph was installed 
73 Just.l/986, mlO 
74 Just.l/986, mlOd 
75 ibid, m13 
76 E.368/67, m7d 
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The career of Robert I de Clifford marked the final step in the 
establishment of the Clifford family in a dominant position in 
Westmorland and in the North. of England as a whole. Clifford's 
majority coincided quite closely with the outbreak of hostilities 
between England and Scotland and the war provided Clifford with 
opportunities between England and Scotland and the war provided 
Clifford with opportunities to serve the crown and this service 
played an important part in the expansion of the Clifford estates. 
Even more important, however, were the steps Edward II was prepared 
to take to ensure Clifford's loyalty during his disputes with the 
baronage over Gaves±on, 
Th.e outbreak of war and the disruption caused by the hostilities means 
that it is not possible to study the nature of Robert de Clifford's 
lordship in the detailed way ~ich is possible for the careers of his 
father or perhaps as importantly hi.s mother. There is no reason to 
doubt that Robert de. Clifford's own policy was closely influenced by 
the outlines that had been laid by his family. Nor is there any room 
to question that Robert de. Clifford was as active, vigorous and 
domineering a lord in Wes.tmorland as. he proved to be a successful 
soldier and courtier. It is reasonaf>le to see Clifford's political 
alignments in terms of a calculated campaign aimed at the enlargement 
of the family estates. This resolution to expand the family lands is 
evident from one of the first of Clifford's recorded actions, which 
dates from the earliest years. of his career. The affair showed Clifford 
was as determined a lord as Robert I Vipont had been and that a 
.magnate's retainers w.ere enlisted principally to further their lord's 
ends and any benefits they derived from the connection were, to a 
degree, incidental. Clifford made. an agreement with Thomas de Helbeck 
concerning the manor of Souerhy by Brough under Stainmore which was 
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held in dower by Agnes sk.rol!lyn. Under the agreement if Agnes di.ed 
within a short time Thomas, of whom the land was held, would assign it 
to Clifford, if she did not obli'ge 15y her imminent death. then Thomas 
would sue against her with_ the. re.sul t that Agnes would assign her land 
to Clifford. Ei.ther way Clifford was to be the beneficiary and to make 
certain that Thomas de He.lbeck held to the terms of the agreement an 
additional clause stipulated that if Clifford had not been enfeoffed 
wi_ th. the land within a se.t date. then Helbeck was forced to compensate 
77 him by a payment of £40 
Clifford made very few other gains. of land during the reign of Edward I 
though in 1306. he was. granted the forfeited lands in Hart, in the 
bishopric of Durham, after the capture and execution of Christopher de 
78 Seton . He also gained three. manors in Cumberland, Skelton, Ellonby 
79 
and Lambynyby which had also he.en forfeited by Seton These, however, 
were relatively small gains compared with those which Clifford was able 
to make during the reign of Edward II. The first of Clifford's major 
acquisitions of territory in Wes.tmorland was achieved by means of an 
exchange which. he arranged with_ his aunt, Idonea de Leyburn, and her 
second husband, John de. Cromwell. The exchange may have been 
facilitated by the be.tter relations which seem to have prevailed 
between Clifford and his. aunt than had existed between Idonea and her 
sister but practical reasons may also have played a part. Idonea de 
Leyburn had always played a less active part in Westmorland and it is 
poss.ible that the worsening military situation also spurred Idonea and 
Cromwell to cut their links wi.th the north. Clifford was just as 
77 Bodleian Library, M S Dodsw_orth, 70, 9 
78 Bain, CDS, v2, no 1776 
79 ibid, no 1894 
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eager to arrange the exchange and in July 1308 royal permission was 
granted allowing Clifford to grant land in Wiltshire to Cromwell and 
Idonea in return for a grant of the Leyburn share of Westmorland 
consisting of Brough under Stainmore, Mallerstang, Kirby Stephen, 
Meaburn Maud and the half share in the hereditary shrievalty of 
80 Westmorland . As a further part of the deal, Clifford granted 
Idonea and her husband his rights in the manor of Stavely in Derby-
shire which he had recently acquired from Walter Merton, probably 
81 purely as collateral for the lands in Westmorland 
Clifford also gained control, gradually and in a number of stages, 
over the lordship of Skipton in Craven in North Yorkshire, though 
the details of this grant owed much to the wranglings over Peter 
Gaveston and cannot be easily explained without reference to the 
82 
wider political context during the early years of Edward II's reign 
The final gain of Skipton was perhaps Clifford's last real success 
but it was one of the highest importance, providing a second large 
estate in the North of England. The result of Clifford's machinations 
was the establishment of the Cliffords as one of the most important 
and powerful families in the North of England and the twin bases of 
Appleby and Skipton provided the basis of the Clifford's power in 
the later middle ages. Equally the Clifford power in the later 
middle ages was based on the twin achievements of Roger de Clifford 
and that of his son Robert de Clifford, though in fact Robert de 
Clifford's part in the development of the West March during the 
reign of Edward II provides one of the most important studies in 
80 CPR 1307-13, 134 
81 ibid, 144 
82 See below Chapter VII 
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the history of the regi_on for as a soldier, Clifford was inevitably · 
in the forefront of the war as it developed on the West March. 
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SKETCH PEDIGREE OF THE CLIFFORD FAMILY 
BASED ON T. W. CLAY, Y.A.J., VOL XVIII (1967), p354 
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d.1284-5 LORETTO 
I 
- - --
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 1- - - -
_____ j 
ROGER III 
d.1282 
I 
I 
m ISABEL 
I 
I 
ROGER de LEYBURN m(1) IDONEA m(2) JOHN de CROMWELL 
ROBERT I m MAUD de CLARE ROGER d.s.p. 
d.1314 
I 
ROGER IV 
d.1322 
ROBERT II m ISOBEL de BERKELY 
d. 1344 
ROBERT II m EUPHEMIA NEVILLE 
d.1354 
ROGER V m MAUD de BEAUCHAMP 
d.1389 
~~~:J ELIZABETH de ROS 
JOHN m ELIZABETH PERCY 
d.1422 
CHAPTER Vl 
PEACE AND 'tlAR ON THE WEST i']Ai'.CH 
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Edward I succeeded to a realm which was effectively pacified after the 
Baron's War and which enjoyed good relations with its neighbour to the 
North. By the end of his reign Edward's policy of conquest in Scotland 
had exposed the Northern counties not only to large scale material 
destruction but to a situation in which war and smaller scale raiding 
were endemic. Put perhaps more precisely, he had succeeded in destroy-
ing the native mechanisms on the West March which, if they did not 
suppress cross border reiving and other forms of crime, at least kept 
the situation within bounds. Edward unleashed war on the March 
without providing either warning or, more seriously, any adequate form 
of defence. 
While there was a long history of the kings of Scots attempting to gain 
control of the Northern counties of England as Alexander II had done 
during the last years of John's reign, in 1237 Alexander II had 
renounced his claims to them and the habit of confrontation appeared 
to have been broken. Tangible evidence appeared to have been provided 
for this during the Disturbance of the Realm when Alexander III had 
repayed his father-in-law's assistance during his minority by supplying 
money and probably men to aid Henry's cause, assistance which played 
an major role in upholding the royalist cause in the North of 
1 England Henry's cause was also vastly assisted by the support of 
major Anglo-Scottish families, the Bruces, the Comyns and the Balliols. 
This co-operation provided a precedent for the good relations which 
existed between the local communities on the two sides of the border, 
relations which were made more close by the fact that other families 
lower down the social scale, such as the Culwens, also held land on 
both sides of the border. 
1 Acts of Parliament of Scotland, v1, 108 
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Though good relations generally existed across the border, occasional 
incidents suggested that there were other possible states of affairs. 
Edward I's insistence that Alexander III should do him homage provide 
one such illustration, the Bishop of Durham's dispute with the Scots 
in the east another. These, however, can have had only little effect 
in Cumberland. Possibly a more serious cause for concern was the 
ease with which Scottish criminals could cross into Cumberland, commit 
their crimes and return to safety in Scotland as English criminals 
2 
could find safety to the north , but it is important to put this 
problem in perspective. The major local franchises also provided a 
degree of refuge for fugitives especially where, as at Cockermouth, 
seigneurial supervision was weak and officials could make a modest if 
illegal profit from the fact that pursuit across franchise boundaries 
was not possible 3 Though the fact that Scotland provided a possible 
refuge for robbers occasioned some concern, there is no evidence that 
Borderers considered that the extension of English rule into Scotland 
would solve the problem. In any case, local men could see clear 
advantages from the fact that England and Scotland were legally 
distinct. Thus in a plea between Robert de Mulcaster and Alan de 
Pennington concerning,an exchange of lands in Ayrshire and Cumberland, 
Robert de Mulcaster could use the existence of two seperate, if 
4 
compatible, legal systems to obstruct his opponent 
The fact of Cumbria's proximity to Scotland and the tenurial inter-
relationship existing between the two made it inevitable that the 
region should be involved in the crisis over the Scottish succession 
2 Tanquerey - Receuil de Lettres Anglo Francaises, no 9 
3 Just.1/137, m33 
4 Bain CDS, v2, no 133 (29, 30) 
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which developed on the death of Alexander III. It was from the 
northern counties, for example, that Edward I summoned many of those 
requested to attend the opening of the great cause at Norham in 1291. 
The summons was, in one sense, an unusual one being more comprehensive 
than any which was based on the strict feudal service owed and it 
included several lords who did not owe the crown knight service. The 
inclusion of these men, notably John de Wigton and Gilbert de Culwen, 
may be an indication that the summons was based more on 'border 
service' than on 'feudal' quotas, though there is a clear similarity 
between the list summoned to Norham and those who had been summoned 
for the last campaign in Wales. It seems probable that Edward I was 
not expecting any form of military confrontation at Norham, however, 
for a number of ladies were also among those summoned. The ladies of 
Westmorland were both directed to attend as was the dowager Matilda 
de Multon of Gilsland. The inclusion of these ladies, though they 
represented three of the most important regional families, probably 
suggests that Edward's concern at Norham was to create an occasion of 
due ceremony and to bolster his legal pretensions by providing both 
an audience and a retinue of sufficient size to impress, if not over-
5 
awe the Scots 
The limited documentary evidence which survives and the fact that most 
of the castles of the West March were extensively redeveloped in the 
later middle ages makes it extremely hard to assess the state of the 
defences of the border at this time but there is little evidence to 
suggest a high state of preparedness. Liddell Castle has already been 
discussed and it was in a very poor state of repair. Other lords, 
notably Roger de Clifford, had given the construction of modern castles 
higher priority, regarding them as an essential adjunct of regional 
5 Parl Writs, v1, 256; see also E L G Stones and G G Simpson-
Edward I and the throne of Scotland (Oxford 1978), v1, 176 
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dominance rather than as a bulwark against a possible Scots attack, 
however. If any local castle might be expected to have been placed 
in a state of readiness against the possibility of war it was the 
chief royal castle of Carlisle. In 1255 the castle had been in a state 
of the utmost disrepair. The lead guttering of the towers was decayed 
and the joists and timberwork were also in a poor state. Other parts 
6 
of the castle were in danger of total collapse Eustace de Balliol, 
who served as castellan of Carlisle under Henry III, had been allowed 
£400 to spend on the repair of the castle but not all this sum had 
7 
actually been used on the required repairs A local jury later 
recorded that Balliol was not alone in this petty fraud; most of the 
sheriffs of Cumberland had been guilty of it. Beginning around 1285, 
however, Edward I made provision for the rebuilding of the castle. 
Rebuilding work was extensive and quantities of timber were taken 
from Inglewood for it but this was probably used more for the 
redevelopment of the castle's living quarters than for the fortifica-
tion 8 . In 1292 a fire started in a suburb of Carlisle by an arsonist 
destroyed much of the city and reached the castle where the timber 
9 bridge over the moat was burned and had to be replaced • At this time 
though, no money was spent on preparing the castle to resist a siege, 
suggesting that war in the area was considered unlikely. 
If it is hard to see the years from the death of Alexander III to John 
de Balliol' s revolt against Edward I as a period 'in which the March 
was prepared for war , this was, nevertheless, a time in which the 
crown expanded its influence in Cumbria. Two important estates were 
6 Bain CDS, v1, no 2481 
7 Just.1/132, m33 
8 H M Colvin- The History of the King's Works (1963), v2, 597 
9 ibid, 599 
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brought into the hands of the king in these years, and the administra-
tion of these estates was to be intimately involved with the organisa-
tion of the defence of the region and with local rivalries. One of 
these reversions, that of the king of Scots' regality of Tynedale with 
its dependent manors in Cumberland, was directly connected with the 
disputed succession to the Scots throne. Tynedale was taken into the 
hands of the king on the death of Alexander III, the lands were 
theoretically held until the heir to the kingdom could be determined but 
the lands were rapidly drawn into the reservoir of royal patronage. 
In November 1290 John de Balliol granted Bishop Bek of Durham two 
manors in Tynedale, if not in order that Bek should plead Balliol's 
cause with his royal master, at least in confident expectation of 
eventual success. Bek gained custody of the five Cumberland manors 
by a different route, when EdwarJ I allowed him to have them in recom-
10 pense for the expenses which he had incurred going to Norway Bek's 
biographer has convincingly suggested that Bek's acquisition of land 
in Tynedale and Cumberland were intended to be integrated into the 
palatine liberty of Durham and perhaps the beginnings of an almost 
autonomous principality guarding the Anglo-Scottish border. If this 
were so the bishop probably cast his eyes still further west to 
Cockermouth which had reverted to the crown, albeit under legally 
doubtful circumstances, on the death of Isabella de Forz in 1293 11 . 
If Bek, whose star was then in the ascendant could have gained control 
of the honour of Cockermouth, it could have been easily accomodated 
into his growing collection of franchises and its possession would have 
10 Fraser - Bek, 89-90 
11 Early Yorkshire Charters, v7 l.~- 2."l. 
A Beanlands - 'The Claim of John de Eston', Thoresby Society 
Miscellany, v24 (1914-18) 211- 'a' 
N Denholm-Yaung- 'Yorkshire Estates of Isabella de Forz', 
Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, v31 (1932-34)8ttiu Hc14"fJ'il' f"'''fb H.a-,~fc. 
K B McFarlane - 'Did Edward I have a policy towards the earls?' 
in The Nobility of Later Mediaeval England (Oxford 1971),~n, 
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given him land stretching from the North Sea to the Irish Sea 12 . As 
has been aptly remarked, such a large episcopal palatinate might well 
have provided an effective solution to the problem of the defence of 
the north, but if the idea was ever considered it came to nothing. 
Bek's fortunes waned and he lost control of his lands in Tynedale and 
the Cumberland manors during his dispute with Edward I and their 
administration was entrusted to the sheriffs of Cumberland as was the 
running of Cockermouth. The result was the creation of a large stock 
of patronage in the region available either to reward good service or 
to build up the position of the favoured, options with which both 
Edward I and his son experimented. 
The deterioration of relations between Edward I and John I of Scotland, 
which was to have the most profound consequences in the long-term, seems 
to have caused little alarm during 1293 and 1294. When Edward I set 
about assembling a force to serve in Gascony he seems not to have 
expected that there would be any need to defend the West March and he 
summoned men from it. Service was asked of John de Lancaster of Kendale 
and of Idonea de Leyburn but the result was probably disappointing and 
the summons was extended to cover lands held in wardship including the 
lands of the Greystoke family, of the Wakes and of John and Adam de 
Hudlestone of Millom 13 . Even so the summons was generally ineffective, 
partly since it vmuld not have been realistic to have demanded strict 
feudal service in Gascony. The government also requested service from 
men of known military experience such as John de Wigton who had 
12 Fraser - Bek.. Though there is no direct evidence that Bek 
considered trying to gain control of Cockermouth he was probably 
well informed about Cumberland, particularly if he had served as 
an adviser to Edmund of Lancaster (53). He had also been presented 
to Brigham, near Cockermouth, by Isabella de Forz.(2s) 
13 Parl Writs, v1, 259 
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previously been summoned for the Welsh campaign of 1287 14 . Whether or 
not most of those asked to be present ever mustered is uncertain but it 
is significant that Edward I felt confident enough of the safety of the 
northern border to summon away some of its most experienced defenders. 
Events moved rapidly to a crisis in 1295. The Welsh revolt which had 
created difficulties in the face of the proposed Gascon campaign was 
matched by a deterioration of the situation in Scotland. John Balliol 
had been summoned to serve at Portsmouth and his default was exacerbated 
. Ed d' h l d . h h'l' f 15 ln war s eyes w en 1e rna e common cause Wlt P l lp o France 
Edward greeted this alliance with a demand for the castles of Berwick, 
Jedburgh and Roxburgh and made ready to back this'up with force 
summoning a large army 16 to meet him at Newcastle on 1 March 1296 
The preparations for the proposed campaign brought Cumberland into the 
fore-front of the plans for the first time. A large force of foot was 
scheduled to arrive at Whitehaven from Ireland and this g.roup was 
probably also intended to collect siege engines constructed at Carlisle 
17 from timber taken from Inglewood The home front was not neglected, 
however, and orders were sent out for the siezure of the lands of 
18 
rebels . The close links between Cumbria and Scotland made it 
inevitable that there should be such forfeitures and among the lands 
seized were Bolton in Allerdale from Alexander de Moubray, Ulvesby 
forfeited by Alexander de Bonkil, Robert de Ros' manor of Cargou and 
part of the barony of Kirklevington which was forfeited by Walter de 
14 ibid, 250 
15 Barrow - Bruce, 250 
16 Parl Writs, v1, 259 
17 J F Curwen - The Castles and Fortified Towers of Cumberland and 
Westmorland (Kendal 1913) ~t 
18 Bain CDS, v2, no 73C 
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18 Corry These lands were added to the stock of land available to 
royal patronage. The defence of the border was also organised. The 
custody of Carlisle castle was seperated from the shrievalty of the 
county and entrusted to Robert Bruce of Annandale while two captains 
and keepers of the peace, Robert le Brun and William de Carlisle, were 
19 
appointed to organise the defence of the rest of the county Both 
the keepers were men of limited local standing, contrasted with the 
later wardens of the march, and this was probably a reflection of the 
relative importance which was attached to their task at this time. 
The adequacy of these arrangements was soon put to the test. Led by 
the Earl of Buchan and the Earls of Menteith, Lennox, Athol, Mar and 
John Comyn a Scots force crossed the Solway fords and attacked north 
Cumberland. The Wake lordship of Liddell was hardest hit, Arthuret 
and Nicol Forest were plundered and burned. The Scots then advanced 
as far as Carlisle, wasting the barony of Kirklevington as they moved 
forward, including those parts formerly held by the scots Patrick 
Trump and Walter de Corry. The Scots' arrival at Carlisle was greeted 
with wild alarm, enhanced by fears of Scots sympathisers within the 
city wall. The limitations of the preparations there were revealed by 
the fact that the defenders were reduced to throwing stones at the 
attackers, a task in which they were assisted by the women of the city20 
The scots, however, were no more prepared than their adversaries, having 
no siege engines and they withdrew rapidly into Annandale after burning 
the outskirts of Carlisle. Despite the extensive damage the scots force 
caused in northern Cumberland, at Kirklevington the chief messuage was 
19 Bain CDS, v2, no 716: Parl Writs, vl, 278 
20 H Rothwell - The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough (Royal 
Historical Society 1957), 273 
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completely destroyed and the campaign had achieved very little. Local 
opinion, however, was incensed and viewed Edward's own depredations in 
21 
eastern Scotland as nothing more than just retribution on the Scots 
The defeat of the Scottish field army at Dunbar and Edward's subsequent 
progress through Scotland placed Cumbria, once again, in the background 
but the campaign provided important opportunities for local lords. 
Robert de Clifford was evidently eager to make his mark. On April 2 
1296 he was appointed to hold the March of Scotland with a force of 
22 140 men at arms and 500 foot It was an important experience of 
command for the young Clifford, barely out of his minority, but Edward 
himself left little to chance taking hostages to ensure the submission 
of the Scottish borders. 
The revolt led by William Wallace, or at least associated with his 
leadership, brought the renewed prospect of war to the border. After 
their experiences in 1296 the leaders of the local communities took 
steps to organise regional defence more effectively. An established 
tradition of historical writing, probably originating in the work of 
23 Gaillard Lapsley first published in 1900 , has suggested that the 
crown took the initiative in forging the local communities of the north 
of England into a form of devolved, semi-autonomous entity capable of 
organising its own defence under royal guidance. The truth appears to 
have been more gradual and more complicated but during the reign of 
Edward I when the March had still suffered relatively little, the border 
lords were capable of taking the initiative themselves without the need 
21 Lanercost, 173, Bain CDS, v2, no 1402 
22 Bain CDS, v2, no 734 
23 G Lapsley - 'The Problem of the North' in Crown 1Community and 
Parliament (Oxford 1950), 380 and following. 
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for the king to intervene. The evidence from 1297 suggests that the 
local lords were taking control of the war in the region. Though the 
important appointments of Robert Clifford as Captain of the March of 
Cumberland and John de Halton as castellan of Carlisle were made by 
the crown, both were important local figures and, noticeably, seem to 
have been free to arrange the detailed aspects of the defence at their 
24 
own discretion Edward I was himself pre-occupied with the campaign 
in Flanders. 
The English commanders on the West March showed themselves to be both 
competent and thorough. According to one report all the free tenants 
and knights of Westmorland assembled in Cumberland for the defence of 
25 
the March . On instructions from Walter Reynolds, Bishop Halton 
attended to the garrisoning of Carlisle castle, enlisting a force of 
crossbowmen. The cautious Halton even tried to ensure the loyalty of 
Robert Bruce the younger, the future Robert I, by forcing him to swear 
26 loyalty to Edward I, a pledge Bruce later repudiated Bruce's 
defection may have wholly vindicated Halton's doubts but Percy and 
Clifford moved rapidly on to the offensive. They organised a force 
for the pursuit of Bruce, Wishart and the Stewart, probably with a good 
degree of support from other local men. One local lord, Thomas de 
Multon of Egremont, received quittance of his debts to the crown in 
return for service in Scotland, but it is uncertain whether Multon was 
27 
encouraged or coerced 
24 CPR 1292-1301, 315 
Some local men were clearly more reluctant 
25 M C Prestwich - Documents Relating to the Crisis of 1297 (Royal 
Historical Society 1981), no 47 
26 Reg Halton, v1, 179 
27 CCR 1296-1302, 69. SeeM C Prestwich- War, Polit.ics and Finance 
under Edward I (1972), for examplesof coercion. ""~ pp .S.J,,.(}l-. 
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to serve, and mindful of Edward's other attempts to extract unpaid 
service stipulated that though they would serve on this expedition 
provided that it was recognised that this would provide no precedent 
for the future, a condition the two commanders undertook to have 
. 28 
ratified by the klng . This agreement, together with Clifford's 
local influence illustrated by the inclusion in Clifford's retinue 
of his tenants including Hugh de Louther who held Louther John of 
his lord, enabled Clifford and Percy to mobilise an effective force 
29 
with a speed which took the Scots by surprise Advancing rapidly 
into Annandale, they caught the Scots commanders unprepared and 
this, with the strength of the English force, forced the Scots to 
surrender, Wishart and Stewart capitulating at Irvine. According to 
a later claim for expenses incurred in the campaign by Bishop Halton, 
Bruce also recognised that he was defeated and returned to his former 
30 
allegiance at the bidding of the English leaders Having partially 
pacified the region, Clifford and Percy remained in South West 
Scotland engaged in mopping-up operations throughout August. Clifford, 
at any rate, seems to have expected that the campaign could last a 
31 good deal longer and he obtained further protections for his followers 
The gains made by Percy and Clifford in their campaign into Galloway 
in the summer of 1297 were more than wiped out by Earl Warenne's 
defeat at Stirling Bridge and Wallace's campaign into the North of 
England. Wallace's attack concentrated mainly on Northumberland but 
28 Bain, CDS, v2, no 899 
29 RS vl, 48; Feodary, 316 
30 Barrow - Bruce, 118; Bain, CDS, v3, no 527 
31 RSv1,48 
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after turning through the Tyne Gap his forces attacked Cumberland, 
destroying part of Inglewood Forest and raiding as far into the 
32 
county as Cockermouth before withdrawing by way of Hexham . Local 
defence was again organised by Percy who was drawn back from Galloway 
and the forces under his command were paid from money in the possession 
of the Bishop of Carlisle from locally collected taxes 33 The Scots 
made no attempt to lay seige to Carlisle but they had still proved 
the vulnerability of the West March. The fact of this vulnerability 
was little affected by the success of a counter raid into Annandale 
organised by Robert de Clifford, though the chevauchee no doubt 
34 
enhanced Cliffords already growing prestige A larger expedition 
organised after Edward of Caernavon's reconciliation with the dissident 
magnates in the spring of 1298, though supported by levies of foot from 
the North of England, achieved little more. The Scots 
retreated and taken anything which could have supported the army with 
35 
them 
Freed from the need to fight on two fronts, in the summer of 1298 
Edward mounted a major offensive against Wallace and the Scots. In 
this the West March was bound to play a large part and it was well 
represented in the force which mustered at Roxburgh in June. Thomas 
de Multon of Egremont and John Wake of Liddell served under Anthony 
Bek as did William de Dacre, but the largest of the contingents drawn 
36 from the West March was that led by Robert de Clifford 
32 Guisborough, 304, 305 
33 Bain, CDS, v2, no 508 
34 Guisborough, 307, 308 
35 ibid 314, 315 
36 H Gough - Scotland in 1298 (Falkirk 1888), 17 
In part 
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this represented the force Clifford had kept in being during the 
previous winter in the defence of Carlisle. Included in it were 
Clifford's neighbour and relative by marriage John de Cromwell, 
Idonea de Leyburn's second husband, and Hugh de Multon of Hoff. 
Hugh de Multon was a member of a cadet branch of the de Multons of 
Gilsland and held Hoff in Westmorland of Clifford 37 . Other members 
of the gentry of Westmorland made up a substantial part of the remainder 
of the force including Robert L'Engleys, John de Teesdale and William 
de Harclay, an elder brother of the future Earl of Carlisle, who may 
originally have been recruited by Cromwell. Others were from 
Cumberland such as William de Boyvill and Robert de Whitrigg while 
Nicholas de Vipont was a representative of the Vipont lords of Alston, 
distant relatives of Idonea and Isabella de Vipont. Clifford's 
Inquisition Post Mortem disclosed that he had granted fees of 20 marks 
yearly to Thomas and John de Mounteney from the manor of Brough under 
Stainmore and though this grant cannot have been made before 1308, it 
is clear that the connection went back much further as did Clifford's 
relationship with Thomas de Helbeck to whom he had granted reasonable 
sustenance for himself, one esquire and three grooms. All three 
served under Clifford in 1298 38 and they were his most frequent 
companions in later expeditions. After the fall of Lochmaben 
to Edward, the castle was entrusted to Clifford and the garrison which 
he supplied was, again, based very closely on the force he had 
commanded in the active part of the campaign. In the early summer of 
310 
37 Feodary;~ PQW, 790 
38 Scotland in 1298, 17; CIPM, vS, no 533. There were two Thomas 
de Helbecks, father and son, whose careers were contemporary 
with that of Robert I de Clifford. Since both held only of 
Clifford, not in chief, no Inquisitions were taken into their 
holdings and thus it is not possible to distinguish satisfactorily 
between them. 
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1299 Clifford's force numbered among others John de Castre, Thomas de 
39 Helbeck, Hugh de Multon, Hugh de Louther as well as John de Cromwell 
The capture of Lochmaben did relatively little to secure the West March 
and during 1299 the area continued to see active campaigning. The 
situation remained fluid,for while the front line remained north of the 
Solway in Annandale and Galloway, Cumbria came to be more and more 
closely involved in the campaign. The failure of the campaign planned 
to start in summer of 1299, placed much of the initiative with local 
commanders. For the abortive campaign planned by the king, infantry 
was summoned from the Northern counties on a block basis, 1000 from 
Westmorland and 2000 from Cumberland but such mass levies were likely 
to prove ineffective in a county such as Cumberland where so many lords 
claimed the right to exclude royal bailiffs from their land. When 
matters were arranged locally it is significant that the approach was 
different. For a smaller offensive planned by local commanders in 
July 1299 a more effective method of raising forces was tried. The 
force consisted of the retinues of experienced local men such as John 
de Lancaster of Kendale and John de Hudlestone of Millom. Infantry 
for the foray was also raised through local connections and institutions. 
Two hundred infantry were recruited from the lordship of Egremont under 
Hudlestone, who himself was one of the chief mesne tenants of the lord-
ship and who had understandably close links with the Multons of 
40 Egremont Well organised this raid may have been but the contribution 
it made to the position of the English forces in Galloway was probably 
minimal and the need for a major offensive continued to increase. 
39 C.67/13 
40 Bain, CDS, v2, nos 1136, 1081 
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The war continued to play a growing part in local life and there was 
a significant increase on the involvement two years earlier. While 
the borderers had been prepared to serve without pay in 1297, it was 
at least intended that they should be paid, though the organisation 
of this was not always perfect. In the same way Carlisle castle 
began to be developed as a major local arsenal, supplied from the 
port at Skinburnness. In 1299 Halton was granted a writ of allocate 
for money he had spent on providing 6000 crossbow quarrels that he 
41 had supplied to the garrison of Lochmaben Another result of the 
deteriorating military situation in South West Scotland was that the 
front-line crept closer to Cumberland. The supply line from Carlisle 
to Lochmaben came increasingly under threat and on at least one 
occasion the Scots managed to intercept a supply train as it crossed 
42 
the Solway fords, almost within sight of Carlisle castle A force 
of cavalry had to be used to escort supplies. Even when stores were 
ferried from Skinburnness to Annan by boat, there were risks, particularly 
that the Scots would mount a raid while the stores lay unprotected 
after debarkation. Such guerilla tactics provided more of a threat to 
the English garrisons in Galloway than direct assaults. In August 1299 
Clifford's men managed to beat off a frontal attack on Lochmaben by 
Robert Bruce who was enjoying another of his habitual surges of 
patriotism, Clifford perhaps being warned of Bruces approach by scouts 
43 posted to track the Scots' movements 
41 Reg Halton, v1, 179 
42 Bain, CDS, v2, nos 1115, 1116 
The payment of wages also 
43 ibid, no 1084. In July 1299 Clifford requested that Richard le 
Bret, an Irish hobelar, whom he employed to spy on the Scots, 
should be paid in case he should desert for lack of wages. 
A Richard le Bret appeared as a centenar of Cumberland foot in 
1300, (Lib Quot, 208) and 1304 (E.101.11/15, m18) 
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provided continuing problems in spite of the elaborate arrangements 
for their distribution. At one stage Clifford feared that unless wages 
44 
were paid to his men, widespread desertions would occur 
During the winter of 1299-1300, Edward I was able to turn his undiverted 
attention to his Scottish problem. The first priority was the relief 
of Stirling and preparations were set in hand to raise a force for this 
purpose. Robert de Tilliol and Hugh de Multon were appointed to raise 
45 infantry from Cumberland and Westmorland . The commissions of array 
were only partially successful. Multon managed to raise 625 of the 
1000 men expected from Westmorland, arranged under seven centenars by 
16 December 1299. Tilliol was able to raise a much smaller force of 
446 foot from Cumberland. Neither force, however, made any real 
contribution to the war effort. By 22 December the Westmorland contin-
gent had dwindled to only 265 men while the Cumberland force had almost 
wholly disappeared, only 65 men were left under the command of its 
constable, Thomas le Fraunceys, and the whole force was disbanded having 
achieved nothing. Orders were given for the deserters to be punished 
45 but the campaign was effectively over 
Preparations for a large scale offensive began almost as soon as the 
recriminations from the last campaign were over. These preparations 
faced a degree of resistance. Early in 1300 Walter de Bedwin reported 
to the king that the people of Cumberland and Westmorland refused to 
46 
co-operate with the appointed captain of the March, John de St. John 
Edward's response to this complaint suggested that more than simple 
44 Bain, CDS, v2, no 1089 
45 CCR 1296-1302, 323, 379; Lib Quat, 208, 241-243 
46 Bain, CDS, v2, no 1133 
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obedience may have been required. The king directed that fines were to 
be imposed on those who refused to obey St. John's instructions whether 
these were for the defence of the March or, significantly, for attacks 
47 
on the enemy One credible explanation of the need for such an 
instruction would be provided by attempts by St. John to demand unpaid 
service from the borderers probably on the pretext of the service they 
professed to owe to serve at their own expense from the Solway to the 
Rere Cross on Stainmoor. In 1297 the borderers had stated that though 
they were prepared to serve with pay, this was not to stand as a 
precedent. A petition which James Wilson believed to be closely 
related, printed by Joseph Bain under a tentative date of 1315-20, 
1 d . h 48 part y expan s on thls t erne Stating that any service outside the 
traditional bounds of Cumbria should be done for the payment of wages, 
the document tends to fit more closely with this period than with the 
49 
more desperate situation of Edward II's reign Though the evidence 
for concerted resistance to Edward's attempts to levy undue service 
from Cumbria is limited, it is clear that the claims made by the 
Cumbrians had significant parallels with the resistance organised in 
other areas, notably the Palatine Bishopric of Durham. Despite this, 
there is no reason to believe that there was any form of co-ordination 
between opposition in Durham and in Cumbria, and resistance to Edward's 
impositions in support of the war effort was on a restricted scale even 
within the region. There were two principal reasons for this. Firstly, 
in spite of the increasing involvement of the West March in the war, 
demands of supplies from the region remained limited. Purveyance, which 
lay at the heart of the opposition in the rest of England was levied 
47 ibid, no 1134 
48 ibid, no 899 
49 ibid, no 716 and see VCH, v2, 253 and note. Internal evidence is 
consistent with this interpretation. 
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only on a small scale, possibly since the counties of Cl~berland and 
Westmorland grew such small quantities of wheat which formed a large 
part of the supplies needed for an Edwardian Army. A second reason 
may well have been more important still. Many of the leaders of the 
local communities of the March were active supporters of the war. 
Both John de Hudlestone and still more importantly Robert de Clifford 
served as commissioners to attempt to raise cavalry service from the 
50 holders of £40 worth of land 
If the degree of active opposition to the preparations for the war 
was limited, there was still only little enthusiasm for the war out-
side the relatively narrow if influential group, who were actively 
involved in the war. Cumbria remained of limited value as a recruiting 
area. As in other regions the attempt to obtain service from the 40 
librate holders led to little increase in the number of those enlisting. 
Some new men were recruited among whom was the interesting example of 
Gilbert de Brunolsheved, the disgraced sub-sheriff of Westmorland, who 
51 
served under Matthew de Redman in the Earl of Lincoln's contingent 
Robert de Clifford also led an important force. Among those in 
Clifford's contingent in 1300 were, for example, Thomas de Helbeck and 
William de Rosgill 52 Other members of the force included Hugh de 
Louther, John de Cromwell and Thomas de Mounteney who was described as 
Clifford's esquire 53 Not all of Clifford's force can be linked with 
his holdings in Westmorland, Henry Trumpator, Stephen de Burghersh and 
Roger de Edenham provide three examples but it is clear that the most 
l 
regular members of Clifford's military retinue were his feed men and the 
50 Parl Writs, v1, 330, Hudlestone was a commissioner in Lancashire. 
51 C.67/14. On Gilbert's earlier career see above Chapter 5 
52 C.67/14 
53 Lib Quat, 137, 132, 197. C.67/14 
54 
tenants of the barony of Westmorland 
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In May 1301 when Clifford 
obtained protections for the core of the force which had wintered with 
him, his force included Hugh de Louther, Robert L'Engleys, Thomas de 
Helbeck, William Beching and the Cumberland soldier John de Wigton 55 
Both L'Engleys and Helbeck also served under Clifford in the following 
56 year 
Clifford's influence may have assisted Hugh de Multon to raise infantry 
from Westmorland for the summer campaign of 1300 too. As had been the 
case in the campaign started in the previous winter, Westmorland 
produced a significantly higher proportion of the foot required of it 
than did Cumberland. Of the 1000 men expected from Westmorland, Hugh 
de Louther found it possible to enlist almost three-quarters, 742 in 
all. In Cumberland where the commissioners of array, John de Wigton 
and Robert de Tilliol, were just as well connected locally and possessed 
just as much relevant experience but they managed to raise only less 
than half the force of 2000 infantry demanded from the county, 922 foot 
57 
who were organised into nine companies corrunanded by a centenar 
Neither body of troops proved to be reliable, however. During July 
almost half of the foot from Cumberland who were mustered deserted and 
by 25 August only 318 men from this force remained having been re-
. d . f' . 58 organlse ~nto lve companles The inclusion of centenars named 
William of Egremont, John of Waberthwaite and Nicholas of Laysingby 
suggests that the force had originally been recruited from throughout 
the county, but the co-operation of the magnates of the region must 
have been vital, especially in the priveleged liberties of the south-
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
Lib Quot, 
C.67/14 
C.67/15 
Lib Quot, 
ibid, 255 
137 
241 
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west of the county. Since Multon of Egremont was on campaign in 1300, 
59 it is probable that this was not a problem The difficulty remained 
that of organising and disciplining the levies and this continued to 
trouble the commanders of the Westmorland men too. By the end of 
August only 31 of them remained in service. 
The desertion of most of the infantry levied for the campaign launched 
in the summer of 1300 present Edward with a serious problem which 
could not be solved simply by calls for the exemplary punishment of 
60 deserters Though Caerlaverock had been captured, little else had 
been achieved. A novel solution was attempted to remedy the problem 
caused by the shortage of infantry. On 21 September letters were 
directed from the king to the Bishop of Carlisle and the gentry of 
Cumberland and Westmorland. Among the recipients were Hugh de Louther, 
Thomas de Lucy, Michael de Harclay, John de Halteclo and numerous 
others. Though none of these letters seems to have survived, their 
contents were probably concerned with the military situation and they 
may have contained requests for troops, together with assurances that 
any service done would be paid for by the king. The requests were 
apparently well received and a force of infantry was mustered. The 
first point to make is that the force mustered was relatively small, 
just over 500 foot, were raised from the whole of Cumberland and 
Westmorland. More important and interesting, however, was the way in 
which this force was recruited. Most of the troops raised were 
recruited from 'the men' of local landholders and were often led by 
men described as their esquires. John de Castre, for example, led 30 
of 'his own men', Alexander de Bassenthwaite led a force of 77 men. 
59 ibid, 256; C.67/14 
60 J E Morris -The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford 1901), 302 
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Thirty of these men were his own whi.le 40 came from Thomas de Lucy 1 s 
men and the remaining seven were from Thomas de Ireby 1 s men. Alan 
de Brigham brought 30 of hi.s Lord Thomas de Derwentwater 1 s men, John 
de Halteclo brought 10 men from amongst those of his own master 
Mi.chael de Harclay. The larger liberties contributed more men. In 
mid October Alan le Fraunceis brought 92 from the lordship of Greystoke 
and Nicholas de Waberthwaite and Nicholas de Windscale brought a force 
61 from Egremont 
The successful recrui.tment of foot during the late summer of 1300 is 
consistent with much else that is known about local conditions. 
Firs.tly it is clear that, as in 129.7, bodies of foot could be success-
fully recruited from large local liberties such as Greystoke and 
Egremont. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the lordship 
exercised by individual members of the gentry was a powerful force, it 
was quite clear, for example, which of the Hestmorland men were Michael 
de Harclay 1 s followers and which owed their allegiance to the Leyburn 
brothers. Likewise Thomas de Ireby 1 s seven men were distinct from the 
larger group formed from the men of his own lord Thomas de Lucy. It 
is also tempting to see in these bodies of infantry some degree of 
similarity to the force of men Bishop Anthony Bek raised from Tynedale 
and Weardale during his disputes with the Prior and Convent of Durham 
and later with. Guy, Earl of Warwick and it certainly had parallels 
wi.th the ability of larger-scale lords to raise forces from the men 
of their lordships. Even accepting this, however, we should not over 
estimate either the importance of these forces or their coherence. 
The total forces raised were limited and as with troops raised in the 
usual way the size of this force declined 1 probably because of desertion. 
61 Lib Quot, 260-63 
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Secondly it seems possible that much of this force served more as 
labourers than as combat infantry. One group from Westmorland was 
engaged in repairing the moat at Lochmaben and their performance in 
this. unexciting task earned each man a special bonus on the instructions 
62 
of Edward himself 
The conclusion of a truce in October 1300 provided only a brief 
respite in hostilities. Edward I did not intend to let even the limited 
gains made in the preceding campai_gn slip away during the closed season 
for campaigning. Clifford, who had been granted custody of Caerlaverock, 
63 in part as a reward for his leading part in the castle's capture was 
ordered to take command of a group of other castles adjacent to the 
English West March. Garrisons. were kept in Caerlaverock, Dalswinton, 
Tibbers and Dumfries and these garrisons probably drew heavily on the 
men from Cumberland and W.es.tmorland who had already taken part in the 
war. John de Castre, for example, who had served under Clifford in 
64 1298 was among the garrison of Dumfries 
The truce on the West March was placed under the supervision of John 
de St. John who was provided with a force of 100 men at arms and 300 
foot. Other steps were taken to improve the defences of the region 
too. On 10 November Edward granted the lands of John de Wake in 
Liddell, which were in the king's hands after Wake's death to Simon de 
Lindsey together with the adjacent Scottish castle of Hermitage. 
Linds.ey was charged no farm on these lands on the condition that he 
spend at least £20 on the repair of the castle and manor buildings at 
62 ibid, 262 
63 T Wright- The Roll of Caerlaverock (1864), 34, Bodleian Library 
M S Dodsworth, 70, 64 
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Liddell and that he should remain there to assist in the defence of 
65 
the county The fact that Liddell which had once been worth at 
least £300 should be granted out for such limited return demonstrates 
both. Edward's attempts to provide cheaply for local defence but more 
importantly the extent of the damage which the war had caused even as 
early as 1300. The period also saw a growing realisation that the 
war was likely to prove extremely protracted and lands forfeited by 
rebels were unlikely to have to be restored to their former holders 
on the conclusion of peace or conquest and they began to be used as 
rew.ards. for those who had contributed to the war effort. William de 
Mulcaster was allowed to farm Bolton in Allerdale at the rate of £40 
yearly, though. this may have left him little margin for profit 66 
John de St. John was rewarded on a larger scale, with the custody of 
two of the former properties. of the Forz family, Skipton and 
67 Cockermouth Cockermouth.was valued at £110 yearly but having 
been burned by the Scots in 1297 it was probably worth much less than 
th . . 68 at J..n practJ..ce St. John was later alleged to have wasted the 
estate but such treatment was the almost inevitable fate of a large 
estate when granted out on a short term basis to holders who had no 
. 69 J..nterest in its long term welfare • 
It is difficult to ass.ess the degree of mobilisation for war which 
existed in Cumbria in the earliest years of the fourteenth century. 
On one hand the local gentry continued to he willing to serve in the 
war in south west Scotland, but with the exception of raids such as 
65 Bain, CDS, V2, no 1173 
66 CPR 1292-1301, 199 
67 CPR 1292-1301, 160 
68 SC.6.824/2 
69 CPR 1292-1301, 537 
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that led by Wallace in 1298 the region did not yet see active 
campaigning. Moreover, only a limLted section of the local gentry 
served in Scotland. Those who served were generally either 
fee'd retainers of local magnates or were younger men. One result was 
that the administration of the county was disrupted very little because 
few potential officials w~~e involved in the war, though this did 
happen on occasions as when Robert de Joneby, who had been chosen as 
one of the coroners for the body of the county of Cumberland, was 
70 found to be serving under Price Edward generally. However, the 
administrative tasks. of the county devolved on men whose military 
careers were behind them such as Michael de Harclay. It is significant 
for example, that when Michael de Barclay was reported to be too ill 
to s.erve as a collector of the thirtieth, granted the king in 1306 a 
list of the most suitable replacements appended to the letter named 
four of the most substantial men of Westmorland as Thomas de Bethum, 
John de Helton, Henry de Warcop and Robert de Wessington. None of 
these men had appeared in any of Cli.fford • s military contingents 71 
In this, if in little else, the West March seems to have conformed 
to patterns whi.ch have been discerned in other regions of England 72 · 
The summer campaigns of both. 1300 and the elaborate double pronged 
attack planned for 1301 achi.eved very little towards either the 
subjection of Scotland or the protection of Northern England from 
~cots raids. The W.estern Borders continued to be an area of active 
campaigning until the fall of Stirling but local enthusiasm for the 
war seems to have lapsed. Whi.le a narrow group of enthusiastic 
70 Calendar of Chancery Warrants, vl, 217; C.67/l5 
71 SC.l/28/159, A, B 
72 Saul - Knights and Esquires ~-~ 
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professional soldiers exemplified by Clifford continued to serve in 
Scotland, many of the local gentry were ready to return to their 
estates. There, however, they were still regarded as the first line 
of defence in the case of an attack. In June 1303 when a force of 
Scots led by Wallace threatened Cumberland from Annandale and Galloway, 
instructions were given for the defence of the West March to be 
73 
organised by Thomas de Multon and John de Hudlestone . In the same 
way John de Botetourt could raise a powerful force including contin-
gents led by Clifford, Hudlestone and including experience knights 
such as Hugh de Multon, John de Wigton and Richard le Brun for a 
foray into Galloway in the following winter. Though it would be a 
mistake to see the local gentry as permanently in arms, there is no 
doubt that a substantial and often practiced force could be raised on 
the border in a relatively short time. Both cavalry and foot were 
raised from Cumberland, Westmorland and Lancashire albeit for a 
74 
relatively short mobilisation 
The sporadic raids mounted, or at least threatened, by Wallace and the 
other Scottish leaders linked the first phase of resistance to Edward 
I's attempts to conquer the Scots with the hostilities inaugurated by 
Robert Bruce's renewed rebellion. A similar continuity can be observed 
in the other effects of war on Cumberland and Westmorland. The pre-
vailing trend was upwards and Cumbria was expected to play an increasing 
role in supplying Edward's army of occupation. In January 1304 the 
sheriff of Cumberland was instructed to provide fifty wagons and 120 
75 
sheep to be delivered to Roxburgh 
73 Bain, CDS, v2, no 1374 
74 ibid, no 1435 
75 ibid, no 1439 
An equally pressing need was for 
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timber, particularly since Edward was forced by fiscal restrictions to 
fortify his conquests with wooden rather than stone castles. Much of 
the timber needed was taken from the forests of Inglewood and Allerdale 
and the rights of local land-holders were infringed in some cases. In 
1305 Thomas de Lucy petitioned that almost all the timber from that 
part of the forest which he held in common with the escheated honour 
of Cockermouth had been felled to provide wood for the peels which the 
76 king had had built at Dumfries and at Holm Cultram There is no 
reason to believe that Lucy suffered particularly because he had taken 
little part in the war effort against the Scots. John de St. John, a 
former commander of Edward's forces, had earlier made an almost 
exactly similar complaint. It was simply that the need for timber had 
outstripped the limits of supply. 
Perhaps the most significant development in the organisation of the war 
effort on the West March lay in the way in which the raising of forces 
of infantry was organised. In 1303 for the first time, shire boundaries 
w.ere not used as the sole basis of the raising of troops by commissioners 
of array. The contingent expected from Cumbria remained extremely 
optimistic at 2300 but a new recognition of local boundaries emerged. 
Walter de Stirkland and Robert L'Engleys were commissioned to raise 
1000 men from Westmorland and Kendale, the two significantly being 
distinguished. Richard le Brun was to raise 1000 from Cumberland with 
the exception of Copeland which was to supply 300 men under John de 
77 Hudlestone • There were clear precedents for troops being raised in 
this way, notably the 200 foot raised by Hudlestone in 1297. The foot 
demanded, however, did not materialise in the required numbers but the 
76 NP, 124-129 
77 Parl Writs, vl, 330 
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performance of the Cumbrian foot was better than on some occasions and 
there were still almost 100 of them serving when a pay roll was compiled 
78 
at Clackmannan in June 1304 Improved discipline within the levies 
themselves may also have played an important part in this improved 
performance possibly as a result of the existence of a recognisable 
cadre of experienced centenars such as Thomas le Fraunceys and Richard 
79 le Bret, both of whom had served in 1300 and probably also before 
The policy of attempting to recruit foot on the basis of local 
jurisdictional units was resumed in 1307 when renewed efforts were 
made to raise an army to suppress Bruce's rebellion. Four commissioners 
were appointed to raise 140 foot from the Multon lands of Eskdale and 
Gilsland, a further four including Nicholas de Herleston, a former 
centenar, were to raise another 140 from Leath Ward and from Alston 
Moor. Forty men were to be chosen from the liberty of Penrith, 60 
from Cockermouth and the liberties of the Bishop and the Prior of 
Carlisle were required to contribute 20 each. The lordship of Egremont 
was required to send 160, the commissioner being the lord Thomas de 
Multon himself 80 . In spite of the careful allocations of these quotas 
the results may have been disappointing and two days later a renewed 
81 
commission was issued to Hugh de Louther to punish deserters In 
March a revised commission was issued for a total of 900 foot from 
82 Cumberland, 300 from Westmorland and 300 from Tynedale This time 
fewer commissioners were appointed but they were generally of greater 
78 E.101.11/15, m30 
79 ibid; Lib Quat, 266, 261 
80 CPR 1301-1307, 498 
81 ibid, 500 
82 ibid, 5081 509 
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status. The four commissioners for Gilsland were replaced by one 
John de Castre, lord of part of Gilsland in right of his wife Matilda 
de Multon. Other commissioners included long-serving local soldiers 
such as Richard le Brun. Cockermouth and Egremont were placed under 
the administration of Richard de Cleator, a retainer of Thomas de 
Multon. It is hard to assess the effectiveness of this commission 
and even to discover how many of the troops summoned actually mustered. 
Though accounts survive for wages paid to infantry and cavalry by James 
Dalilegh at Carlisle for actions against Bruce in 1307, most notably 
one account printed by Joseph Bain 83 , it is impossible to trace the 
Cumbrian men. The Tynedale contingent mustered at the same time as 
they were summoned showed itself to be an outstandingly reliable unit, 
saving always the possibility that its pay returns were fraudulent. 
The 300 Tynedale archers summoned served from 10 April for 24 days 
without suffering any losses either from desertion or from enemy action. 
Once again it is pertinent to recall the force of Tynedale archers 
which Bek had recruited to carry on his feud with the Prior and 
Convent. If the men who served under Moubray did not include any of 
the members of Bek's force, it is clear nonetheless that the crown was 
drawing on the same source of military manpower as had the bishop. 
The foray into Glen Trool on which the Tynedale men served accomplished 
very little even though i.t was supported by a strong force of cavalry 
including a sizeable contingent from Cumbria led by Clifford and John 
de Hudlestone. Like the raids organised in the region since 1297 it 
had limited value strategically but it did demonstrate the ability of 
the Cumbrian lords to put their followers in the field. The war effort 
in the West in a large part depended on this ability. On this occasion 
83 Bain, CDS, v2, no 1923 
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the borderers made a larger contribution than they had at any time 
previously, partly perhaps because there was, by this time, no doubt 
that the crown would pay war wages where required and partly perhaps 
because local opinion was genuinely outraged by the murder of John 
Comyn and Bruce's renewed rebellion. Robert de Clifford led a large 
retinue predictably based on his fee'd retainers and other experienced 
soldiers from the region. Thomas and John de Mounteney both served as 
did the brothers Robert and Nicholas de Leyburn, who had previously 
served under Henry de Lacy. Others in Clifford's contingent included 
Walter de Stirkland, John de Wigton, Robert L'Engleys and John de 
84 
Castre Multon of Egremont's force was also based on his liveried 
retainers and there was an understandable cohesion in this group recruited 
from the gentry of south-west Cumberland. The force was not confined 
to veterans, however. Among the new recruits to Edward I's force was a 
small contingent from the Lucy family. Another new campaigner was 
Thomas de Multon of Gilsland who served under Henry de Percy. William 
85 de Dacre served under the Earl of Lancaster 
Despite the defeat Bruce inflicted on the English force at Glen Trool, 
the propects for English success in the war seemed good in 1307. The 
magnates and gentry of the West March served in 1307 in unprecedented 
numbers and among their numbers was an experienced leavening of knights 
such. as John de Wigton and Ri.chard le Brun. Perhaps even more important 
in an age which valued individual prowess and leadership above all else, 
in Robert Clifford 1Edward II enjoyed the support of the West March of a 
magnate of proven military ability and powers of leadership and with 
84 C.67/l6 
85 ibid 
86 
whom he was personally on close terms 
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Organisationally too, the 
war effort was well into its stride and the policy of recruiting foot 
along the boundaries of local liberties was an experiment which might 
well have repaid perseverance. The history of the West March during 
the reign of Edward II, however, is the history of how this store of 
advantages was dissipated uselessly and it saw a developing absence of 
royal and local leadership become a full scale crisis brought about by 
a rebellion against Edward's rule. 
86 Clifford had previously served Edward as an emissary to his 
father during a disagreement. H Johnstone - Edward of 
Caernarvon (Manchester 1946), 101 
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Robert de Clifford was predictably among those who accompanied Edward I 
on his last campaign against the Scots in 1307. Clifford also knew 
the young king well, though he was ten years his junior. He had 
campaigned with him in 1301 and had also served as a go-between during 
one of the disputes that had taken place between the Prince and the 
. l K1ng This, the active role Clifford had taken in Edward I's campaigns 
and the old king's high regard for Clifford, probably ensured him a 
prominent place among those who did homage to the new Edward II on 
20 July 1307. Clifford served under Edward II in his first campaign 
..., 
against the Scots shortly afterwards ~ The former good relations 
which had prevailed between Clifford and the king continued and Clifford 
seems to have enjoyed close contact with the king as the English forces 
progressed into Scotland. At Sanquhar on 18 August, Edward confirmed 
him in the office of Justice of the Forest North of Trent, an office 
Edward I had granted to him 3 • Two days later he was appointed to hold 
4 
custody of the important royal castle of Nottingham 
The campaign itself, which resembled in many ways those of 1300 
and 1301, was, on balance, inconclusive. On the positive side many 
Scots. did attend at Dumfri.es to affirm their loyalty to Edward II, but 
on the debit side it failed to achieve its principal aim of bringing 
5 Bruce into captivity While it is true that the campaign achieved 
relatively little its failure has probably been exaggerated and there 
must be some doubt as to whether the retreat after the campaign was 
l N Denholm-Yaung- History and Heraldry (Oxford 1965), 116 
2 Lanercost, 209; Bain, CDS, v2, no 1961 
3 CFR 1307-19, 2 
4 ibid 
5 Lanercost, 209 
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6 
really as unpopular as has been suggested It is possible, though 
by no means certain, that Pembroke was irritated by John de Brittany's 
reinstatement as Warden of Scotland, but if an opposition group 
developed at this time, Clifford like ot.her landholders in Scotland 
such as Pembroke and Bohun who held by the gift of Edward I, did not 
7 join it The day after Edward returned to England, Clifford was 
8 
appointed as Marshal In view of the impending coronation and the 
attending ceremonies this appointment can only be interpreted as a 
sign of the king's complete confidence in him. It seems improbable 
too that Clifford would have taken up the office had he entertained 
serious opposition to Gaveston 1 s presence in the royal household at 
this time. Other evidence confirms this. In November 1307 at Langley 
Clifford was among those who witnessed a surrender of land to the king 
and among the other witnesses were Gaveston, Roger de Mortimer, Payn 
9 Tibtot and William Inge Though there is no certainty that all the 
witnesses were physically present when the surrender was made, it is 
improbable that they should have agreed to vouch for the transaction 
in the company of Gaveston if his presence was wholly objectionable to 
them. 
Clifford's acquiescence in Gaveston's presence at court and more notably 
to his elevation to the Earldom of Cornwall stands at odds with the 
account given by the Brut that at Edward I's deathbed Clifford, Pembroke, 
Lincoln and Warwick pledged that they would not allow Gaveston to 
10 
return to England Two possible reasons can account for this 
6 Maddicott - Lancaster, 72 
7 Barrow - Bruce, 220; Bain, CDS, v2, no 12 
8 CPR 1307-13, 6 
9 CPR 1307-13, 46 
10 FWD Brie- The Brut (Early English Text Society 1904-6), vl, 202 
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discrepancy. The first is simply that the three earls and Clifford 
gave their pledge to Edward I and reneged on it after his death. Had 
this been so, it might have been expected that some reference to this 
perjury would have been recorded in one of the contemporary chronicles, 
such as the Vita. The Vita, however, records that it was the Earl of 
Lincoln who advised the king that he was within his rights to grant 
the earldom of Cornwall to Gaveston, since the grant was made in 
Scotland while Clifford was on campaign and it is probable that he too 
witnessed the grant. No suggestion appears that either man had acted 
dishonourably, though honour was a matter which the author considered 
11 
at length elsewhere • As a result of this there seems to be a high 
probability that the melodramatic scene in which the magnates clustered 
around Edward's deathbed to hear his last injunctions was an invention 
by the writer of The Brut, probably intended to justify Gaveston's 
later murder by Thomas of Lancaster by demonstrating that only 
12 Lancaster had been true to the spirit of opposition to Gaveston 
Though Edward enjoyed the support of Lincoln and Clifford even after 
the recall of Gaveston, this rapidly waned. Since both magnates had 
taken part in the inconclusive campaign of the late summer of 1307 they 
could not reasonably have blamed the king alone for its failure, even 
though the military situation in Scotland had deteriorated substantially 
in the last months of 1307, something of which Clifford must have been 
specially conscious. It seems likely that the cause of the breach was 
Gaveston. Clifford broke with the court between the end of November 
1307 and the end of January 1308 13 On 31 January 1308 Clifford was 
11 ~' 3; Rymer- Foedera (Record Commission 1814), v3, 2. 
Lists only witnesses of comital rank. 
12 See also J R Bray - 'Concepts of Sainthood in Fourteenth Century 
England'; Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library, vl4 (1984)tl~~ 
13 History and Heraldry, 128; Maddicott - Lancaster, 117 
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among Anthony Bek, Warenne, Pembroke, Hereford and others who issued 
letters patent from Boulogne affirming their loyalty to the king and 
14 
their determination to preserve the honour of the crown The 
Boulogne agreement represented the first organised opposition to 
Gaveston, though it was opposition of a most restrained and loyal kind. 
As a warning to Edward II, however, it proved to be ineffective. Any 
efforts Clifford made to limit Gaveston's role at the coronation were 
equally insubstantial since he was allowed to carry the crown at the 
ceremony 15 As a peer of the realm it is hard to see on what ground 
Gaveston could have been excluded from the ceremony, but it is clear 
16 
that Gaveston's behaviour and bearing provoked widespread hostility 
Clifford fell from favour with the king during March 1308 and was 
replaced as Marshal by the Lancastrian retainer Nicholas de Segrave 
while custody of Nottingham castle was also withdrawn from him 17 . It 
is probable that these actions were intended by the king to punish 
Clifford for his part in the Boulogne Indenture but Clifford was by no 
means alone in opposing Edward's continuing support of Piers Gaveston. 
Almost the whole of the baronage ranged itself against the favourite. 
For Clifford the experience was, as it was for the Earl of Lincoln, a 
novel one after many years of loyal service to Edward I. After Gaveston's 
banishment Clifford was ready to be reconciled with the king and he was 
certainly among the first of those whom the king was described as trying 
18 to win over to his caus.e with gifts, promises and blandishments 
14 Phillips - Aymer, Appendix 4 
15 CCR 1307-12, 53 
16 Lanercost, 210 
17 CPR 1307-13, 52; Maddicott - Lancaster; 117 
18 ibid, 80 
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Gilbert de Clare, whose standing as Gaveston's brother-in-law, restrained 
him from active opposition to him and seems to have served as an 
intermediary between the king and Clifford. 19 • It was at the Earl of 
Gloucester's instance, for example, that a licence was granted to the 
household knight, John de Cromwell, to enfeoff Clifford with the Leyburn 
moiety of Westmorland in return for the grant of lands Clifford held in 
20 
Derbyshire and Wiltshire Clare was particularly well placed to 
mediate with Clifford since Clifford had married his sister Maud. It 
was probably a further sign of reconciliation between Clifford and the 
king when Clifford was appointed as captain of the men at arms in 
21 Scotland in August 1308 
Clifford was probably the best commander available to Edward II for 
this post.at this time, but even so he achieved very little there. In 
part this was not his fault. The provision of supplies for the English 
garrisons provided one major diffi.culty. A more serious problem still 
was the continuing dispute over the future of Gaveston which place an 
effective paralysi.s on any sustained resistance to the Scots' gains. 
Internal politics continued to enjoy a higher priority than the conduct 
of the war and this was probably the incentive behind a truce which was 
')') 
agreed with tl1e Scots in the early part of 1309 ~~ Local opinion held 
that the Scots were guilty of numerous breaches of the truce and were 
using its provisions for their own ends but the English desire for the 
truce constrained them to pass over such violations. As the English 
commander at the time, Clifford was directly associated with the decision 
to make a truce and the fact appears to be that he, like the other 
19 Vita, 6 
20 CPR 1307-13, 134, 144 
21 ibid, 92 
22 Lanercost, 214 
Page 272 
magnates, gave a higher value to attacking Gaveston than to the 
prosecution of the war. This may have been partly because Gaveston 
showed signs of emerging as a rival for Clifford's territorial schemes 
in the north of England. In June 1308 Gaveston had been granted 
custody of Cockermouth along with the rest of the former holdings of 
the Forz family 23 The lands were granted ostensibly for the use of 
Gaveston's family and were more than counterbalanced by Clifford's own 
gains in Westmorland but with Gaveston's return from exile imminently 
expected Clifford may well have seen in him a formidable potential 
rival for the leadership of the local gentry. 
Whatever the reason, it is clear that Clifford moved into opposition 
to the king shortly afterwards. In March 1309 he was among those who 
attended a tournament held at Dunstable at which it seems almost 
certain that plans were laid for the Parliament held in the following 
24 
month. . The Duns.table tournament was the first occasion on which it 
is possible to see Robert de Clifford's retinue mustered for political 
rather than military purposes and a surprising feature of those who 
attended in Clifford's train is how few of them had any clear links 
with Westmorland. Equally Clifford's retinue was by no means co-
incident with hi.s war retinue. Most surprising of all is that the 
Mounteney brothers, Thomas de Helbeck and John de Penrith, all known 
life retainers of Clifford were absent from his force at Dunstable. 
In all Clifford's contingent at Dunstable seems likely to have numbered 
25 
ten men . Thomas de Sheffield and William de Bayeux served in 
Clifford's force in Scotland in 1311, and may as a result be presumed 
23 C.Chart.R, v2, 111 
24 Maddicott - Lancaster, 95-102 
25 Collectanea Topographial. et Genealogica, v4 (1837), 65; J E Morris 
- 'Military Levies from Cumberland and Westmorland in the reigns 
of Edward I and Edward II'; Trans of C&W II, v3 (1903), 312 
26 
to have a long term connection with him 
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John de Castre is easier 
to associate with Clifford with whom he had served in 1306. Only one 
man of Clifford's retinue can be even tentatively linked with Clifford's 
lands in Westmorland, Andrew de Harclay. rt is not wholly beyond 
doubt, .though probabl~, that Harclay was a member of Clifford's retinue. 
His name appears as the forty-sixth on the list of those who attended 
the tournament while Clifford appears one place below, preceding the 
27 
rest of his followers as appears to have been customary . On this 
basis the place which Harclay's name occupies would suggest that he was 
a member of the Earl of Warwick's retinue, but no evidence exists which 
would support such a link between Harclay and Beauchamp, and it appears 
on balance more probable that an error placed him before Clifford 
rather than after him. Though Harclay had served in 1304 in the garrison 
of Stirling under John de Cromwell, then lord of Brough and Mallerstang 
in ri.ght of his wife, it is highly significant to find him apparently 
in the retinue of Clifford at a meeting opposing the king, for previously 
he might have been presumed to adhere to John de Cromwell's staunchly 
royalist alignment. There w.ere, however, probably good reasons why 
Harclay should have aligned himself with Clifford at this .time. In the 
previous year Cromwell had exchanged his share of Westmorland, in which 
the Harclay lands were situated, with Clifford so that Harclay now held 
28 
of Clifford Cli.fford appears to have embarked on the same type of 
assertive measures to bui.ld up local influence in his new acquisitions 
as his father had done in the rest of Westmorland. For example, he 
rapidly developed the fortifications of Brough Castle and he may well 
have placed pressure on the Harclay clan and other local gentry to accept 
26 Morris- 'Military Levies', 312 
27 C.67/16 
28 See above 
29 
his leadership 
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The opposition to Gaveston voiced during the Parliament of Stamford was 
successful only in part. It was agreed that Gaveston should be allowed 
to return from exile but should be allowed only a life interest in the 
Earldom of Cornwall and should relinquish his tenure of the Forz 
. h 30 1.n eri tance . In return for these concessions a twentieth and fif-
teenth was allowed to the king and the concessions made were codified 
in the Statute of Stamford. The autumn and winter of 1309 witnessed a 
continuing deterioration of relations between Edward and the dissident 
magnates who fell increasingly under the leadership of Thomas of 
31 Lancaster . The situation in the north deteriorated just as recognis-
ably. The truce which had been agreed earlier in the year was due to 
expire at the beginning of Novemb.er but no effective policy was formulated 
to deal with this contingency and the most that was attempted was to 
order landholders in the north to return to their lands to defend the 
32 
region against any Scots attack • Clifford and Hereford were sent 
north to take command in the. west while Henry de Beaumont was given 
charge in the east at Berwi.ck. Neither command made any effective 
contribution to the war effort and negotiations were opened for a renewed 
truce which after a conference with the king Clifford caused to be 
33 
extended to last unti.l the following spring 
Clifford's willingness to serve Edward in the north was, in part, 
probably motivated by the increasing danger to his own estates which 
Bruce's rebellion presented but it had a political significance as well. 
29 W D Simpson -Brough Castle (H.M.S.O. 1982), 3 
30 J H Ramsay - The Genesi.s of Lancaster (Oxford 1913), vl, 23; 
CCR 1307-13, 225 
31 Maddicott - Lancaster, 109-110 
32 RS, vl, 77 
33 ~' 7; Lanercost, 214; Guisborough, 384 
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It marked the fact that Clifford had again distanced himself from the 
hard line opposition group led by Lincoln and the Earl of Lancaster. 
During late 1309 and early 1310 Edward seems again to have deliberately 
cultivated Clifford. A number of reasons can be suggested why he should 
have done this. The first was Clifford's importance in the West March 
and in any plans to defend the north of England as a whole. Secondly 
Clifford's previous record may well have marked him out as a potential 
supporter. He also had close connections with the court through his 
marriage to Maud de Clare while his aunt, Idonea de Leyburn, was the 
wife of John de Cromwell, himself among Edward's closer associates. 
The first signs that Edward was trying to win Clifford over can be 
found in a number of small acts of patronage in the autumn of 1309. On 
24 October Clifford was granted power to alienate land held in chief 
34 
to John de Penrith In the following February Clifford was granted 
a messuage of land near St. Botolph's church in London which had 
35 formerly been held by John de Brittany He was also granted a sum of 
36 
money from the issue of customsshortly afterwards 
In March 1310 Clifford stood poised to take possession of a much larger 
and more important grant, life tenure of the honour of Skipton, with 
hereditary rights in half of the lordship, by a grant attested under 
37 
the Privy Seal . The following day, 17 March, Clifford was among 
those who sealed letters patent ratifying the election of the Lords 
Ordainer who were to have power until Michaelmas 1311 but it is clear 
that this did not signify a breach with the court. Clifford has often 
been regarded as one of the most royalist of the Lords Ordainer who 
34 CPR 1307-13, 195 
35 ibid, 224 
36 ibid, 211 
37 ibid, 220 
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were elected in March 1310 but there is some doubt as to whether 
d . h' . 38 Clifford was, in fact, an or a1ner at t lS t1me His name is 
absent from the list of Ordainers contained in the Canon of Bridlington's 
account of the period and that printed in Palgrave's Parliamentary Writs 
but it is contained in the list found in the Muniments of London and 
the Annales Londoniensis. In the Bridlington account and the list in 
Parliamentary Writs Clifford's place is taken by Robert FitzRoger of 
1 . 39 C aver1ng This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that the 
list of Ordainers contained in the Annales describes those who actually 
served rather than those who were originally appointed as the first two 
lists do. It seems probable in fact that Clifford was not among those 
selected originally as an Ordainer but that he replaced Robert FitzRoger 
after the latter died during April 1310 40 . Clifford's replacement 
of FitzRoger was a useful bonus to the king since, despite earlier 
disputes, Clifford was much more likely to prove sympathetic to Edward 
than was FitzRoger who had taken part in Bigod and Bohun's opposition 
41 
to Edward I in 1297 The value Edward placed on Clifford's support 
was demonstrated by a grant to him converting his tenure of Skipton to 
full hereditary tenure, which Clifford obtained in return for a parcel 
42 
of land in Monmouth 
Clifford's association with the court was further demonstrated by his 
participation in the offensive mounted against the Scots in the summer 
38 J C Davies- The Baronial Opposition to Edward II (Cambridge 1918), 
361 
39 Bridlington, 37; Parl Writs, v2, 26, 27; Munimenta Gildhallae 
Londoniensis ed. H T Riley (Rolls Series 1860), v2, 203; 
Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II, ed. W Stubbs 
(Rolls Series 1883), vl, 172 
40 CIPM, v4, no 219 
41 M C Prestwich - The Three Edwards (1980) , 84 
42 CPR 1307-13, 273 
Page 277 
of l3Lo. The campaign was boycotted by the 'radical' element among the 
Earls leaving only Warenne and Gloucester as representatives of the 
higher nobility and this may have further enhanced Clifford's importance. 
He appears to have served as a senior commander and eight bannerets were 
placed under his command. They included a number of important northern 
lords, Thomas de Multon of Egremont, Thomas de Multon of Gilsland and 
Henry FitzHugh, another important local magnate who was a tenant of 
f k . 43 Cliffords on the honour o S ~pton The other members of the force 
were drawn heavily from the March of Scotland and from Clifford's 
retinue. Two, William de Ry and William de Bayeux, had accompanied 
Clifford to the Dunstable tournament, as had one of the bannerets, John 
de Castre. In contrast with Dunstable, Clifford's known life retainers 
were strongly in evidence. Both Thomas and John de Mounteney served, 
as did John de Penrith and Richard de Musgrave who was described as 
44 Clifford's 'yeoman' There were other local men, for example, 
Walter de Stirkland and John L'Engleys but men from north Cumberland 
also served, including the stalwart John de Wigton and Richard de 
45 Kirkbridge whose experience dated back to Caerlaverock and beyond 
Tw.o of Henry de Lacy's retainers also served under Clifford, the 
brothers Robert and Nicholas de Leyburn. It is uncertain whether this 
represented any form of political re-alignment by the Leyburn brothers. 
Both. were professional soldiers and since Lincoln was appointed as 
Governar of the Realm they may have simply enlisted with Clifford in 
order to take part in the campaign rather than as a sign of discontent 
with Lincoln's leadership. A similar difficulty exists in the case of 
Andrew de Barclay who, according to J. E. Morris, served under John de 
43 Maddicott - Lancaster, 113; RS, vl, 104; CPR 1307-13 1 279 
44 Cal.Chancery Warrants, vl, 351 
45 Roll of Caerlaverock, 31 
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46 
Cromwell on this campaign Harclay served under Cromwell in the past 
and it is significant that like Clifford he had moved away from his 
earlier opposition to the king, though it seems probable that like the 
Leyburns Harclay was a professional soldier who was prepared to enlist 
under any commander for the term of a campaign. In the following winter 
47 
he and John de Harclay served in Scotland under John de Segrave 
If it is hard to discern clearly the political alignment of a relatively 
unimportant northern knight at this time, the same is not true of a very 
substantial part of the English baronage which remained deeply suspicious 
of Edward II. It was this hostility which led Edward II to establish his 
48 headquarters in Berwick The choice of Berwick was a reflection of 
Edward's pre-occupation during this period. Firstly it was the natural 
base for operations against the Scots, a concern which exercised Edward 
more than has been generally recognised. Secondly the city provided a 
poss.ible refuge for Gaveston. Edward's concern for Gaveston, it need 
hardly be noted, provoked nothing but the greatest hostility on the part 
of the English baronage and this dis-satisfaction materially influenced 
the conduct of the war against the Scots. It is clear, however, that 
Edward saw in the northern magnates a possible source of support, both 
for the conduct of the war and, conceivably also on Gaveston's behalf 
and this may have added to the attractiveness of Berwick. The northerners 
were certainly more willing, for easily comprehensible reasons, than many 
of their peers to serve against the Scots. Robert de Clifford took the 
lead and kept his retinue on the March throughout the winter of 1311. 
In April 1311 he again took charge of Scotland, south of the Forth 49 
46 Morris- 'Military Levies', 313 and note. I have been unable to 
find the reference Morris cited from Parl Writs. 
47 Bain, CDS, v3, nos 170, 175 
48 Lanercost, 215 
49 Cal Chancery Warrants, vl, 314; RS, vl, 97 
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Deprived of support from other quarters it was to the northern lords 
that Edward turned for support for the projected offensive of the summer 
of 1311. Northern magnates including Ralph FitzWilliam of Greystoke, 
Henry FitzHugh, John de Castre, Clifford, Robert de Nevill and Multon 
of Egremont were asked to bring as large a force as they could raise to 
serve agains t th h k ' I 50 e Scots at t e ~ng s wages Clifford at least 
raised a substantial force centered round his retainers, Thomas de 
Helbeck, John de Penrith, Richard de Musgrave, Thomas de Sheffield and 
featuring a number of other men from Clifford's holdings in Westmorland51 . 
There is some evidence that Edward attempted to establish Gaveston as a 
major landholder in the north of England during this period. Gaveston 
held Cockermouth briefly from 1308 to 1309 but was forced to relinquish 
it. Edward tried again in 1310-1311. The first grant was a relatively 
small one, the town and manor of Penri.th which was granted to Gaveston 
in December 1310 52 • In May 1311 a larger grant of the lordship of 
Tynedale followed. Closely adjacent to Penrith, Tynedale had been worth 
at least £300 in time of peace and perhaps just as significantly was the 
recruiting ground for an easily and rapidly mobilised private army of 
53 
archers • Other grants to Gaveston in the early months of 1312 
included custody of the lands belonging to John Wake. He was also 
appointed as Justice of the Forest, north of Trent, and assigned a sum 
of money payable from the Berwick customs 54 The result was that by 
that by the spring of 1312 the favourite had become a substantial land-
50 RS, vl, 104-106 
51 Morris - 'Military Levies', 314 
52 CPR 1307-19, 76 
53 C.Chart.R, v2, 181 
54 CPR 1307-13, 450; Maddi.cott - Lancaster, 122 
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holder in the north of England, though it is also accurate to record that 
Edward's grants were often dictated by little more than the availability 
of suitable lands and offices. It may have made good sense, however, for 
Edward to build up Gaveston's holdings in the north since as the campaign 
of 1311 illustrated, this was an area from which he could more confidently 
expect support than from south of the Tr~nt. 
Edward's hopes for support from the northern nobility were not wholly 
well placed however, and his support dwindled rapidly during 1311. One 
of the earliest to withdraw his backing was Thomas de Multon, lord of 
Egremont. Multon had taken part in the campaigns of 1310 and 1311 but 
like the Earl of Lancaster he resisted Edward's later attempt to raise 
one foot soldier from each vi.ll 55 • Multon's opposition to Edward's 
poli.cy may well have been a result of new links with Lancaster which 
developed after LancasterLs succession to the lands formerly held by 
Henry Lacy of Lincoln, since as well as Egremont, Multon held important 
estates in the east Midlands where Lacy's lands and influence passed to 
Lancaster. Multon may also have had other links with Lincoln and he had 
served in his division at Caerlaverock 56 • Adam de Hudlestone, one of 
Multon's most important tenants in Egremont, held lands in Lancashire 
of Lincoln and he is known to have entered Lancaster's allegiance at 
57 this time Edward suffered two more important desertions. The first 
was Henry Percy who seems to have begun to distance himself from the 
court after the first issue of the Ordinances in 1310. Clifford also 
seems to have moved away from Edward's party, though more gradually. 
Clifford was still in a degree of favour with Edward in the late spring 
55 RS, vl, 99 
56 Maddicott - Lancaster, 10; Roll of Caerlaverock,34 
57 Maddicott - Lancaster, 54-5, 61 
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of 1311. In May the sheriffs of Westmorland and Yorkshire were ordered 
permit him to take a reasonable aid from his men on the marriage of his 
58 
eldest daughter Idonea to the younger Henry Percy . He also appears 
likely to have been among those who moved south with the court and a 
substantial part of his retinue probably accompanied him. For example, 
an agreement made in London in September was witness by Clifford and 
Thomas de Mounteney. This clearly weakened the defences of the West 
59 
March . The day before Edward reached London Bruce seized his chance 
and his men mounted a raid across the Solway burning Gilsland and much 
60 
of Tynedale Shortly afterwards a renewed raid through Redesdale and 
Tynedale caused greater material damage and much greater loss of life. 
Though Warden of the Marches had been appointed earlier in the year, 
deprived of the backing and leadership of the regional magnates, 
especially perhaps that of Clifford, they were able to accomplish very 
little for the defence of the March, a fact of which the Scots commanders 
were well aware and which they had taken into account in their planning. 
The captains appointed on the English side, in fact, simply destroyed 
any goods that they could find to prevent them being of use to the 
61 Scots 
If Clifford was informed of developments in the north, nevertheless, he 
continued to give precedence to internal politics. There are signs, 
however, that he did re-align himself. It is possible that the problems 
of the border counties played some part in this process though it is 
difficult to see by what criterion Edward had behaved less responsibly 
than Clifford and the rest of the Northern nobles. It could at least 
be argued that the border had enjoyed a period of relative security 
58 CCR 1307-13, 386 
59 ibid, 436 
60 Lanercost, 216 
61 ibid 
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while Edward had been established at Berwick for only after he had moved 
south had the Scots raids been renewed. On the whole it seems more 
plausible to suggest that Cliffor's re-alignment was the result of grow-
ing links between himself and the leaders of the opposition party though 
it is also possible, considering Clifford's later determination to 
capture Gaveston, that some bitter quarrel emerged between Clifford and 
the favourite. Whether or not this was the case, the leaders of the 
opposition played on Clifford's interests to allow him to support them 
without jeopardising his own interests. Initially, the grant of the 
estate of Skipton in Craven was exempted from the policy of resumption · 
which was ordained to cover the other grants made by Edward, but even 
when this order was superseded Cliffords interests were protected. When 
Skipton was ordered to be taken into the king's hands the order was 
quietly ignored and then the lordship was regranted to Clifford with 
such speed that it is doubtful if he at any time actually relinquished 
it 62 . His territorial ambitions secured, Clifford was free to break 
with the court completely. It is clear that he had done so by December 
1311, for when Edward and his closest advisers left London for Windsor, 
Clifford stayed behind. In London he seems to have played an increasing 
role in the attempts of the Ordainers to operate their administration in 
competition with Edward's own. On December 19, for example, Clifford 
was, together with Bishop Gifford of Worcester, the initiator of a grant 
of 1000 marks to Robert de Holland, Lancaster's trusted retainer in 
recompense for the loss he had suffered when the Office of Justice of 
63 Chester had been granted to Payn Tibetot 
Clifford was probably also closely involved in the disputed and confusing 
62 Davies - Baronial Opposition, 382: CPR 1307-13, 395, 408; 
CCR 1307__:13, 386 
63 CPR 1307-13, 411 
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issue of the custody of Carlisle castle which began in autumn 1311 and 
continued to be a problem until spring 1312. During this time the 
castle was entrusted to a series of different custodians, at least 
nominally, and this episode has been described as demonstrating the 
weakness of Edward II in operating the system of patronage at this 
. 64 tlme . The dating and location of the various grants makes it 
possible to expand on this interpretation, however. Carlisle castle 
had been entrusted to John de Castre, who had become a household knight 
65 in December 1309 . uespite the fact that de Castre had been admitted 
to the royal household, by the autumn of 1311 it is clear that he was 
no longer in the confidence of Edward, probably because of his earlier 
links with Clifford. On 12 October Edward and his court left London 
for Windsor, on 15 October an order was issued from Windsor, clearly by 
Edward and his circle, appointing Andrew de Harclay as custodian of 
66 Carlisle castle Harclay was not, however, able to gain custody of 
the castle. It seems to have remained in the possession of de Castre 
and to make certain of this an order was issued, tested at London, 
therefore by the Ordainers including Clifford, instructing Harclay to 
67 deliver the castle to de Castre The following month Edward II made 
a new attempt to instal Harclay in Carlisle though the order that was 
issued is misleading and was probably intended to be so. The order 
recited that the castle of Carlisle had been entrusted to Harclay at 
Michaelmas last but the king in ignorance of a former commitment had 
committed the same to John de Castre and wished the order of council to 
64 M C Prestwich - 'English Castles in the Reign of Edward II', 
Journal of Mediaeval History, v8 (1982), 161 
65 CFR 1307-19, 60, British Library, M SCotton Nero, C.8, f91 
66 Maddicott- Lancaster, 117; CFR 1307-19, 78 
67 CPR 1307-13, 450 
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68 be observed . The reference to an order made by the council may have 
been intended to imply that this new grant to Harclay had been made with 
the assent of the Ordainers when in fact the instruction had originated 
solely with Edward's entourage. This becomes clear beyond doubt when 
the last of Edward's attempts to install Harclay in Carlisle is 
considered. On April 1 Edward again granted Carlisle to Harclay's 
custody after first assigning it to John de Weston and then to Piers 
Gaveston. The order, issued from York, rehearsed that the castle had 
in ignorance been granted to John de Castre and also recorded that the 
date when the castle had been granted to Harclay 'by order of the 
council' namely October 15 1311, the date on which Harclay had first 
b . d f . . d 69 een glven custo y o lt at Wln sor . It becomes reasonable to 
believe, as a result, that the 'ignorance' professed by the royal 
mandates was in fact an attempt to disguise the fact that there were, 
in effect, two rival governments attempting to control military 
appointments on the West March. The court's anxiety to see Harclay 
established in custody of Carlisle sheds some light on his political 
alignments during the early part of his career. It is clear from the 
persistence with which Edward and his advisers tried to establish him 
in Carlisle that by the spring of 1312 he was a trusted agent of the 
70 
court rather than being a Lancastrian supporter as Tout suggested . 
This deepens the mystery of why he had attended the Dunstable tournament, 
probably in Clifford's retinue but there is little reason to doubt his 
allegiance from the winter of 1311 onwards. In the spring of 1312 he 
succeeded in gaining control of Carlisle from de Castre and his 
favourable standing was further illustrated by other grants in his favour. 
68 ibid 
69 S:..~1_l_07-~9, 128, !29; CPR 1307-13, 450 
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In April 1312 Harclay was granted the farm of the forest of Mallerstang 
which had been taken into the king's hands after being acquired without 
royal licence though it was held in chief, a grant which probably 
enhanced Harclay's position at the expense of Clifford 71 . In July 1312 
John de Harclay also benefitted. He was granted the forestership of 
Inglewood which had been forfeited by Thomas de Multon of Gilsland for 
72 
an alleged trespass 
If Andrew and John de Harclay emerged as reliable royalist supporters 
during 1311 and 1312 they did so in the face of local opinion which 
followed Clifford and which was broadly turning against Edward, and 
more severely against Gaveston. Edward's intentions were viewed with 
the deepest suspicion in the north and it was even rumoured that he 
proposed to enlist the aid of Bruce and the Ordainers were forced to 
despatch Clifford and Percy to the north to cut Edward off from this 
73 potential source of support Clifford had probably changed his 
alignment more radically than any of the other leaders of the opposition 
to Edward II and though he remained as one of the 'moderate' wing of the 
opposition it is clear that he was now irreconcibably hostile to 
Gaveston. He was among those who pursued Gaveston together with the 
Earl of Lancaster and they almost succeeded in capturing him at 
Newcastle. It is clear from the pardons later issued to Clifford's 
supporters that he was able to call upon the support of much of the 
local gentry for this purpose. Clifford's men certainly included Hugh 
de Louther, Robert de Askeby, John L'Engleys, Richard de Musgrave, 
71 List of Sheriffs: CFR 1307-19, 130; Contrast Morris 'Military 
Levies', Trans of C&W II, v3 (1903), 316 
72 CPR 1307-13, 482 
73 Vita, 22; Chronicles of Edward I and Edward II, v2, 204 
(Annales LondQniensis) 
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Thomas de Sheffield, Thomas and John de Mounteney, John de Penrith, 
n 
John de Rosgill and Nicholas de Vipont, all of whom are know~to have 
74 
served with Clifford previously Other Cumbrian men, such as 
Michael and John de Harrington and John and Adam de Hudlestone and 
William and Ranulph de Dacre may have been enlisted into the opposition 
75 
to Gaveston through the influence of Thomas of Lancaster . Still 
others, notably the Leyburn brothers, Nicholas and Robert, and James 
de Torthorald, a Scot, are harder to place but all were recognisable 
as having long experience in campaigns against the Scots and they may 
very likely have had some degree of connection with Clifford. 
The fact that the force Robert de Clifford had deployed in the pursuit 
of Gaveston was essentially the same force on which the defence of the 
borders depended, was not missed by Bruce. As Clifford and his men 
progressed warily south after Gaveston's death, Bruce again used his 
excellent intelligence work to mount renewed threats to the English 
borders with the result that he was able to collect large sums of 
76 protection money Again Bruce's timing was superb and was effectively 
used since, while the English magnates tried to reach a settlement of 
the Gaveston affair with Edward II, Bruce raided the northerncounties 
again. Once more he met with little opposition. If Clifford had acted 
irresponsibly in deserting the border to play his part in the disputes 
with the king, Harclay, the appointed defender of Carlisle did nothing 
more valuable. In fact he is known to have been with the court at 
Stamford, Lincolnshire, on the 24 July when, in the company of John de 
77 Cromwell and other curialists, he witnessed an agreement 
74 CPR 1313-17. 21-26 
75 Maddicott - Lancaster, passim 
76 Ua?ercost, 220 
77 CCR 1307-13, 540 
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Andrew and his brother John remained high in the king's trust, however. 
Shortly before John de Harclay had been appointed to collect money ·for 
78 
the king's use from Inglewood forest Like Clifford, it is clear 
that Harclay was absent from the March for much of the summer of 1312. 
Clifford remained deeply involved in the negotiations for a reconcilia-
tion between the earls and the king, acting as a representative of the 
d . 'd 79 lssl ent magnates In default of effective leadership from Clifford, 
John de Halton emerged as the leading figure on the West March during 
this period and it was probably under his influence that the communities 
of the West March fell back on the strategy of paying protection money 
to the Scots. Cumberland as a whole, however, found difficulty in 
raising the sums the Scots demanded and had to give hostages for their 
future payment. Copeland, which probably raised its ransom separately 
79 from the rest of the county paid them 160 marks on this occasion 
Andrew de Harclay returned to the north late in 1312 and took charge of 
the defence of Carlisle. In spite of the truce which was due to remain 
in force until midsummer 1313 the castle remained strongly garrisoned 
80 
with a total of 33 men at arms, 12 hobelars and 18 archers In the 
expectation of further assaults timber was ordered to be taken to 
81 
repair the defences of the castle from Inglewood In an attempt to 
provide leadership for the region Bishop de Halton was excused attend-
ance at the Parliament planned for the spring of 1313, though Halton's 
previous achievements in defending the March left much to be desired 82 . 
The March still lacked the services of Clifford who continued to devote 
his energies to negotiating between Lancaster and the king and he spent 
78 ibid, 464 
79 Lanercost, 220; Chronicle of StMary's York, 53 
80 E.101.14/15, m4 
81 CCR 1307-13, 541 
82 Reg Halton, v2, 74-76 
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the winter of 1312-13 in the south of England. Partly as a result of 
this and partly as a result of Edward II's own neglect of the north, 
marked by his attendance at the knighting of three of Philip IV's sons 
which took him to France from May to July 1313 and further demonstrated 
by his advice to the borderers to simply defend themselves as best they 
could, the years 1313-14 witnessed the development of a very real crisis 
on the West March, a crisis which was exacerbated by a growing realisa-
83 
tion that the government was almost wholly indifferent to their plight 
There were two principal reasons for the development of the critical 
situation which afflicted the West March in 1313 and the years which 
followed. The first was the effective collapse of English military 
power in Scotland which left Bruce free to turn his attentions to south 
of the border. The second was the almost complete failure of the working 
relationship which generally existed between the crown and the nobility 
of the north and which effectively prevented the English borderers from 
defending themselves. A third cause of weakness developed hard on the 
heels of these two problems. Bruce's attacks happed to co-incide with 
a period of natural wastage among the ranks of the lords of the West 
March, a process which continued during the second decase of the century 
and which was exacerbated by the defeat inflicted on the English army at 
Bannockburn. In the extreme north of the county the Wake lands of Liddell 
were subject to a minority from 1300 to 1317. Another important local 
family, the Multons of Gilsland became extinct in the male line in 1313. 
Though neither the Wakes nor the Multons of Gilsland played a dominant 
role in the region the effect of their minorities was cumulative, 
particularly when added to the fact that the lordship of Cockermouth 
remained in the hands of royal custodians appointed either simply as 
83 Ramsay- Genesis of Lancaster, vl, 50, 51; Rymer - Foedera, v2 
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military commanders or in recompense for debts owed to them for war 
wages. 
During 1314 the disruption on the West March continued to deepen. This 
was despite the most important English initiative of the whole of 
Edward II's regin, the attempt to relieve Stirling. The signs for the 
campaign which was to lead to the defeat of Bannockburn were not wholly 
propitious, the Earls of Warwick and Lancaster refused to send more 
than the strict quotas in the servitium debitum 84 . Still more serious 
was the persistence of the extreme factional hostility which had 
occasioned the earl's reluctance to serve. Despite the absence of the 
Earls of Warwick and Lancaster, however, Edward was able to put in the 
field an extremely powerful force centered round a potentially formidable 
court coalition led by the Earl of Gloucester, Pembroke, Hereford, Hugh 
Despenser and Robert de Clifford 85 In the case of Clifford the 
forced reconciliation of the autumn of 1313 seems to have presaged a 
genuine reconciliation too. The explanation for this renewed royalist 
alignment was perhaps provided by the death of Gaveston for since 1307 
Clifford had been distinguished by his loyalty to the crown and had 
been forced into opposition only by his apparent hatred for Gaveston's 
overweening predominance. Gaveston's death removed this impediment and 
allowed Clifford to return to his preferred loyalties. He may also have 
felt impelled to return to a path of co-operation with the king in order 
to advance the war effort since the Scots attacks of 1312 and 1313 were 
threatening to bring the war into the heart of his own lands in 
Westmorland. 
84 Vita, 50; Lanercost, 225. M C Prestwich - 'Cavalry Service in 
the Fourteenth Century' in War and Goverment in the Middle Ages, 
ed J C Holt and J Gillingham (Oxford 1984), 148 note 
85 Vita, 50 
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Clifford was less successful in raising troops from the West March in 
1314 than he had been in previous years. This may have reflected a 
growing awareness of the Scots threat to Cumbria, demonstrated by their 
raid into the region in April 1314, necessitating greater preparedness 
on the home front. It may also have reflected growing disquiet over the 
fact that Clifford's neglect of the West March had been an important 
contributory factor to the success with which the Scots had organised 
their raids into Cumbria. Fewer of Clifford's contingent originated 
on the West March than previously. Only two, Richard de Hudlestone and 
William de Pennington, were recognisably from Cumberland and it may have 
been significant that both held land in the south-west of the county 
which had suffered least from the Scot's raids. Others in Clifford's 
retinue were recruited from Westmorland including Robert and Nicholas 
de Leyburn and Matthew de Redman. Thomas de Mounteney, one of 
86 Clifford's life retainers, also served 
There is no necessity to attempt another acco~~t of the campaign which 
led to Bannockburn. Clifford played a major, though on the whole 
inglorious, part in the battle itself before being killed on the second 
day of the conflict. Chivalrously, Bruce caused Clifford's body to be 
returned to England but such niceties did not disguise the fact that his 
death was a severe blow to the defences of northern England, nor the 
enormous advantages Bruce was able to take from the defeat he had 
87 inflicted on the English army Clifford may have been as guilty of 
neglecting the defence of the West March as his sovereign had been but 
he had still been the most effective and powerful leader of the local 
community of the Western border and his death broadened and deepened the 
difficulties which afflicted the West March. 
86 Morris- 'Military Levies'; Trans of C&W II, v3 (1903), 316 
87 Lanercost, 226 
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I 
The disturbed conditions which prevailed on the West March during the 
reign of Edward II provided unprecedented opportunities for political 
and territorial advancement. Members of families of the second rank of 
local importance were able to break through into the ranks of the magnate 
class. Ranulph de Dacre provided the most successful example of this 
phenomenon, but Dacre's achievement was, at least in the short term, 
overshadowed by that of Andrew de Harclay, the first Earl of Carlisle. 
Within a year Harclay enjoyed both a meteoric rise to the top level of 
the nobility and an equally abrupt disgrace and fall. In consequence his 
career has exercised a powerful attraction for historians working on the 
history of Cumberland and Westmorland. He has generally enjoyed a 
favourable reputation. J. E. Morris expressed the prevailing opinion 
in 1903 when he described Harclay as 'doing his work manfully in the 
blackest years of English history' 1 • The tale of an earl, chosen from 
the squirearchy, rising by merit and martial virtue and of his unjustified 
execution at the hands of an ungrateful king is an attractive one which 
may have originated in large part in the work of Joseph Bain and it has 
2 found a large school of devotees Some manifestations of this trend 
have been truly grotesque. One writer, Cornelius Nicholson, even refused 
to accept that Harclay had had dealings of any sort with the Scots, an 
error which may be explained by ignorance of the existence of much 
d t "d 3. ocumen ary ev1 ence Later opinion has been less extravagantly 
inclined to believe the very best of Harclay, but the traditional inter-
pretation, summarised by John Mason in 1929, has found its way into modern 
work on the north of England under Edward II. The synthesis of local 
l Morris- 'Military Levies'; Trans of C&W II, v3 (1903), discuss 
Harclays career. 31 <j, - .3 2 S: 
2 Bain, ~' v3, xxxi 
3 C Nicholson - Sir Andrew de Harclay, A Personal Episode in English 
History (Kendal, undated) 
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tradition with original research has not always been a fortunate one 
A reconsideration of Barclay's career is therefore long overdue. 
A part of Andrew de Barclay's historical prestige has depended on the 
belief that his rise was not only spectacularly rapid but also correspond-
ingly large in social terms. Michael de Barclay, it has been noted, for 
. h" f 5 example, was not even a tenant 1n c 1e . The whole story, predictably, 
is more complex but some details are worthy of discussion. The first or 
origins of the de Barclay family are obscure. During Edward III's reign 
Andrew de Barclay's nephew Henry petitioned the king and claimed that 
his family had served the king's predecessor since the conquest. It 
seems most probable that the family were not originally of continental 
birth and were like the Greystoke family of native stock 6 . Some support 
for this can be found in John's reign when Walter de Harclay was among 
17 tenants in drengage who made fine with the king to avoid being forced 
7 
to serve with the king across the Channel The precise legal status 
of drengage tenure at this time need detain us only very little here. 
The dreng was essentially a free, ministerial tenant, though one of 
8 lowly status • By 1282 the family tenancy, Hartley, had been converted 
to carnage tenure but this modification was overshadowed by a much more 
major transformation worked on the tenurial structure of Westmorland by 
John when he granted to Robert I de Vipont the whole service of the 
9 
county except for those who held knight's service The effect of this 
4 J Mason- 'Sir Andrew Harclay, Earl of Carlisle'; Trans of C&W II, 
v29 (1929) is heavily derivative of Bain and Morris. It has 
nevertheless been accepted as the standard work on Barclay's career. 
5 Fryde - Tyranny, 123 
6 Bain, CDS, v3, no 941 
7 Rotuli de Oblatis, 127 
8 Barrow- 'Northern English_ Society'; NH, v4 (1969), 10, 11 
9 Bodliean Library, M S Dodsworth, 7o,t9 
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was to reduce the status of those cornage and drengage tenants, who had 
10. 
formerly been tenants in chief, to the status of mesne tenants 
Writers who had taken cognisance of this fundamental development in the 
tenurial history of Westmorland would find no cause for surprise in the 
fact that Michael de Harclay was not a tenant in chief. 
It appears probable that Walter de Harclay was succeeded by the William 
de Harclay who witnessed a grant of lands in Crosby Garrett during the 
11 
reign of Henry III • The founder of the family's fortunes seems, 
however, to have been Michael de Harclay who raised his family above 
the ranks of the toponymic gentry of the region, though it is possible 
that the family's fortune was set on a sound path even at the start of 
his career. Matthew Paris records the suit brought by a baron of the 
region against Bishop Silvester of Carlisle and a substantial local 
tradition, born out by evidence from plea rolls, suggests that the 
12 
s.uitor in this important case was Michael de Harclay 
During the Disturbance of the Realm Mi.chael de Harclay was closely 
associated with Robert II de Vipont, but he seems to have played a 
wholly dependent role in local politics and after Vipont's death he 
rapidly re-aligned himself wi.th the l'oyalist forces. His links with the 
new powers in W.estmorland during the early years of Edward I' s reign were 
i~lustrated by his appointment as sub-sheriff in 1275 and he appears to 
have demonstrated both administrative ability and an unusual degree of 
b 't . h' ff' 13 pro 1 y 1n 1s o 1ce In 1278 it was recorded that though the 
sheriffs of Westmorland had made a habit of demanding bribes to allow 
10 Feodary, 265 
11 CRO D.Lons/L/Deeds, C.G.l 
12 Matthew Paris Chronica Majora, v5, 210; Hist and Antiq, v2, 257 
Bouch - Prelates and People of the Lake Counties, 55 
13 List of Sheriffs, 150. 
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suspects to have bail, Michael de Barclay was not guilty of this 
14 
offence . His administrative ability continued to be used to the 
end of his career in the later years of Edward I's reign. In 1285 he 
was appointed as sheriff of Cumberland and if his record as sheriff 
of Cumberland was less impressive than it had been in Westmorland, the 
reason was probably that since he was the incumbent sheriff at the time 
of the 1292 eyre, documentation on his misdeeds was more abundant. 
He was among those, in all truth a very comprehensive list, who were 
guilty of taking payments to remit fines due to the crown, but on other 
occasions he was firm and correct, as when he seized a group of Scots 
15 
to compel payment of a debt owed to the Exchequer His standing as 
an expert in the conduct of the shrievalty was demonstrated when in 
1300 he was among those appointed to hold an inquiry into William de 
16 Mulcaster's conduct as sheriff of the county He also assisted 
Robert de Clifford in the administration of the royal forests, north of 
the Trent, but his most frequent official employment in the last years 
of his career was as a tax collector. He was appointed to collect the 
40 shilling scutage of 1302, a commission which seems to have followed 
hard on the heels of instructions to collect the fifteenth of the 
17 previous year He remained a favoured local agent in the region 
until his final illness and was chosen to levy the thirtieth of 1306, 
only being excused this duty on the grounds of ill health when a group 
of neighbours reported that his health had declined to the extent that 
he was unable to mount his horse without being ill for months afterwards 18 . 
14 Just.1/982, m23d 
15 CPR 1282-92, 186; Just.1/137, mm15d, 26 
16 CPR 1292-1301, 554 
17 CPR 1301-07, 77 
18 SC.1.28/159 
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Michael de Harclay married sometime before 1278, Ricarda the daughter 
of Gilbert le Fraunceis by whom he had several children including at 
least three sons, William, Andrew and John and a daughter Sarah who 
19 
married Robert de Leyburn of Skelsmergh in Kendale . William, who 
was probably the eldest of the sons was killed sometime before 1301, by 
one John de Kirkoswald, about whom nothing else is known, leaving 
Andrew as the eldest. It is clear, however, that at the time of 
William's death the family was enjoying enough prosperity to grant 
four messuages, four bovates 1 four acres of meadow and 30 shillings of 
rent to the Abbey of St. Mary's Carlisle for masses to be said for the 
soul 20 of the deceased . The impression of financial solidity was 
borne out by the Clifford feodary which rated the Harclay lands as worth 
21 
more than £50 annually when in wardship 
The division made betw.een the estates of Isabella and Idonea de Vipont 
placed the Hartley family lands of Hartley and Mallerstang in the 
position which fell to Idonea and her husband and Roger de Leyburn. 
Despite his duties in Cumberland, Michael de Harclay was actively 
involved in affairs in Westmorland, where he was closely, though not 
always harmoniously, associated wi.th Idonea de Leyburn. On one occasion, 
for example, he brought a writ jointly with Idonea for possession of a 
.-,.-, 
group of lands in Sandford~~. On another occasion he was forced to 
relinquish 3000 acres of pasture to her as a result of a court case. 
It is clear that the Harclay family remained essentially dependent on 
23 
the lords of the region 
19 CFR 1272-1309 t 97 
20 CPR 1292-1301' 366, 
21 Fe_?da_ry, 304 
572 
,.,,., M S Dodsworth, 70, t 9; ~~ 
23 Just.l/991, m7d 
It was not therefore surprising that when 
Just.l/989, m3d 
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Andrew de Harclay first appeared serving against the Scots it was in 
24 
the train of John de Cromwell at Stirling in 1304 
We know much less than we should wish about Andrew de Barclay's career 
before 1311 but the probability appears to be that he served as a 
professional soldier in the years after 1304 and gained an introduction 
to the court, probably through John de Cromwell. Though he briefly 
experimented with opposition to the crown in 1309 and attended the 
Dunstable Tournament, Harclay appears to have risen in the confidence 
of the court and after Dunstable there is no evidence to link him with 
Robert de Clifford. Harclay does not seem to have served under Clifford 
in Scotland even though Clifford recruited extensively from Westmorland 
25 
and from 1308 Harclay held his lands directly of him 
There were some similarities between the career of Andrew de Harclay 
and that of his father but it would be misleading to over-state the 
importance of the comparison. Michael de Harclay served as sheriff of 
Cumberland for a significant part of his career as did his son, but the 
office changed significantly between the two tenures. For most of 
Michael's career the shrievalty of Cumberland was no different from the 
tenure of that office in any other English county. During the period 
in which Andrew served the administrative aspect of the office was 
belittled by the sheriff's prime role as a military commander, the 
sheriffs of Cumberland also functioned as Custodians of the March and 
on occasions also exercised powers comparable with those used by local 
magnates serving as captain of the March, notably by Robert de Clifford. 
24 C.67/15; Cal. Chancery Warrants, vl, 217 
25 Compare Fryde - Tyranny, 157. It is not in any way clear if 
this is intended to refer to Robert I de Clifford who died in 
1314 or his s.on Roger IV who died in 1322. There is no evidence 
linking Harclay with Roger de Clifford. 
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Briefly, Michael's career was more that of an administrator than of a 
soldier, while Andrew was a soldier rather than an administrator. It 
was, moreover, to Michael's work as an administrator that the family 
owed much of its prosperity and its right to take part in the adminis-
tration of the county was well established. In this context, it is 
worth examining Natalie Pryde's suggestion that in the northern counties 
of England the shrievalties and other administrative offices were 
repeatedly filled by knights and barons of higher rank than was usual 
in the rest of England, which would indeed be a puzzling phenomenon 
were the office 'unimportant and unprofitable' as Dr Pryde suggests. 
The office appears to have been held mainly by local knights of no 
particular distinction including Alexander de Bassenthwaite who held 
mediately of the honour of Cockermouth. Another sheriff was William 
de Mulcaster who was found to hold lands that were worth only £10 lOs 6d, 
26 
though this valuation 1in fairness 1dates from 1319 . Nor is there any 
evidence to support the contention that barons held the office with any 
more frequency in Cumberland and the rest of the north than elsewhere 
in England. Robert III de Bruce served in Cumberland for a time, though 
with conspicuous neglect, but this is poor evidence for the rest of Dr. 
27 Pryde's argument In any case this contention rests on two mistaken 
suggestions. Firstly the three baronial families, whom she describes 
as monopolising the offices of the northern counties, the Nevilles, the 
Percies and the Lucies, though of the first importance later in the 
century were of less importance in Edward II's reign. The Percies and 
the Nevilles we may dispose of quickly. The Percies were not, in a word, 
a major presence on the border before 1310 when Henry Percy acquired 
Alnwick and even after that acquistion they did not immediately emerge 
26 Hist and Antiq, v2, 93; CIPM, v6, no 164 
27 Just.l/137, ml; Pryde - ~ranny, 123 
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28 
as a major force . The Nevilles too were only of secondary importance 
until the reign of Edward II and their importance did not extend beyond 
th . 29 the Bishopric of Durham before at t1me . It is worth discussing the 
case of the Lucies of Aspatria in greater detail. Anthony Lucy emerged 
as a major presence in Cumberland after 1323 but though the family were 
co-heirs to the baronies of Copeland and Allerdale they were the most 
junior of the heirs and probably also the least well provided for. 
Moreover, they seem to have had relatively little local influence. When 
Thomas de Lucy went to war in 1306 the only known members of his follow-
30 ing were his brother Anthony and the family steward Thomas de Ireby 
No member of the senior branch of the Lucy family served as sheriff of 
Cumberland before the reign of Edward II. John de Lucy served in 1303 
but he was a representative of a cadet line. 31 Though Anthony de Lucy 
served as keeper of the March in 1313, this office was regularly held 
by knights such as John de Wigton, whose economic level compared very 
closely with that of the Harclay family as well as by major local 
magnates such as Thomas. V de Multon of Gilsland who served with Lucy 
in 1313 32 . In passing, it is also worth noting the contradiction in 
Dr. Pryde's argument which appears to state that the established 
families. resented Harclay' s sudden success and entry to the county 
33 
elite even though his. early career was similar to that of his father 
Harclay was appointed by the court party to the custody of Carlisle 
castle in late 1311 and he succeeded in gaining possession of the castle 
28 J M W Bean -,'The Percies Acquisition of Alnwick', Archeologia 
Aeliana, Series 4, v32 (195f.H .311-314\. 
29 T P Tout - Chapter in the Administrative History of Mediaeval 
England, (Manchester 19.28)_, v4, 81 
30 C.67/16 
31 List of Sheriffs(Cv""61!1-I.A.Jb) 
32 CPR 1307-13 I 597 
33 Pryde - Tyranny, 123 
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in the spring of 1312 but it is clear that this was simply a subordinate 
step in the protracted struggle waged between the court and the ordainers 
ff . 34 for control of appointment to crown o 1ces . In March 1313 Harclay 
was re-appointed as castellan of Carlisle and importantly for his future 
35 
career he continued to hold this post into early 1314 In the spring 
of 1314, probably as a prelude to the planned campaign against the Scots, 
arrangements were made for the defence of the West March. A key problem 
which the government had to face was a series of minorities within the 
leading families of the region to whom in normal times the West March 
was accustomed to look for leadership. In an attempt to fill this lack 
the government passed over Harclay and appointed John de Halton to take 
overall command of the defences of Carlisle and Harclay was appointed 
36 
as his subordinate 
The arrangements for the defence of the region were soon put to the 
test. On the 16 Apri.l 1314, ten days after Halton was appointed as 
superior custodian of the city, a force of Scots led by Edward Bruce 
established themselves at the Bishop's manor of Rose near Carlisle to 
levy distress for a sum of money the borderers had pledged to pay them 
37 the previous summer for a truce which lasted until September 1314 
Though Carlisle remained immune from the Scots attacks the attack wholly 
disrupted the defence of the West March. Halton's uninspired leadership 
achieved almost nothing, though he tried unsuccessfully to obtain 
exemption for two of his own manors Rose and Linstock by promising to 
obtain the release of David de Lindsey's brothers held captive in England, 
34 See above, Chapter 7 
35 CFR 1307-19, 164 
36 CPR 1313-17, 103 
37 Lanercost, 224 
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a promise he proved unable to fulfill 38 Many of the people of the 
county fled with their goods or contracted to pay ransoms with the 
39 Scots as best they could 
The crisis which had been created by natural wastage deepened as a 
result of the battle of Bannockburn. In the aftermath of the battle, 
in fact, probably as soon as news of the English defeat reached Carlisle, 
Bishop , Halton fled from Carlisle pausing only long enough at Kirby 
40 Stephen to appoint Adam de Appleby as his vicar general He spent 
h . . l h. 41 the next two years on is estates ~n L~nco ns ~re • Many followed 
his example. It was in these circumstances that Harclay first emerged 
as a major figure on the March. According to a later inquisition, 
Harclay drew the remaining men of the region to him for the defence of 
the March. Probably he had already exercised effective control over the 
forces in the region before Halton's departure but this account suggests 
that those outside the garrison began to look to Harclay for leadership 
42 
at this time 
It would be easy to exaggerate the importance of Harclay's role in 
Cumberland on the strength of that inquisition. His influence was 
probably confined to the countryside immediately around Carlisle. In 
the late summer of 1314 Copeland, the lordship of Egremont, acting 
seperately from the rest of the county, made an agreement with the 
Scots for protection at a price, which was at odds with the policy of 
38 Reg Halton, v2, 96, 97; Bain, CDS, v3, no 402 
39 E.l43/8/4, no 10 
40 Reg Halton, v2, 99, 100 
41 M J Kennedy - 'John de Halton'; Trans of C&W II, v73 (1973), 107 
42 E.l43/8/4, no 10 
Page 301 
43 
resistance which Barclay seems to have been trying to organise Even 
within the garrisons of the two most important castles in the region, 
Carlisle and Cockermouth, it is clear that traces of local organisations 
and local loyalists still remained. Thomas de Richmond's garrison at 
Cockermouth contained several members of the Allerdale gentry such as 
Thomas de Ireby, William de Clifton, Hugh de Moriceby and William de 
44 Derwentwater who held of the honour of Cockermouth The Carlisle 
garrison was drawn from markedly different sources and included not 
only Andrew de Barclay but also his brother John and his cousin Patrick 
de Culwen. With one or two exceptions such as the Copeland knights, 
John de Lamplugh and Richard de Denton, the rest of the garrison was 
drawn from the county round Carlisle, notably Simon de Dalston and 
Robert de Grindsdale, or were professional soldiers from Westmorland 
45 like Roger de Lancaster 
Probably, in common with other local commanders, Barclay made efforts to 
provide himself with advance warning of impending Scots attacks. In 
July 1314 he wrote to the king warning that the Scots were expected to 
attack through the West March, probably with a view to capturing 
Carlisle, though he also tried to whip up additional alarm by suggesting 
that the Scots would try to capture the king himself if they did not 
attack Carlisle 46 . His information proved to be poor. The Scots, in 
fact, had already attacked down the east. coast plundering Northwnberland 
and passing through Durham, raided as far south as Richmond. Then they 
crossed the Pennines through Swaledale before returning north through 
Kirkoswald having first plundered the Clifford lands in Westmorland, 
wholly immune from the attentions from the small garrison in ApPleby 
43 Lanercost, 229 
44 E.101/14/15, m2 
45 ibid 
46 Bain, CDS, v3, no 369 
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and undeten::-ed by a raid mounted against them by Harclay and his men 
47 
who intercepted tham at Stanemoor early in July 
Harclay has been extravagantly praised for his efforts in defending 
Carlisle during this periodbutthe truth appears to be that they were 
almost wholly ineffective 48 The Scots continued to come and go 
almost at will and the only practical way of stopping their depradations 
remained the payment of ransom. Harclay did mount some brief raids 
against the Scots in November but the good these did was negligible 
though they tend to disprove the belief that if the Scots could have 
been engaged they could have been defeated for the English forces 
suffered heavy casualties. The Scots continued to press their advantage 
and raised Northumberland late in 1314 and during the early months of 
1315 49 . According to the Lanercost Chronicler, they effectively 
conquered north and south Tynedale, where the men did homage to Bruce 
50 
and then joined in the attack on their neighbours in Gilsland 
In simple terms it appears that Tynedale was brought under Scottish 
rule and there is documentary evidence to support this conclusion, 
though Bruce is not generally believed to have attempted to annexe 
English territory before 1329. The first of these pieces of evidence 
was originally printed in the nineteenth century and was afterwards 
printed by V. H. Galbraith from the Historia Aurea of John of Tynemouth. 
Briefly it is a little noticed chronicle which records the grant of 
51 
Falstone in Tynedale to Philip de Moubray by Robert I of Scots 
47 Lanercost, 229 
48 Morris - 'Military Levies'; Trans of C&W II, v3 (1903)~1l Mason -
'Andrew Harclay', Trans of C&W II, v29 (1929) 108 
49 E.101/14/15, mm4d, 9 
50 Lanercost, 229 
51 G W S Barrow - 'A Note on Falstone', Archaeologia Aeliana, Series 
5, v2 (1974), 164 
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This in turn is confirmed by two other pieces of proof which demonstrate 
that not only was the English government aware that Tyndale had been 
occupied, but even that it accepted the fact. In 1315 the people of 
Tynedale petitioned the king that whereas they had made fine with William 
de Soules, to whom they said Bruce had granted Wark in Tynedale, so that 
he would not exercise his rights of lordship over them, they had in fact 
no choice but to accept him as their lord and they asked to be allowed 
52 
to enter Cumberland and Westmorland . Apparently aware of this 
situation in December 1315 the government commissioned Anthony de Lucy 
to attack them and he was granted any plunder he might take from the 
Scots as well as the issues of any of the king's lands which had been 
53 
occupied by the Scots which he could collect 
The actual loss of English territory to the Scots was the most dramatic 
illustration of the crisis which affected the government of the north 
of England after Bannockburn. This partial collapse, the isolation of 
the region, the local orientation of the local communities of the area 
and, perhaps above all, the urgency of the war effort meant that 
Cumbria was less fully integrated into the political development of the 
realm than were other districts. As a result it would not be accurate 
to portray the conflict betweent the king and the Earl of Lancaster as 
the driving force behind political alignments and appointments in the 
region, though did have an influence on the region. Thomas of Lancaster 
was not without contacts in the region through his retainers Adam de 
. . 54 Hudlestone, John and Michael de Harrington and W1ll1am de Dacre . 
Royalist influence, however, was strong enough to counter-balance the 
52 J Hodgson - A History of Northumberland, Part 2, v3 (Newcastle 
1840), 21 
53 RS, v1, 152 
54 Maddicott - Lancaster, 50-55 
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-Lancastrian party particularly in the north of the March. The royalist 
sympathies which had existed in the north of England in 1310 had not 
wholly evaporated by 1314, though death had certainly thinned their 
ranks. Local support was mustered through the royal household. One 
important local figure was John de Castre. The Harclay family were 
also more closely associated with the crown than with any other potential 
focus of loyalty. John de Harclay is known to have become a king's 
yeoman by 1316. The crown also maintained close links with the Lucy 
family and in 1315 and the three following years, Thomas de Lucy, the 
son and eventual heir of Anthony de Lucy, was paid five marks as a simple 
55 knight of the royal household . It would be inaccurate to visualise 
a coherent royalist affinity in the region, however, and there were many 
individual feuds and rivalries within the broader royalist party. 
The defeat of the royal army at Bannockburn was a decisive blow to 
Edward II's government and it inauguract:ed an administration dominated 
by the Earls of Warwick and Lancaster. The chief problem facing the 
new administration was the defence of the north and this brought the 
government firmly into contact with the problems of the West March. 
The position of the Ordainers was strengthened by their former links 
with Robert de Clifford. While Clifford had been closely associated 
with the court in 1311, among the favours he had received from Edward 
was the concession that his executors should have the administration 
of his estates after his death. Clifford's executors were Bartholomew 
de Badlesmere, the Earl of Warwick, and Henry Percy and in the highly 
charged climate this concession gave the executors a role which had 
b . l' . l t . 56 o v1ous po 1t1ca conno at1ons The administration of Clifford's 
lands allowed Warwick and Badlesmere to expand their influence 
55 CFR 1307-19, 298. British Library, M S Cotton Nero, C8, ff223, 224 
56 CPR 1307-13, 320 
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in the north of England, though as holder of Barnard Castle, Warwick 
was already well established there. A vital part in this process was 
forming effective links with local gentry and there is some evidence 
that they were able to pursue this objective successfully. Robert de 
Leyburn, who had served under Clifford and earlier under the Earl of 
Lincoln, served as the attorney for Warwick and Badlesmere to receive 
57 
seisin of Clifford's lands . Later Badlesmere formally retained one 
58 
of Clifford's former men, John de Penrith, in his own service 
During the years after Bannockburn, however, the Ordainers were not 
restricted to the exercise of powers which devolved to them by virtue 
of their position as Clifford's executors. Much of the ordinary 
exercise of government patronage was in their control and they were able 
to use it to advance and reward their supporters. In March 1315 Thomas 
of Lancaster's retainer, William de Dacre, was appointed to the 
59 Stewardship of the Forest of Inglewood, for example . The power of 
the Ordainers to impose their will on the West March was not unrestricted, 
however. Though they felt the need to institute a wholesale purge of 
the shrievalties Cumberland provided one of only two exemptions to this 
60 There were probably several reasons for this. One was the process 
immediacy of the threat to the West March, but the example of the 
dispute between Harclay and de Castre in 1312 demonstrated that castellans 
of Carlisle could be changed more easily in theory than they could 
actually be forced to give up custody of the castle. The Ordaining 
government may well have entertained real doubts as to whether they had 
57 CFR 1307-19, 212 
58 Phillips- Ayrner, 255 
59 CPR 1307-19, 225 
60 T F Tout - The Place of the Reign of Edward II in the English 
History (Manchester 1936), 101 and note 
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the necessary local muscle to displace Harclay if he proved obdurate. 
They sought to place control over the region by another means, that of 
appointing Ralph FitzWilliam as custodian of Carlisle and keeper of the 
61 March . FitzWilliam, Lord of Greystoke, was a former ally of Warwick 
and Lancaster in the attack on Gaveston and he was, in many ways, a 
62 
suitable choice He had long experience of nothern affairs and the 
necessary local power base but he was still to face severe difficulties. 
Fitz William's major problem was to exert his authority over Harclay. 
Harclay was by this time well established in Carlisle and he made 
Greystoke's task a difficult one. The evidence for the dispute between 
FitzWilliam and Harclay consists chiefly on a series of complaints 
against Andrew and John de Harclay contained in a document which was 
63 printed by Joseph Bain It has long been accepted that though Bain 
did invaluable work in collecting and editing documents in the Public 
Record Office, pressure of time on occasions prevented him from devoting 
enough attention to the dating of some documents, forcing him to rely on 
nothing more than informed guesswork. So it was in the case of this 
document which Bain attributed to 1319. In fact, it relates to the 
summer of 1315 and was probably drawn up not more than a few months 
later. There are several reasons to suggest that 1315 was, in fact, the 
date to which this document refers. The first clue is provided by the 
repeated references to the obstructions placed by Andrew and John de 
Harclay in the face of Ralph de Greystoke as he attempted to set about 
his duties. It is self evident that this cannot, in fact, refer to 
1319 since FitzWilliam died before then, certainly before February 1317 
61 RS, vl, 140, 141 
62 CPR 1313-17, 22 
63 Bain, CDS, v3, no 675 
64 in fact More positive evidence is provided by the fact that 
Page 307 
Greystoke served as custodian of Carlisle only from March 23 1315 to 
65 
July in the same year, when he was replaced by Harclay . Other 
evidence confirms this dating. The first charge brought against John 
de Harclay alleged that he had removed victuals from the store after the 
death of Gilbert de Bromley. Bromley died in the winter of 1315 and 
again this would suggest that the alleged events took place in the 
spring of that year. This was also the period in which Richard de 
Kirkbride served as keeper of the peace, an office which he is described 
as exercising in the complaints. Finally, the document describes how, 
when Ralph FitzWilliam arranged forays against the enemy with the advice 
of the best people of the county such as Richard de Kirkbride and 
Anthony de Lucy, John Harclay took steps to thwart these efforts. Since 
Lucy was captured after Bannockburn and cannot have returned to 
Cumberland before the spring of 1315 this must be reckoned as the start-
ing date for the complaints' probable origin 66 
I.f it is possible to establish the period of the origin of the complaints 
brought against Andrew and John de Harclay with high degree of certainty, 
it is much harder to assess the accuracy of the complaints since the 
charges were brought in a blatantly partisan way. The first of the 
eight allegations complained that after the death of Gilbert de Bromley 
John de Harclay, having been denied victuals to which he claimed that he 
was entitled, broke into Carlisle Priory where the supplies were being 
stored and helped himself to a quantity of the best wine held there 
which he later gave away to Thomas le Clerk of Moffat, one of Bruce's 
64 CIPM, v6, no 50 
65 RS, vl, 141, 142, 147; CFR 1307-19, 270 
66 Lanercost, 229 
67 
closest adherents it was alleged 
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Leaving aside the charge of 
trafficking with the enemy, which is a recurrent theme in the document, 
there may well have been grounds for suspicion over the fate of the 
victuals stored at Carlisle. After Bromley's death an enquiry was 
ordered to be held to discover what had happened to them. This enquiry 
was held by Andrew de Harclay and Robert de Welle, however, so that it 
was unlikely, to say the least, to have condemned John de Harclay's part 
68 in the matter 
This was later regarded as unsatisfactory and a further enquiry was 
69 
ordered shortly after John de Castre replace Harclay as sheriff De 
Castre evidently thought that the misappropriation which had taken place 
was the work of the Harclay family and he seized a quantity of victuals 
from the house of Henry de Harclay, Andrew's nephew, under the pretext 
of his office 70 . There remains room to doubt, however, whether de 
Castre's inquisition was any more accurate than that held by Harclay. 
The second, fifth, sixth and seventh charges against the Harclay brothers 
may be considered together. They all allege that Andrew and, more 
especially, John de Harclay maintained close contacts, not only with 
convicted criminals but also with the Scots. It was alleged that one 
Adam Greenhead, who had been captured in Tynedale and brought to 
Carlisle on the order of Andrew de Harclay had been released from the 
castle, then in the keeping of Ralph FitzWilliam, and taken to the 
Solway by John de Harclay who had ransomed Adam and one, John Notehode, 
to the Scots for 200 and 12 marks respectively. Both, it was claimed, 
67 Bain, CDS, v3, no 675 
68 CPR 1313-17' 326 
69 RS, vl, 154 
70 Bain, CDS, v3, no 674 
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later joined a band of schavaldors and commited robberies in England 
to pay their ransoms. John de Barclay was also accused of releasing 
the picturesquely named Black Adekin from gaol and allowing him to go 
free in Nichol Forest. In the sixth complaint it was alleged that 
John de Harclay had warranted as a good liegeman John Mareschal 1 who 
had later joined the Scots after he and John de Prendergast had 
surrendered the peel of Liddel to them. The seventh charge alleged 
that two of the Barclay's men, after being discovered trading with the 
Scots by Greystoke's followers, simply joined up with them. On all 
these charges it is impossible to reach any decisive verdict, though it 
seems probable that extensive trafficking with the Scots and with local 
bands of renegades or schavaldors did take place. It is wholly 
uncertain how far either of the Barclay brothers was involved in this, 
however. One albeit insubstantial clue to the truth of the allegations 
brough.t against Andrew de Barclay may lie in the fact that after John 
de Castre was appointed as sheriff of Cumberland in 1316 Richard de 
Kirkbride was among those who refused to deliver custody of the castle 
to him, probably from some degree of loyalty of Barclay. It seems hard 
to understand why Kirkbride should have opposed Barclay's replacement 
if he believed that Barclay had been responsible for the release of 
suspected criminals. I.t also seems puzzling why he should have done 
this if John and Andrew de Barclay had obstructed his attempts to raise 
forces for attacks on the Scots as the third and fourth charges brought 
against them alleged, but there may well be a degree of truth in the 
fourth charge brought against John de Harclay that by false indictments 
he had forced the best and richest people of Liddell and Gilsland to the 
adherence of the Scots. Extortion of money by means of false indictments 
was common in Cumberland in peacetime and the war provided outstanding 
opportunities for unscrupulous officials. Other castellans of castles 
71 
in the Marches were also guilty of similar extortions 
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The truth of 
the allegation that John de Barclay's exactions had forced the people 
of Gilsland and Liddell to the Scots is also partially borne out by 
other evidence, that the English lost control of Tynedale at about this 
time and many of the people of Gilsland may also have changed their 
72 
allegiance 
The series of contradi.ctions and partial inconsistencies in the charges 
against Andrew and John de Barclay make any final assessment of the 
reliability of these charges as a whole impossible and as a result the 
value of the document for the history of Carlisle remains questionable. 
The document has considerable value, however, for the history of the 
disputes over the custody of Carlis.le which were conducted both locally 
and at court. At the most basic level the complaints prove nothing more 
than the unremarkable fact that Barclay was not without his enemies at 
this stage of his career and that these enemies were prepared to use 
'smear' tactics in their campaign against him. It seems very probable 
that these complaints, or some very closely related to them, were the 
false rumours which Barclay's friends claimed were being circulated at 
73 
court in an attempt to discredit him after his capture by the Scots 
The question of the originators of these complaints is not possible to 
dis.cover but there are two likely suspects. The first is Ralph Fitz-
William, the displaced warden of the March, who may well be the most 
likely choice since he was the alleged victim of six of eight of Barclay's 
supposed crimes. Since Greystoke was replaced by Barclay early in July 
he may have sought to pin the blame for his apparent failure on Barclay. 
The other possible originator of the charges against Barclay was John de 
71 Bain, CDS, v3, no 463 for other examples 
72 see below 
73 Bain, CDS, v3, no 515 
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castre, the household knight, as later events proved was deeply hostile 
to Barclay perhaps not only since both were rivals for the command of 
Carlisle. 
As. the writer of the list of complaints made against Barclay may well 
have known, Ralph FitzWilliam's tenure of the wardenship of Carlisle 
proved to be short and early in July 1315 Barclay was re-appointed as 
74 
custodian of Carlisle and sheriff of Cumberland . If he had set out 
to subvert Greystoke's authority, his campaign had been successful. 
Almost immediately, however, he faced a renewed threat from the Scots. 
The Scots made a determined attempt to take the city of Carlisle and 
this provided perhaps Barclay's greatest military challenge. The seige 
has generally been believed to have begun on 22 July 1315 and the 
detailed narrative offered by the Lanercost Chronicler which provides 
75 
this date, has much. to commend it Two other sources can be used to 
add to the information available for the seige of Carlisle and these 
suggest that the attack mounted on the city was longer than has been 
generally accepted. The Chroni.cle of St. Mary's Abbey York, which 
contains important material collected at St. Bees, suggests that the 
Scots. first arrived on 20 July, two days before the Lanercost account, 
but according to a peti.tion later presented by the citizens of Carlisle, 
detailing their sufferings., the seige began on 14 July and continued 
76 
until 3 August • The apparent inconsistencies in the three possible 
dates. for the seige seem best to be reconciled by the suggestion that 
the first Scots force arrived near Carlisle in the middle of July and 
the way having been prepared the main Scots force, together with such 
s.eige engines as they possessed, probably arrived on 20 July while the 
74 RS, vl, 147 
75 Lanercost, 230, see for example Maddicott - Lancaster, 169 
76 Chronicle of St. Mary's York; Bain, CDS, v3, no 621 
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Scots king himself, who was reported to have taken the capture of the 
city so much to his heart that he had taken a vow not to eat meat before 
he had captured it, arrived on 
77 22 July Bruce also took more 
practical steps to extend his control over English territory. According 
to a later petition presented by Richard de Kirkbride, while Bruce was 
at Carlisle, he not only knighted Walter de Corry, one of the co-
parceners of the barony of Levington, but also granted him the lands 
belonging to the other co-heirs, one of whom was Kirkbride, both in 
78 Scotland and in England 
Harclay was placed in command of the defences of Carlisle shortly before 
the attack began and he appears to have had some warning of it. On 
hearing of the Scots approach. he resorted to scorched earth tactics and 
burned the buildings of the city which stood outside the city wall, 
including a tannery and mills belonging to the Prior of Carlisle. He 
also arranged for a di.tch to be dug round the outside of the walls. 
The city gates were blocked up, leaving only a small postern and houses 
within the city were knocked down to provide additional material to 
work on the walls themselves including a tower, which was built to stand 
79 
above an engine the Scots later attempted to bring up against the wall 
The seige itself is described in detail in the Lanercost Chronicle and 
it is clear it was fiercely contested on both sides. The Scots attempted 
to fill in the castle moat with fascines and they tried all of the city's 
gates in turn looking for a weakness. Another tactic was a diversionary 
assault to create an opportunity for a main attack on another part of 
80 
the wall The Scots also raided the surrounding countryside. On July 
77 Lanercost, 230 
78 Bain, CDS, v3, no 528 
79 ibid, nos 524, 621 
80 Lanercost, 231 
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24th a group of Scots led by James Douglas left Carlisle and attacked 
Copeland under cover of darkness. Meeting with no resistance they 
burned Cleator Moor and Stainburn and also robbed and despoiled the 
81 
church of St. Bees . Douglas returned from this raid to lead an 
attempt to scale the city walls using rope ladders and grappling hooks. 
As a result of the determination with which the defenders stuck to their 
task even this tactic proved unsuccessful and the Scots retreated soon 
afterwards probably to avoid a large English force led by the Earl of 
82 
Pembroke which was advancing north to relieve the city The English 
forces, no doubt elated by having set the Scots to flight, began to 
pursue them as they retreated northwards. In this they met with only 
parti.al success. A group of the Carlisle garrison led by Harclay made 
two valuable captures, John de Moray and Robert de Bardolf but on 
83 
th.e whole the expedition was ill-judged The retreating Scots led 
Valence's men into a trap later, turning to attack them and inflicting 
84 
severe losses 
The successful defence of Carlisle was an important victory for the 
English side. Had the city fallen it would have been as great a loss 
as that of Berwick. in 1318. There can have been few illusions, however, 
at how narrowly the loss of the city had been averted. Equally the 
chances that the Scots would make another attempt were high and they 
were unlikely to repeat such mistakes as allowing the seige engine to 
become bogged down in mud if they did. The state of the March remained, 
in short, desperate and the borderers looked anxiously to the king for 
81 Chronicle of St. Mary's York, 68 
82 Vita, 62 
83 Lanercost, 23; Guisborough, 397 
84 Guisborough, 39.7. Compare the interpretations offered by Barrow -
Bruce, 338; Maddi.cott- Lancaster, 170-171; Phillips- Aymer, 89; 
Fryde - Tyranny, 121 
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assistance. It seems almost certain that it was from this period that 
one of the best known documents from the border in the reign of Edward 
II dates. The petition was printed by both Stevenson and Bain and 
though. Stevenson's text is to be preferred, Bain's has been more 
85 generally used . Stevenson printed the text in a form close to the 
original, in Norman-French, complete with marks for abbreviation and 
left the date no more narrowly defined than the reign of Edward II. 
Bain, however, was more ambitious, though he still left the date as 
provisional. He suggested that the petition might date from 1322, 
which fitted in well with the belief he expressed that the treaty 
Harclay made with. the Scots in 1323 was in the best interests of the 
1 1 1 . 86 oca popu at1on Bain's tentative dating was accepted as definitive 
by Mason, whose work followed Bain closely, though not closely enough 
to take notice of Bain's note of caution 87 . It is almost impossible 
to believe, in fact, that the peti.tion does date from 1322. The 
Marchers related their sufferings in graphic terms and concluded with two 
requests, firstly that the commission of Andrew de Harclay, who was 
described as 'gardeyn de la Marche de Kardoill' be changed since his 
present commission was inadequate for him to provide for the defence of 
the city. The second reques.t was that the king should come to the rescue 
of the border in person with a large force. The endorsement of the 
petition by the council makes it clear that Harclay was warden, not of 
the whole of the March, but only of the city of Carlisle, the post he 
held in 1315 rather than the more extensive powers he held in 1322. A 
second fact supportSthis. Had the petition dated from 1322 it could be 
reasonably expected that it would refer to Harclay as Earl of Carlisle, 
85 Lanercost, Illustrative Documents, no 50; Bain, CDS, v3, no 799 
86 Bain 1 CDS, v 3, xxxi. 
87 Mason - 'Andrew Harclay'; Trans of C&W I.I 1 v29 ( 1929) , lll 1 112 
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since the first Scots raid into Cumberland took place in June of that 
year while Harclay was ennobled in March. Before then there had been 
88 
two years of truce on the Border Though there may have been no 
certain rule, the conventions were generally respected. Even the 
threatening summons ordering Harclay to court after news broke of his 
treaty with the Scots was careful to use his title 89 . An additional 
problem if the document had really originated in 1322 would be to explain 
th.e Marcher's reference to the eight years of suffering which the 
Marchers had endured in the king's service. It is hard to find any 
significant anniversary that the petition should refer to in 1322, 
but the term fits in very comprehensibly with the other evidence which 
links it with 1315, for Edward II's eighth regnal year ended shortly 
before the Scots began the seige of Carlisle 90 . Left with 'nothing 
but their naked bodies' the borderers eagerly looked for succour to the 
king. Their entreaties drew. only a very uninspired response. The 
council simply ordered that Harclay be directed to harass the Scots in 
91 
any way he could 
If we accept that the peti.tion in question originated in 1315 a partial 
mystery in Harclay's career become more clear. Harclay was re-appointed 
as custodian of Carlisle in September 1315 with a commission to last 
until midsummer 1316 92 . In November 1315 he was still in high favour 
and was granted an assignment of any available wardships to the value of 
93 1000 marks as a reward for his part in the capture of Bardolf and Moray 
88 Lanercost, 240 
89 CCR 1318-23, 692. Harclay was created as Earl of Carlisle on 
25 March 1323. CPR 1321-24, 93, see for example CCR 1318-23, 555 
also Bain, ~' v3, 773, 780, 802. 
90 Cheney - Handbook. of Dates, 20 
91 Lanercost, Illustration Documents, 50 
92 RS, vl, 149 
93 Bain, CDS, v3, no 456 
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Shortly aftEilrwards the confidence of the court in his abilities seems 
to have declined. In December a sharply worded missive accusing him 
of negligence in the defence of Carlisle was issued and it seems highly 
likely that this was the result of the complaints from the Marchers 
about their situation and the council's suggestion that Harclay be 
94 
enjoined to greater efforts Other complaints against him may also 
have been circulating at court. Malicious rumours were alleged to be 
being put around at court against him shortly afterward, but so far 
from being ignored as Mason suggested, it is clear that together with 
the complaints from the horderers that they were not being sufficiently 
protected, these were enough_ to undermine the court's confidence in 
Harclay and the decision was taken to relieve him of the command of 
95 Carlisle 
The choice for Barclay's replacement in Carlisle fell on John de Castre, 
a household knight who was in many ways the understandable choice, 
since he had considerable experience against the Scots and as commander 
of Carlisle. On 22 January 1316 a mandate was issued from Clipston 
appointing de Castre as custos of Carlisle and ordering Harclay to 
96 deliver it to him De Castre found considerable difficulty in 
taking possession of the castle, however. On 3 February a further order 
had to be issued to instruct the garrison of Carlisle, including Richard 
de Kirkbride, Robert de Leyburn, John de Harclay and Patrick de Culwen 
threatening them with_ forfeiture if they did not obey the order to 
97 deliver Carlisle castle to de Castre . It seems probable that the 
absence of Harclay himself from the list of the garrison of Carlisle was 
94 RS, vl, 149 
95 Bain, CDS, v3, no 456 
96 RS, vl, 152 
97 i.&c.m 
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a result of his having been captured by the Scots shortly before. 
According to Barbour's Bruce, Barclay was captured in Eskdale by John 
de Soules, lord of Eskdale, who defeated Barclay's large force with a 
98 
much smaller one of only 50 men Though Barbour may have adjusted 
his tale to cast a more favourable light on de Soules, there is a 
slight confirmation that Barclay's capture reflected rather less than 
creditably on him, probably because he allowed himself to be caught in 
an ambush, since after his capture his valet John de Beauchamp was 
99 
charged with giving a full account of how he came to be captured 
De Castre seems to have set a high priority on weakening Barclay's 
influence and Barclay's absence made this process much less difficult. 
The eclipse of Barclay was by no means the only, or even the most 
important, political development on the West March during these years. 
Without doubt the most important event of the period, after the seige 
100 
of Carlisle was the death in August 1315 of the Earl of Warwick 
The author of the Vita, who thought Warwick to have the ability to 
lead the whole country believed this to be a disaster, but it had a 
101 
special bea~ing on the north of England The vacuum which was 
created by the death of the Earl of Warwick was immediately filled by the 
Earl of Lancaster who was appointed as the commander of the forces in 
102 the north early in August Much more dramatic events followed and 
it is clear that these were part of a sustained attempt to establish 
Lancastrian dominance on the West March, made possible by the death of 
Warwick. The principal sufferers from Warwick's death were the Clifford 
98 W Skeat - Barbour's Bruce (Early English Text Society 18741, Book 
16, lines 508-520 
99 Bain, CDS, v3, no 514 
100 The precise date of Warwick's death is discussed by Phillips-
Aymer, 92 and note 
101 Vita, 62, 63 
102 Phillips - Aymer, 9.2 
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family. Warwick had been the most powerful of Clifford's executors 
and it is clear that during his lifetime the family's interests were 
w!ll protected. A request by the monks of Holm Cultram for the advowson 
of the church of Brough under Stanemoor was refused, for example, to 
protect the rights of Clifford's heir 103 In the autumn of 1315 this 
situation changed abruptly and the vulnerability of the Clifford's 
posltion became immediately obvious. The most dramatic illustration of 
this new-found vulnerab.ility was the abduction of Maud de Clifford, 
Robert's widow, by Jack the Irishman, the castellan of Warwick's former 
castle of Barnard Cas.tle, where she remained until a rescue was 
104 
organised by Pembroke, Henry FitzHugh and Bartholomew de Badlesmere 
Another serious blow. to the Clifford's fortunes took place a little 
after this, in fact, was to have the roost long lasting consequences. 
The terri.torial gains made by Robert I de Clifford during the ~rly years 
of Edward II' s reign have already been discuss.ed but it is clear that 
he planned to provide for hia younger son Robert II as thoroughly as he 
had provided for his. elder son, Roger IV. The tool chosen was marriage 
and Robert's bride was. to be. Margaret de Multon, the daughter and sole 
heir of Thomas V de Multon of Gilsland. According to the Lanercost 
Chronicle, the marriage took place at Hoff in Westmorland, a very 
suitable location s.ince it was a Clifford fee held by a cadet line of 
105 
the Multons, probably in 1307 The date of the marriage can be 
determined by the ages of the respective parties. The Lanercost account 
seems to be best interpreted as suggesting that when the marriage was 
contracted Margaret de Multon was seven years of age. The best available 
information on Margaret's. date of birth is from a plea for proof of age 
103 Bain, CDS, v3, no 529 
104 Bridlington, 48, 49 
lOS Lanercost, 223; Feodary, 283 
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~ntered by Margaret's eventual husband, Ranulph de Dacre, which suggests 
106 
that she was born on 20 July 1300 Robert de Clifford was 
unquestionably of tender years at the time of the marriage since he lay 
in his bed during the betrothal. Despite the extreme youth of the 
parties and a pre-existing arrangement between de Multon and William de 
Dacre, the match was a very good one for the Cliffords since it would 
provide the cadet line with a very large estate on the boarder leading 
to almost total Clifford dominance in the region. Neither party attempted 
to make good their claim before 1315, however, and Margaret de Multon 
seems to have join0d the household of the Countess of Warwick 107 . Late 
in 1315 or in January 1316, but certainly before February 1316, Ranulph 
de Dacre seized the opportunity offered by the eclipse of power of the 
Cliffords and the death of the Earl of Warwick, abducted Margaret from 
Warwick castle and married her with all possible speed. Just as quickly 
he took steps to gain possession of her inheritance and sued out a writ 
108 for proof of age Ranulph's father, William de Dacre, was a 
retainer of the Earl of Lancaster and there seems to be a high probability 
that Lancaster connived at, or approved, the abduction of Margaret from 
. k 109 Warw~c . Ranulph's marriage to Margaret de Multon established him 
as potentially one of the leading magnates on the West March but he was 
not able to gain possession of Gilsland, Burgh by Sands and the other 
Multon lands immediately. Indeed for a spell Dacre remained in disgrace 
for the offence of abducting a minor in the king's custody. By June 1316 
the Dacre family had managed to gain some degree of control over them. 
They were placed in the charge of Adam de Skelton. William de Dacre 
106 Complete Peerage, v~l This date seems preferable to that suggested 
in CIPM, v8, no 308 
107 Davies - Baronial Opposition, App Doc, no 102 
108 Complete Peerage, v4, 2 
109 Davies - Baronial DEposition, App Doc, no 102 
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mainprised for Skelton to answer for the revenues of the estate if they 
should turn out to belong to the crown suggesting that Skelton had 
110 
close links with the Dacres . Ranulph'de Dacre's large gains of 
land by marriage to Margaret de Multon were matched by the rising 
importance of William de Dacre in the region, a rise which may have 
owed much to Lancaster 1 s. sponsorship. 
Lancas.ter' s influence in the Wes,t March. seems to have reached something 
of a peak in the s.ummer of 1316. In August a commission was issued for 
the levying of all the available men between 16 and 60 and this reflected 
111 Lancas.ter' s inf 1 uence very clearly Two of those appointed in 
Cumberland and Westmorland, William de Dacre and John de Harrington were 
known Lancastrian retain~/.5 while the third, Anthony de Lucy had no known 
links wi.th any of the leading .magnates at this time. There were limits 
to Lancaster's power, however, and a commission to allow rebel Scots 
112 back into the king 1 s. peace show.ed them . Two of the four appointed 
were Adam de Swinburn, who also seems. likely to have had links with 
Lancaster, while the others were Lucy and the known royalist John de 
113 Cas.tre . De Castre had b.een appointed to hold Carlisle early in 1316 
and though this co-incided with Lancasters greatest period of influence 
the appointment had been .made in Lancaster's absence and probably against 
his wishes 114 •. 
The dispute between Lancaster and the court over appointments was not 
the only struggle on the West March at this time. An intense 
and potentially very damaging feud was also being waged between two 
110 CFR 1307-9, 283 
111 RS, vl, 160 
112 ibid, 162 
113 Maddicott - Lancaster, 206 
114 S.A.MS 121, fllO; Maddicott - Lancaster, 180, 181 
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rival broadly 'royalist' factions, centred round John de Castre and 
Andrew de Harclay. After Barclay's capture early in 1316, de Castre's 
party was temporarily in the ascendant. Probably very shortly after 
de Castre took command of Carlisle he hit out against Harclay's party 
and replaced John de Harclay as. sub-sheriff by his own man John de 
Kirkos.wald. He then mounted a raid on goods belonging to Henry de 
115 Harclay, claiming that they had been stolen from the garrison stores 
Harclay's reputation at this time can be gauged from the size of the 
ransom the Scots demanded for his release which was finally set at 
2000 marks. This sum was. so large that Harclay could not raise it 
'th . t 116 Wl. out ass1s ance . A group, styling themselves as Harclay's 
friends, though lacking any more defini.te identification, petitioned 
the king on his behalf and to good effect. In July 1316 400 of the 1000 
marks obtained from the ransoms of Moray and Bardolf were assigned 
towards Harclay's ransom and soon afterwards a further sum of 1600 marks 
in cash and in the form of prisoners was allowed for it and John de 
Harclay left for Scotland to arrange his brother's release in August 
1316. It seems. unlikely that Andrew_ Harclay returned to England before 
August 1317. and John de Cas.tre used Harclay' s absence to expand his own 
. . 117 pos.1t1on Harclay' s. fri.ends accused him of trying to prolong 
Harclay 's absence by oos.tructing arrangements for the payment of his 
118 
ransom 
De Castre was established in command of Carlisle from the summer of 1316 
but it is. not certain whether any clear command structure existed between 
the custodian and the garris.on in the city of Carlisle and those in the 
115 Bain, CDS, v3, no 674 
116 ibid, 514 
117 ibid, 515, 516, 697 
118 ibid, 515 
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outlying strongholds. The garrison of Carlisle castle consisted of a 
mixed force of 25 men at arms, excluding de Castre himself; a force of 
119 
hobelars, 6 crossbowmen and 40 foot archers This basic force could 
supplemented in the event of an attack by the Scots. In July and early 
August, Richard d!Umfraville and Richard de Denton joined the garrison 
though. independent of de Cas.tre 1 s retinue with their followers because 
of an expected raid. The city had its own garrison commanded by Richard 
de Kirkbride with a force of 6 knights and 57 esquires. De Kirkbride 
w.as among those who had tried to deny de Castre access to the castle 
earlier in the year and may thus tentatively be assigned to the ranks 
120 
of Harclay 1 s. supporters. Another member of this group was Robert 
de Leyburn, Harclay 1 s brother in law. Whatever Leyburn 1 s alignments 
within the disputes going on in the region he was in other respects 
typical of the hard-nosed group of military entrepreneurs on whom much 
of the defence of the borders fell at this time. Leyburn held 
Cockermouth. under a fixed contract with ll men at arms and 20 hobelars 
taking for his own wages only a knights fee of 2 shillings per day 121 
The castles of Brougham and Appleby were held on a different basis. 
They w.ere held by Bartholomew de Badles.mere during the minority of 
Roger IV de Clifford. Of 42 men who were in the garrison of these 
castles. only part, 30 men w:ere paid by the crown. The rest were paid 
l'"''"' hy Badlesmere ....... A similar situation existed at Brough under Stanemoor 
w:hi.ch was held by Robert de Welle who had married Maud de Clifford in 
December 1315. According to the agreement de Welle had made with the 
king, of the 15 men at arms and 20 hobelars in the garrison, the crown 
was to pay for only 10 men at arms and 10 hobelars. Castleswholly in 
private hands such. as Egremont were presumable garrisoned entirely at 
119 S.A. MS 120, f88 
120 RS, vl, 175 
121 S.A. MS 120, f86 
1'"''"' <..<.. id,.(ln· 
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their lord's expense but these garrisons were probably under-staffed. 
Andrew_ de Barclay's. return to a posi.tion of influence after his captivity 
in Scotland was a gradual one. Though it is clear that he had not wholly 
forfeited the confidence of the court, he found many of the chief 
positions in the defence of the March blocked. The custodianship of 
the March. and the captaincy of Carlisle were filled. As a result his 
first commission after hi.s return was merely a licence to accept Scots 
123 back into king's. peace This w.as probably a sign that Harclay 
organised and led an independent force of horse against the Scots at 
his own expense, living on whatever they could capture. Barclay was not 
forgotten by the government, however, and in September 1317 he was 
assigned the farm of Carlisle, the carnage of Cumberland, the issues of 
Inglewood and the lands of Thomas V de Multon of Gilsland, John de 
124 Wigton and Thomas de Derw.entw_ater. . This assignment was against a 
debt of £1951 which Barclay was. owed for wages from the time when he 
was in charge of Carlisle. Barclay's advancement was blocked by the 
continuing fortune of the Dacre family, however. In October 1317 
Ranulph de Dacre was ordered to be given seisin of the lands belonging 
125 
to Margaret de Multon on proof of her majority being accepted • 
Barclay was thus deprived of Gilsland and the other Multon lands. More 
seriously, in November 1317 William de Dacre was appointed to hold the 
March of Carlisle in conjunction with Barclay's antagonist John de 
126 Castre • The arrangement of this dual commission was a complicated 
one but this does not seem to have made it any less effective than 
any other attempt to organise local defence. De Castre commanded the 
123 RS, vl, 175 
124 CPR 1317-21, 30 
125 ibid, 39 
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garrison of Carlisle with 25 men at arms, 10 hobelars, 40 foot archers 
and 6 crossbowmen while Dacre and Anthony Lucy with a force of hobelars 
and men at arms. took responsibility for the peel towers of Scaleby; 
Dunmalloght and Staward in Tynedale. Cockermouth remained in the 
custody of Robert de Leyhurn who was admitted to the royal household 
127 
early in 1318 
The main thrust of Scottish activity during 1318 was directed down the 
East March were they achieved notable success in gaining control of Wark 
128 
on Tweed, Harbottle, Mitford and most importantly Berwi.ck Such 
partial respite as the W.es.t 1>1arch. gained was larely spent in a renewed 
di.spute for dominance in the region, a struggle which. was complicated 
by a co-incident break-down of relations. between the king and Lancaster. 
At the heart of the dispute was the custody of Carlisle castle. Under 
the patronage of Badlesmere, Harclay again aspired to regain he former 
post. In June 1318, at Badlesmere's instance, he was re-appointed to 
d f h h 1 . d c t 129 cus.to y o t e Marc , rep ac1.ng e as re The earlier situation 
was. now reversed, how.ever, and de Castre refused to surrender the 
130 
castle to Harclay Again a potentially damaging local dispute 
developed and in July Harclay was. ordered not to try to interfere with 
the custody of the castle or to try to gain custody of it, notwith-
standing the recent commission he had been issued. De Castre was 
ordered to depute one of his men to hold the castle in his name and 
hath men were summoned to the king so that the matter could be settled. 
Th.e form of settlement was a compromise neither man being re-appointed 
127 S.A. MS 121, ff42, 168 
128 Lanercost, 235 
129 CFR 1307-19, 363 
130 CCR 1318-1324;1; Compare Mason -'Andrew Harclay' who concluded 
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and the beneficiary was Anthony de Lucy who took charge on 4 August 
131 
1318, his rise being highlighted by promotion to banneret . Lucy's 
appointment was one of a series. of complicated and important but 
obs.cure re-alignments that took place on the West March during this 
period, which were probably connected, at least to some degree with 
the contemporary s.ettlement betw.een Edward II and Lancas.ter. Lucy may 
have been a compromise acceptable to both parties since, though he had 
served with known Lancastri.ans such as William de Dacre, who died 
around this time, he had never been directly associated with the earl. 
Much. more important than Lucy's. appointment was the return of Clifford 
dominance in Westmorland. On 29. July 1318 it was ordered that Roger 
IV de Clifford should have possession of his lands even though he was 
132 
s.till under age • The reason behind this decision may have been 
partly financial, since i.t relieved the crown of the obligation to 
find any part of the wages of the castle of Brougham, Appleby and 
Skipton, but it had important political results too. The Clifford 
lands had provided a pow.er base on ·the March for Bartholomew de 
Badlesmere and the res±oration of them to Roger IV ended his power 
there. Since Badlesmere seems to have been Harclay's patron during 
1317 and 1318, this may have been a blow to him in turn. Harclay's 
political links at this. time are another mystery. On 1 November along 
with a large number of known Lancastrians, he was granted a pardon for 
133 
all the trespasses he had committed up to 7 August 1318 • This 
pardon raises several problems. The most serious of these is the fact 
that there is no other evidence linking Harclay with Lancaster since he 
131 S.A. MS 121, f42 
132 ibid, f39.; CFR 1307-19, 370, 371 
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had attended the Dunstable tournament. A second, though much less 
important discrepancy is provided by the fact that the pardons are 
enrolled to Andrew and John, the sons of Michael de Harclay. It is not 
easy to understand why, ten years after Michael de Harclay's death, 
this style should be revived when it had not been in general use before 
134 
or afterwards . A third and more serious difficulty is provided by 
the absence of any other signs that Harclay had displeased the court. 
He was granted a renewed commission to receive rebel Scots back into 
peace on August 7, the operative date for pardons granted to Lancastrian 
135 followers . Three possible explanations seem plausible for Harclay's 
being grated a pardon in 1318, though none of them seems unassailable. 
Firstly it cannot be accepted beyond reasonable doubt that the Andrew de 
Harclay pardoned was the future Earl of Carlisle. Secondly it is 
possible that Harclay's name found its way on to the lists of those to 
be pardoned from earlier lists of those who had links with Lancaster or 
another of his adherents, perhaps dating back to 1309. This would 
explain the reference to Harclay's father which might make more sense 
in the context of the earlier years of Edward's reign. Finally, and in 
light of the later events, this explanation seems the most satisfactory, 
the pardon may be connected more with Harclay's attempts to gain control 
of Carlisle castle earlier in the summer than with any part he had 
played in support of Lancaster even though it had become, in some way, 
with the larger mass of pardons granted to Lancaster's supporters. 
Anthony de Lucy's period as commander of the West March during the 
Autumn and Winter of 1318 and early 1319 co-incide with one of the 
134 See for example CCR 1313-18, 127 
1 3 5 RS , v 1 , 1 7 0 
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spells of paralysis endemic to Edward II's war effort. Though there 
was probably no justifiable reason to associate Lucy with this inaction, 
when a renewed accord between Edward and the Earl of Lancaster led to a 
more vigorous military policy, Lucy was passed over and Harclay was re-
. d 136 
appolnte Harclay was re-appointed as custodian of Cumberland and 
Westmorland in April 1319. He was also granted control of the castle 
and manors of Cockermouth to provide him with additional resources for 
h . . 137 lS operatlons This was a direct blow to Anthony Lucy who had 
succeeded in gaining a grant of custody of the lordship in December 
1318 138 . Cockermouth was a matter of very particular interest to Lucy, 
since the lordship was not merely contiguous with his own holding of 
139 Aspatria, but the two were judicially inter-dependent The Lucy 
family had attempted to gain control of Cockermouth over a long period 
of time on the strength of their claim as heirs of Aveline de Forz, 
usually in conjunction with their cousins the Multons of Egremont. 
Their most recent attempt had been in 1315 but this, like their earlier 
ff h d b d . d 140 e orts, a een enle . Having succeeded in gaining temporary 
control of it, Lucy had now to see the lordship snatched away for 
Harclay's benefit. 
Though Lucy had done little wrong during his tenure of command, it seems 
probable that Harclay was preferred to him for command during the spring 
of 1319 to facilitate the planned offensive against the Scots. Harclay's 
selection was probably made in light of his proven ability to get men 
into the field. In this respect he justified the appointment and was 
136 ibid, 181 
137 CFR 1307-19, 395, 396 
138 ibid, 386 
139 PQW, 112, 113 
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able to lead a very powerful force on campaign. At the core of Barclay's 
force was the garrison of Carlisle castle consisting of 25 men at arms, 
8 crossbowmen and 40 foot archers who were organised into two platoons 
h f d h d f . 141 eac o twenty men un er t e comman o a Vlntenar . This force left 
Carlisle on 20 August and crossed to Newcastle where it met up with 
forces coming from further south. It was joined shortly afterwards by 
Barclay with a larger force consisting of over 1000 men. This force 
consisted of 3 knights and 13 esquires, two of whom were later promoted 
to knights, 361 hobelars and 980 foot raised from Cumberland and 
Westmorland, again divided into platoons commanded by vintenars 142 
This main group was suplemented by a number of smaller forces led by 
local magnates of which the largest was that led by Anthony de Lucy 
consisting of 73 hobelars which served from 1 September until the 9th. 
The household knight Hugh de Louther served with 7 knights, 25 hobelars 
and 20 foot from 28 August to 28 September, as did John de Stirkland 
who served with his two collegues. Stirkland served with such distinction 
143 
that he was dubbed as a knight on 14 September westmorland was 
represented by two groups, one led by Robert de Welle and another force 
led by Roger de Clifford. Clifford's force was small consisting of only 
two knights and eight esquires and it is significant that this was the 
largest force Clifford was able to raise, evidence of how far his minority 
144 had weakened his family's hold on Westmorland 
From the English point of view there were several positive features to 
the Berwick campaign. Perhaps the most important of these was the short 
141 E.101.378/4, m13 
142 ibid, mm 20, 37; E.101.15/27 
143 E.101/378/4, m20; British Library Additional, MS 17362, f35 
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lived identity of purpose between the king and the Earl of Lancaster. 
Secondly the size of the force as recorded by surviving payrolls 
testified to the fact the English military potential was still very 
formidable. The overwhelming negative factor in the calculations 
remained the tactical ineptitude and imprudence of Edward and his 
advisers. Though their decision to attack Berwick was a wholly reason-
able one, the city was the key to any projected advance into Scotland, 
145 
the organisation of the army for the siege flew in the face of caution 
Except for a few miles east of Berwick the whole border lay open to Scots 
incursions. Even the vital garrison in Carlisle had been run down to add 
a few men for the attack on Berwick. The Scots were left with the option 
of a major attack in the west or a flanking manoeuvre to cut off the 
English retreat. This proved to be the tactic which the Scots 
employed and by 3 September a Scots force had crossed the border without 
difficulty and was engaged in raiding Yorkshire. Shortly afterwards 
Randolph and Douglas inflicted a severe defeat on a force hastily 
assembled by William de Melton for local defence. Even before this, 
however, the army at Berwick had begun to break up. Anthony Lucy and his 
men left the army on 9 September and most of Barclay's men the day after, 
leaving Barclay with a force consisting of only 38 hobelars and 32 foot 146 
Barclay himself seems to have stayed with the king until the army 
disintegrated amid bitter recriminations between the Lancastri~faction 
145 Vita, 94, 95. Or' Maddicott (Lancas~, 246) has argued that Edward 
decided to attack Berwick only at the last minute, largely on the 
grounds that a siege engine and ditchers were ordered to be sent 
from Holderness on 9 September (Bain, CDS, v3, no 663). While it 
is true that extra siege machinery was ordered the army already 
had a 'sow' which was used on 13 September (Lanercost, 239). It 
seems likely that this could have been brought from Holderness as 
a result of the order of the ninth of the month. News of the 
battle of Myton reached the king two days later and if we assume 
that the king's letter travelled at this speed it would still have 
required extraordinary expedition to bring the siege machinery 
north for use before the siege was abandoned. 
146 E.101/378/4, mm 35, 35d 
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and the Despensers. Cowardice by one party or the other proved a more 
popular explanation of failure than the bad planning which had allowed 
147 
the Scots to march unopposed through the north of England Harclay 
seems to have marched south with the king after the collapse of the 
siege and he was with the king at York on 25 October to collect his 
148 This accords very badly with Harclay's reputation as a pay 
stalwart defender of the March, for while he was there the Scots 
raided the March as they withdrew after the victory at Myton. They 
returned again towards the end of October plundering as far south as 
Brough under Stanemoor, before going back to Scotland with large 
quantities of cattle. They also burned the grain stored in granges 
after the harvest with the result that famine and disease were added 
149 
to the other troubles of the region 
It was clear from the collapse of the offensive of 1319 that no 
military solution to Edward's problem with the Scots was possible. 
In addition, Edward's obligations to the king of France necessitated 
him making a trip to France to do homage for Guienne and Ponthieu. 
Accordingly negotiations for a truce were set in train and Bishop 
Halton, Pembroke, Hugh Despenser Junior and Badlesmere negotiated a 
150 
truce with the Scots to run from 1 January 1320 for two years 
Shortly afterwards Harclay and Anthony de Lucy were appointed as 
wardens to monitor the truce in Cumberland and Westmorland. Harclay's 
attitude to the truce was clearly equivocal, however. On 28 January 
a bond was made in which Robert D'Umfraville, Henry de Beaumont, John 
de Clavering, John de Moubray and Harclay acknowledged a debt payable 
147 Vita, 98 
148 E.101.378/4, m20 
149 Lanercost, 240 
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151 
to Valence, Despenser and Badlesmere . This bond was almost 
certainly intended to ensure that Harclay and the others observed 
152 
the terms of the much needed truce It also provides useful 
evidence on Barclay's alignment at this time. Notwithstanding his 
total failure to defend the West March during the previous autumn it 
is clear that he was closely associated with a group who were committed 
to the continuation of the war at all costs. Two of them1 Beaumont and 
Umfraville 1were to play a leading part in the campaigns organised by 
153 
the 'Disinherited' during Edward III's reign 
As important as the alignment that Barclay's association with Beaumont 
and the others implied, were the personal contacts which he was 
evidently enjoying at this time. Beaumont was a close confidant of 
Edward II and it is clear that Harclay too was rising in Edward's 
entourage even if he was not yet a member of the king's innermost 
circle . On June 18 orders were issued for Harclay and Lucy to 
continue as conservators of the truce with the Scots but though Harclay 
was probably intended as the senior of the two it was planned that Lucy 
should undertake most of the work. The king had other plans for 
154 Harclay • Two days later protections were issued for him and two of 
his closest followers, Patrick de Culwen and Richard de Halton, to 
155 
accompany the king to France Whether Harclay had been included in 
the group going to France as an adviser on the Scottish problem or as a 
device to ensure that he did not try to mount any action on his own 
initiative, it is clear that he had emerged as a dominant force on the 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
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West March by this time. Of three commissioners appointed to conserve 
the peace in July 1320, one was Robert de Leyburn and another was 
Alexander de Bassenthwaite who was a retainer of Harclay and had 
presented his account at the Exchequer for Harclay's service as 
156 
sheriff in the eighth year of the king's reign Harclay's domin-
ance was demonstrated in other ways too. Andrew and his brother used 
their local power to extend their landed holdings. John de Skelton, 
for example, was forced to make over his share in a mill at Blencarne 
157 
and the service owed to him by Adam Steadman to John de Harclay 
They also used their growing estate to reward their followers. Walter 
de Stirkland, for example, was granted lands in Hakethorp to be held 
158 
of John de Harclay 
Harclay returned to the West March by 13 November 1320 when protections 
159 
were issued to him and his followers Harclay and his men were 
probably engaged in pacifying groups of rebels who had gone over to the 
Scots side, ,Tior even though the truce was still in force he was granted 
160 
a power to receive Scots back into the king's allegiance It is 
very possible that the armed force Harclay was empowered to keep 
assisted his territorial schemes. There is evidence that some people 
found it prudent to pay for Harclay's favour. This was probably the 
explanation behind bonds for £60 which Hugh de Louther and Robert de 
161 Welle entered with Andrew Harclay During the following months 
Harclay was able to extend his influence still further. In May 1321 
156 idem; E.372/164, Cumberland 
157 CRO D/Lons/L/Deeds, p 37 
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Richard de Budlestone appeared as a member of Barclay's retinue. In 
the following summer he was joined by Michael and John de Barrington162 
These were significant recruits for two reasons. First, though none of 
these men had abandoned their earlier links with the Earl of Lancaster, 
it is clear that Barclay was beginning to draw support from among the 
Earl's supporters. This would be of major importance later. Secondly 
the recruitment of men from south-west Cumberland was evidence of 
growing territorial influence now extending into Copeland and a clue 
that Barclay's power was emerging as a threat to that of Budlestone 
and'Harrington's territorial lord, Thomas de Multon of Egremont. 
Barclay's contacts in Copeland were a threat to Anthony de Lucy too. 
Barclay had already ousted him from Cockermouth, now his nascent 
power in south-west Cumberland began to cast a shadow over Lucy's 
h ld . . . 163 o lngs ln Aspatrla Lucy did receive some compensation for the 
losses he had suffered with an assignment of the royal manors of 
Penrith and Soureby to hold until he had been repaid a sum of wages 
that was owed to him, but this was very slight consolation for Barclay's 
164 dangerous gains in Lucy's home territory and of Cokermouth above all . 
Barclay's power on the West March was growing during 1321 but he was 
not yet completely dominant and some northerners were still prepared to 
back the Earl of Lancaster against the Despensers. Even if their 
loyalty to the Earl was beginning to come under reconsideration, 
Lancaster's fe~d men, Richard de Budlestone and the Barringtons, 
supported him as did two more important men from the West March, Thomas 
de Multon of Egremont and Ralph de Greystoke. They were joined by a 
162 CPR 1318-21, 583; CPR 1321-24, 130, 
163 CPR 1321-24, 200 
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164 CPR 1317-21, 409. It would be inaccurate, however, to describe 
Lucy as 'Lord of Penrith' as Dr Fryde chooses to do. Tyranny 
157 
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new recruit to the magnate ranks, Ranulph de Dacre, now holder of 
Gilsland and Burgh by Sands in right of his wife. Another very 
important recruit to Lancaster's party was Roger IV de Clifford whose 
hostility to the Despensers was assured since he held them to have 
166 disinherited his mother Though Roger de Clifford spent much of 
his career in Wales and his influence in Westmorland was certainly 
less than his fathers had been, his adherence to Lancaster had 
important effects in Westmorland. His leadership was still enough to 
bring the support of a number of Westmorland men with it including 
John de Stirkland, Robert de Bampton, Robert and William L'Engleys, 
167 Hugh de Louther, John de Orreton and Roger de Brunnolsheved 
Anthony de Lucy was also pardoned at Clifford's instance. It seems 
probable that the vital factor determining Lucy's support for Lancaster 
was his opposition to Barclay, since he could only benefit from any 
re-organisation of the border which might weaken Barclay's role. 
The early summer of 1321 marked the high point of support for the Earl 
of Lancaster on the West March. Even though his meeting at Sherburn 
was attended by the Bishops of Durham and of Carlisle his backing was 
slipping away. Louis de Beaumont in any case can hardly have been 
regarded as a political supporter of Lancasters1• Illness may have 
removed another of Lancaster's supporters since Multon of Egremont died 
in the following February. Others such as Ralph de Greystoke and 
Ranulph de Dacre simply deserted the Earl's cause. Greystoke did not 
attend the Sherburn meeting but even though Dacre did, he was prudent 
enough not to follow Lancaster into armed opposition. 
166 Vita, 109 
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The hostilities between the king's party and that of Lancaster ran 
without interruption into the winter of 1321 and in November Harclay 
was ordered to raise forces against the contrariants. Civil war, 
however, was only one of the problems facing the West March. On the 
first day of 1322 the truce of two years that had been negotiated with 
h . 1319 . d 168 t e Scots 1n exp1re Within a week of the end of the truce, 
Moray, Douglas and the Stewart has crossed the border to attack 
Northumberland and Durham. Cumbria was clearly in line for renewed 
attacks as well and Harclay, who had surveyed the defects in the 
castles of Cockermouth and Carlisle the previous years, can have been 
169 
under no illusions about his ability to repel any attack . 
Accordingly he left hurriedly for the south to consult the king whom 
he met at Gloucester early in February 1322. Though the account which 
is presented by the Vita is certainly stylised, the content can be 
170 
accepted as accurate . Harclay reported the desperate situation on 
the March and requested that the king should turn his efforts to the 
defeat of the Scots notwithstanding the danger from Lancaster and his 
supporters. Edward, on the other hand, placed an absolute priority on 
the defeat of the Contrariants and in order to free his hands to deal 
with the problem he was prepared to relegate the war to second place. 
He granted Harclay a commission to re-open negotiations with the Scots 
f f . l 171 or a 1na peace . That was all that the king was prepared to do 
to alleviate the problem of the border but the trip was not without 
real advantages for Harclay himself. In February news of the Marchers 
final rebellion broke at court and Harclay was commissioned to take 
172 Roger de Clifford's lands into the king's hands 
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Barclay made another important gain at the expense of Anthony de Lucy 
when the liberty of Tynedale was removed from Lucy and given to Barclay, 
probably because Lucy remained under suspicion of harbouring Lancastrian 
173 
sympathies 
Equipped with these valuable instructions Barclay hurried north to 
raise the forces of Cumberland and Westmorland against Lancaster. 
Lancaster had already forfeited much of his support from the northern-
ers by refusing to attack the Scots, after giving only what the 
174 Lanercost Chronicler thought were just feigned excuses Deserted 
by his northern men and even by men he trusted as much as Robert de 
Holland, Lancaster briefly laid siege to Tickhill before joining the 
rebel Marchers at Burton on Trent. Having already let the time for a 
successful military confrontation with the king's forces slip by, 
Lancaster and his allies were left only one option, an inglorious 
retreat. Rejecting the splendid fortifications of Pontefract they 
retreated north in disarray and in poor spirits. Lancaster himself 
wished to make a stand at Pontefract and had to be physically threat-
ened by Roger de Clifford before he would consent to move further 
175 
north Lancaster claimed that were the rebels to have retreated 
north it would be thought that they were making for Scotland. It 
seems, in fact, that this was nothing less than the truth. 
Dunstanburgh could have provided no effective refuge for the rebels 
and both Lancaster and Roger de Clifford were deeply implicated in a 
176 
treasonous correspondence with the Scots The rebels reached 
neither Dunstanburgh nor Scotland, however. At Boroughbridge they were 
173 ibid, 94 
174 Lanercost, 242 
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intercepted by Andrew de Harclay who had taken command of the crossings 
of the River Ure, over which the rebels had to find their way if they 
177 
were to go any further The battle, or more precisely skirmish, 
which resulted when Lancaster and Hereford attempted to cross the Ure 
in the face of Harclay's opposition has been written into the canon of 
English and even Scottish historiography as a major set piece compar-
able with Bannockburn or the battles of the Hundred Years War. This 
tradition seems to have originated with an article written by T. F. 
Tout in which Harclay was described as the originator of the English 
178 
tactic of employing men at arms to fight defensively on foot 
Tout went on to suggest, on no clear evidence, that Harclay's pikemen 
were interspersed among the archers and that this was the origin of 
the tactics that were to prove successful for Edward III against the 
French. Tout's version of the battle was based on the account 
contained in the Lanercost Chronicle to the exclusion of all other 
sources but this has not limited its appeal. It was developed by 
J. E. Morris who was always ready to regard Harclay in the most 
favourable light, and it has many distinguished adherents to this day. 
Dr J. R. Maddicott, for example, has written that Boroughbridge 'was 
more important for military history than political', while Professor 
Barrow has described Harclay's tactics as 'a deliberate and masterly 
179 imitation of Bruces' at Bannockburn' 
Though the account in Lanercost is a valuable one, it is neither the 
only one available nor is it necessarily the most accurate. It is, 
however, probably the most dramatic and that which lends itself best 
177 Vita, 123 
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179 Maddicott- Lanercost, 193; Barrow- Bruce, 344; 
Page 338 
the pattern Tout and Morris were too ready to impose. There are 
four other chronicles which has light to shed on the battle of Borough-
180 bridge and of these the Vita is by far the most informative but 
there are also important other details in the Gesta of the Canon of 
Bridlington and the Meaux Chronicle 181 In addition to these 
182 
accounts there is the narrative contained in The Brut This, 
however, seems to have been excessively stylised and its accuracy is 
seriously brought into doubt by it partisan bias. 
The most convincing narrative which can be constructed from the 
various sources is that the rebel earls arrived at Boroughbridge late 
in the day on 16 March. They were already settling into their lodgings 
when they became aware that Harclay and his men had already occupied 
the two c~ossings of the River Ure to the north of the village. The 
river could be c~ossed by means either of a narrow wooden bridge or a 
183 ford and Harclay had taken control of both . The Contrariants 
split their forces into two parts. One party of cavalry led by the 
Earl of Lancaster attempted to force the ford while Herefore and 
Clifford endeavoured to force a way across the bridge. Both Lanercost 
and the Vita agree that they were forced to dismount since the bridge 
was not sufficiently substantial to take a war horse. According to 
the Lanercost account, Harclay had stationed his men at arms and pike-
men in the Scottish fashion at the ends of the bridge and of the ford. 
This savoured of Bruce's practice but the friar who wrote the 
chronicle went on to undermine his comparison by noting that Harclay 
ordered his archers to fire on the earls as they approached. Though 
the Scots were reported to have many archers in their force at 
180 Vita, 123 
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Carlisle in 1315, there is no evidence that the Scots made extensive 
use of archers at Bannockburn and their use at Boroughbridge may have 
184 been exaggerated . Harclay's force at Boroughbridge was probably 
very similar in composition to that he led to Berwick in 1319 and that 
force had contained relatively few archers. Hereford and Roger de 
Clifford, a man physically well fitted for the role of the warrior, 
possessing enormous resources of strength, led the way to their 
objective, the narrow wooden bridge and they reached it before the 
Earl of Lancaster had arrived at the ford. Hereford and Clifford were 
probably first on to the bridge but they were closely followed by 
Hereford's standard bearers Ralph de Applinsdene, William de Sule and 
Roger de Berefield. Because of the narrowness of the bridge it was 
possible for only one or at most two men to cross it at a time and 
Hereford may well have been the first to mount the bridge. On the 
bridge the rebel noblemen were confronted by a gauntlet of pikes thrust 
at them from every side. The Meaux Chronicle confirms a story found in 
The Brut that one of Harclay's men even hid unchivalrously underneath 
the bridge and from this vantage point skewek,tthe Earl as he fought 
above. Geoffrey le Baker later incorporated the Earl's ignominious 
death into his narrative but unaccountably added the detail that the 
Earl's assailant was a Welshman. It seems more likely that any Welsh-
men at Boroughbridge were serving in the Earl's force than that they 
185 
were under Harclay Despite the loss of their leader the rebels 
on the bridge seem to have made a determined attempt to force a 
crossing and fierce fighting resulted. The narrowness of the bridge 
stopped the Contrariants from bringing their re-inforcements to bear. 
Shortly they were forced to retreat with most of those who had attempted 
184 Lanercost, 243, 229 
185 EM Thomson- Chronicon Galfridi le Baker (Oxford 1889), 14; 
Fryde- Tyranny, 17, curiously chose· to accept this without 
question. 
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to force the crossing including Roger de Clifford, seriously wounded. 
Lancaster's force of cavalry reached the ford a little later and their 
morale, the Vita and the Bridlin~ton accounts are agreed, had been 
adversely affected by the failure of the Earl of Hereford and by his 
death. The result was that, in marked contrast to the traditional 
account of Boroughbridge which seems to require a full scale cavalry 
charge, the Earl of Lancaster's attempt to cross the Ure was a very 
half-hearted affair. The Lanercost Chronicle states that the Earl's 
men were unable to enter the river because of the density of the 
arrows loosed at them, but the Vita suggests that a mere shower of 
arrows was enough to make the Earl turn back and accept defeat. The 
affair had indeed been quickly settled. 
There is agreement that a truce was negotiated between Harclay and 
the Earl of Lancaster to last until the following day but there is a 
degree of divergence about the details of how this truce was negotiated. 
It is worth considering this truce in detail too, for it forms an 
integral part of Harclay's reputation. The Vita simply records that a 
truce was arranged between Harclay and Lancaster and after that both 
men returned to their lodging to await daybreak. Neither the accounts 
in the Meaux Chronicle nor the Canon of Bridlington adds anything of 
significance to the account in the Vita, but the Lanercost version of 
the battle suggests that the truce was, in fact, arranged through 
messengers sent from one to the other. The Brut's description is at 
odds with these accounts and it is couched in terms of high drama. It 
suggests that Lancaster and Harclay met face to face and that first of 
all Lancaster tried to win Harclay over to his side with the promise of 
large grants of land. Finally when Harclay stressed his loyalty to 
the king, Lancaster replied with a prescience surely born of hindsight 
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that within a year Harclay would suffer the same fate as Lancaster. 
'And so' continues The Brut 'went the false traitor Harclay, for it 
was through the noble Earl Thomas of Lancaster that he was first made 
a knight'. There is no independent evidence that this was, in fact, 
true. The story is repeated in the Eulogium Historiarum but this is 
a repetition of the Brut's account rather than corroboration of it 
186 
since it is largely based on The Brut . In the absence of any 
proof that Harclay was knighted by Lancaster, though it is not on its 
own merits impossible, the story seems hard to accept. The Brut seems 
to have been written with a greater regard for literary and dramatic 
merit than for absolute accuracy and the tale of Harclay's knighting 
by the Earl of Lancaster is wholly consistent with the Brut's 
eulogistic, even hagiographic, account of Lancaster's career. The 
Brut sets out to portray Lancaster as a saint and his betrayal by a 
man he had apparently trusted adds a distinctly biblical overtone to 
187 
the Earl's defeat and death . A second point is worth making too. 
Even were it true that Harclay had been knighted by the Earl of 
Lancaster, it in no way follows from this that Harclay was ever one 
of the Earl's retainers. While a lord might knight one of his own 
followers, knighthood and indentures of retinue were not interchange-
able and aspiring knights were generally dubbed by any available 
188 dignitary 
Whatever hope Lancaster had of support arriving for his side during 
186 F S Haydon - Eulogium Historiarum (Rolls Series 1863), v3, 196 
187 Bray - 'Concepts of Sainthood in Fourteenth Century England' 
Bulletin of the John Ryland's University Library, New Series, 
v4 ( 1'984) ~i"6. 
188 If Harclay was knighted by Lancaster, though there is no 
corroborative evidence that he was, it may have taken place 
at the Dunst able tournament. Fryde - Tyranny ,tt accepts that 
Harclay was one of Lancaster's retainers on the strength of 
the Brut's statement that he was knighted by the earl, 56. 
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the night proved to be groundless, though Harclay cautiously stationed 
men at both crossings in case Lancaster should try a night attack. 
In fact, Lancaster gained nothing by seeking a postponement and during 
the night many of his force disappeared. Hereford's men drifted away 
after their lord's death and Roger de Clifford's men did the same. 
Many of Lancaster's own men also deserted him, leaving only Lancaster 
and the severely wounded Clifford and Moubray to await capture. 
During the night Harclay was joined by an additional body of men 
brought from York under the Sheriff of Yorkshire, Simon Ward, and 
supported by this force Harclay moved in Boroughbridge probably at 
f . 1' h ak' d 189 1.rst 1.g t, t 1.ng Lancaster unprepare Arresting Lancaster 
and the remnants of his. force, Harclay took them in cus.tody to York 
and thence to Pontefract where a hastily convened court passed 
sentence of death on them after very summary proceedings. Lancaster's 
less noteworthy followers w.ere left prey to be attacked and robbed by 
local people and members of Harclay's force 190 
There is. no doubt that on a national scale the defeat and executions 
of the Contrariants was of the first importance. On the West March, 
however, the Boroughbridge campaign was less decisive. Events in the 
north continued to be dominated by Bruce and on another level by the 
continuing rise of Harclay himself. Edward rewarded Harclay for his 
services by elevating him to the title of Earl of Carlisle and with a 
191 promise to grant him 1000 marks worth of land • Half of this was 
to be in Cumberland and Westmorland and half was to be in the March of 
Wales. Harclay was paid in very doubtful coin. At the end of April 
1322 he was granted Brougham, Mallerstang, Meburn Regis, Kirby Stephen, 
189 Brut, 217 
190 C.Inq.Misc, v2, no 527 
191 CPR 1321-24, 93 
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Langton and Whinfell, all o£ which had been forfeited by Roger de 
Clifford. These lands were placed at the optimistic valuation o£ 
192 £200 In the following June, he was granted Wark in Tynedale to 
hold by the service o£ one goshawk. This was valued at £120 but this 
was even more hopeful. In 1315 the Scots had effectively occupied 
Tynedale and Bruce had parcelled some parts o£ it out among his 
followers. Even if the S.cots no longer held Tynedale it had been so 
193 
thoroughly plundered as. to be virtually valueless There is no 
record of any grant in fulfillment o£ the promise o£ 500 marks worth 
of land in the March o£ Wales. 
Despite the forfeiture of Roger de Clifford, Barclay gained control o£ 
only a part, though a substantial one o£ Clifford's former lands. He 
was not granted the manor and castle o£ Appleby and Edward II reversed 
John's policy by retaining in the hands. of the crown, not only the 
shrievalty of the county of Westmorland but also the service due to 
the lords of Appleby by the carnage tenants o£ Westmorland. Barclay 
also faced growing competition £or influence in Westmorland. Maud de 
Clifford's husband, Robert de Welle, was a rising star and there is 
evidence to suggest that both~the Younger Despenser and Robert de 
Baldock began to take a growing interest in Cumbria. During the 
summer of 1322 Barclay seems to have become involved in a potentially 
dangerous competition with de W.elle and Despenser as he tried to build 
up his following in Westmorland. In July 1322 a pardon was issued to 
William L'Engleys, one of Roger de Clifford's former adherents, at the 
instance of Robert de Welle 194 . Four days later John de Stirkland 
19.5 
was pardoned at the behest of Despenser and de Welle In October 
192 C.Chart.R 1300-26, 442 
193 ibid, 445 
194 CPR 1321~24, 193 
195 ibid, 201 
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they also obtained a pardon for Robert de Watervill, though W.atervill 
. d 196 had no known connection WJ.th_Westmorlan . Both de Welle and 
Despenser had clear designs on other of Clifford's lands. Despenser 
gained control of Clifford's lands in Wales after Boroughbridge and 
in September de Welle was granted a parcel of land in London which 
had formerly been held by Clifford 197 Even Robert de Baldock took 
part in the general free-for-all. In June he was granted the king's 
righ.ts. in thos.e kni.gh.t' s fees which Roger de Clifford had held in 
ll 198 common with John de Cromwe . In danger of being outbid by these 
dangerous rivals for support, in September 1322 Harclay obtained a 
pardon for Hugh de Louther, another of Clifford's former men, though 
l 199 events were to prove that Louther owed Harclay little oyalty 
If the entry of the Younger Despenser into the West March, in whatever 
degree offered a. new potential rival for Harclay that neither inhibited 
him from trying to expand his influence nor from pursuing old rivalries. 
One of the chief targets of this policy was Anthony de Lucy. As soon 
as the rebellion had broken out Harclay took the opportunity to sieze 
de Lucy's lands and chattels., claiming that he was a supporter of the 
rebels. When, however, Lucy was able to demonstrate that he had not 
joined in the rebellion, Harclay was forced to restore Aspatria and 
P 'th h' 200 enr1.. . to 1.m . This did not end Harclay' s campaign against Lucy, 
however, and Harclay continued to make moves against him in court even 
though he retained him in the force that he led against the Scots. 
196 C.Chart.R 1300-26, 442, 443 
197 CPR 1321-24, 206 
198 ibid, 193 
199 ibid, 201 
200 CCR 1318-23, 434 
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Barclay's career as Earl of Carlisle was dominated by the twin themes 
of military operations against the Scots and his own attempts at 
territorial aggrandisement. Indeed, the expansion of Barclay's landed 
estate depended on success against the Scots. The position of any man 
who depended on Edward II.' s. mili.tary successes was a precarious one 
but in the spring of 1322 there were some signs for hope. Edward was 
apparently sympatheti.c to calls for a renewed offensive against the 
Scots, a remedy in whi.ch the borderers had persistent, if misplaced 
faith.. The king remained in the north after the defeat of the Earl of 
Lancas.ter and preparations were made for the campaign. Barclay was 
bound to play a leading role both in the planned attack on Scotland 
and in any preparations to resi.st Scots counter-attacks. In March he 
had been appointed as. keeper of the counties of Yorkshire, Lancaster, 
Cumberland, Westmorland, Northumberland and the Bishopric of Durham 
for thei.r defence. The Scots and the foot recruited fro.m these 
counties for the campaign into Scotland were placed under his command201 : 
The campaign as a whole was badly organised, and since Barclay was one 
of the chief commanders this can only reflects to his discredit. In 
spi.te of Barclay's reputation as a leader and organiser of hobelars, 
massive levies of foot were envisaged as an integral part of the 
campaign, many of those serving being from Wales. The ini.tial muster 
of the army was planned for 13 June but Edward and his advisors let the 
best months of the season slip by and it was almost the end of August 
when the army finally mustered at Newcastle. In the interim the 
initiative was left with the Scots and with Barclay who was charged 
with the defence of the English Marches. In early June Barclay was 
serving on the borders with. a strong force which reflected his increas-
ing power in the north.of England as a whole. As well as established 
201 CPR 1321-24, 92 
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retainers such as William le Blount, Patrick de Curwen and John de 
Harclay the force included a number of former Clifford retainers such 
as Robert de Askeby and former followers of the Earl of Lancaster, 
Richard de Hudlestone and John de Harrington. Ralph de Neville from 
Durham also served under him as well as a strong force from Cumberland 
including Ranulph de Dacre, Ri.chard de Denton, Richard le Brun, Peter 
de Tilliol and Anthony de Lucy. Since Lucy's name appeared immediately 
after that of Harclay it seems probable that he was. one of the earl's 
. 202 
chief lJ.eutenants . Harclay's efforts to defend the border seem to 
have been wholly ineffective. Apparently taking note of the preparations 
in the east the Scots attacked down the west coast. Entering Cumberland 
on 19 June the Scots burned the Bishop of Carlisle's manor of Rose then 
proceeded into Allerdale, a direct blow to both Harclay and Lucy's lands 
there, before advancing south into Copeland burning Holm Cultram as they 
went. From Copeland the Scots proceeded into Furness where they first 
took. protection money from the Abbot and then, possibly unsatisfied, 
burnt parts of Furness. This done they crossed the Kent, putting Lancaster 
to flames and advancing as far south. as Preston. They then returned 
north through the Eden Valley plundering as they went. Reaching 
Carlisle, the Scots set up camp with. complete immunity and spent several 
days plundering the surrounding district before returning for home at t 
203 
the end of July Neither Harclay nor anyone else had done anything 
to interrupt their progress. 
Harclay joined the king in preparation for the planned offensive late 
in August at Newcastle. Harclay's contingent was an important one in 
the campaign and like the force that he had brought to Berwick in 1319 
202 CPR 1321-24, 130 
203 Lanercost, 246 
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it included a large number of light cavalry. The hobelars in Harclay's 
force were divided into two groups, originally there were 354 who were 
paid at 6d per day and 1081 who received 4d daily, almost three 
quarters of the total hobelars in the whole army. He also brought 2069 
foot from the counties of Cumberland and Westmorland, who were under 
the command of two of his followers, Robert de Bampton and Richard de 
204 Denton . Like the Berwick campaign three years earlier, the 
mobilisation was impressive but the English army was totally outmanoeuv-
red. Bruce retreated north of the Firth of Forth destroying anything 
which might have been of use to the invaders. Faced with supplying a 
large army in a devastated wilderness the English supply arrangements 
collapsed with the result that famine and disease inflicted heavier 
205 
casualties than did the Scots The campaign was, in fact, a thorough 
fiasco and was probably the least successful of Edward's reign. 
Harclay's contribution to the campaign is harder to assess than that of 
his sovereign and commander. It is not certain, for example, how far 
Harclay was responsible for devising what passed for strategy on the 
campaign. However, it is clear that Harclay was not able to make any 
significant contribution to the campaign. If Harclay's hobelars were 
intended to bring the Scots to battle they failed in this, or if they 
were meant to act as scouts this added very little to the success of 
the campaign. Nor, it is clear, did they function as foragers. 
Finally it is evident that discipline in Harclay's force was little 
better than in the rest of the army. It suffered severely from 
desertion, or possibly from the famine that afflicted the whole army. 
In all Harclay's force included 113 men at arms when it first mustered 
204 British Library, M S Stowe, 553, f82v; CPR 1321-24, 125 
205 Lanercost, 247 
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on the 21 August as well as 384 hobelars paid at 6d daily and 1081 at 
4d per day. By the 29 August the force had been reduced from over 
2000 to only 629. Plainly this was not a force of battle hardened 
veterans forged into a coherent force by years of fighting though it 
b bl h . f d 11 . d d 206 is pro a e t at lt was orme round a we organlse ca re On 
30 August, at the end of the campaign, Harclay reduced his force to 
what was probably its usual level, 18 men at arms, 97 hobelars and 
48 foot and Harclay remained on patrol on the Marches while the king 
improvidently disbanded the rest of his forces. Barclay's force from 
the evidence of the protections he swore out for his leading followers, 
was drawn mainly from the West March and included Ranulph de Dacre, 
Michael de Harrington, Patrick de Culwen, Richard de Hudlestone and 
207 Anthony de Lucy It seems likely that Harclay led his force 
westwards to protect their own estates. Their efforts to defend the 
March were once again unsuccessful, however. At Michaelmas, Bruce 
crossed the Solway and set up camp at Beaumont near Carlisle. The 
Scots scouts, in contrast to the English a few months earlier, ranged 
widely over the north of England keeping the Scots king well informed 
about Edward's movements. Believing Edward to be in Blackmoor in 
Cleveland, Bruce's men left Carlisle and crossed the Pennines in a 
208 forced march . Realising the danger he was in Edward rapidly 
summoned assistance from Harclay who raised a force from Cumberland 
and Westmorland and set off in pursuit of the Scots. The progress of 
Harclay and his men bore many similarities to that of the Scots. 
Harclay seems generally to have allowed his men to live off the 
countryside even when they were in England and this occasion was no 
206 British Library, M S Stowe, 553, f82v 
207 Lanercost, 247 
208 idem. Contrast Fryde - Tyranny, 131 
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different. Henry FitzHugh later complained that Hugh de Louther and 
others in Harclay's retinue had caused over £300 worth of damage to 
209 his estates as they marched to Yorkshire to join the king 
Harclay received the king's summons he did not arrive in time to 
Though 
prevent the debacle at Byland though he may have hoped to cut off the 
Scots if they tried to cross the Ure at Boroughbridge, the site of 
210 his earlier victory Edward's close escape from capture at Byland 
needs no further exposition but it is clear that the king was 
dissatisfied with Harclay's conduct. Edward was a firm believer that 
his misfortunes were the fault of others and on this occasion he 
considered that he had been betrayed by Harclay. Edward passed 
through Bridlington on his way south after his escape and the 
chronicle may well record something of Edward's views on the failure 
of the campaign. If this is true, the king accused Harclay of 
remaining plundering around Boroughbridge while the battle of Byland 
was in progress expecting, or at least doing nothing to prevent 
210 Edward's capture . According to the Lanercost Chronicle, however, 
which was less influenced by Edward's irrational recriminations, 
Harclay rejoined the king at York, but realising that Edward had no 
force mustered and intended to abandon the campaign, disbanded his 
211 forces and returned home 
Harclay's fall followed so swiftly on the Byland debacle that the 
Lanercost Chronicler believed that it was Edward's conduct on that 
212 
occasion that convinced Harclay to seek peace with the Scots 
209 SC.l.49/80 
210 Bridlington, 82 
211 Lanercost, 82 
212 idem 
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The Bridlington writer in part supports this and shows that by the 
autumn of 1322 Harclay had used up much of the goodwill which his 
victory at Boroughbridge had earned him from Edward II. It is clear, 
however, that there was a recognisable hiatus between Byland and 
Harclay's downfall. During this period Harclay continued ruthless 
and desperate attempts to exert his superiority on the West March. 
In November he forced John Wake to enroll a recognisance to him in 
Chancery for a sum of over £400, though other details of the agreement 
213 
are lost Harclay's desperate determination to expand his estate 
even triumphed over family loyalty. John de Harclay died late in 
November 1322 and immediately the harsh side of Harclay's leadership 
was revealed. John de Harclay held the peel of Highhead and a good 
spread of other lands in Cumberland but as soon as he was dead Andrew 
evicted John's widow, Errniarde, from the tower and took John's lands 
214 
of Gatescales and Whithale into his own possession Highhead had, 
it is true, a military significance, but the ruthless pursuit of land 
which led Harclay to disinherit his nephew suggests that he was a man 
to whom loyalty had to be extorted by threat and duress rather than 
being granted spontaneously. 
Harclay behaved in an equally harsh way towards Anthony de Lucy. Lucy 
was not only the most obvious target for his hostility, since he was 
in competition with Harclay for control of Cockerrnouth, he was also 
among the best connected of Harclay's followers. Dangerously for 
Harclay, Lucy's connections were not with baronial families in the 
north of England but with the other gentry families who were represented 
in Harclay's retinue and even more important with the court. He was, 
213 CCR 1318-23, 685 
214 C.Inq.Misc, v2, nos 1072, 890 
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as a result, a rather more formidable rival than he may have seemed. 
Lucy, in fact, seems to have his own powerful affinity within Barclay's 
larger retinue. One key member of this circle was Peter de Tilliol who 
was probably Lucy's father in law 215 Tilliol served as sheriff of 
Cumberland during Barclay's period of dominance, according to a hitherto 
unpublicised deed preserved in the Carlisle Record Office, evidence of 
Barclay's trust in him, but this loyalty to Barclay may well have been 
216 
subordinate to his support for Lucy Lucy had other important 
connections. His son, Thomas de Lucy, had at one time been a household 
217 knight, as had another relative by marriage Hugh de Louther It is 
worth examining de Louther's connection with Lucy. Sometime before 
1316 Hugh de Louther had married Margaret, the daughter of John de 
218 Lucy Natalie Fryde has suggested that there was a degree of 
hostility between Louther and the Lucy family and has drawn attention 
to a plea of disseisin, brought by John de Louther's widow Christiana, 
against Louther and his wife Margaret and has suggested that their 
219 hostility may have resulted in part from this In fact, however, 
Louther' s wife was a member of the Lucy family and it appears certain 
that the plea was part of the settlement of disagreement about the 
endowment of the couple. The damages which were settled in the case 
suggest that the marriage had taken place around 1314. It may well be 
significant that Louther did not defend the case and Louther and his 
wife had been living at Wythop near the Lucy holdings since at least 
215 Hist and Antiq, v2, 458 
216 CRO.D/Lons. Denton, D3. The witnesses to this deed were 
Andrew de Barclay, Earl of Carlisle, Peter de Tilliol, sheriff 
of Cumberland and others. 
217 
218 
British Library Additional, MS 17362, f35; Cotton Nero c, f223 
CRO D.Lons/L/Deeds, L 0 58, 62a. I see no reason to doubt the 
dating offered by the calendar in the search room at Carlisle. 
See below also. 
219 Just.l/142, m2; Fryde - Tyranny, 157 
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1318 220 . A further indication of the close relations between Lucy 
and Hugh de Louther is provided by a letter written by Lucy in support 
of Hugh de Louther's petition against the outlawry which Henry FitzHugh 
had sought to bring against him after the destruction of his estates by 
221 Louther as Barclay's force marched towards Byland Others in Lucy's 
sub-retinue included Hugh de Moriceby whose family lands in Bracken-
thwaite were very close to the Lucy holdings and Richard de Denton. It 
was to Moriceby, Denton and Hugh de Louther that Lucy turned for support 
when he was comissioned to arrest Barclay after his dealings with the 
222 Scots became known 
During the summer of 1322, though Lucy was a high ranking and well 
connected member of his retinue, Barclay began to move against him and 
increasingly to threaten his position. In July while Lucy was serving 
under Barclay, the earl brought an action for trespass against him in 
• 1 h 223 Klng s Bene He continued the action in the following term of the 
court's sessions and an order was issued for distraint to be made on 
Lucy's lands even though the sheriff had already obstructed the case by 
failing to serve the writ on Lucy. The sheriff was, it would appear 
220 
221 
223 
See F WRagg- 'Early Louther and de Louther'; Trans of C&W II 
vl6 (1916) , 189. 
SC.l.49/8l. Dr Fryde suggests that the pardon which Barclay 
obtained for Hugh de Louther was for either his trespass against 
Henry FitzHugh or hi.s disseisin aga.inst John de Lucy. It is 
quite clear 1 however 1 that the pardon was for Louther's earlier 
support of Roger de Clifford and so far as I can decipher the 
document, which is in very poor condition, it appears that Lucy 
wrote in support of Louther, not to condemn him. In any case 
if Dr Fryde wishes us to believe that Louther was among Lucy's 
enemies, she would have to explain why Lucy chose him to take 
part in the capture of Barclay, when, we may presume Lucy chose 
men he could trust. 
Lanercost, 250 
KB.27/249, m54d 
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from evidence already discussed, Peter de Tilliol. Barclay also tried 
to settle other old scores at this time and he began actions for 
trespass, in: the king's name, against other enemies. John de Castre 
was one of these but Barclay also started an action against John de 
224 Cromwell As with Hugh Despenser, these were potentially dangerous 
enemies. For Lucy, however, Barclay's moves were particularly threat-
ening, for on the death of Thomas de Multon of Egremont, Egremont had 
225 been granted in custody to Robert de Leyburn Lucy thus found 
himself threatened in the courts and with territorial outflanking by 
one of Barclay's close supporters. Given the vengeful nature Barclay 
demonstrated by reopening disputes several years in the past, the 
omens were not good. 
The mechanics of Barclay's downfall were very simple ~nd the facts 
of Barclay's dealings with the Scots have not generally been called 
into doubt. On this simple basis, however, there had been laid down a 
deep sediment of speculation, justification and romance which has left 
the matter open to varying degrees of doubt and obscurity. In light 
of this it is probably wisest to set out the facts which are common to 
all the various interpretations of Barclay's fall. On 3 January 1323 
Barclay met with Bruce at Lochmaben and agreed a form of peace with 
the Scots king 226 The treaty of peace, which was agreed at Lochmaben, 
survives in a variety of texts and these will be discussed in greater 
detail below. Five days later, news of Barclay's action reached the 
court and Edward II ordered that no truce should be made without his 
direct commission. Barclay was summoned to court to explain his 
224 KB.27/25o, ml3d 
225 CFR 1319-27, 91, 132 
226 Lanercost, 248 
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227 
behaviour On 13 January William Airmin was ordered to search the 
228 
royal files to find if Barclay had any commission to make a truce 
Other steps were put in hand too. Anthony de Lucy was ordered to arrest 
Barclay by any means that he could. On 28 February news came to the 
king that this had been done. Three days later Barclay was executed, 
229 
suffering every rigour of a traitor's death 
Discussion of Barclay's fall centres round three closely related 
problems. The first problem is to establish, insofar as the extant 
material allows, the terms of the agreement which Barclay concluded 
with Bruce. The second problem follows very closely from the first, 
it is to decide whether Barclay was indeed guilty of treason by virtue 
of his dealings with the Scots and why, if they were not, Barclay 
suffered the fate that he did, was there in fact a conspiracy against 
Barclay? Thirdly Barclay's motives in treating with Bruce must be 
considered. 
It is perhaps easiest to start by considering the last of these 
questions. Local tradition takes the highest possible view of 
Barclay's conduct. 'It has always been an article of faith that 
230 Barclay endeavoured to save, not to sell his country' The 
Lanercost Chronicle attributes two motives to Barclay and neither is 
incompatible with the local tradition, suggesting that Barclay believed 
that Edward was in danger of losing his own realm as a result of the 
failure of the war effort and secondly that the local community would 
benefit from a period of peace, with an end to the incessant crime and 
227 Bain, £DS, v2, no 800 
228 ibid, no 801 
229 ibid, no 805; Lanercost, 251 
230 Bouch - Prelates and People of the Lake Counties, 71 
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231 plundering that hostilities engendered Joseph Bain concluded not 
only that Harclay acted for the best interests of the country but went 
on to suggest that his fall was the result of emnity of the envious 232 
This suggestion has been an influential one and it plays a central role 
in the growth of the 'conspiracy' explanation of Barclay's fall. The 
allegedly 'flat and factual narrative' of Adam Murimuth that Barclay's 
motive in dealing with the Scots was a romantic desire to marry Robert 
233 de Bruce's daughter Another chronicler, not Lanercost, as Dr. 
Fryde mistakenly states, but John de Trokelowe suggests that Barclay's 
rebellion owed much to his hatred of the Despensers. Despite the 
possibility that Hugh Despenser was increasing his interest in Barclay's 
f . fl th. 1 . . . f 2 34 areas o ln uence, lS exp anatlon lS unsatls actory There is 
no other direct evidence that Harclay had any animosity towards the 
Despensers and it is not obvious how peace should have weakened their 
position. This seems, in fact, to be a later gloss on Barclay's career 
born of the almost universal hatred in which the Despensers came to be 
held and it was accepted by the majority of later writers such as 
235 Thomas Walsingha.m and John de Capgreve Despite the difficulties 
with Trokelowe's account, it does bring out a very important fact which 
the Lanercost Chronicler chose to ignore, that Barclay's fall was 
preceded, not merely by unauthorised diplomacy but by a violent attempt 
to impose his will on the north of England. Though it appears in none 
of the chronicles another explanation is also worth considering. 
231 Lanercost, 248 
232 Bain, CDS, v3, XXX 
233 E M Thompson - Chronicae Adae Murimuth et Robert de Avebury 
(Rolls Series 1889), 39; Contrast Fryde -Tyranny, 11 
234 H T Riley - Chronica Johannes de Trokelowe (Rolls Series 1866) 
v3, 127; Fryde - Tyranny, 157 and note at 261 
235 P J Lucas - John Capgreve's Abbreviation of Chronicles (Early 
English Text Society 1883), 147, 148, xxi 
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Though it appears in none of the chronicles another explanation is 
also worth considering. Barclay's reward from Edward II for the 
victory at Boroughbridge took the form of promises of grants of land 
in Cumbria and the March of Wales. The latter did not materialise 
and the land in Cumbria, especially Tynedale, were virtually valueless 
while the war continued. Barclay did not need to look to others to 
see the desirability of peace. As the largest landholder in the 
region he would have gained most from a period of peace and this may 
well have been an important consideration in the decision to reach an 
agreement with Bruce, despite the public spirited rationalisation 
which Barclay offered from the scaffold and which the Lanercost 
writer found convincing. In the last analysis, however, Barclay's 
motives will remain a mystery though the desire for peace in the north, 
for whatever reason, seems to make better sense than Trokelowe's 
suggestion of emnity between Barclay and the Despensers. 
The difficulty of trying to identify Barclay's motives in making peace 
with Bruce is matched by the textual difficulties provided by the 
treaty drawn up by Bruce and Barclay, problems which Professor Stones 
. 236 
considers may well be 1nsoluble . Bruce's treaty with Barclay is 
extant in five versions. One of these printed first by Bain and 
printed in an improved version by Professor Stones, survives in the 
Public Record Office and it contains the text of the treaty which 
Edward II sent from Stow Park to the Barons of the Exchequer for 
237 
their consideration This will be referred to as text E. A much 
longer version of the treaty was printed from the register of the see 
of Bergen and this is text P. Three other important versions of the 
236 Stones - Relations, 154 
237 Bain, CDS, v3, no 803; Stones - Relations, no 39 
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text occur in the chronicles of Lanercost, L, Bridlington, B, and a 
238 
chronicle printed by Joseph Stevenson from MS Harley 635, text H, 
On perhaps the most important point, that England and Scotland should 
each be entirely independent, subject to their own laws and kings, all 
the texts are agreed. All, moreover, recognise Bruce's unquestioned 
right to the realm of Scotland. Other parts of the agreement appear 
consistently in the different texts. On the settlement of peace, 
Bruce was to pay to Edward II 40,000 marks (E,P,B,H) though L. makes 
this sum 80,000 marks. These arrangements, like the plan to grant the 
marriage of the heir of the king of Scots were, to a degree, unexcep-
tionable to the English side and as has often been noted they match 
very closely with the form of peace agreed at Northampton in 1328. 
The texts are most divided on what is probably the most contentious part 
of the treaty, the arrangements for its administration and for, the 
word is not too strong, its enforcement. Here texts E. and especially 
P. are vital and it is here that Barclay's treason becomes most 
evident. First of all, as L, E. and P. all make clear, Barclay's 
negotiations with Bruce were not simply negotiations for a peace which 
he had been commissioned to do in February 1322, or even draft proposals 
for a form of peace, they were a detailed, fully worked out treaty, 
intended to be binding. Barclay had accroached the royal power as fully 
as Gaveston or the Despensers had done, for he had endeavoured to agree 
a treaty binding on the king and realm of England even though, as the 
238 Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, v3 
(1857-60), 458-461 
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Lanercost Chronicler recognised, he exceeded his powers by doing this 
and the treaty could not be regarded as valid without the agreement 
of the king. Here was, at least, one count: of treason of which even 
a favourably inclined observer recognised Harclay to be guilty. 
Texts P. and E. bring out another, and if possible, more serious 
count. Six magnates from each realm were to be chosen to 'negotiate, 
ordain and settle all that required to be done for the benefit of 
both realms' and their decision was to be binding. This jury of 
twelve auditors had clear links with earlier practices for the settle-
ment of border disputes but P. makes it clear that the powers of the 
twelve jurors went beyond mere mediation and investigation. The 
twelve magnates were to assist in settling disputes between Harclay 
and Bruce but they were also to have another function. With the earl 
and Bruce, they were to proceed in arms against anyone who opposed the 
settlement or resisted the implementation of the peace, trating them 
as enemies of both kingdoms. This included the king of England by 
clear implication. Not since clause 61 of Magna Carta had a treaty 
endeavoured to legalise the levying of prilivate war by a subject against 
the king. Harclay, in fact, presented Edward with two choices, either 
he could accept Barclay's treaty or he had to face an invasion of 
England by Bruce in which Harclay and the six English auditors would 
support the Scots. Barclay's complicity was, moreover, to be complete. 
He was to be an ally rather than a by-stander and he was to be repaid 
by Bruce's promise to spare his estates, a strange echo of the charges 
brought against Thomas of Lancaster. This was, in short, a treaty no 
king could ever accept and Harclay returned from Scotland irrevocably 
239 
committed to treason 
239 Contrast Fryde - Tyranny, 156 "Harclay was to be charged with 
treason though there was no certainty that the accusation was 
justified". 
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The Lanercost Chronicle states that the negotiations between Bruce and 
Harclay were long and difficult, but it is very hard to imagine that 
Bruce, who must have been very much in the stronger position, could 
really have expected that the treaty would be successful. Obtaining 
support for it would be almost impossible but that was not 
Bruce's problem. In order to try to muster support for the treaty, 
Harclay returned to England with a document which was probably 
closest to version E. with the most controversial feature of P. 
excised but still fully operational in Bruce's and Harclay's minds. 
Even so, since Harclay had committed the kingdom to a final peace 
this was still 'treasonable'. It is hard in retrospect to believe 
that Harclay could have had any reasonable hope that he could have 
gained support for his agreement with Bruce and there may be much in 
Thomas Grey's suggestion that pride blinded Harclay to what could 
240 
actually be done 
The nature of Harclay's dealings with Bruce was rapidly known to 
Edward II and on his return Harclay faced a desperate struggle to 
gather support for the inevitable reckoning. His first act was 
probably to hold a meeting of clergy and laity in Carlisle. Here 
Harclay's coercive power was strong and though many disliked the 
241 
agreement he was able to compel many to agree to it Harclay 
needed support from a much wider constituency, however, if he was to 
survive. It seems likely that to this end he distributed copies of 
the agreement, suitably amended, to notables and religious houses in 
the north of England. This may be the origin of text B. preserved in 
Gesta written at Bridlington, which shows significant similarities 
240 The Scalacronica of Sir Thomas Grey, ed E Maxwell (Glasgow 1907), 67 
241 Lanercost, 249 
Page 360 
with the version found in Lanercost. Harclay certainly did write to 
the mayor and community of Newcastle but the limits of his power were 
evident for he could not threaten but only beg them to accept his 
242 
treaty Others were amenable to coercion and he was able to 
force the sheriffs of Yorkshire, Northumberland and the Bishopric of 
243 Durham to accept his treaty He also tried to raise support 
from Lancashire. He sent Robert de Leyburn and Roger de Brunnolsheved 
to try and induce the men of Amounderness and Leylandshire to support 
244 him, claiming that the treaty had been made for the king's honour . 
In this Leyburn and Brunnolsheved were partially successful and at 
least two men, Nicholas de Clifton and Nicholas de Moreis, did pledge 
themselves as required. In Furness, John de Harrington was more 
successful. He had been given the same instructions as the others and 
he managed to force Edmund de Neville, Baldwin de Gynes and many others 
to swear, though they did so against their will. Even Leyburn may 
have been half-hearted in his support for the jurors in the case later 
testified that he had taken Barclay's part only because he had married 
the earl's sister. Despite this Barclay's rebellion threatened to 
spark off a major revolt. Lancashire was a particularly dangerous 
area where the defeat of the Earl of Lancaster had created a reservoir 
of discontent against Edward II. If Harclay could have attracted a 
sizeable proportion of the leaderless local gentry there the revolt 
might have got rapidly out of hand. Edward recognised the danger and 
as early as 19 January he sent William Latimer to York with a force of 
245 
men at arms in case Harclay should try to take over the city 
242 Bridlington, 83 
243 Stevenson - Illustrations of Scottish. History, g_ 
244 Tupling ~South Lancashire in the Reign of Edward II, 15 and 
following 
245 Stones - Relations, 155 
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In the event, Harclay's plans came to nothing. He lost control even 
of his own retinue. The king wrote to Anthony de Lucy whom Thomas 
Grey described as the chief of Harclay's council, promising him 
rewards if he should take Harclay prisoner. In spite of his 
position, Lucy had little reason to be loyal to Harclay and he did 
not hesitate. With Denton, Moriceby and Hugh de Louther they entered 
Carlisle castle, probably on 25 February, when Lucy's account for 
custody of the castle begins, and arrested the earl. The rebellion 
246 Some of Harclay's closest associates, his cousin was over 
Michael de Harclay and William le Blount, a Scottish knight in the 
247 
earl's retinue, fled to find refuge north of the border . The 
rest of Harclay's former men seem to have readily abandoned the 
rebellion and joined Lucy. The list of Harclay's remaining supporters 
was extensive but it contained few men of substance and these 
immediately fell prey to plundering by the royalists. 
Having been arrested, Harclay was granted a travesty of a trial, the 
judges having been equiped with the sentence to be passed even before 
248 
the trial began The trial was, in fact, little more than a 
glorification of Edward's revenge. After summary procedure the 
details and procedure of which are too simple and well known to need 
further repetition, Harclay was sentenced to be degraded, hanged, 
disembowelled, beheaded and quartered. By the 14 March the late 
rebel's head had been brought to London to the accompaniment of the 
249 
of the blowing of horns The fortunes of the Harclay family which 
246 Lanercost, 250; British Library, M S Stowe, 553, f62v 
247 Lanercost, 250; Stevenson - Illustrations of Scottish History, 9 
248 J G Bellamy - The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle 
Ages.· (Cambridge 1970), 52 
249 Flores His.toriarum, v3, 212 
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had been carefully nurtured over several generations were placed in 
ruins and they never recovered. Equally in disarray was what passed 
for Edward's policy towards the north of England. Harclay's fall 
had created an unstable situation which offered major opportunities 
for ambitious men such as Lucy and Ranulph de Dacre, opportunities 
they were not slow to appreciate. 
CHAPTER IX 
RE-ADJUSTMENT AND REVENGE 
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Andrew de Barclay's indenture with the Scots and his subsequent 
attempts to compel its acceptance by the local communities of the 
north were in direct contempt of Edward II's authority. In practical 
terms, however, they represented no real threat to the king's rule. 
Barclay's energies, after he returned from Scotland, were impressive 
but they were largely ineffective and his pretensions were put down 
without the need for a military campaign. The desertion of his 
retainers was enough to ensure Barclay's downfall. It would, more-
over, be inaccurate to suggest that it was Barclay's downfall which 
forced the English government to abandon hopes of a military victory, 
1 
or even of effective defence against the Scots Edward seems to 
have accepted his inability to deal with the problem after Byland and 
Barclay had been commissioned to open negotiations with the Scots for 
a final peace in February 1322, his crime was not to treat with the 
Scots, but to conclude a peace treaty with them without authorisation 
and to enter into an agreement against the king. The search for an 
accomodation with Bruce remained a high priority even if it was not 
an objective which was always pursued honestly or wholeheartedly and 
2 its importance grew as Edwardt other difficulties deepened 
The chief beneficiaries of Barclay's downfall were those who brought 
it about, Lucy, Louther and to a lesser extent Denton and Moriceby. 
Lucy's rewards were by far the greatest. On 10 March 1323 he was 
3 granted temporary custody of Barclay's lands Shortly afterwards he 
received the grant of Cockermouth to hold in permanent hereditary fee 
4 
as one knight's fee This was a concession of first importance. 
1 Contrast Pryde - Tyranny, 156-58 
2 Barrow - Bruce, 358 and following details Edward's various 
chicaneries. 
3 CFR 1319-27, 199 
4 C.Chart.R. 1300-1326, 453 
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Lucy's predecessors had nursed a claim to Cockermouth since 1275 and 
its control had been an important part of the feud with Harclay. By 
gaining control of Cockermouth by Barclay's death, however, Lucy had 
also made a significant gain over the Multons of Egremont whose 
claim to the honour had been pressed jointly with that of the Lucies. 
This claim was now permanently blocked, though neither family 
abandoned their claim to other lands formerly held by the Forz family, 
Skipton and Rudeston in Nottinghamshire. In July 1323 Lucy made a 
further gain which heightened his influence in Cumberland still 
more. He was granted custody of the lands belonging to John de 
5 Multon of Egrement till he came of full age This was a gain of 
essentially limited duration since Multon was due to reach his 
majority in the following year, but it had a striking importance 
. . ll 6 terrltOrla y . Lucy now held, albeit for a limited period, the 
whole of the lordships of Copeland and Allerdale, a state of affairs 
which had no precedent since the death of William of Egremont in the 
twelfth century. He was also supreme commander of the royal forces 
in Cumbria and though his command did not include Northumberland as 
Barclay's had done it was complete within Cumberland. Lucy had the 
garrison in Egremont directly under his own command. He also had 
control of the forfeited Harclay strongholds of Mallerstang, Highhead 
and the peel of Staward in Tynedale 7 • The cost of supporting this 
extensive military establishment was considerable but it fell solely 
on the crown. The government was, as a result, anxious to reduce the 
forces in the region at the earliest opportunity. On 30 May 1323, 
soon after the Truce of Bishopthorpe had been agreed, the garrisons 
of the West March were run down. Four knights, 57 men at arms, 43 
5 CFR 1319-27, 212 
6 SC.6.824/19 
7 British Library, M S Stowe, 553, f62v 
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foot and 63 hobelars were paid off leaving only a holding force of 
25 knights and men at arms, 49 foot and 8 hobelars. No money was 
spent on repairs to local fortifications many of which remained in an 
almost ruinous condition. 
Anthony de Lucy was the most important figure in Cumbria in the last 
years of Edward II's reign but it is clear that the government had 
learned its lesson. Despite his wide ranging military commission 
Lucy was treated with much greater caution than Barclay had been, 
though this may have been as much the result of parsimony as of 
prudence. The large stock of lands in Westmorland which Barclay's, 
and earlier Roger de Clifford's, fall had brought into the hands of 
the crown was not allowed to fall to Lucy and even as his power in 
Cumberland grew the lands in his possession in Westmorland were 
stripped away from him. Most of Barclay's and Clifford's former 
lands were placed in the administration of short term keepers. The 
Barclay family lands of Mallerstang were removed from Lucy's custody 
on 8 July and entrusted to Thomas de Synerthwaite 8 Appleby and the 
greater part of the Clifford lands were taken from Lucy and placed in 
the custody of Patrick de Curwen who was to answer for their revenues 
9 
at the Exchequer • This was, at the least, an imprudent move. 
Curwen had been one of Barclay's closest followers and was almost 
certainly a relative, and his appointment indicated the weakness of 
the regime's understanding of Cumbria, for if Edward had built up a 
real network of local agents, as has been suggested by Dr. Nigel Saul, 
10 Curwen would surely never have been appointed 
8 CFR 1319-27, 221 
9 ibid, 224; Stowe, 553, f62v 
As it was, when his 
10 N Saul- 'Despensers and the Fall of Edward II'; EHR, v99 
(1984), 28 
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links with Barclay were discovered the government demonstrated its 
nervousness by ordering his removal and replacement by a man of 
11 
unquestioned loyalty There was some justification for alarm. 
The government had few committed supporters in the region and Edward 
did little to build up a body of supporters. Instead of creating a 
well-endowed court party on the West March he pointlessly kept a 
large stock of land in his own hands to fill the royal coffers. Hugh 
de Louther, for example, was rewarded for his services in the capture 
12 
of Harclay with only a life interest in the manor of Hartley 
The absence of any attempt to build up a body of his own supporters 
on the West March constrained Edward to recognise the power and 
influence of the magnates who had been able to establish themselves 
during the earlier years of his reign. This recognition and 
dependence, in turn, strengthened their position. In the absence of 
any representative of the Cliffords or the Multons of Egremont the 
dominance of Anthony de Lucy and of Ranulph de Dacre was almost 
unchallengeable. It was through them that the court had to work in 
the ordinary course of events. Below Lucy and Dacre was a slightly 
broader group of middling rank who were essentially the leading 
followers of the dominant magnates. Those summoned to the great 
council held at Bishopthorpe in 1324, for example, included Lucy and 
Dacre almost as of right, but the region was thinly represented if 
they were ignored. From Westmorland only Hugh de Louther attended. 
Two Cumberland men were summoned, John de Harrington and Richard de 
Hudlestone. Both were adept political survivors having been followers 
first of the Earl of Lancaster, then Barclay but they could in no sense 
11 Bain, CDS, v3, no 825 
12 ibid, no 869 
l3 
be regarded as reliable men for the court's purposes 
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Even though Edward's policy was responsible for a large part of the 
problem on the border he was capable of taking some steps to alleviate 
it. On the death of Bishop Halton he over-ruled the wishes of the 
convent who wished to appoint William de Airmin and chose to insert 
h d . th 14 Jo n e Ros lnto e see • A southerner, Ros was to justify Edward's 
choice by being one of the three clerics who opposed Edward's disposi-
tion. Within Cumberland he may well have been less effective. 
Edward's dealings with the West March during the last years of his 
reign are obscure but neglect was their most visible characteristic. 
This had a serious effect locally. One writer complained that Edward 
had been responsible for the loss of part of the English March to the 
15 Scots . Even in times of peace i.t was complained that attacks by 
schavaldurs wasted lands in the region, and the dividing line between 
attacks by schavaldurs operating locally and attacks by groups of 
renegade Scots acting without official sanction was exceedingly 
16 In fact it appears clear that even in times of truce or narrow 
peace Cumbrians could not consider themselves safe from attack. The 
security of the district was further weakened by the decision to run 
down local garrisons which could have been used to put down groups of 
robbers. Moreover, local castles stood in need of much repair if war 
were to be renewed. Neither the crown nor local communities showed 
any urgency to repair them. The citizens of Carlisle were pardoned a 
part of the farm of the city on condition that they spent the money on 
the repair of a section of the city walls but they had done nothing by 
13 Davies - Baronial Opposition, 292, 293; App. Doc., no 94 
14 Lanercost, 253; Vita, 141 
15 Lanercost, 25~ 
16 Bain, CDS, v3, no 892 
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March 1326 17 Around the same time a group of Scots attempted to 
18 
capture Carlisle castle under cover of darkness In this climate 
of insecurity, Edward continued to harbour his suspicions about the 
defenders of the March and accused them of allowing Scots to enter 
19 England Local opinion had no higher opinion of the king and was 
alarmed by the re-appearance of the persistent rumour that Edward 
would cede a large part of the northern counties to Bruce in return 
for support against the enemy of the day, in this case Isabella and 
20 her supporters 
The events leading to the deposition of Edward II are sufficiently 
familiar to need no further discussion, but less clarity surrounds 
the role played by the W~st March in Edward's fall. One of the 
leading figures in the opposition was Thomas Wake, Lord of Liddell, 
who with Henry de Percy brought a large force to join Isabella at 
Gloucester. It is uncertain how much, if any, of this force had been 
recruited from Cumberland. While it is true that the north of 
England was the ideal place to recruit a force of armed men, Wake had 
only limited influence on the border, the lordship of Liddell had 
been so thoroughly was.ted time and again that it can have provided 
little of a power base. It is not certain either if the force Wake 
led was drawn from the border rather than from the north of England 
in general. To Adam Murimuth, who seems to have had little interest 
in the north, Henry of Lancaster was as much a northerner as Percy or 
Wake, an imprecision perpetuated by writers to this day. 
17 CCR 1324-27, 456 
18 ibid, 466 
19 ibid, 457 
20 Lanercost, 256 
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Dr. Saul has suggested that the purge of administrative officials in 
early 1327 was an attempt to remove former supporters of the Despenser 
from positions of importance in which they had been placed, particularly 
21 in the command of strategic castles It is possible to find evidence 
to support this thesis in Cumbria. In Cumberland the sheriff was 
replaced, as was Henry de Threlkeld the castellan of Appleby. To base 
an account of local politics simply on the removal of local officials 
would lead to gross distortions, howEver. While it is possible that 
Richard le Brun, Lord of Bowness on the Solway, was sympathetic to the 
old regime, his immediate loyalties were probably more to the Bishop 
of Carlisle than to either of the Despensers. His successor, Peter de 
Tilliol, had close links with Lucy and was at least nominally a tenant 
22 
of Thomas Wake . It is also in the case of Westmorland that Dr. 
Saul's thesis departs furthest from the realities of the contemporary 
situation on the border. The vital political event in the political 
re-arrangement of Westmorland in 1327 was not the removal of Henry de 
Threlkeld from custody of Appleby but the restoration of a member of 
the Clifford family to their estate, in this case Robert II, brother 
23 
and heir of Roger IV 
The restoration of Robert de Clifford to his family's dominant position 
in Westmorland was a much more important event than the removal of 
Henry de Threlkeld, a minor tenant of the Greystokes. It was also 
21 Saul- 'Despensers', 1, 28 
22 Hist and Antiq, vl, 213. Le Brun was less obscure than Dr. Saul 
suggests. His father had also served Edward I regularly. 
23 E.l99/43/3; CFR 1327-37, 5. Dr. Saul notes that Appleby castle 
was generally granted jointly with the shrievalty of Westmorland. 
Both, of course, were hereditary possessions of the Cliffords 
except from 1322 to 1327. 
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wholly consistent with the rest of the new government's policy towards 
the border. The Issue roll for 1327 records a sustained policy aimed 
at winning, or at buying, the support of the border magnates. On 17 
February Henry de Percy made an indenture for the custody of the 
whole of the Scottish March under which he was allowed his wages, 
restoration of horses and the remainder of 1000 marks after these had 
24 been deducted • Anthony Lucy was cultivated almost as thoroughly. 
Lucy agreed to keep the city and castle of Carlisle at his own risk 
until the following Pentecost for the sum of £500. In contrast with 
25 
other occasions, he was paid promptly Anthony de Lucy's importance 
to the new regime and his local dominance was demonstrated in other 
ways. In March 1327, keepers of the peace were appointed for the first 
time to combat the lawlessness which was perceived as one of the most 
serious contemporary problems. In the borders, lawlessness was 
certainly a severe problem and it required almost military measures to 
suppress i.t. For this reason Lucy was given charge of the commission 
which included power to enter liberties. Significantly his deputy was 
Richard de Denton 26 
During the early years of Edward II's reign Bruce had used the dissen-
sion between the king and th ~agnates to brilliant effect, timing his 
raids to take the best advantage of internal disputes. Bruce had 
trained his followers well for on exactly the day on which Edward III 
was crowned the Scots attempted to seize Norham castle 27 Professor 
Barrow has suggested that this attack was intended to do nothing more 
than remind the new English regime that a truce existed between the 
24 E.403/225, 17 February 
25 E.403/225, 9 arid 18 February 
26 B H Putnam- Proceedings before the Justices of the Peace (1935), 1 
27 Barrow - Bruce, 356 
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two realms but this interpretation seems unduly idealistic. It seems 
on balance more probable that this attack, together with the earlier 
attempt to take Carlisle which was said to have the support of some of 
the Scottish magnates, was part of a sustained plan to re-open 
hostilities. Certainly Carlisle and Norham were the most important 
obstacles to renewed attacks by the Scots and even possible annexation. 
As before, Scottish intelligence work was precisely accurate, for the 
leading defenders of the March, Percy and Lucy, were at court when the 
Scots attacked. 
The new regime was more than willing to reopen the war with. the Scots 
and the attack on Norham provided it with justification. A military 
victory over the Scots would greatly have enhanced t.he government 1 s 
prestige and underlined the contrast with Edward's misrule. Both sides, 
in short, were set on war in the summer of 1327. There was little 
evidence of significant advances in tactics on the English side. Once 
again superior numbers were to be used to crush the enemy, recruits 
having been increased by preferential rates of pay offered to John of 
Hainaul t and his. followers. As under Edward II 1 s leadership, however, 
the English force was still engaged in its labourious preparations 
when the Scots began to move. 
In contrast with the disas.trous campaign of 1322 the garrison of 
Carlisle was exampted from preparations for the attack on the Scots 
28 
and placed under the command of Anthony de Lucy Though this was a 
sensible precaution the rest of the plan campaign was an extremely odd 
one. The Scots had probably entered England through Kielder and 
Redesdale in the first half of June and stung by the speed of the Scots 
28 RS, vl, 214, 218 
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attack, plans were made for the main army to advance from York on 
1 July. Two days later news reached the English commanders that the 
29 Scots planned to mount another attempt to take Carlisle by siege 
This proved to be misleading, the Scots made no attempt on the city, 
though one was still expected and instead they raided further south, 
keeping to the west of the Pennines. Early in June a group was 
30 
reported to be in Appleby Incomprehensibly in light of the belief 
that theScots were about to attack Carlisle, the royal army advanced 
slowly from York, via Northallerton, to Durham, which Edward reached 
31 
on 15 July . The army's scouts must have been either ineffective 
or absent for the Scots passed very close to the English force but 
their presence was only brought to the attention of the English by the 
32 
smoke from burning villages 
It is worth considering the organisation of the English army in 1327 
for it had direct implications on the conduct of the campaign. 
Following J. E. Morris' argument, Professor Nicholson has suggested 
that 'thanks to the w_ork of Sir Andrew de Barclay' a large contingent 
of the English. force consisted of hobelars equipped to match the Scots 
33 
.mounted infantry and capab.le of figh.ting the same kind of war • As 
the preceding chapter has attempted to show there is no reason to 
believe that Barclay was alone responsible for the introduction of 
hobelars into the English forces. They were to be found serving under 
Edward I as early as 1297 and their origin seems originally to have been 
29 CCR 1327-30, 27, 2@ . Rymer - Foedera, 296 
30 Bain, CDS, v3, no 920; Ramsay - Genesis of Lancaster. vl 
identifies the writer as the Earl of Kent. tqO, 
31 Ramsay - Genesis of Lancaster, vl, 190 
32 Chronique de Jean le Bel, 48, 49 
33 R Nicholson - Edward III and the Scots (Oxford 1965)_, 27 and see 
the literature cited there. 
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in Ireland. Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the 
hobelars who were in the English army at this time made any contribu-
tion of value to English success. As in the campaign of 1322 they 
failed either as scouts, for the army was singularly badly informed 
about the locations of the Scots, or as a rapid corps able to close 
with the Scots and force them to give battle. Indeed in one respect 
its failure was even more ignominious, after a series of futile 
forced marches across the north of England, the Scots raiders escaped 
and Edward's force failed to cross the border. As in 1322 supply 
arrangements broke down leaving the English troops to plunder the 
peasants of their own country while such rations as were available 
ld t f •t . t 34 were so a pro l eerlng ra es . Defeated, the English field army 
withdrew to. York while the Scots were able to devote themselves to 
the task of laying siege to the castles of Norham, Warkworth and 
Alnwick. There was particular alarm in England as a result of the 
belief that Bruce intended to return to his earlier policy of granting 
out English territory to his followers, but the success of such a 
policy depended on the capture of the northerAcastles, especially 
Norham and though the Scots completely dominated Northumberland they 
failed to capture the castles. They were also able to return to their 
previous practice of demanding protection money and left defenceless 
after the retreat of the royal army, the Bishopric of Durham, Cumberland, 
35 Richmondshire, Cleveland and Westmorland paid tribute 
In the face of a sustained Scots siege of Norham and the fact that 
they were completely powerless to prevent the Scots levying blackmail 
34 L~cost, 259; See Nicholson - Edward III and Scots, Chapter 
III; Melsa, v3, 357 
35 Scalacronica, 155; RS, vl, 221 
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from northern England, Isabella and Mortimer were left only with the 
option of re-opening negotiations for peace. Bruce was very willing 
to entertain the idea and he remained in the stronger position. As 
a result he was able to take the initiative in composing the treaty 
which bore important similarities with Barclay's treaty and 
contained much to the benefit of the Scots. Edward III was 
compelled to quitclaim al,l rights to homage or superiority over 
Scotland, but in other respects the treaty was not ungenerous to the 
1 . h 36 Eng lS Even so the agreement with the Scots was widely held to 
be a betrayal and a source of shame. One group of English nobles, 
including Thomas Wake of Liddell, who seems to have devoted more 
energy to affairs on the border than had many of his predecessors, 
considered themselves to be particularly aggrieved by the terms of 
the settlement for it made no provision for those who held lands in 
Scotland but who had sided with England to have their estates restored 
37 
to them 
Despite the palliatives offered to the English side by Bruce in the 
treaty of Northampton/Edinburgh, the agreement was a major foreign 
policy defeat for England. It was clearly understood as such by the 
young Edward III, as well as by many of those like Henry of Lancaster 
who had risen against Edward II. The leaders of the 'disinherited' 
were willing to put their grievances to the test but after attempting 
to raise a force at Rothbury in Northumberland, Wake and Beaumont were 
38 forced to flee the country The 1disinherited'may have looked to 
the border nobility for support but if so they were to be largely 
36 Stones - Relations, no 41. On the relationship between the 
settlements of 1322 and 1328 see Barrow - Bruce, 362 
37 Nicholson - Edward III and Scots, 57 
38 Scalacronica, 156 
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disappointed. Though Anthony de Lucy was held in uncertain regard by 
Isabella and Mortimer they were under no illusion that they could run 
the north west without him and accordingly made assiduous efforts to 
cultivate his co-operation. In March 1328 he was granted custody of 
Penrith, Souerby, Ulvedale and the revenues of the demesnes of 
39 Carlisle castle until he was repaid debts owed to him for war wages 
Even as conditions deteriorated, Lucy's interests were protected. In 
the autumn of 1329 he was granted permission to alienate 100 marks 
h f 1 d h ' h ' h h 40 wort o an to lS son T omas at any tlme e c ose Even such 
substantial concessions to Lucy could not wholly put Isabella and 
Mortimer's minds at rest. They continued to regard the border as a 
possible source of insurrection, even after the confiscation of Wake's 
estates. Aware of the limits of their power they were forced to 
continue to appoint established local magnates to positions of power. 
In July 1330 they appointed Ranulph de Dacre to hold Lancashire 
against possible rebellion while Henry de Percy was commissioned to 
41 hold Cumberland, Westmorland and Northumberland Anthony de Lucy 
was not mentioned in this arrangement but there was no other sign that 
his stock had fallen with the regime and in the light of Percy's 
earlier services to the regime it was wholly unsurprising that he should 
be given control of the whole March. 
Edward III's relations with his nobility have been the subject of 
considerable, if uneven, study. In particular, attention has been 
focussed on Edward's creation of six new earls in 1337 both because 
39 CCR 1327-30, 245 
40 ibid, 455 
41 ibid, 563 
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historians have given exaggerated emphasis to titular rank and, 
more practically, as a sign that 'a new start was being made', a new 
42 
aristocracy being created without the alienion of the old . 
Though it is not practical to reconsider the whole subject here it is 
clear that Edward's policy towards the magnates of the West March was 
at variance with the complete new start that was made in the rest of 
the realm. Edward III's policy in the years soon after his assumption 
of personal rule bore a marked resemblance to that followed by 
Isabella and Mortimer. Like them, Edward was forced to work through 
the existing nobility of the West March rather than try to recreate 
or remodel it. In this Edward was assisted by an almost visible 
political caution displayed by the most influential men of the area. 
Robert II de Clifford, having gained the restitution of his family 
estates in 1327 seems to have been willing to play little part in the 
treachorous politics of the minority. His attentions were doubtless 
fully taken up in the restoration of his family's position in 
Westmorland and it was probably for this reason that he chose to 
serve as sheriff in Westmorland in 1327 rather than have the office 
43 performed by a deputy 
Anthony de Lucy's career is even more interesting than that of Robert 
II de Clifford. Though Lucy remains in many ways an enigmatic figure 
it is clear that he possessed both a high degree of caution and an 
ability to align himself with the winning party. In addition he was 
capable of rapid and decisive action when the occasion required, as 
he had shown in 1323. Lucy, who was an experienced man of around 
fifty 
42 
43 
44 in 1330 1displayed a brilliant talent for political survival 
Prestwich - Three Edwards, 215 
List of Sheriffs, 150 
44 CIPM, v5, no 146. Lucy was 25 'and more' on his brother's death 
in 1309 
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Despite briefly having links with the Contrariants, he had served 
under Harclay but had shown the good sense to avoid Harclay's 
rebellion. From 1323 to 1327 Lucy had been a vital figure in the 
defence of the March but he had survived the fall of Edward II without 
difficulty but on their fall he had rapidly taken office under 
Isabella and Mortimer. With their power gone, Lucy remained entrenched 
in Cumberland and emerged as a man who could be relied upon as a 
'troubleshooter'. 
The high confidence which Edward III placed in Anthony de Lucy was 
demonstrated soon after Edward assumed power. It was to Lucy that 
Edward turned for a strong man to curb the growing unrest in the 
English lordship of Ireland, news of which presented Edward with the 
45 first major problem of his personal rule . As Dr. Frame has aptly 
pointed out Lucy's appointment to the Justiciarship 'ought to have 
carried a warning to the·more alert of the Anglo-Irish' and on arrival 
in Ireland he did not hesitate to take drastic steps to impose 
discipline in the lordship. Lucy's career in Ireland needs no further 
discussion here, though it clearly marked another stage in his advance 
but one aspect is worth discussing for the light it sheds on his 
growing dominance in Cumberland. Before setting out for Ireland Lucy 
took our protections for his followers. His retinue was a powerful 
one and it included two of the men who had taken part in the arrest 
of Harclay, Hugh de Louther and Hugh de Moriceby. The rest of his 
force was just as clearly drawn from the West March. Peter de Tilliol 
was a former sheriff of Cumberland, John de Derwentwater, Adam de 
Bassenthwaite had obvious links with Cumberland while others, such as 
Matthew de Redmayne and Thomas de Stirkland were drawn from Westmorland. 
45 Frame - English_Lordship in Ireland, 196, 197 
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Another group, Robert de Lamplugh, John de Pennington and Robert de 
46 Rottington were drawn from the minor gentry of south-west Cumberland . 
As Dr. Frame has commented, this was a powerful and coherent force 
and it contrasted very dramatically with the paltry retinue Thomas de 
47 Lucy had led against the Scots in 1306 
Preparations were afoot in the summer of 1332 for a larger expedition 
to Ireland to follow on from the advances Lucy had been able to make. 
Two of the lords of the West March were summoned to be ready to cross 
to Ireland with the king and on 26 July Multon was ordered to raise 
48 160 archers for the expedition It appeared very briefly as though 
Ireland was to provide martial employment for Multon, Clifford and 
the other lords of the West March, as Scotland had done for their 
fathers, but the possibility of growing involvement there was cut 
short by the outbreak of renewed hostilities between England and 
Scotland. Lucy was hurriedly recalled from Ireland and the lords who 
had been preparing to cross to Ireland awaited developments nearer 
49 home . The root of the disturbance was Edward de Balliol who, 
having been recalled from exile in France, had left for Scotland at 
the head of an expedition comprising military adventurers and claimants 
to forfeited Scottish estates. With the tacit support of Edward III 
the expedition had enjoyed striking early successes, defeating a Scots 
force at Dupplin Moor and holding a coronation ceremony for Edward 
Balliol at Scone. Thereafter the campaign had run into difficulties. 
Balliol had been defeated at Annan and forced to f,lee back to England. 
46 CCR 1330-33, 105 
47 Frame - English Lordship in Ireland, 201 
48 CCR 1330-34, 487, 586 
49 H R Lumby - Chronicon Henrici de Knighton (Rolls Series 1889), 
vl, 465, 466; Mels~, v2, 367 
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Late in 1333 Balliol was in Cumbria .drumming up support for his cause. 
He found a sympathetic audience in Carlisle where the idea of inflict-
ing revenge on the Scots was a popular one. Local magnates were just 
as willing to support his schemes. Both Ranulph de Dacre and Robert 
de Clifford entertained the fugitive king and in return for hospitality 
and promises of support they received grants of land in Scotland 
The Scots were hardly less bellicose than the English. In March 1334 
Archibald Douglas crossed the border to attack Gilsland. His force 
spent four days wasting Gilsland with a thoroughness which suggests 
that Dacre was singled out for attack by the Scots for some 
particular reason. This may have been connected with Dacre's part 
in the abduction of Roger de Kirkpatrick, for opposing Edward de 
Balliol 50 . Anthony de Lucy assumed charge of the preparations for 
counter-attacks. Leading a force of 800 men twenty miles into 
51 Scotland before inflicting a defeat on William Douglas In the 
east, English successes continued when Edward III's force inflicted a 
devastating defeat on the Scots at Halidon Hill, compelling the Scots 
to surrender Berwick. 
The campaigns of 1333 and 1334 mark a dividing point in the history 
of the West March, less because they were successful but in that the 
border magnates showed themselves willing to serve and to serve 
regularly against the Scots. Robert II de Clifford fought at Halidon 
where his efforts were rewarded by a gift of victuals from Edward III 
52 
while in the West, Lucy and Dacre were prepared to remain on guard 
The following year all three were to be found campaigning on the West 
50 Bain, CDS, v3, nos 1067, 1072, 1089; RS, v1, 296 
51 Melsa, v2, 369 
52 Nicholson - Edward III and, Soots, 179 
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March, prudently left as a seperate force in the West rather than 
having been subsumed into the main army. Just as significantly the 
magnates of the West March showed that they were prepared to under-
take routine commissions of justice, such as that issued to Thomas 
Wake, Anthony de Lucy and Peter de Tilliol to put down robbers and 
evil-doers in Cumberland and Westmorland in 1340 53 . The willingness 
of local magnates to take on such unspectacular duties was a sign of 
the increased role played by local magnates in the routine life of 
the region. This was a very significant transformation from the 
predominance of absentee lordship in Edward I's reign. 
The battle of Halidon Hill provided a dividing line in the military 
sense but 1334 was almost as important in family and dynastic terms. 
1334 prefigured the division of the most priveleged and extensive 
liberties of the region, Egremont 1on the death of the last representa-
tive in the male line of the Multons of Egremont, John de Multon. 
Multon had played an active part in the Berwick campaign, in which he 
54 
was charged with blockading the city to prevent a Scots break out . 
His career might well have matched that of Robert II de Clifford or 
Thomas de Lucy as an active and assertive local figure had not death 
intervened. 
John de Multon's death left the lordship of Egremont without male heir 
and the heirs to it were his three sisters. The castle itself fell 
to John's eldest sister, Joan, the wife of Robert FitzWalter, together 
with a third of the arable and the profits of the court. A second 
share descended to Elizabeth de Bermingham but this descended not in 
53 Bain, ~DS, v3, no 1334 
54 Bridlington, 114 
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the de Bermingham family since Elizabeth bore Walter de Bermingham no 
issue, but in the possession of Elizabeth's son by a previous marriage, 
Robert de Harrington. A final third fell to Margaret de Multon who had 
married Thomas de Lucy in 1329 and this came increasingly to be inte-
grated into the rest of the Lucy family's holdings in western Cumberland, 
eventually falling to the Percy family on the extinction of the Lucies in 
the male line when a marriage settlement added the Lucies' dominance in 
the west to that which they already enjoyed in the east. The dominance 
of the Percy family in the west was only challenged by the power of the 
Clifford family based on its holdings of Appleby and Skipton. Much of 
the Clifford family's prestige and influence was dissipated in a series 
of wardships and minorities in the late years of Edward III's reign and 
the early years of Richard II. It was partially restored by Thomas de 
Clifford but on his death in 1391 a further eclipse occurred when Richard 
used the minority to install Ralph II de Neville in the Clifford lands. 
Richard added insult to injury by granting him the title of Earl of 
Westmorland. A brief upsurge in the Clifford's fortunes was ended by 
the death of John de Clifford at the siege of Meaux in 1422 and despite 
the recovery which the family fortunes made during periods of Lancastrian 
dominance during the Wars of the Roses the Cliffords never succeeded in 
challenging the dominance of the north of England enjoyed by the 
Nevilles or the Percies. The extinction of the Percies and the eclipse 
of the Cliffords by the prospering Nevilles of Raby, left the West March 
to the dominance of two families from east of the Pennines and in a 
degree ended the isolation of the West March as a discrete and self-
contained political community. Henceforth it was more fully integrated 
into a political arena formed by the north of England as a whole. 
Within that greater arena, however, the important institutions and 
conditions remained those created and modified during the reigns of 
Edward I and Edward II. 
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